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Foreword
The subject of Draining Development? is one that we feel very strongly 
about. 
Estimates on the magnitude of illicit fi nancial fl ows from developing 
countries vary enormously, but even the most conservative suggest that the 
total outfl ow exceeds signifi cantly the amount of offi cial development assis-
tance from the Organisation of Economic Co-operation and Development 
countries. When we look at the fi nancing needs of the developing world—
what it will take to achieve the Millennium Development Goals—it is clear 
that development aid alone is insuffi cient. To have any hope of reaching the 
Millennium Development Goals, poor countries must attack the illicit out-
fl ow of monies and recover what is now illegally held abroad. 
Nigeria’s experience illustrates the challenges. In the early 2000s, the 
Nigerian government made a concerted push to recover the funds that ille-
gally fl ed their country. They encountered problems both in Nigeria and 
abroad: outdated rules and poorly trained staff at home, and overseas there 
was bank secrecy, opaque corporate and trust vehicles, and time consuming 
procedures precluding cooperation. The playing fi eld was tilted against 
Nigeria’s national interests.
No developing country should have to repeat what Nigeria had to go 
through to recover funds that rightly belong to its citizens. The effort 
required thousands of hours of investigative work to locate where the money 
was hidden, and then the government had to pay millions of dollars in legal 
fees to recover just a portion of it. 
Although recovery is becoming easier, too many obstacles remain. Laws 
governing trusts and corporations in many countries still provide anonym-
ity to asset holders. Even where the laws are up to date, enforcement often 
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continues to lag. A recent Global Witness report on banks and money laun-
dering provided a damning indictment of the enforcement efforts of many 
nations. 
No matter how successful we are in reducing barriers to asset recovery, it 
will continue to be a time-consuming and expensive proposition. Differ-
ences in legal systems, the demands of due process, the need to respect prop-
erty rights—all of these factors ensure that recovery will never be a straight-
forward affair.
That is why Draining Development? and the information and analysis it 
provides on illicit fi nancial fl ows are so important. Far better than reducing 
barriers to asset recovery is to not have to recover the assets in the fi rst place. 
If we can fi nd ways to stop the illegal outfl ow of money, developing coun-
tries can refocus their energies on development. 
But as the chapters in this volume show, money fl ows out illicitly for 
many reasons, including tax evasion, the smuggling of illegal goods, the traf-
fi cking of human beings and other organized crimes, the manipulation of 
transfer prices and trade mispricing, customs fraud, the failure of money 
laundering controls, terrorist fi nancing, and bribery. In addition to depleting 
already meager public coffers and hiding the profi ts of crime, illicit fi nancial 
fl ows pose a risk to the stability of global fi nancial markets; contribute to 
suboptimal investment decisions; undermine tax morale and accountability 
between citizen and state; and add to growing income inequality both within 
and between countries. The consequences are incalculable.
It is our contention that the illicit outfl ow of money from developing 
countries, in particular, has not received the attention it deserves—either 
from the development community or from policy makers in developed or 
developing countries. This book represents an important step toward gar-
nering the attention the issue deserves. Norway is proud to have assisted the 
World Bank in this endeavour, and together we would like to thank the 
authors and the editor for the fi ne work they have produced. 
Erik Solheim, Minister of the Environment and International Development, Norway 
Otaviano Canuto, Vice President, World Bank
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Abstract
A remarkable consensus emerged during the fi rst decade of the 21st cen-
tury on the need for the wealthy countries of the world to increase their 
aid sharply to developed states. At Monterrey, Mexico, in 2002, the 
world’s leaders committed to a “substantial increase in offi cial develop-
ment assistance [to help] developing countries achieve internationally 
agreed development goals and objectives” (United Nations 2003, 14). 
Three years later, at Gleneagles, United Kingdom, the heads of the G-8 
nations reaffi rmed this commitment, and in Doha, Qatar, in 2008, the 
nations of the world again recognized the need to increase development 
aid and pledged to do so. However, although development assistance 
steadily increased over the decade, rising from US$58 billion in 2000 to 
a projected US$125 billion in 2010, it still falls far short of what the 
developed world promised, and what many believe poor countries need 
if their citizens are to escape poverty.
As it became clear over the decade that the wealthy world’s commit-
ments would not match the rhetoric, the development community began 
searching for other sources of funding to fi ll the development fi nance gap. 
At the same time, reports of massive, illegal outfl ows from developing 
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countries began appearing. In 2004, Transparency International estimated 
that 10 of the most notoriously corrupt heads of state in developing coun-
tries may have, together, spirited as much as US$60 billion out of their 
countries during their respective tenures in offi ce (Transparency Interna-
tional 2004). In 2005, Raymond Baker estimated that more than US$540 
billion fl owed out of developing countries each year thanks to a combina-
tion of tax evasion, fraud in international trade, drug traffi cking, and cor-
ruption (Baker 2005). In 2007, Christian Aid and the Tax Justice Network 
produced studies reporting similar fi gures (Kapoor 2007; TJN 2007).
These reports and their implications were not lost on those looking 
for ways to fi ll the development fi nance gap. If, in fact, the amount of 
money illicitly fl owing out of developing countries was anywhere near 
the amounts estimated in these reports, even partially staunching the 
fl ow held signifi cant promise for fi lling the gap. Two questions thus 
immediately arose. Are the outfl ows large enough to justify efforts to 
staunch them? And, if so, what can be done?
In 2008, the Norwegian government asked the World Bank to under-
take a research project that would address these questions. The Bank, in 
turn, commissioned the editor of this book to organize a conference 
with authors of original papers and to edit the proceedings. The purpose 
of this book is to assess what is known about the composition of illicit 
fl ows, the processes that generate these fl ows, the role of tax havens in 
facilitating them, and the effectiveness of programs aimed at either pre-
venting the fl ows or locating and recouping them once they have left.
The book provides the fi rst collection of analytic contributions, as 
opposed to advocacy essays and black box estimates, on illicit fi nancial 
fl ows (IFFs). Some of the chapters present new empirical fi ndings; oth-
ers, new conceptual insights. All of them enrich the understanding of the 
dynamics of the illicit fl ows phenomenon. The book does not offer a 
new estimate of the global total of these fl ows because the phenomenon 
is too poorly understood.
The chapters are based on papers fi rst presented at a September 2009 
conference at the World Bank. Each paper had one or two assigned dis-
cussants, and the revisions refl ect the often searching critiques of the 
discussants, as well as additional comments from the editor and from 
two external peer reviewers. The chapters have been written to be acces-
sible to nonexperts.
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Following this introduction, the book has fi ve parts: I. The Political 
Economy of Illicit Flows; II. Illegal Markets; III. To What Extent Do Cor-
porations Facilitate Illicit Flows?; IV. Policy Interventions; and V. Con-
clusions and the Path Forward.
The Short History of Illicit Financial Flow Estimates
Raymond Baker’s Capitalism’s Achilles Heel: Dirty Money and How to 
Renew the Free-Market System, published in 2005, gave shape to the 
topic. Baker reported on the results of 550 interviews he had conducted 
with senior business executives around the world in the early 1990s to 
estimate the extent of illicit fl ows involving corporate mechanisms, 
mostly in transactions between unrelated parties. He examined govern-
ment and academic reports on other sources of the fl ows, such as illegal 
markets, and, accompanied by explicit statements on the reasons for his 
judgments, offered assessments of the amounts that might be fl owing 
internationally out of developing countries as a consequence. A sum-
mary of his quantitative fi ndings is provided in table 1.1.
Baker estimates that over 60 percent of total illicit fl ows arise from 
legal commercial activities, and most of the remainder from criminal 
activity. The former leave the developing world through three channels: 
the mispricing of goods traded between independent parties, the distor-
tion of transfer prices charged on goods traded within a multinational 
fi rm, and fraudulent transactions.
Baker provides minimal detail about the derivation of these fi g-
ures. Thus, there is no information on the methods used to convert the 
Table 1.1. Crossborder Flows of Global Dirty Money 
US$, billions
Type
Global From developing or transitional countries
High Low High Low
Criminal 549 331 238 169
Corrupt 50 30 40 20
Commercial 1,000 700 500 350
Total 1,599 1,061 778 539
Source: Baker 2005.
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interviews with 550 senior corporate executives in 11 nations into esti-
mates of trade mispricing in the global economy. This is not a simple 
task. For instance, the nature of the sample is critical to such an exercise 
(in terms of dimensions such as the commodities and services involved 
or the countries with which these are traded). Similarly, between the 
early 1990s, when Baker did his interviews, and 2005, when the estimate 
was published, there were many changes that could have either raised or 
lowered the share of mispriced transactions.
For the criminal revenues, Baker uses fi gures that are often cited in 
the semiprofessional literature. Consider drug markets, for example: this 
represents the most well studied illegal industry. Baker uses fi gures from 
the United Nations Offi ce on Drugs and Crime that cite a total of US$400 
billion in retail sales and US$120 billion in wholesale revenues. There is, 
however, a critical literature suggesting that these are substantial over-
estimates, perhaps twice the true value.1
As Baker and his colleagues have acknowledged, given the scarcity of 
available data, the numbers Baker presents are not precise estimates, but, 
rather, are indications of orders of magnitude that are meant to prompt 
academic researchers, the International Money Fund (IMF), and the 
World Bank to collect more accurate and complete data and devise more 
rigorous estimating techniques. Nonetheless, as is the norm with such 
work, popular accounts of Baker’s conclusions have focused on the 
money amounts, which are in the hundreds of billions of dollars, and 
ignored the caveats that accompany them.
Moisé s Naí m’s Illicit: How Smugglers, Traffi ckers, and Copycats Are 
Hijacking the Global Economy, also published in 2005, has added to the 
prominence of the topic. Naí m’s emphasis is on the expansion of the 
variety of illicit international trade involving banned goods, such as 
drugs, or the counterfeit and theft of intellectual property. He offers no 
original estimates, but includes alarmingly high numbers, such as an 
international trade volume in illegal drugs amounting to US$900 billion. 
Though Naí m’s book does not use the term “illicit fi nancial fl ow,” it rein-
forces the sense that there are large fl ows of dirty money from the devel-
oping world to the developed nations.
Global Financial Integrity, an organization founded by Raymond Baker 
in 2006, has turned out a number of reports on illicit fl ows.2 These have 
 Introduction and Overview: The Dynamics of Illicit Flows 5
attracted a great deal of media attention. Beyond one that is much dis-
cussed in this volume (Kar and Cartwright-Smith 2008), it has also pub-
lished studies showing the importance of these fl ows to specifi c countries 
and regions (on Africa, for example, see Kar and Cartwright-Smith 2010). 
However, as with the estimates in Baker’s book, popular accounts generally 
ignore the caveats attached to the estimates in favor of the raw numbers. 
Though several contributors to this volume have raised questions about 
the validity of the current estimates, there is no doubt that these numbers 
have helped galvanize attention on illicit fl ows and ways to deal with them.
In addition to the work mentioned above, there has been a steady fl ow 
of reports from organizations such as the Tax Justice Network (for 
example, TJN 2007) and Christian Aid that focus, in particular, on the 
role of contracts involving multinational corporations. These contracts 
have apparently allowed the exploitation of natural resources by the cor-
porations through failure to specify properly the price at which the gold, 
timber, and so on is to be exported from developing countries. The 
transfer may be legal, but, it is often alleged, the underlying contract is 
the result of corrupt dealings between offi cials and the multinational 
corporations; the fl ows are thus appropriately classifi ed as illicit.
One disappointing note is that, since the appearance of Baker’s vol-
ume in 2005 to broad acclaim, our volume is the fi rst substantial attempt 
to address the issue from a scholarly perspective. Of the over 100 Google 
Scholar citations to Capitalism’s Achilles Heel, none is from a major aca-
demic journal.3
When this volume was in fi nal preparation, an odd affi rmation of the 
reality of IFFs appeared fl eetingly on the Internet site of the Bank of 
China.4 The headline-catching sentence was as follows:
According to a research report published by the Chinese Academy of Social 
Sciences, since the middle of the 1990s, the overall number of the escaped 
Party and Government cadres, offi cials in the judicial and public security 
branches, senior-level administrators in the state-owned enterprises, as 
well as staff in the Chinese institutions stationed abroad, added up to 
16,000–18,000, and these corruptors have taken with them around RMB 
800 billion (circa US$100 billion).
The report then detailed many major cases, identifying not only the 
offenders, but also the methods that they had used to move the money 
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out of the country. The RMB 800 billion was not intended to be an esti-
mate of the gross fl ows. It was an estimate of how much had been 
detected in roughly a 10-year period, surely a modest fraction of all IFFs, 
particularly because it included only offi cial corruption and not other 
sources such as tax evasion and criminal earnings.
The Policy Response to Illicit Financial Flows
Norway has led government efforts to focus attention on the issue. In 
2008, the Norwegian government created a commission to prepare a 
report on illicit fl ows.5 It has also funded, with other nations, the Task 
Force on Financial Integrity and Economic Development, for which 
Global Financial Integrity serves as the secretariat, and funded the confer-
ence that led to this volume.6 The governments of Germany and the Neth-
erlands have also paid attention to the topic. This is refl ected, for example, 
by Germany’s sponsorship of a side event on tax fl ight at the fall 2008 
meetings of the World Bank and IMF and the funding by the Netherlands 
of an ongoing World Bank study on illicit fl ows in East Africa in 2010.
Despite (or because of ?) the absence of serious scholarly attention, 
illicit fl ows have become a topic of high-level policy discussion. For 
example, the G-20 Pittsburgh summit in September 2009, near the 
height of the global fi scal crisis, addressed the issue in its communiqué.7 
It was also discussed at the October 2009 annual meetings of the World 
Bank and IMF Boards (Development Committee 2010).
IFFs have often been identifi ed as a contributing factor in the current 
global fi nancial crisis and a source of instability in the world fi nancial 
system because of the illicitness.8 Tax havens, more appropriately called 
secrecy jurisdictions, have been inculpated in many major scandals over 
the last decade; they have been under attack because they can undermine 
effective fi nancial regulation in other nations, both developed and devel-
oping.9 Once the spotlight is turned on them, it is hard not to notice that 
they also serve as the destination for the bribes received by many dic-
tators; for example, James Maton and Tim Daniel, in chapter 13 in this 
volume, describe how Sani Abacha, the dictator of Nigeria in the late 
1990s, kept substantial liquid funds on the Isle of Jersey.
More importantly, IFFs have been identifi ed as a major impediment to 
growth and to the development of sound fi nancial systems and gover-
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nance in developing countries, an issue dealt with by Mick Moore in chap-
ter 14 in this volume. Attention to the issue has also grown as the demand 
for greater resources to fi nance development has collided with the shrink-
ing volume of funds arriving from developed countries following the 
fi nancial crisis and, more generally, with the lack of support by taxpayers. 
The greater attention has highlighted that illicit fl ows may be engendered 
by offi cial development assistance given that aid represents, in some coun-
tries, a substantial share of the money available to central governments. It 
also highlights that misuse of the funds helps undermine support for for-
eign aid. Still, if there are large fl ows of illicit funds out and if they can be 
curbed, the development fi nance gap can be met painlessly.
Defi nition is an important source of controversy in the study of this 
phenomenon.10 “Illicit fi nancial fl ows” is an ill-defi ned term, and the 
boundaries are disputed. “Illicit” is not the same as “illegal.” No one will 
deny that the deposit of Mobutu Sese Seko’s corrupt earnings in Swiss 
banks is an illicit fl ow. However, there will be less agreement, for exam-
ple, about fl ows that represent efforts to evade the arbitrarily adminis-
tered taxes and regulations of corrupt governments; efforts to evade the 
oppressive economic legislation of President Ferdinand Marcos might 
have been illegal, but they were not necessarily illicit. Perhaps the defi n-
ing characteristic of illicit is that (1) the acts involved are themselves 
illegal (corruption or tax evasion) in a regime that has some democratic 
legitimacy, or (2) the funds are the indirect fruits of illegal acts (for 
example, benefi ts given to those who have provided illegal funding for a 
presidential election). Thus, illicit funds are not merely the consequence 
of bad public policy and do not include all international illegal fi nancial 
fl ows from illegitimate regimes. The questions about defi nition are taken 
up in a number of chapters, notably, those of Stephanie Blankenburg 
and Mushtaq Khan (chapter 2) and Max Everest-Phillips (chapter 3).
The remainder of this chapter gives brief summaries of the individual 
chapters.
The Political Economy of Illicit Flows
In chapter 2, Stephanie Blankenburg and Mushtaq Khan, economists at 
the School of Oriental and African Studies, in London, develop an ana-
lytical framework that identifi es core determinants and drivers of illicit 
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capital fl ight from developing countries. They begin with an extensive 
history of the use of the term capital fl ight and the variety of concepts 
and measures that have been attached to this label. This is an essential 
starting point because the central estimates of the scale of illicit fl ows are 
based on methods developed to estimate the volume of capital fl ight. 
Moreover, the concept of capital fl ight has morphed a number of times 
since it was fi rst formulated by Kindleberger (1937); even now, there is 
considerable ambiguity as to whether capital fl ight refers to short- or 
long-term capital movements.
Blankenburg and Khan then relate systematically the concepts of 
dirty money, illegal capital fl ows, and capital fl ight, which are often used 
almost synonymously, but which represent different behaviors and chal-
lenges. Some defi nitions are legalistic and rule oriented; others are broad 
and oriented toward defi ning the phenomenon in terms of motivations 
or effects.
A signifi cant component of the illicit funds leaving developing coun-
tries results from the structural features of the societies of these countries, 
such as laws that advance the interests of a ruling elite; paradoxically, 
these features cause domestic capital to seek profi table investment oppor-
tunities in more advanced economies. Policy measures to control and 
reduce illicit capital fl ight from developing economies will be effective 
only to the extent that they take account of these structural investment 
constraints. Market-improving good governance reforms are insuffi cient 
and can sometimes even be counterproductive in this respect.
The heart of Blankenburg and Khan’s argument is that, in many 
developing countries, governments lack legitimacy; government policies 
do not represent the result of the working out of a bargain among vari-
ous interest groups, but, rather, the imposition of the power of a small 
set of economic actors. Illegal fi nancial fl ows may not be illicit fl ows 
because of the state’s lack of legitimacy.
Max Everest-Phillips, a governance adviser at the U.K. Department for 
International Development at the time of writing, also examines, in chap-
ter 3, the determinants of IFFs through a political economy analysis. His 
focus, though, is tax evasion. Reviewing the experiences of a large array of 
countries and tax systems, he argues that the root cause of all illicit capital 
outfl ows is ultimately not poor policy or capacity constraints in adminis-
tration, but the failure of political will. Controlling tax evasion (and the 
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other dimensions of illicit fl ows: criminality and corruption) requires 
political incentives to build an effective state. An effective state includes 
effective tax systems, which derive from formal and informal institutional 
arrangements (political settlements) that establish the ambition to pro-
mote prosperity and raise public revenue. Such a commitment arises if 
political leaders and taxpayers perceive the need for effective tax systems 
so as to provide the state with the resources required to enforce property 
rights, deliver political stability, and promote economic growth. The 
extent and the form of tax evasion derive from the political consensus to 
tax effectively and to develop the administrative capacity to do so. In turn, 
this shapes and refl ects the intrinsic willingness to pay taxes (tax morale) 
of taxpayers. The political economy of controlling illicit capital fl ows, 
including tackling tax evasion, demonstrates the necessity of addressing 
ineffective governance and the weak state legitimacy of many developing 
countries. If regime leaders and elites are not prepared to tax themselves 
and prevent free-riding, genuine political ownership of efforts to curb 
illicit capital fl ows will be problematic.
In chapter 4, Clemens Fuest and Nadine Riedel, economists at Oxford 
University, assess tax evasion and avoidance in developing countries and 
the role of international profi t shifting, which may serve as a channel for 
illicit fi nancial fl ows. They begin, as does Volker Nitsch in chapter 10, by 
expressing skepticism about the existing estimates of the extent of tax 
losses to developing countries that occur as a result of the movement of 
capital from developing countries to tax havens. The available data are 
limited, and estimates refl ect broad assumptions, often selected in a way 
that generates high estimates. For example, it is often assumed that the 
capital would, if kept at home, pay the full tax rate, even though there are 
numerous loopholes that allow corporations to incur much lower tax 
obligations.
Empirical evidence on the magnitude of the problem and on the 
 factors driving income shifting is scarce and confi ned to studies of 
de veloped nations. Fuest and Riedel discuss methods and available data 
sets that can be used to gain new insights into the problem of corporate 
income shifting. The authors argue that the results of many existing 
studies on tax evasion and avoidance in developing countries are diffi -
cult to interpret, mainly because the measurement concepts used have a 
number of drawbacks. They discuss alternative methods and data sets 
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and present descriptive evidence that supports the view that profi t shift-
ing takes place from many developing countries into tax havens.
Illegal Markets
The international fl ows of funds in illegal markets, apart from the mar-
kets for drugs, have not been the subject of systematic empirical study. 
Nonetheless, it is routinely asserted that they also generate large fl ows 
from developing countries, where cocaine and heroin are produced and 
from which many humans are traffi cked. For example, as noted above, 
Raymond Baker (2005) estimates that illegal markets account for US$168 
billion–US$231 billion of the illicit fl ows from developing nations.
In “Illicit Capital Flows and Money Laundering in Colombia” (chap-
ter 5), Francisco Thoumi, a Colombian economist, and Marcela Anzola, 
a Colombian legal scholar, assess illicit fl ows in Colombia primarily gen-
erated by the trade in illegal drugs. They show that Colombia’s principal 
problem is the infl ow rather than outfl ow of drug moneys and that this 
has had important economic and political consequences for the nation. 
For example, these fl ows have exacerbated the concentration of land 
ownership in rural areas and, by providing access to foreign funds, also 
exacerbated the long-running insurgency. Though Colombia has enacted 
model asset-recovery and anti–money laundering (AML) control laws, a 
detailed examination of the record of the last decade indicates that it has 
failed to provide a serious threat to the fi nancial well-being of traffi ckers. 
In turn, this refl ects the failure of the Colombian state to establish norms 
of compliance with fi nancial laws.
Thoumi and Anzola argue that the key to these failures of well- 
written laws, as well as an important factor in Colombia’s prominence 
in the international cocaine trade, is the broad lack of compliance with 
legal norms and the general weakness of the state.
In “Human Smuggling and International Financial Flows” (chapter 
6), Pierre Kopp, an economist at the University of Paris (Sorbonne), 
examines the markets for human smuggling in the fi rst such essay by an 
economist. These markets are varied, ranging from successfully assisting 
workers to cross illegally into the United States to coercively employing 
sex workers from Thailand in Belgium. Drawing on basic economic con-
cepts, Kopp shows that the fi nancial fl ows vary by type of traffi cking. In 
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some of these markets, there will be fl ows back to the country of human 
origin, but, in others, the value added will occur and remain in the des-
tination country. Kopp concludes that there are no authoritative esti-
mates of the scale of these markets and little prospect that such estimates 
will be generated either globally or at the national level; prices for ser-
vices vary substantially, and there is no systematic basis for estimating 
the scale of the human traffi cking itself.
To What Extent Do Corporations Facilitate Illicit Flows?
The chapters in part III mostly deal with inherently technical questions 
that cannot be avoided in seeking to understand the fl ow between the 
developing and developed worlds. In particular, transfer pricing, the 
methods by which multinational fi rms price transactions between affi li-
ates in different countries with varying tax rates, may permit large trans-
fers of taxable revenue that are properly viewed as illicit, even if not for-
mally illegal. Trade mispricing, in which export or import documents 
carry false prices, also may be important both as a source of tax evasion 
and as a channel for movement of illicit funds.
In “Transfer Price Manipulation” (chapter 7), Lorraine Eden of the 
Mays Business School at Texas A&M University provides an overview of 
the methods by which fi rms set prices in these internal, but international, 
transactions. There is a well-established set of theoretical principles and, in 
some nations, generally in the Organisation for Economic Co-operation 
and Development (OECD), a detailed set of rules to implement these 
principles. However, in the real world, there are many potential sources of 
deviation that allow for considerable discretion and potential abuse. 
Moreover, some countries, mostly in the developing world, have not cre-
ated rules specifi c to the setting of these prices.
Eden reviews the thin empirical literature on the extent of income 
transfer by transfer price manipulation (TPM). Whether through analy-
sis of individual transactions or more aggregate methods, most studies 
fi nd evidence that TPM occurs in response to changing corporate tax 
rate differentials. However, the research task is complicated by the large 
variety of factors that infl uence a corporation’s incentives for TPM; ad 
valorem taxes, restrictions on the repatriation of profi ts, and political 
instability all play a role. The literature is also dominated by studies 
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focused on where the data are available, particularly the United States. 
Eden concludes that TPM occurs, but she is not able to estimate how 
important it is anywhere, let alone in individual developing countries.
More detail that is specifi c to the case of developing countries is pro-
vided in “The Role of Transfer Pricing in Illicit Financial Flows” (chapter 
8) by Carlos Leite, a former IMF economist and Deloitte Touche Toh-
matsu analyst in Toronto. Leite illustrates the inherent uncertainties in 
many dimensions of transactions. For example, what is a reasonable 
method of allocating risk among different affi liates in a multinational 
corporation? He uses the example of an oil company in a developing 
country. The company entered into a complex contract that generated 
unexpectedly high profi ts in the country, which lacked any specifi c regu-
lations for transfer pricing. The company was thus able to shift the prof-
its to the country in which its oil trading subsidiary resided and in which 
it may have paid only a 1 percent tax. Should this be treated as tax avoid-
ance, particularly given the fi rm’s legitimate fear of expropriation by the 
new regime in the developing country, or tax evasion, given that any 
reasonable set of transfer pricing rules would have required declaration 
of the income in the developing country? Leite’s chapter emphasizes the 
extent to which many transfer pricing decisions that affect developing 
countries lie outside the realm of the OECD principles.
Richard Murphy, an accountant and a principal analyst in the Tax 
Justice Network effort to bring attention to the corporate and tax haven 
roles in illicit fl ows, tackles the scale of the corporate fl ows in “Account-
ing for the Missing Billions” (chapter 9). Basing his analysis on the 
approach of an auditor, Murphy fi rst tests the hypothesis that substantial 
transfer mispricing by major corporations might contribute to a loss of 
at least US$160 billion a year to developing countries in the context of 
the total likely corporate profi ts tax paid or not paid worldwide in a year. 
Second, he explores the hypothesis that activities in developing coun-
tries and in the extractive industries in particular might be especially 
prone to this abuse. This refl ects both the lack of any effective monitor-
ing capability in many developing countries and the fact that transfer 
prices can greatly affect not only taxes on corporate profi ts, the usual 
focus of transfer mispricing, but royalties and other price-sensitive taxes. 
Third, Murphy considers whether this sum could be hidden from view 
within the accounts or fi nancial statements of the multinational corpo-
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rations that might be perpetrating the mispricing. Finally, he explores 
the possibility that the corporations might use secrecy jurisdictions 
(usually called tax havens) to assist in hiding these transactions from 
view. In each case, Murphy fi nds that the hypothesis is plausible and that, 
as a consequence, losses of the estimated amount are also plausible, 
although not proven to exist as a result of this work. In addition, the 
chapter identifi es the potentially important role of the Big Four fi rms of 
accountants with regard to this issue based on their signifi cant presence 
in secrecy jurisdictions, their role as auditors of most of the world’s mul-
tinational corporations, and their important role in setting International 
Financial Reporting Standards.
Volker Nitsch, an economist at Technische Universität Darmstadt, Ger-
many, addresses a related issue in “Trade Mispricing and Illicit Flows” 
(chapter 10). A potential vehicle for the unrecorded movement of capital 
out of a country is the falsifi cation of invoices in international trade trans-
actions. In contrast to transfer pricing, this involves transactions between 
formally unrelated parties. Exporters may understate the export revenue 
on their invoices (whether by giving low fi gures for the price or quantity), 
and importers may overstate import costs, while their trading partners are 
instructed to deposit the balance for their benefi t in a foreign account. The 
chapter critically reviews empirical approaches to quantify the extent of 
trade mispricing. Various reasons for discrepancies in bilateral trade statis-
tics are discussed, and incentives for faking trade invoices other than capi-
tal fl ight are highlighted. Overall, the accuracy and reliability of estimates 
of IFFs based on trade mispricing are questioned.
Policy Interventions
Alex Cobham, an economist with Christian Aid, examines the role of tax 
havens in “Tax Havens and Illicit Flows” (chapter 11). This chapter makes 
three contributions. First, it provides a brief, critical survey of the state 
of knowledge on the impact of havens on development. Second, it uses 
existing data to extend that knowledge by examining the detail on bilat-
eral trade and fi nancial fl ows between havens and developing countries 
and identifying the exposure of developing countries of different types. 
Third, the chapter sets out a research agenda that would allow greater 
certainty about the scale of the impact of tax havens on development.
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Two results emerge. First, the exposure of developing countries to tax 
havens is on a par with, if not more severe than, that of high-income 
OECD countries. Thus, efforts to ensure that developing countries ben-
efi t from moves to require greater transparency in terms of international 
tax cooperation in particular may be of great value. Second, the differ-
ences in developing-country exposure across different income groups 
and regions are substantial, and recognition of this must lead to more 
detailed and careful study and, over time, policy responses.
OECD member countries and others, through the intergovernmental 
Financial Action Task Force, have invested considerable effort in the 
implementation of a comprehensive set of laws and regulations against 
money laundering in all nations; this is seen as a major tool to prevent 
illicit outfl ows.11 Michael Levi, a criminologist at Cardiff University, in 
“How Well Do Anti–Money Laundering Controls Work in Developing 
Countries?” (chapter 12), examines how well the AML system in devel-
oping countries has worked for those countries. Levi fi nds evidence 
that, for many countries, perhaps particularly those most in need of 
effective AML controls, the regime has minimal capacity to detect or 
punish violations. Indeed, there are few instances in which domestic 
AML controls have generated cases against kleptocrats or their families. 
Levi examines fi ve cases of grand corruption to show the extent to which 
the fl ows of funds could plausibly have been detected by a domestic 
system of rules and fi nds the results quite mixed. He concludes by not-
ing the many diffi culties of creating an effective AML regime if the gov-
ernment is thoroughly corrupted, reinforcing a message in the Daniel 
and Maton chapter.
Though illicit fl ows are a relatively recent issue, components of the 
response to the fl ows have been prominent for some time. In particular, 
there has been growing emphasis since the 1990s on the recovery of sto-
len assets and the spread of AML controls around the globe.
Tim Daniel and James Maton, London-based lawyers at Edwards 
Wildman UK who have represented governments in successful suits 
against corrupt offi cials in a number of developing countries, describe 
and analyze experiences in attempting to recover stolen assets in “The 
Kleptocrat’s Portfolio Decision” (chapter 13). Though success is rarely 
complete in that not all the assets are recovered, Daniel and Maton fi nd 
growing willingness on the part of British and Swiss courts to render 
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judgments that facilitate the collection of such assets. They provide a 
particularly detailed and compelling account of the recovery of assets 
from the estate and family of Sani Abache, the military ruler of Nigeria 
in the 1990s. The experience in recent cases suggests that the use of 
secrecy jurisdictions to hide benefi cial ownership is often only a modest 
obstacle to recovery. More often, the problem lies in the home country, 
where the successor government may be unwilling to provide the legal 
and evidentiary support for effective recovery or where the local courts 
thwart overseas suits; the case against Tommy Suharto in Indonesia, 
whereby a Guernsey court froze assets while waiting for action by the 
Indonesian government, which is still not forthcoming years later, pro-
vides one illustration of the problem.
Conclusions
Mick Moore, a tax economist at the Institute of Development Studies at 
the University of Sussex, assesses some of the consequences of IFFs in 
“The Practical Political Economy of Illicit Flows” (chapter 14). The 
increasing scope to expatriate capital illicitly exacerbates problems of 
corruption, low investment, the unequal sharing of tax burdens across 
different parts of the private sector, the low legitimacy of private enter-
prise, and relatively authoritarian and exclusionary governance. The 
international community is already developing a range of interlock-
ing tools to deal with the nexus of problems around illicit capital fl ows, 
capital fl ight, corruption, money laundering, tax avoidance, tax havens, 
and transfer mispricing. Improvements in the design of these tools and 
greater vigor in implementation should have especially benefi cial effects 
within many of the poorest countries, notably, in increasing private 
investment and economic growth, reducing the popular mistrust of 
 private enterprise, and providing more space for more democratic gov-
ernance. More effective international action against illicit capital fl ows 
would be complementary rather than competitive with attempts to 
improve from within the quality of public institutions in the poorest 
countries.
The fi nal chapter (15) presents the editor’s overview of the topic and 
how the issues should be dealt with in terms of future research. The 
chapter argues that illegal markets, though signifi cant in absolute terms, 
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are unlikely to be the source of substantial illicit fl ows out of developing 
countries because most of the value added is in rich countries, and much 
of it that is earned by developing county nationals is repatriated home. 
It also argues that, whatever the problems with existing IFF estimates, 
the phenomenon is large enough to command serious attention. Illicit 
fl ows is a coherent concept in policy terms; what links the international 
outfl ows from tax evasion, corruption, and drug markets is the fact that 
they can all, in principle, be stopped by the same set of policies and laws. 
A central question is whether there is a set of measures that has the pros-
pect of making a substantial difference to these fl ows. The alternative 
view is that these outfl ows are much less of a problem than the underly-
ing phenomena that generate them and that the debate on outfl ows may 
actually divert attention from these phenomena. The chapter suggests a 
research path for clarifying this issue. Illicit fi nancial fl ows have complex 
origins and varied consequences and present diffi cult policy options. 
The research program appropriate to study them will also be complex, 
varied, and diffi cult.
Notes
 1. For an early critique, see Reuter (1996). For a much more detailed analysis pub-
lished after 2005, see Kilmer and Pacula (2009).
 2. See http://www.gfi p.org/.
 3. A 2010 paper written for the United Nations Department of Economic and 
Social Affairs by a well-known development economist does make extensive use 
of Baker (see FitzGerald 2010).
 4. The odd feature was that the item was withdrawn within a few hours of appear-
ing on the website. Even in that brief period, it captured public attention. See, 
for example, Chen and Pansey (2011). Apparently, the report, “Investigation on 
the Asset Transfer Routes Used by Corrupt Offi cials and the Corresponding Sur-
veillance Methods,” was given a Bank of China award for the quality of the 
research but was never intended to be made public. The translated report can be 
found on the website of this volume, http://go.worldbank.org/N2HMRB4G20.
 5. See Norway, Minister of the Environment and International Development, 
2009, Tax Havens and Development: Status, Analyses and Measures, Oslo: Gov-
ernment Commission on Capital Flight from Poor Countries, http://www
.regjeringen.no/upload/UD/Vedlegg/Utvikling/tax_report.pdf.
 6. See Task Force on Financial Integrity and Economic Development, Washington, 
DC, http://www.fi nancialtaskforce.org/.
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 7. Leaders’ Statement, G-20 Pittsburgh Summit, September 24–25, 2009, 
paragraphs 22 and 42, http://www.g20.org/Documents/pittsburgh_summit
_leaders_statement_250909.pdf.
 8. See “Final Report from the Task Force on the Development Impact of Illicit 
Financial Flows” at http://www.leadinggroup.org/IMG/pdf_Final_report_Task
_Force_EN.pdf.
 9 . Wall Street Journal, 2009, “Tax Havens Pledge to Ease Secrecy Laws,” March 13, 
http://online.wsj.com/article/SB123685028900906181.html.
10. A typical defi nition of illicit, presented at dictionary.com, shows two meanings. 
“1. not legally permitted or authorized; unlicensed; unlawful,” and “2. disap-
proved of or not permitted for moral or ethical reasons.” See http://dictionary
.reference.com/browse/illicit.
11. See Financial Action Task Force, Paris, http://www.fatf-gafi .org/.
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Part I
The Political Economy 
of Illicit Flows
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Abstract
The concern about illicit capital fl ows from developing countries refl ects 
a variety of relevant policy issues, but is often motivated by weakly for-
mulated underlying analytical frameworks. We review the literature on 
illicit capital fl ows and suggest that the common underlying concern 
that motivates the different approaches is the identifi cation of fl ows that 
potentially damage economic development. Implicitly, if these fl ows 
could be blocked, the result would be an improvement in social out-
comes. Illicit fl ows can be illegal, but they need not be if the legal frame-
work does not refl ect social interests or does not cover the relevant fl ows. 
A minimal defi nition of an illicit capital fl ow has to consider both the 
direct and the indirect effects of the fl ow and has to assess these effects in 
the context of the specifi c political settlement of the country in question. 
To demonstrate the implications in simplifi ed form, we distinguish 
among advanced countries, intermediate developers, and fragile devel-
oping countries. The types of fl ows that would be considered illicit are 
shown to be signifi cantly different in each of these cases. The analysis 
provides a rigorous way of identifying policy-relevant illicit fl ows in 
developing countries. Given the potential importance of these fl ows, it is 
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vital to have a rigorous framework that at least ensures that we minimize 
the chances of causing inadvertent damage through well-intentioned 
policies. Indeed, the analysis shows that many loose defi nitions of illicit 
capital fl ows are problematic in this sense.
Introduction
The concept of illicit capital fl ows has come to prominence relatively 
recently, refl ecting growing concerns about the ramifi cations of an insuf-
fi ciently regulated and apparently increasingly predatory international 
fi nancial system. In advanced economies, the 2008 global fi nancial crisis 
brought into sharp relief the growing gap between the effectiveness of 
national regulatory tools and the global operations of private fi nancial 
agencies. As illustrated, for example, by the standoff between the U.S. 
Securities and Exchange Commission and Goldman Sachs employees 
over the collateralized debt obligation deal, Abacus 2007–AC 1, the 
debate in advanced countries has highlighted important ambiguities 
about what constitutes legitimate fi nancial market behavior.
In the case of developing countries, the international concern about 
illicit capital fl ows is motivated primarily by concerns that vital develop-
mental resources are being lost to these economies because of the ease 
with which capital fl ight can fl ourish in the context of a burgeoning, yet 
opaque international fi nancial system (for example, see Eurodad 2008a; 
Global Witness 2009; Kar and Cartwright-Smith 2008; Baker 2005). 
Closely related to this is the idea that illicit capital fl ows from developing 
economies are indicative of deeper structural problems of political gov-
ernance in these countries. Finally, there also are worries about how 
illicit capital fl ows from developing countries may affect advanced coun-
tries through diverse mechanisms, such as directly or indirectly fi nanc-
ing crime or terror. In this chapter, we are concerned mainly with the 
impact of illicit capital fl ows on developing countries and the effective-
ness of policy to control such outfl ows.
The next section situates the literature on illicit capital fl ows within 
the wider context of economic analyses of capital fl ight from developing 
economies and provides our defi nitions. The following section elabo-
rates our defi nition of illicit capital fl ows. We simplify the range of varia-
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tion across countries using a three-tier typology of different economic 
and political contexts: advanced economies; an intermediate group of 
normal developing countries in which a stable political settlement exists 
even though institutions still have a large element of informality; and a 
fi nal tier of fragile and vulnerable developing countries in which the 
political settlement is collapsing, and economic processes, including 
illicit capital fl ight, are driven by the collapsing polity. A defi nition of 
illicit capital fl ight has to be consistently applicable across these substan-
tially different institutional and political contexts. Keeping this in mind, 
we defi ne illicit capital fl ows as fl ows that imply economic damage for a 
society given its existing economic and political structure. The penulti-
mate section develops some basic policy tools to operationalize this ana-
lytical framework. The fi nal section concludes.
Illicit Capital Flows and Capital Flight: 
Concepts and Deﬁ nitions
The term illicit has strong moral undertones, but a closer look at the 
actual use of the term almost always reveals an underlying concern with 
the developmental damage that particular capital fl ows can infl ict. We 
believe that, from a policy perspective, this has to be made explicit, as 
well as the precise methodology that is being applied to determine the 
damage. We start by defi ning an illicit capital fl ow as a fl ow that has a 
negative impact on an economy if all direct and indirect effects in the 
context of the specifi c political economy of the society are taken into 
account. Direct effects refer to the immediate impact of a particular 
illicit capital fl ow on a country’s economic growth performance, for 
example, through reduced private domestic investment or adverse effects 
on tax revenue and public investment. Indirect effects are feedback 
effects on economic growth that arise from the role played by illicit capi-
tal fl ows in the sustainability of the social and political structure and 
dynamics of a country. For clarity of exposition, we specify the political 
economy of a society in terms of the political settlement. A political set-
tlement is a reproducible structure of formal and informal institutions 
with an associated distribution of benefi ts that refl ects a sustainable dis-
tribution of power. Sustainability requires that the formal and informal 
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institutional arrangements that govern societal interaction in a country 
and the distribution of benefi ts to which they give rise achieve a suffi -
cient degree of compatibility between economic productivity and politi-
cal stability to allow the society to reproduce itself without an escalation 
of confl ict (Khan 2010).
There are two important elements in this defi nition. First, the judg-
ment of impact has to consider both direct and indirect effects because we 
are interested in the overall net effect of particular fi nancial fl ows on the 
developmental prospects of a country. Second, the specifi c political settle-
ment of the country is important because the indirect effects, in particu-
lar, depend on the interplay between the economic and political structure 
of the country, and this can vary greatly across contexts. To simplify, we 
focus on three broad variants of political settlements, but fi ner distinc-
tions can be made. The assessment of both direct and indirect effects is 
necessarily based on a counterfactual assessment of what would happen if 
the illicit capital fl ow in question could hypothetically be blocked. The 
assessment is counterfactual because, in many cases, the fl ows cannot 
actually be blocked or only partially so. The assessment is therefore subject 
to the analytical perspective of the observer, but we believe that this needs 
to be done in an explicit way to facilitate public debate. Our defi nition 
allows us to make sense of the perception that not all illegal fl ows are nec-
essarily illicit, while some legal fl ows may be illicit. The task of policy is to 
identify both the particular capital fl ows that can be classifi ed as illicit, but 
also the subset of illicit fl ows that can be feasibly targeted.
What constitutes damage in the sense of a negative developmental 
impact depends on how we defi ne development. When illicit capital 
fl ows are equated with illegal outfl ows (as in Kar and Cartwright-Smith 
2008; Baker and Nordin 2007), the implicit suggestion is that adherence 
to prevailing legal rules is suffi cient for promoting the social good.1 Yet, 
the use of the notion of illicitness also suggests that damaging develop-
mental outcomes may not always correspond to violations of the law and 
that, therefore, social, economic, and political damage needs to be more 
precisely defi ned. Moreover, if we are not to suffer the criticism of pater-
nalism, our criteria have to be widely accepted as legitimate in that soci-
ety. In practice, it is diffi cult to establish the criteria that measure devel-
opment and therefore can be used to identify damage in any society, but 
particularly in developing ones. A social consensus may not exist if there 
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are deep divisions about social goals. However, as a fi rst step, we can 
insist that analysts and observers making judgments about illicit fl ows at 
least make their own criteria explicit. This will allow us to see if these 
criteria are so far away from what are likely to be the minimal shared 
assumptions in a society as to make the analysis problematic. In addi-
tion, because the effect of capital fl ows (and economic policies in gen-
eral) is often heavily disputed, we also require an explicit reference to 
analytical models that identify how particular capital fl ows affect par-
ticular developmental goals. Making all this explicit is important because 
observers may disagree in their choices on these issues.
Our defi nition suggests that capital fl ows that are strictly within the 
law may be illicit if they damage society and that, conversely, fl ows that 
evade or avoid the law may sometimes be benign, and blocking some of 
these fl ows may have adverse consequences. However, all illegal capital 
fl ows may be judged illicit from a broader perspective if the violation of 
laws is judged to be damaging for development regardless of the specifi c 
outcomes associated with lawbreaking. We argue that this position is 
easier to sustain in advanced countries where the formal structure of 
rules is more or less effectively enforced by rule-based states and where 
political processes ensure that legal frameworks are relatively closely 
integrated with the evolution of socially acceptable compromises to sus-
tain political stability and economic growth. The ongoing global fi nan-
cial and economic crisis has demonstrated that this picture does not 
always hold true even in advanced countries. Meanwhile, developing 
countries are typically characterized by signifi cant informality in social 
organization; laws, if they exist, are, in general, weakly enforced and do 
not typically refl ect worked-out social compromises and economic pro-
grams, and signifi cant aspects of the economy and polity therefore oper-
ate through informal arrangements and informality in the enforcement 
of formal rules (Khan 2005, 2010). Violations of formal rules are wide-
spread in these contexts and do not necessarily provide even a fi rst 
approximation of social damage.
To keep the analysis broad enough to include different types of societ-
ies, what then should we be looking for to judge damage to society? Is 
damage to be judged by the effects of particular fl ows on economic 
growth, or income distribution, or different measures of poverty, or 
some combination of the above? We suggest that we should use the least 
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demanding way of judging damage because the more minimal our 
requirement, the more likely we are to fi nd broad support across observ-
ers who may disagree at the level of more detailed specifi cations.
An illicit fi nancial fl ow (IFF), according to our minimal defi nition, is 
one that has an overall negative effect on economic growth, taking into 
account both direct and indirect effects in the context of the specifi c politi-
cal settlement of a country. A fl ow that has not directly affected economic 
growth, but has undermined the viability of a given political settlement 
without preparing the ground for an alternative sustainable political 
settlement may be seen to have, indirectly, a negative effect after we 
account for adjustments that are likely as a result of a decline in political 
stability. It is now increasingly recognized that the different ways in 
which the political and social order is constructed in developing coun-
tries have important implications for how institutions and the economy 
function (North et al. 2007). Because the construction of political settle-
ments (and, in North’s terminology, of social orders) differs signifi cantly 
across societies, the economic and political effects of particular fi nancial 
fl ows are also likely to be different.
Our defi nition has some overlaps with, but also important points of 
departure from, the way in which damaging capital fl ight has been ana-
lyzed in the economics literature. The loss of developmental resources 
through capital fl ows from poor to rich economies has been an important 
topic of development economics since its inception. In particular, the lit-
erature on capital fl ight had made the problem of abnormal capital out-
fl ows from developing countries its main interest long before the policy 
focus on illicit capital outfl ows from such economies emerged. A brief 
review of this literature allows us to identify systematically different core 
drivers of capital fl ight highlighted by different strands of the literature. 
Our review also establishes the problems associated with ignoring the 
structural differences in the types of political settlements across countries, 
problems that our defi nition of illicit capital fl ight specifi cally addresses.
From capital ﬂ ight as abnormal capital outﬂ ows 
to single-driver models of capital ﬂ ight
In 1937, Charles Kindleberger famously defi ned capital fl ight as “abnor-
mal” capital outfl ows “propelled from a country . . . by . . . any one or 
more of a complex list of fears and suspicions” (Kindleberger 1937, 158). 
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A specialist of European fi nancial history, Kindleberger had in mind 
well-known episodes of European capital fl ight going back to the 16th 
century, as well as the troubles of crisis-ridden Europe in the 1920s and 
1930s. In most of these historical cases, this “complex list of fears and 
suspicions” can be attributed to specifi c events or to exceptionally dis-
ruptive periods of political, social, and economic change or confronta-
tion. To differentiate ex post between abnormal capital outfl ows driven 
by profound uncertainty (fear and suspicion) about the future on the 
one hand and, on the other hand, normal capital outfl ows driven by 
usual business considerations was a rather straightforward exercise in 
those contexts.
For policy purposes, however, such ex post analyses are of limited rel-
evance. What matters is suffi cient ex ante knowledge of the factors that 
differentiate abnormal from normal situations. Such ex ante knowl-
edge—to facilitate effective preventive policy options—will have to 
include consideration of the determinants of precisely those economic, 
political, and social factors that may trigger the disruption that we regard 
as obvious from an ex post perspective. There may not be any general or 
abstract solution in the sense that what qualifi es as capital fl ight requir-
ing a policy response may differ across countries. A half-century on from 
his original contribution, Kindleberger himself struck a considerably 
more cautious note in this respect, as follows:
It is diffi cult—perhaps impossible—to make a rigorous defi nition of capital 
fl ight for the purpose of devising policies to cope with it. Do we restrict 
cases to domestic capital sent abroad, or should foreign capital precipi-
tously pulled out of a country be included? What about the capital that 
emigrants take with them, especially when the people involved are being 
persecuted . . . ? Does it make a difference whether the emigration is likely to 
be permanent or temporary, to the extent that anyone can tell ex ante? And 
what about the cases where there is no net export of capital, but capital is 
being returned to the country as foreign investment . . . ? Is there a valid 
distinction to be made between capital that is expatriated on a long-term 
basis for fear of confi scatory taxation, and domestic speculation against the 
national currency through buying foreign exchange that is ostensibly inter-
ested in short-term profi ts? (Kindleberger 1990, 326–27)
As attention shifted to capital fl ight from contemporary developing 
economies, in particular in the wake of the Latin American debt crisis of 
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the early 1980s, a growing consensus emerged about the diffi culty of 
 isolating specifi c determinants of abnormal capital outfl ows ex ante 
(Dooley 1986; Khan and Ul Haque 1985; Vos 1992). While there was 
some agreement on basic characteristics of abnormal outfl ows (that they 
tend to be permanent, not primarily aimed at asset diversifi cation, and 
not generating recorded foreign exchange income), the original effort to 
identify the characteristics of abnormal capital outfl ows was replaced by 
defi nitions of capital fl ight in terms of a single-core driver, perceived dif-
ferently by different approaches (Dooley 1986, 1988; Cuddington 1987).
Capital ﬂ ight as portfolio choice
First, the portfolio approach adopts standard models of expected utility 
maximization by rational economic agents to explain capital fl ight as a 
portfolio diversifi cation response to higher foreign returns relative to 
domestic returns on assets (Khan and Ul Haque 1985; Lessard and Wil-
liamson 1987; Dooley 1988; Collier, Hoeffl er, and Pattillo 2001). More 
specifi cally, this involves a counterfactual comparison of after-tax domes-
tic and foreign returns, adjusted for a range of variables, such as expected 
depreciation, volatility of returns, liquidity premiums, and various indi-
cators of investment risk, including indexes of corruption. In this view, 
capital fl ight is caused by the existence of market distortions and asym-
metric risks in developing countries (relative to advanced economies). 
The underlying market-theoretical model of economic development 
builds on four core premises: (1) economic behavior relevant to capital 
fl ight is correctly described by expected utility maximization, (2) markets 
exist universally (and thus can be distorted), (3) individual agents possess 
the ability to compute the probabilities of investment risk globally and on 
the basis of counterfactual investment models, and (4) computable prob-
abilities can be attached to all events.
These are obviously fairly restrictive assumptions in any case. In the 
present context, however, the most important conceptual drawback is 
illustrated by the following remark of a Brazilian economist:
Why is it that when an American puts money abroad it is called “foreign 
investment” and when an Argentinean does the same, it is called “capital 
fl ight”? Why is it that when an American company puts 30 percent of its 
equity abroad, it is called “strategic diversifi cation” and when a Bolivian 
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businessman puts only 4 percent abroad, it is called “lack of confi dence”? 
(Cumby and Levich 1987, quoted in Franko 2003, 89)
The obvious answer is that, relative to overall domestic resources, 
more domestic capital tends to fl ee for longer from Argentina and Bolivia 
than from the United States and that this is so because structural uncer-
tainty about future investment opportunities is higher in the former 
economies. To prevent relatively scarce capital from voting with its feet 
in situations of great structural uncertainty, developing countries are 
more likely to impose regulatory barriers on free capital movement, thus 
turning what might simply appear to be good business sense into illegal 
capital fl ight.
By focusing on a single broad motive for capital fl ight, namely, utility 
maximization in the presence of differential policy regimes and invest-
ment risks, the portfolio approach confl ates short-term utility (and 
profi t) maximization with structural political and economic uncertain-
ties. No systematic distinction is made between the drivers of asymmet-
ric investment risks in developing economies, which may range from 
infl ation and exchange rate depreciation to expectations of confi scatory 
taxation and outright politically motivated expropriation. Similarly, 
 policy-induced market distortions can range from short-term fi scal and 
monetary policies, common to all economies, to policies promoting 
long-term structural and institutional changes with much more wide-
ranging (and often more uncertain) implications for future investment 
opportunities. This failure to distinguish between different drivers of 
capital fl ight considerably weakens the effectiveness of the policy impli-
cations arising from this approach. This consists essentially in the rec-
ommendation of market-friendly reforms to eliminate such market dis-
tortions on the assumption that these will also minimize asymmetric 
investment risks. If, however, markets do not as yet exist or suffer from 
fundamental structural weaknesses, market-friendly reforms may be 
insuffi cient to minimize differential investment risk relative to, for 
example, advanced economies.
This problem is, in fact, at least partially recognized by advocates of 
this approach. Some authors use a narrow statistical measure of capital 
fl ight, the hot money measure, which limits capital fl ight to short-term 
speculative capital outfl ows of the private nonbank sector (taken to be 
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the primary source of net errors and omissions in a country’s balance of 
payments) (for example, see Cuddington 1986, 1987). In contrast, the 
most widely used statistical defi nition of capital fl ight, often referred to 
as the residual measure, includes recorded and nonrecorded acquisitions 
of medium- and short-term assets and uses broader estimates of capital 
infl ows (World Bank 1985; Erbe 1985; Myrvin and Hughes Hallett 
1992).2 Cuddington thus reemphasizes the idea that abnormal capital 
outfl ows of money running away are a reaction to exceptional circum-
stances and events rather than ordinary business, although, in times of 
extensive deregulation of international fi nancial markets, this conjecture 
may be less convincing. Other authors have taken a different route to 
distinguish portfolio capital fl ight from other forms of capital fl ight, in 
particular that induced by extreme political instability, such as civil war 
(Tornell and Velasco 1992; Collier 1999). In the latter case, capital fl ight 
can occur despite lower actual foreign returns relative to potential 
domestic returns (if peace could be achieved) and is part of a wider out-
fl ow of productive resources, including labor.
The social controls approach to capital ﬂ ight
A second strand of the capital fl ight literature defi nes capital fl ight as 
“the movement of private capital from one jurisdiction to another in 
order to reduce the actual or potential level of social control over capital” 
(Boyce and Zarsky 1988, 192). To the extent that such capital fl ight is 
motivated primarily by the pursuit of private economic gain, this social 
control defi nition is not radically different from the portfolio approach. 
In both cases, capital fl ight occurs in response to policy intervention. 
However, the “social controls” approach rests
upon an explicit premise absent in much conventional economic theory, 
namely that individual control over capital is rarely absolute or uncon-
tested, but rather subject to social constraints, the character and extent of 
which vary through time. Unlike many authors, Boyce and Zarsky, there-
fore do not consider capital fl ight to be necessarily “abnormal.” (Rishi and 
Boyce 1990, 1645)
As with the portfolio approach, there is no systematic distinction 
between fundamentally different drivers of capital fl ight. All capital 
fl ight occurs in response to government controls, whether these concern 
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short-term macroeconomic stabilization through fi scal and monetary 
policy measures or more long-term structural interventions. However, 
in this case, the underlying model of the economy is not that of universal 
and competitive markets inhabited by maximizers of expected utility 
and profi ts, but rather that of a mixed economy in which markets are 
one set of several institutions ultimately governed by a (welfare or devel-
opmental) state or, more broadly, by social interventions from outside 
the market sphere. Different from the portfolio approach, the main pol-
icy implication is therefore not simply a focus to promote markets, but 
to minimize capital fl ight through the strengthening of existing social 
controls or the introduction of alternative, more effective administrative 
measures to control private capital movements.
The social controls approach remains ambiguous, however, about the 
origin and legitimacy of social (capital) controls. A weak version of the 
approach identifi es governments as the core players in social control, 
and no explicit judgment is made about the legitimacy or effectiveness 
of specifi c government controls. This position comes closest to the port-
folio approach. In this vein, Walter, for example, argues that capital fl ight
appears to consist of a subset of international asset redeployments or 
portfolio adjustments—undertaken in response to signifi cant perceived 
deterioration in risk/return profi les associated with assets located in a 
particular country—that occur in the presence of confl ict between objec-
tives of asset holders and the government. It may or may not violate the 
law. It is always considered by authorities to violate an implied social con-
tract. (Walter 1987, 105)
By contrast, the strong version adopts the more heroic assumption 
that social (capital) controls refl ect some kind of a social consensus 
about the ways in which economic development is best achieved. The 
implied social contract here is not one merely perceived by government 
authorities to exist, but one based on genuine social approval. A recent 
example is the observation of Epstein, as follows:
When people hear the term “capital fl ight” they think of money running 
away from one country to a money “haven” abroad, in the process doing 
harm to the home economy and society. People probably have the idea that 
money runs away for any of a number of reasons: to avoid taxation; to 
avoid confi scation; in search of better treatment, or of higher returns 
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somewhere else. In any event, people have a sense that capital fl ight is in 
some way illicit, in some way bad for the home country, unless, of course, 
capital is fl eeing unfair discrimination, as in the case of Nazi persecution. 
(Epstein 2006, 3; italics added)
For Epstein (2006, 3–4), capital fl ight is therefore an “inherently polit-
ical phenomenon” and also mainly “the prerogative of those—usually 
the wealthy—with access to foreign exchange.” This view entails a more 
explicitly normative position than either the portfolio approach or the 
weak version of the social controls approach in that capital fl ight is char-
acterized not only as economically damaging for development, but also 
as illegitimate from the perspective of an existing consensus about the 
social (developmental) good.
Capital ﬂ ight as dirty money
Both the portfolio approach and the social controls approach broadly 
interpret capital fl ight as a response by private capital to expectations of 
lower domestic returns relative to foreign returns on assets. Both are out-
come oriented in that their primary concern is with the macro economic 
analysis of the perceived damage infl icted by capital fl ight on developing 
economies rather than with the origins of fl ight capital or the methods by 
which it is being transferred abroad. They differ with regard to their ana-
lytical benchmark models of a normal or ideal economy. Whereas the 
portfolio approach subscribes to variants of the standard model of a com-
petitive free-market economy, the social controls approach adopts a mixed 
economy model in which the social control of private capital, for example 
by a welfare state, is normal. This translates into different single-driver 
models of capital fl ight. In the fi rst case, the driver is simply profi t (or util-
ity) maximization (or the minimization of investment risk) at a global 
level, and the damage done arises not from capital fl ight per se, but from 
market distortions that lower relative returns on domestic private assets. 
In the second case, the driver is the avoidance of policy controls, and the 
damage arises from private capital breaking implicit or explicit social con-
tracts. These models overlap only in so far as (1) market distortions arise 
from domestic policy interventions rather than other exogenous shocks 
and (2) social controls are judged, in any particular context, to be poorly 
designed so as to undermine rather than promote economic development 
and thus violate the implicit or explicit social contract.
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The more recent literature on illicit capital fl ows adopts an explicitly 
normative perspective on capital fl ight that focuses primarily on adher-
ence to the law or perceived good practice. Illicit capital fl ows are fl ows 
that break the implicit rules asserted as desirable by the observer. A cross-
border movement of capital that, at any stage from its generation to its use, 
involves the deployment of illegal or abusive activities or practices is illicit. 
Probably the most well known example of this procedural or rule-based 
perspective on capital fl ight is Baker’s notion of dirty money that distin-
guishes criminal, corrupt, and commercial forms of illicit capital fl ows (a 
term used interchangeably with dirty money) (Baker 2005; Baker and 
Nordin 2007). Criminal fl ows encompass “a boundless range of villainous 
activities including racketeering, traffi cking in counterfeit and contraband 
goods, alien smuggling, slave trading, embezzlement, forgery, securities 
fraud, credit fraud, burglary, sexual exploitation, prostitution, and more” 
(Baker 2005, 23). Corrupt fl ows stem “from bribery and theft by (foreign) 
government offi cials” trying to hide the proceeds from such activities 
abroad, and the commercial component of dirty money stems from tax 
evasion and mispriced or falsifi ed asset swaps, including trade misinvoic-
ing and abusive transfer pricing (Baker 2005, 23). Of these components of 
dirty money, illicit commercial fl ows have been estimated to account for 
around two-thirds of all illicit outfl ows, and proceeds from corruption for 
the smallest part, around 5 percent of the total (Eurodad 2008b).
This rule-based dirty money approach leads to a conceptual defi ni-
tion of capital fl ight that is narrower than the defi nitions adopted by 
more conventional approaches. First, defi nitions of capital fl ight here are 
mostly limited to unrecorded capital fl ows. Thus, Kapoor (2007, 6–7), 
for example, defi nes capital fl ight as the “unrecorded and (mostly) 
untaxed illicit leakage of capital and resources out of a country,” a defi ni-
tion taken up by Heggstad and Fjeldstad (2010, 7), who argue that its 
characteristics include
that the resources are domestic wealth that is permanently put out of 
reach for domestic authorities. Much of the value is unrecorded, and 
attempts to hide the origin, destination and true ownership of the capital 
are parts of the concept.
This does not necessarily translate into the adoption of narrow statistical 
measures of capital fl ight, such as hot money estimates that take account 
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only of unrecorded capital fl ows in the balance of payments. Rather, 
measures of illicit capital fl ows attempt to capture as many likely con-
duits for such fl ows as possible, in practice integrating different conven-
tional measures of capital fl ight with estimates of trade misinvoicing 
(Kar and Cartwright-Smith 2008).
Second, consistent with the conceptual focus on dirty money, the core 
driver of capital fl ight is also more narrowly defi ned, as follows:
The term fl ight capital is most commonly applied in reference to money 
that shifts out of developing countries, usually into western economies. 
Motivations for such shifts are usually regarded as portfolio diversifi ca-
tion or fears of political or economic instability or fears of taxation or 
infl ation or confi scation. All of these are valid explanations for the phe-
nomenon, yet the most common motivation appears to be, instead, a desire 
for the hidden accumulation of wealth. (Kar and Cartwright-Smith 2008, 2; 
emphasis added)
However, capital fl ight in response to return differentials, asymmet-
ric investment risks, or perceived macroeconomic mismanagement 
through social controls can also occur in the open, in particular in a 
highly deregulated fi nancial environment. Thus, the main concern of 
conventional approaches to capital fl ight is with wealth accumulation 
abroad in general, rather than exclusively or even primarily with hidden 
wealth accumulation.
Finally, illicit capital fl ows are also often equated with illegal outfl ows, 
on the grounds that funds originating in (or intended for) illicit activi-
ties have to be hidden and will eventually disappear from any records in 
the transferring country (Kar and Cartwright-Smith 2008; Baker and 
Nordin 2007). This narrows conventional defi nitions of capital fl ight 
because the latter’s focus on capital outfl ows that are, in some sense, 
damaging to the economy is not limited to illegal outfl ows. How exten-
sive the overlap between illegal and damaging capital outfl ows is will 
depend on how closely and effectively legal frameworks encapsulate the 
social or economic good, defi ned in terms of the respective underlying 
benchmark models of an ideal or licit state of affairs.
In fact, the equation of illegal and illicit capital outfl ows is not sys-
tematically sustained, even in the dirty money approach. At least some of 
the activities included in the analysis of dirty money are not illegal, but 
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refer to practices characterized as abusive, such as aspects of transfer 
pricing, specifi c uses made of tax havens, and corrupt activities that have 
not necessarily been outlawed. Rather, the procedural or rule-based 
focus on adherence to the law in this approach to capital fl ight is based 
on an implicit claim that adherence to the law will promote economic 
development or, more generally, the social good. If the principal motiva-
tion for capital fl ight is, in fact, “the external, often hidden, accumulation 
of wealth, and this far outweighs concerns about taxes” (Baker and Nor-
din 2007, 2), the policy response has to be directed primarily at eliminat-
ing the dirty money structure through the enforcement of national and 
global standards of fi nancial transparency and democratic accountabil-
ity. The core obstacle to economic development then becomes the lack of 
good governance, corruption, and the absence of or weaknesses in the 
rule of law (rather than specifi c legislation).
Thus, the dirty money approach to illicit capital fl ows from developing 
countries differs from more conventional defi nitions of capital fl ight 
mainly in that it appears to be rooted less in outcome-oriented models of 
economic growth and development, but in a specifi c rule-based liberal 
model of good governance and a good polity, perceived to be a necessary 
condition for achieving any more substantially defi ned social good.
From the above, we see that the literature identifi es three core drivers 
of capital fl ight from developing economies, each implying a different 
underlying view of what constitutes damage to these economies and 
each adopting a monocausal perspective. Figure 2.1 summarizes features 
of these approaches, as follows:
1.  In the portfolio approach, social damage is a result of interference 
with competitive markets that are presumed to otherwise exist. Capi-
tal fl ight is driven by economic incentives to escape such interference 
given profi t-maximizing investment strategies. The best way to elim-
inate capital fl ight in this perspective is to remove the damaging gov-
ernment interventions in competitive markets. This largely ignores 
the fact that competitive markets require government regulation even 
in advanced economies and that extensive market failures imply that 
signifi cant government intervention may be required to achieve 
developmental outcomes in developing economies.
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2.  The social controls approach is almost the mirror image of the port-
folio approach. All social controls over private capital movements are 
presumed to refl ect a legitimate social contract that is welfare enhanc-
ing. As a result, capital outfl ows that violate social controls imposed 
by a welfare-developmental state are damaging and illicit, presum-
ably because the indirect effects of violating the social contract will be 
socially damaging. The best way to eliminate capital fl ight is to rein-
force social controls. This largely ignores the fact that not all formal 
social controls and regulations in developing countries are legitimate, 
growth enhancing, or politically viable.
3.  In the dirty money approach, social damage is the result of violating 
the rule of law. Capital fl ight is driven by the desire to accumulate 
wealth by hiding from the rule of law. No substantial view on what 
constitutes social, economic, or political damage is typically offered. 
This largely ignores the fact that, in developing countries in particu-
lar, existing legal frameworks may not adequately encapsulate the 
 economic and political conditions necessary to achieve whichever 
substantial idea of the social good is adopted (economic development, 
social justice, the preservation of specifi c human rights, and so on).
Figure 2.1. Deﬁ nitions of Capital Flight
Social good: Competitive markets
Core driver: “Illicit” policy interference with competitive markets
Policy response: Market-friendly reforms
Social good: Benevolent developmental state/mixed economy
Core driver: Evasion of legitimate social controls of 
private capital movement
Policy response: Reinforce controls
Portfolio approach
Social controls approach
Social good: The rule of law/good 
governance
Core driver: Hidden accumulation 
of wealth
Policy response: Global
bans and regulation
Illicit capital flows
Illegal
 capital
flows
outcome
oriented
rule
oriented
broad
narrow
Source: Author compilation.
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Illicit Capital Outﬂ ows: An Alternative Policy Framework
The discussion above suggests that the search for a conceptual defi nition 
of capital fl ight in general and of illicit capital outfl ows from developing 
countries in particular has been motivated by differing perceptions of 
what constitutes the social or developmental good. Implicit differences 
in the values and theoretical models of observers explain the signifi cant 
differences in how illicit capital fl ows have been defi ned. These hidden 
differences are not conducive for developing effective policy responses 
on the basis of which some minimum agreement can be reached. We 
believe we can go to the core of the problem by defi ning illicit capital 
fl ows as outfl ows that cause damage to the economic development of the 
country, taking into account all direct and indirect effects that are likely, 
given the specifi c political settlement.
An implicit assumption in many conventional approaches is that all 
fl ight capital, however defi ned, will yield a higher rate of social return in 
developing economies if it can be retained domestically (Schneider 
2003a; Cumby and Levich 1987; Walter 1987). From a policy perspective, 
locking in potential fl ight capital is supposed to reduce the loss of devel-
opmental resources directly and indirectly stabilize domestic fi nancial 
markets and improve the domestic tax base (Cuddington 1986). In con-
trast, we argue that the problems faced by countries with capital fl ight 
can be different in nature. The widely shared premise of a general nega-
tive relationship between capital outfl ows and domestic capital accumu-
lation simply is not valid (Gordon and Levine 1989). Dynamic links 
among capital fl ows, economic growth, technological change, and politi-
cal constraints mean that, even in advanced economies, the regulation of 
capital outfl ows is an uphill and evolving task. In developing countries, 
too, some capital outfl ows may be desirable to sustain development. 
Moreover, the idea underlying some of the illicit capital fl ow literature 
that adherence to the law is suffi cient for identifying the social or eco-
nomic good clearly does not always apply.
On the basis of our minimalist defi nition of illicit capital fl ows, we 
proceed to develop a simple three-tier typology of economic and politi-
cal constellations and governance structures and the ways in which 
these pose policy challenges in controlling illicit capital outfl ows. Spe-
cifi cally, we distinguish between advanced economies (in opposition to 
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developing countries in general), and, within the latter group, we distin-
guish between normal or intermediate developing countries and fragile 
developing countries.
Advanced economies: The differences with respect 
to developing economies
Advanced economies are likely to be supported by rule-based states and 
political institutions such that the social compromises for political sta-
bility and the economic policies required for sustaining growth—the 
political settlement—are refl ected and codifi ed in an evolving set of 
laws. In these contexts, it is not unreasonable to expect that as a fi rst 
approximation, damaging capital fl ows are likely to be capital fl ows that 
violate existing laws. Illegal capital fl ows are likely to be damaging and 
can justifi ably be described as illicit in this context. However, some dam-
aging fl ows may not be illegal if laws do not fully refl ect these conditions 
or have not caught up with the changing economic and political condi-
tions involved in sustaining growth. For instance, the proliferation of 
inadequately regulated fi nancial instruments that resulted in the fi nan-
cial crisis of 2008 was driven by fi nancial fl ows that were, in many cases, 
not illegal, but turned out, ex post, to be seriously damaging. A focus on 
identifying damaging fi nancial fl ows independently of the existing legal 
framework may therefore be helpful even in advanced countries, though, 
most of the time, a focus on illegal fi nancial fl ows may be adequate.
Advanced economies, by defi nition, have extensive productive sec-
tors, which is why they have high levels of average income. As a result, 
formal taxation can play an important role not only in providing public 
goods, but also in sustaining signifi cant levels of formal, tax-fi nanced 
redistribution. Both help to achieve political stability and sustain exist-
ing political settlements. Taxation may be strongly contested by the rich, 
but an implicit social contract is likely to exist whereby social interde-
pendence is recognized and feasible levels of redistributive taxation are 
negotiated. Signifi cant fi scal resources also provide the resources to pro-
tect property rights and enforce a rule of law effectively.
Tax evasion and capital fl ight in this context are likely to represent 
individual greed and free-riding behavior rather than escape routes from 
unsustainable levels of taxation. Moreover, if economic policies and 
redistributive taxation represent the outcome of political negotiations 
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between different groups, illegal capital fl ows would also be illicit in the 
sense of damaging the sustainability of the political settlement and 
thereby, possibly, having damaging indirect effects on economic growth. 
Transparency, accountability, and the enforcement of the rule of law can 
therefore be regarded as mechanisms for limiting tax-avoiding capital 
fl ight and other forms of illicit capital fl ows in advanced countries.
Nonetheless, even within advanced countries, if legal arrangements 
cease to refl ect economic and redistributive arrangements acceptable to 
major social constituencies, the correspondence between illegal and 
illicit can break down. The more recent discussion of illicit capital fl ows 
in advanced countries has to be considered in a context in which the 
increase in the bargaining power of the rich to defi ne economic laws in 
their own interest has exceeded the pace at which other social groups 
have accepted these changes. This allows us to make sense of the more 
recent preoccupation with IFFs in many countries of the Organisation 
for Economic Co-operation and Development (OECD) where the con-
cern with dirty money has been closely associated with changes in the 
structure of many of these economies as a result of the decline in manu-
facturing and a growth in the service sectors, in particular, fi nance. The 
result has been not only a gradual change in the formal structure of taxa-
tion and redistribution in ways that refl ect the regressive changes in 
power, but also a growing tendency of the super-rich to evade even exist-
ing legal redistributive arrangements through fi nancial innovations or 
outright illegal capital fl ows. The avoidance and evasion of taxation have 
not been uncontested in advanced countries. Many social groups have 
criticized these developments and questioned the legitimacy of capital 
fl ows that seek to avoid and evade taxes. This constitutes an important 
part of the concern with illicit capital fl ows in advanced countries.
Palma (2005) points to the signifi cant decline in manufacturing prof-
its as a share of total profi ts in advanced countries over the last three 
decades and the concomitant search for global fi nancial, technological, 
and resource rents (see also Smithin 1996). The decline in manufac-
turing can at least partly explain the signifi cant change in income dis-
tribution in OECD countries, generally in favor of the highest income 
groups. For example, in the United States, the average real income of the 
bottom 120 million families remained roughly stagnant between 1973 
and 2006, while that of the top 0.01 percent of income earners increased 
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8.5 times, meaning that the multiple between the two income groups 
rose from 115 to 970. During the four years of economic expansion 
under the George W. Bush Administration, 73 percent of total (pretax) 
income growth accrued to the top 1 percent of income earners com-
pared with 45 percent during the seven years of economic expansion 
under the Clinton Administration (Palma 2009). The structural change 
in advanced countries is obviously complex and differs across countries, 
but there has been a signifi cant structural change over the last few 
decades, and the redistributive arrangements that emerged out of the 
postwar political consensus have faced renegotiation as a result.
The contemporary concern with illicit capital fl ows in advanced coun-
tries is motivated by a growing dissatisfaction both with the enforcement 
of law and with the extent to which the law in critical areas still effectively 
supports the social good. Narrower debates about illegal capital fl ows 
have focused on capital movements that have fl outed existing legal redis-
tributive arrangements because of the growing power of the rich to evade 
taxes through complex fi nancial instruments and the threat of relocation 
to other jurisdictions. But a more profound concern with illicit capital 
fl ows is based on a feeling of unease that the increase in the political 
power of these new sectors has enabled them to change laws without the 
acquiescence of groups in society that would once have had a say. This 
includes changes in laws that have weakened regulatory control over capi-
tal seeking to move much more freely in search of risky profi ts or tax 
havens. Even legal capital fl ows could be deemed to be illicit from this 
perspective if economic welfare or political stability were threatened by a 
unilateral redefi nition of the implicit social contract.
The steady deregulation of fi nancial fl ows in advanced countries in the 
1980s and 1990s is a case in point. Changes in regulatory structures 
increased returns to the fi nancial sector, arguably at the expense of greater 
systemic risk for the rest of society, and diminished the ability of states to 
tax these sectors (Eatwell and Taylor 2000). Some of the associated fi nan-
cial fl ows could therefore easily be judged to have been illicit according to 
our defi nition. Underlying this judgment is the implicit claim that the 
restructuring of law is based on an emergent distribution of power that is 
not legitimate because it eventually produces economic and political costs 
in which many social constituencies no longer acquiesce and that thereby 
threatens to become unsustainable (Crotty 2009; Wray 2009; Pollin 2003). 
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The concern here is that some of these fi nancial fl ows were illicit either 
because they were directly damaging to the economy or because they dam-
aged the political settlement in unsustainable ways and may eventually 
bring about economic costs in the form of social protests and declining 
political stability. These are obviously matters of judgment, but our defi ni-
tion provides a consistent way of structuring the policy debate without 
getting locked into a monocausal defi nition.
As long as the new sectors grew rapidly, the critique that some capital 
fl ows were illicit (even if legal) remained a fringe argument. However, the 
fi nancial crisis of 2008, largely the result of excessive risk taking by an 
insuffi ciently regulated fi nancial sector, showed, ex post, that some of 
these fi nancial fl ows were not only questionable in terms of their legiti-
macy and their impact on social agreements, they were damaging in a 
straightforward sense of economic viability. If the political process in 
advanced countries responds to these pressures by enacting laws that com-
bine socially acceptable redistributive arrangements with regulatory struc-
tures that make sense for sustained economic growth, the law could once 
again refl ect a broadbased social compromise grounded on maintaining 
politically sustainable economic growth. Under these circumstances, illicit 
capital fl ows will once again become coterminous with illegal capital fl ows.
Even so, the basic features of advanced countries that we discuss 
above have often created an expectation that a rule of law can and should 
be enforced at a global level, making illicit capital fl ows relatively easy to 
identify and target. Unfortunately, while this analysis makes sense at the 
level of individual advanced countries, it falls apart as an analytical 
framework at a global level. It ignores the obvious fact that global laws 
guiding economic policy or capital fl ows would only be legitimate if 
there were a global social consensus based on the same principles of 
redistributive taxation and social provision on which cohesive societies 
are constructed at the level of individual countries. It also presumes that 
a global agency would have the fi scal resources to enforce laws at the 
global level in the same way that individual advanced countries can 
enforce national laws. None of these presumptions are reasonable given 
the current global gaps among countries in terms of economics and pol-
itics. By our defi nition, the absence of a sustainable global political set-
tlement based on global redistributive and enforcement capabilities 
makes problematic any attempt to defi ne IFFs at the global level.
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To understand this more clearly, the differences between the political 
settlements in advanced and developing countries need to be spelled out. 
First, developing countries are structurally different because their inter-
nal political stability and economic development are not (and cannot 
normally be) organized through formal rules and laws to the extent 
observed in advanced countries. In developing countries, the legal frame-
work is not an adequate guide for identifying illicit capital fl ows even as a 
fi rst approximation. There are two essential limitations on a purely legal 
analysis of what is illicit in the typical developing country. First, in the 
realm of politics, the internal political stability of developing countries is 
not solely or even primarily based on social agreements consolidated 
through legal fi scal redistributions. For a variety of reasons, including 
limited fi scal space and more intense confl icts given the context of social 
transformations, redistributive fi scal arrangements are typically less 
transparent and less formal compared with those in advanced countries. 
The political problem involves delivering resources to powerful constit-
uencies that would otherwise be the source of political instability in a 
context of fi scal scarcity.
If politically powerful constituencies have to be accommodated legiti-
mately and transparently, acceptable redistributions to more deserving 
groups such as the severely poor have to be agreed upon simultaneously 
to achieve political legitimacy. The fi scal sums typically do not add up in 
developing countries for a redistributive package that would pass the test 
of public legitimacy, as well as provide the redistribution required by 
powerful groups. As a result, it is not surprising that the critical redistri-
butions to powerful constituencies typically occur through patron-client 
politics and other mechanisms characterized by limited transparency. If 
successful, these arrangements achieve political stabilization by incorpo-
rating suffi cient numbers of politically powerful factions within the rul-
ing coalition. Even in developing countries where signifi cant fi scal redis-
tribution takes place, critical parts of the overall system of political 
redistribution are not based on transparently negotiated arrangements 
codifi ed in fi scal laws and economic policies (Khan 2005).
Second, the economies of developing countries are also signifi cantly 
different from the economies of advanced countries. Their formal or 
regulated modern sectors are normally a small part of the economy, and 
a much larger informal sector is unregulated or only partially regulated. 
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Much of the economy, including the formal sector, suffers from low pro-
ductivity and does not generate a big enough taxable surplus to pay for 
across-the-board protection of property rights and adequate economic 
regulation. The achievement of competitiveness also often requires peri-
ods of government assistance and strong links between business and 
politics. This is because, even though wages may be low, the productivity 
of the modern sector is often even lower. Developing countries have 
poor infrastructure and poor skills in labor and management, and, in 
particular, they lack much of the tacit knowledge required to use mod-
ern technologies effi ciently, even the most labor-intensive ones.
The strategies through which developing countries progress up the 
technology ladder while maintaining their internal political arrange-
ments can differ substantially across countries (Khan and Blankenburg 
2009). These strategies usually involve creating opportunities and condi-
tions for profi table investment in at least a few sectors at a time. Because 
the creation of profi table conditions across the board is beyond the fi scal 
capacities of developing countries, these strategies inevitably create priv-
ileges for the modern sector and, often, for particular subsectors through 
government interventions in prices, exchange rates, interest rates, regu-
lations, taxes, subsidies, and other policy instruments. The strategies for 
assisting learning in countries with industrial policies, such as the East 
Asian tigers, are well known. But the growth of modern sectors in all 
developing countries has required accidents or smaller-scale policy 
interventions that overcame the built-in disadvantages of operating 
profi tably given the adverse initial conditions (Khan 2009). Some of this 
assistance may be formal and legal, but other aspects of assistance may 
be informal and even illegal. For instance, some fi rms may informally 
have privileged access to land, licenses, and other public resources. Some 
of these privileges may be important in offsetting initial low produc-
tivity or the higher costs created by poor infrastructure and the poor 
enforcement of property rights and the rule of law. Deliberately or oth-
erwise, these arrangements can assist some fi rms in starting production 
in adverse conditions and engage in learning by doing, but they can also 
simply provide privileges to unproductive groups (Khan and Jomo 2000; 
Khan 2006).
Thus, in many cases, business-government links in developing coun-
tries are predatory from the perspective of the broader society. Resources 
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captured by privileged fi rms in the modern sector are wasted, and, in 
these cases, the modern sector remains ineffi cient at signifi cant social 
cost. However, in other cases, periods of hand-holding and bailouts do 
lead to the emergence of global competitiveness through formal and 
informal links between emerging enterprises and the state. The effi cacy 
of developmental strategies depends on the nature of the relationships 
between business and politics, the compulsions on both sides to generate 
productivity growth over time, the time horizons, and so on, but not in 
any simple way on the degree to which formal laws are upheld (Khan 
and Blankenburg 2009; Khan 2009).
It is not surprising that all developing countries fail the test of adher-
ence to a rule of law and political accountability. Yet, some developing 
countries perform much better than others in terms of politically sus-
tainable growth that eventually results in poverty reduction, economic 
development, and movement toward the economic and political condi-
tions of advanced countries. These observations suggest that what con-
stitutes a damaging fi nancial fl ow may be more diffi cult to identify in 
developing countries. Because of the signifi cant differences in the eco-
nomic and political conditions across developing countries, we fi nd it 
useful to distinguish between normal developing countries, which we 
call intermediate developers, and fragile developers that suffer from 
more serious crises in their political settlements.
Normal developing countries: The intermediate developers
Our term intermediate developers refers to the typical or normal devel-
oping country in which internal political and economic arrangements 
sustain political stability. Their internal political settlements can be quite 
varied, but also differ from those in advanced countries in that their 
reproduction typically requires signifi cant informal arrangements in 
both redistributive arrangements and the organization of production. 
Nonetheless, in most developing countries, there is a political settlement 
that has characteristics of reproducibility, and these societies can sustain 
economic and political viability. This does not mean that the govern-
ments are universally recognized as legitimate, nor are violence and con-
fl ict entirely absent, but the political arrangements are able to achieve 
development (at different rates) without descending into unsustainable 
levels of violence.3 Countries in this category include, for example, China 
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and most countries of South Asia, Southeast Asia, and Latin America. In 
contrast, fragile developers are countries, such as the Democratic Repub-
lic of Congo or Somalia, in which a minimally sustainable political set-
tlement among the contending forces in society does not exist and in 
which the fundamental problem is to construct this in the fi rst place.
Our analysis of illicit capital fl ows from intermediate developers can 
be simplifi ed by distinguishing between political and economic actors 
according to their motivations for making decisions about fi nancial 
fl ows. The former are likely to be concerned about threats to the pro-
cesses through which they accumulate resources and about the political 
threats to these resources; the latter are likely to be primarily concerned 
with profi t opportunities and expropriation risk. In reality, political and 
economic actors may sometimes be the same persons; in this case, we 
have to look at the motivations jointly. The simplifi cation may nonethe-
less help one to think through the different analytical issues involved so 
that appropriate policies can be identifi ed in particular cases.
Financial outﬂ ows driven by political actors. An obvious reason why 
political actors in developing countries may engage in capital fl ight is 
that their opponents may expropriate their assets if the opponents come 
to power. A signifi cant amount of the resource accumulation is likely to 
have violated some aspect of the structure of formal laws. The legality 
can be questioned by the next ruling coalition for a number of reasons, 
including expeditious political reasons, for instance, to undermine the 
ability of previous ruling factions to return to power. Let us assume that 
this capital fl ight is immediately damaging because it represents a loss of 
resources. The issue from the perspective of an analysis of (illicit) capital 
fl ight involves assessing the consequences of hypothetically blocking 
specifi c fi nancial outfl ows in these circumstances. The important point 
is that patron-client politics cannot be immediately replaced by fi scal 
politics because these countries are developing economies with a limited 
tax base. Therefore, the fundamental mechanisms through which politi-
cal entrepreneurs gain access to economic resources are unlikely to dis-
appear in the short run in most developing countries, with the exception 
of those that are close to constructing Weberian states.
Given the nature of political settlements in developing countries, 
attempting to block fi nancial outfl ows driven by politicians is unlikely to 
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lead to a liberal rule of law because any new ruling coalition will also 
require off-budget resources to maintain political stability and will keep 
resources available for elections (and for their own accumulation). If 
these resources can be expropriated by a new coalition after an election, 
this can signifi cantly increase the stakes during elections. Expropriating 
the fi nancial resources of former politicians may therefore have the par-
adoxical effect of increasing instability (the case of Thailand after 2006, 
for example). It can increase the intensity with which assets of the cur-
rent ruling coalition are attacked by the opposition, and it can increase 
the intensity of opposition by excluded coalitions as they attempt to pro-
tect their assets from expropriation. Indeed, the evidence from stable 
intermediate developers such as Brazil or India suggests that the stability 
of the political settlement in the presence of competition between 
patron-client parties requires a degree of maturity whereby new coali-
tions understand that it is not in their interest to expropriate the previ-
ous coalition fully. An informal live-and-let-live rule of law guiding the 
behavior of political coalitions can reduce the costs of losing and allow 
elections to mature beyond winner-takes-all contests. However, this type 
of informal understanding is vulnerable.
If the competition between political factions has not achieved a level 
of maturity that informally sets limits on what can be clawed back from 
a previous ruling coalition, a premature attempt at restricting fi nancial 
fl ows may have the unintended effect of signifi cantly raising the stakes in 
political confl icts. If the ruling coalition cannot protect some of its assets 
in other jurisdictions, it may feel obliged to use violence or intimidation 
to stay in power, and this can increase the likelihood of eventual expro-
priation. Paradoxically, some amount of fl exibility in politically driven 
fi nancial fl ows at early stages of state building may help lower the stakes 
at moments of regime change. Thus, restrictions on political fi nancial 
fl ows are only likely to improve social outcomes if live-and-let-live com-
promises between political coalitions have already been established. For 
instance, in more stable political settlements such as in Argentina, Brazil, 
or India, a gradual increase on restrictions on fi nancial outfl ows could 
lead to better social outcomes as long as current politicians feel that the 
risk of domestic expropriation is low and the restrictions simply restrict 
excessive illegal expropriation by political players. If formal rules restrict 
political accumulation that is beyond what is normally required to sus-
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tain political operations in this political settlement, then fi nancial fl ows 
that violate these rules can justifi ably be considered illicit. In contrast, if 
the informal understanding between competing parties is still vulnera-
ble and live-and-let-live arrangements have not become entrenched (as 
in Bangladesh, Bolivia, Thailand, and, to an extent, República Bolivari-
ana de Venezuela), attempts to limit fi nancial outfl ows driven by politi-
cal players are likely to be evaded or, if forcefully enforced, can occasion-
ally have damaging consequences in raising the stakes during elections. 
According to our defi nition, we should not consider all capital outfl ows 
by political actors to be illicit in these contexts, with critically important 
policy implications. Clearly, these judgments refl ect an attempt to take 
into account direct and indirect effects and are open to a degree of dis-
agreement. However, we believe that these judgments have to be made 
and that they are best made explicitly.
Financial outﬂ ows driven by economic actors. Financial outfl ows driven 
by economic actors can be motivated by concerns about expropriation 
or low profi tability (in addition to tax evasion and tax avoidance). These 
factors help explain the frequent paradox that economic actors in devel-
oping countries often shift assets to advanced-country jurisdictions 
where tax rates are higher and the returns achieved, say, on bank depos-
its, are nominally lower (Tornell and Velasco 1992). Some of these fl ows 
are damaging, and blocking them (if that were possible) is likely to leave 
society more well off. Others are not damaging, or, even if they are dam-
aging, attempts to block them would not be positive for society after all 
the direct and indirect effects are weighed.
Financial outﬂ ows with net negative effects. The simplest cases involve 
capital fl ight whereby both the direct and indirect effects are negative, such 
as those driven by tax evasion or tax avoidance. The direct effect of these 
outfl ows is likely to be negative if tax revenue and, with it, public invest-
ment is reduced, and, in addition, the indirect effect is also likely to be 
negative if the taxes are socially legitimate and their loss undermines polit-
ical stability. The capital fl ight in these cases is clearly illicit. Another clear-
cut case is that of theft of public resources with the collusion of political 
actors. A particularly serious example is the two-way capital fl ow involved 
in the odious debt buildup resulting if external borrowing by governments 
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is turned, more or less directly, into private asset accumulation abroad by 
domestic residents. Examples include the Philippines and several Sub-
Saharan African economies (Boyce and Ndikumana 2001; Cerra, Rishi, 
and Saxena 2008; Hermes and Lensink 1992; Vos 1992). Odious debt has 
no redeeming features, and, if it can be blocked, the developing country is 
likely to be more well off in terms of direct investment effects. In normal 
cases where a political settlement involving powerful domestic constituen-
cies exists, theft on this scale by a subset of the ruling coalition is likely to 
undermine the political settlement and have additional negative effects on 
growth. Blocking these fi nancial outfl ows is therefore likely to have a posi-
tive effect on growth through both direct and indirect effects. The fl ows 
are thus rightly classifi ed as illicit.
Many cases are more complex. Consider a plausible case wherein cap-
ital fl ight is driven by attempts to evade environmental restrictions, labor 
laws, or other socially desirable regulations that reduce profi ts. In prin-
ciple, these could be welfare-enhancing regulations, and capital fl ight to 
evade them could be judged illicit. However, a more careful evaluation 
suggests that the issue may vary from case to case. Because developing 
countries are often competing on narrow margins with other developing 
countries, investors may threaten to leave and begin to transfer resources 
away from a country. What should the policy response be? If social poli-
cies in the developing country are signifi cantly out of line with competi-
tors, these policies may have made the country uncompetitive. Yet, 
removing all social protections is also not desirable. The real issue in this 
case is coordination in social policy that takes into account differences in 
initial conditions across countries, not an easy task. If such a coordinated 
policy structure is not possible across countries, the enforcement of 
restrictions on capital fl ight is unlikely to improve growth because 
domestic investors may become globally uncompetitive. These capital 
fl ows would therefore not be illicit according to our defi nition because 
blocking capital fl ight without deeper policy coordination may fail to 
improve economic outcomes in a particular country. This has important 
policy implications: all our effort should not be put into trying to block 
capital fl ight regardless of the underlying causes. Rather, the policy focus 
should be either to achieve the coordination of social policies across 
developing countries or, more realistic, to change policies such that reg-
ulations are aligned across similar countries.
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An even more important example concerns policies to overcome 
major market failures such as those constraining technological capabili-
ties. Growth in developing countries is typically constrained by low prof-
itability because of the absence of formal and informal policies to address 
market failures and, in particular, the problem of low productivity 
because of missing tacit knowledge about modern production processes 
(Khan 2009). In the absence of policies that assist technological capabil-
ity development, capital is likely to fl ow out of the developing country 
despite low wages. Countervailing policies, variously described as tech-
nology policies or industrial policies, involve the provision of incentives 
for investors to invest in particular sectors and to put in the effort to 
acquire the missing tacit knowledge. In the presence of such policies, 
some restrictions on capital movements may be potentially benefi cial. 
The provision of incentives to invest in diffi cult processes of technology 
acquisition and learning may be wasted if domestic investors can claim 
the assistance without delivering domestic capability development. 
Unrestricted fi nancial outfl ows may allow domestic investors to escape 
sanctions attached to poor performance. If the policy is well designed 
and the state has the capability to enforce it, restrictions on fi nancial 
outfl ows may be socially benefi cial. Some amount of capital fl ight may 
still take place, and liberal economists may want to argue that this is a 
justifi cation for removing the policy and returning to a competitive 
market. However, if the market failures constraining investments are sig-
nifi cant, this may be the wrong response, if a credible technology policy 
exists. The restrictions on capital fl ight in East Asian countries in the 
1960s and 1970s worked dramatically because they combined signifi cant 
incentives for domestic investment with credible restrictions on capital 
fl ight. In such cases, capital fl ight would be directly damaging in the 
sense of lost investment and not have any indirect positive effects either. 
It would therefore be illicit according to our defi nition.
The mirror image of this is capital fl ight driven by the absence of prof-
itable domestic opportunities in a country without effective technology 
policies. Capital is likely to seek offshore investment opportunities. Even 
if this capital fl ight appears to be damaging in an immediate sense, it 
may not be. This is because attempting to block capital fl eeing low prof-
itability is unlikely on its own to solve the deeper problems of growth. 
Indeed, enforcing restrictions on capital outfl ows in a context of low 
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profi tability and absent policies to correct market failures could para-
doxically make economic performance worse by reducing the incomes 
of nationals. Capital fl ight in these contexts is not necessarily damaging 
in terms of direct effects on growth, and the indirect effects may also not 
be negative unless we optimistically believe that blocking these fl ows will 
force the government into adopting the appropriate policies for tackling 
market failures. Because this is an unlikely scenario, it would be mislead-
ing to classify these fi nancial outfl ows as illicit. There is an important 
policy implication: developing countries need to design policies to 
address low productivity and to absorb new technologies. Attempting to 
block fi nancial outfl ows without solving these problems will not neces-
sarily improve social outcomes.
A different and even more obvious case is one in which capital fl ight 
is induced by the presence of bad policies such as the protection of 
domestic monopolies that disadvantage investors who are not politically 
connected or privileged with monopoly rights. In this situation, if capi-
tal leaves the country, the direct effects may appear to be damaging in the 
sense of lost investment, but may not be if domestic investment oppor-
tunities are poor. The problem is not the capital fl ight, but the growth-
reducing arrangements that induce it. Blocking fi nancial outfl ows could, 
in an extreme case, lead to the consumption of capital by some investors 
because profi table investment opportunities may be unavailable. The 
indirect effects of blocking fi nancial outfl ows in this context may also 
not be positive, and the fi nancial outfl ow is not usefully described as 
illicit. The appropriate response would be to remove some of the under-
lying restrictions on investment.
Finally, a particularly interesting set of cases concerns fi nancial out-
fl ows associated with activities that are directly growth-sustaining, but 
have signifi cant negative effects on a society’s political settlement and, 
therefore, on long-run growth through indirect effects. A classic example 
is the business associated with narcotics and drugs. For many countries, 
including relatively developed countries like Mexico, the income from 
the production and marketing of drugs is a signifi cant contributor to 
overall economic activity. By some measures, there could be a signifi cant 
positive effect on growth as a direct effect. However, given the legal 
restrictions on the business in many countries, the activity inevitably 
involves criminality and massive hidden rents that disrupt the under-
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lying political settlement of the producing country. The indirect nega-
tive effects are likely to far outweigh any positive direct effect. It would be 
quite consistent with our defi nition to describe the fi nancial fl ows asso-
ciated with these sectors as illicit.
Financial outﬂ ows with positive or neutral effects. We discuss in passing 
above a number of examples in which fi nancial outfl ows do not have a 
net negative effect if both direct and indirect effects are accounted for. In 
some cases, this can involve making diffi cult judgments that are specifi c 
to the context. For instance, in the presence of signifi cant market failures 
facing investors, it may sometimes be useful not to enforce restrictions 
on capital fl ight too excessively. In textbook models, developing coun-
tries lack capital and, therefore, capital should fl ow in if policies are 
undistorted. In reality, the productivity in developing countries is so low 
that most investments are not profi table, and temporary incentives are 
needed to attract investments (Khan 2009). It is possible that some of 
these incentives have to be made available in other jurisdictions to be 
credibly secure from expropriation. In these contexts, the strict enforce-
ment of restrictions on fi nancial fl ows may reduce the degree of freedom 
states have in constructing credible incentives for investors taking risks 
in technology absorption and learning.
For example, a signifi cant part of the foreign direct investments in 
India in the 1980s and 1990s came from jurisdictions such as Mauritius. 
A plausible interpretation is that much of this was Indian domestic capi-
tal going through Mauritius to come back for reinvestment in India. One 
side of this fl ow was clearly a hidden fi nancial outfl ow, the other a trans-
parent infl ow in the form of foreign direct investment. As a result, the 
developing country may not be a net capital loser, and, indeed, the incen-
tives provided through this arrangement may make new productive 
investment possible in areas where investment may not otherwise have 
taken place. As in the case of odious debt, recycling is also only one side 
of a two-way fl ow and is generally assumed to be driven by tax and regu-
latory arbitrage and to be harmful for society (for example, see Kant 
1998, 2002; Schneider 2003b, 2003c). However, in the case of countries 
with low productivity and missing tacit knowledge, the rents captured in 
this way may, in some situations, serve to make investments more attrac-
tive and thereby increase net investments. The direct effect may be to 
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promote growth. Recycling through a foreign jurisdiction may also be a 
mechanism for hiding the source of funds in cases in which much of the 
initial capital base of emerging capitalists has involved questionable pro-
cesses of accumulation that could be challenged by their competitors in 
terms of a formal interpretation of laws. Declaring these fl ows illicit for 
the purpose of blocking them may be a mistake. The direct effect is likely 
to be a reduction in investment because these types of accumulation 
may continue to remain hidden or be diverted into criminal activities. 
The expectation of positive indirect effects, for instance by creating dis-
incentives for accumulating resources through questionable informal 
processes, may also be misguided given the structural informality in 
developing countries discussed elsewhere above. These are matters of 
judgment in particular cases.
Sometimes, capital outfl ows may appear to be illicit simply because 
they are disallowed by ill-considered laws that cannot be enforced. If the 
laws were enforced, society might become even less well off. For instance, 
in some developing countries, vital imports may be illegal for no obvi-
ous reason, forcing importers to engage in illegal fi nancial transfers to 
get around the restrictions. In many developing countries, remitting for-
eign exchange out of the country may also be disallowed for many pur-
poses, including vitally important ones. An example is the widespread 
practice of illegally remitting foreign exchange from Bangladesh to for-
eign employment agencies that want a commission for arranging over-
seas employment for Bangladeshi workers. If, as a result, domestic work-
ers are able to fi nd employment on better terms than in the domestic 
market, their higher incomes are likely to have a positive effect on wel-
fare, and their remittances are likely to support domestic growth. If ille-
gal fi nancial outfl ows involve payments to people smugglers, and most 
domestic workers end up less well off, the direct effects alone would 
make us classify the fi nancial fl ows as illicit. A careful analysis is required 
in each case, but, in many cases, the problem may be an inappropriate 
legal or regulatory structure.
Table 2.1 summarizes some of the examples we discuss. Only fl ows 
falling in the middle row of the table are properly illicit according to our 
defi nition. Defi ning as illicit the other capital fl ows listed may be a policy 
error even in the case of fi nancial fl ows in which the direct effect appears 
to be damaging. Nor is the legal-illegal divide of much use in the typical 
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developing-country case if the aim is to identify fi nancial fl ows that need 
to be blocked to make the developing country more well off. In any par-
ticular country, many fi nancial fl ows may be simultaneously driven by 
different underlying causes. The judgment that has to be made involves 
identifying the drivers of the most signifi cant fi nancial fl ows and assess-
ing whether these are damaging in the context of the specifi c political 
settlement.
Developing countries in crisis: The fragile developers
Fragile developing countries are ones in which the internal political set-
tlement is close to collapsing or has collapsed, and political factions are 
engaged in violent confl ict. This group includes, for example, Afghani-
stan, the Democratic Republic of Congo, and Somalia. It also includes a 
number of other developing countries in North and Sub-Saharan Africa, 
Table 2.1. Logical Framework for Identifying Illicit Flows from Developing Countries
Net effect on growth
(including indirect effects)
Direct effect on growth
Direct effect negative 
(ﬂ ow can be legal)
Direct effect positive or neutral 
(ﬂ ow can be illegal)
Net effect negative
(ﬂ ow is illicit even if legal)
Examples: Capital outﬂ ows to 
evade/avoid legitimate taxes
Evasion of restrictions that support 
an effective industrial policy
Financial outﬂ ows of political actors 
in the presence of live-and-let-live 
agreements
Examples: Financial ﬂ ows associated 
with the production of drugs and 
narcotics
Net effect positive or 
neutral
(ﬂ ow is not illicit even if 
illegal)
Examples: Financial outﬂ ows of 
political actors in the absence of 
informal agreements restricting 
expropriation
Examples: Unauthorized payments 
to overseas agencies to provide jobs 
that are better than domestic 
opportunities (Bangladesh)
Recycling that bypasses critical 
market failures in developing econ-
omies and increases investment by 
domestic investors in their own 
country
Outﬂ ows from countries in which 
proﬁ tability is low because of 
absent industrial policy or presence 
of damaging policies such as pro tec-
 tion for domestic monopolies
Source: Author compilation.
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Latin America and the Caribbean, and Central Asia in which political 
settlements are highly vulnerable to collapse in the near future. IFFs may 
appear to be at the heart of their fragility and, indeed, may be fueling 
confl icts. However, we argue that it is diffi cult to defi ne what is illicit in 
such a context of confl ict. Fundamental disagreements about the distri-
bution of benefi ts are unlikely to be resolved without recourse to sys-
temic violence.
Violence is, nonetheless, not the distinctive feature of fragile coun-
tries; there may also be pockets of intense violence in intermediate devel-
opers such as Bolivia, Brazil, India, or Thailand. Rather, fragile countries 
are characterized by a signifi cant breakdown of the political settlement 
and, in extreme cases, also of social order. While pockets of rudimentary 
social order may spontaneously emerge in such societies, this is largely 
limited to the organization of violence and subnational economies sup-
porting the economy of violence. There is a grey area between interme-
diate developers facing growing internal confl icts and a developing 
country classifi ed as fragile. Nonetheless, in intermediate developers, 
while a few political groups and factions may be engaging in signifi cant 
violence, most signifi cant political factions are engaged in the normal 
patron-client politics of rent seeking and redistribution using the formal 
and informal mechanisms through which political settlements are con-
structed in these countries. A political settlement is possible because 
there is a viable distribution of resources across the most powerful 
groups that refl ects their relative power and that can be reproduced over 
time. This is a necessary condition describing a sustainable end to sig-
nifi cant violence and the emergence of a political settlement.
The defi ning characteristic of fragility is that a sustainable balance of 
power and a corresponding distribution of benefi ts across powerful 
political actors have not emerged. Violence is the process through which 
contending groups are attempting to establish and test the distribution 
of power on which a future political settlement could emerge. But this 
may take a long time because the assessment by different groups of what 
they can achieve may be unrealistic, and some groups may believe that, 
by fi ghting long enough, they can militarily or even physically wipe out 
the opposition. In some cases, this belief may be realistic (Sri Lanka in 
2010); in other cases, the attempt to wipe out the opposition can result 
in a bloody stalemate until negotiations about a different distribution of 
 Governance and Illicit Flows 55
benefi ts can begin (perhaps Afghanistan in 2010). The analysis of what 
is socially damaging needs to be fundamentally reevaluated and rede-
fi ned in these contexts, and this has implications for our assessment of 
illicit fl ows.
The historical examples tell us that apparently predatory resource 
extraction has been the precursor of the emergence of viable political 
settlements that have generated longer-term social order and viable states 
(Tilly 1985, 1990). Yet, in contemporary fragile societies, new circum-
stances make it less likely that confl icts will result in the evolution of rela-
tionships between organizers of violence and their constituents that 
resemble state building. First, natural resources can give organizers of 
violence in some societies access to previously unimaginable amounts of 
purchasing power, destroying incentives for internal coalition building 
with economic constituents in the sense described by Tilly. Second, the 
presence of advanced countries that manufacture sophisticated weapons 
and can pump in vast quantities of resources in the form of military assis-
tance or aid also changes the incentives of domestic organizers of vio-
lence. Instead of having to recognize internal distributions of power and 
promote productive capabilities, these people recognize that the chances 
of winning now depend at least partly on international alliances and the 
ability to play along with donor discourses. Domestic organizers who try 
to fi ght wars by taxing their constituents in sustainable ways are likely to 
be annihilated by opponents who focus on acquiring foreign friends.
These considerations should give us serious cause for concern in talk-
ing about IFFs in these contexts in which the indirect effects of fi nancial 
fl ows through the promotion or destruction of political stability are 
likely to far outweigh the direct effects on growth. By its nature the con-
struction of politically stable settlement involves winners and losers: 
strategies of state or polity formation are not neutral in any sense.
The terminology of illicit fl ows in these contexts should preferably be 
avoided, or its use should be restricted to fi nancial fl ows that are illicit 
explicitly from the perspective of the observer. For instance, the fl ow of 
narcotics incomes, grey or black market transactions in the global arms 
market, or sales of natural resources by warlords may go against the legiti-
mate interests of outsiders, and they are entitled to declare the associated 
fi nancial fl ows as illicit from the perspective of their interests. This is justifi -
able if these fl ows are causing damage to the interests of other countries.
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We should not, however, pretend that blocking particular fl ows is in 
any way neutral or necessarily benefi cial for the construction of viable 
political settlements, because there are likely to be many possible settle-
ments that different groups are trying to impose. Moreover, competing 
groups of outsiders are also likely to be providing aid, guns, and, some-
times, their own troops to their clients within the country. There is no 
easy way to claim that some of these resource fl ows are legitimate and 
constructive and others are not without exposing signifi cant political 
partiality toward particular groups.
The real problem is that we do not know the outcomes of these con-
fl icts, and the internal distribution of power is both unstable and chang-
ing. Because the sustainability of the eventual sociopolitical order that 
may appear depends on the emergence of a sustainable distribution of 
power among the key groups engaged in confl ict, we cannot properly 
identify ex ante the resource fl ows that are consistent with a sustainable 
political settlement. The resource fl ows are likely to help determine the 
political settlement as much as sustain it.
It follows that the analysis and identifi cation of illicit capital fl ows 
must be different across intermediate developers and across fragile 
developers. Fragile societies typically do not have internationally com-
petitive sectors in their economies, nor do their competing leaders have 
the capacity to encourage productive sectors effectively. The adverse 
conditions created by confl ict mean that signifi cant countervailing poli-
cies would have to be adopted to encourage productive investment in 
these contexts. Though this is not impossible, as the example of the Pal-
estinian Authority in the fi ve years immediately following the Oslo 
Accords shows (Khan 2004), the likely direct growth effect of particular 
fi nancial fl ows is a moot question in most cases of fragility.
Globally competitive economic activities do take place in many con-
fl icts, but these are of a different nature from the development of tech-
nological and entrepreneurial skills with which intermediate developers 
have to grapple. One example is natural resource extraction that is a spe-
cial type of economic activity because it does not require much domestic 
technical and entrepreneurial capability. The returns may be large 
enough for some foreign investments or for extraction based on arti-
sanal technologies even in war zones. A similar argument applies to the 
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cultivation of plants associated with the manufacture of narcotics. The 
fi nancial fl ows from these activities are likely to be directly controlled by 
political actors and may provide the funds for sustaining the confl ict. 
The only type of capital fl ight that is likely to emanate directly from the 
decisions of economic actors is the obvious one of attempting to escape 
destruction or appropriation. But if individuals try to move their assets 
out of a war zone to avoid expropriation, it would be unhelpful to char-
acterize these as illicit.
Of most concern in fragile societies are the fl ows organized by politi-
cal actors, as these are bound to be connected with ongoing confl icts in 
some way. In the case of intermediate developers, our concern is that, 
under some conditions, restrictions on fi nancial fl ows may inadvertently 
increase the stakes for holding on to power. A similar, but obviously 
more serious set of uncertainties affects the analysis of confl icts. In the-
ory, if all parties to a confl ict were blocked from accessing the outside 
world, this may have a positive effect in forcing them to recognize the 
existing distribution of power and reaching a compromise more quickly 
than otherwise. In the real world, a total sealing off is unlikely. Some par-
ties to the confl ict are likely to be recognized by outside powers as legiti-
mate well before an internal political settlement has been arrived at and 
receive fi nancial and military assistance.
Two entirely different outcomes may follow. The less likely is that 
the groups excluded by the international community recognize the 
hopelessness of their situation and either capitulate or agree to the 
settlement that is offered. A more likely outcome, as in Afghanistan, is 
that external assistance to help one side while attempting to block 
resource fl ows to the other by declaring these to be unauthorized or 
illicit can increase the local legitimacy of the opposition and help to 
intensify the confl ict. In the end, every group is likely to fi nd some 
external allies and ways to funnel resources to fi ght a confl ict where the 
stakes are high. Paradoxically, fi nding new foreign allies becomes easier 
if the enhanced legitimacy of the excluded side makes it more likely 
that they will win. These considerations suggest that a neutral way of 
defi ning IFFs is particularly diffi cult, perhaps impossible, in the case of 
fragile developers.
Table 2.2 summarizes our analysis in this section.
58 Draining Development
Policy Responses to Illicit Flows
Our discussion above suggests that capital outfl ows from developing 
countries qualify as illicit according to our defi nition if they have a nega-
tive economic impact on a particular country after we take both direct 
and indirect effects into account in the context of a specifi c political 
settlement. Both judgments about effects are counterfactual in the sense 
that we are asking what would directly happen to growth if a particular 
fl ow could be blocked, and then we are asking what would happen after 
the indirect effects arising from adjustments by critical stakeholders to 
the new situation have taken place. The latter assessment depends on our 
knowledge about the economy and polity of the society as summarized 
Table 2.2. Illicit Financial Flows in Different Contexts
Country 
type Deﬁ ning features Main policy concern
Main types of 
illicit capital ﬂ ows
Policy focus in 
addressing illicit 
capital ﬂ ows
Advanced 
economies
High average incomes 
and long-term political 
stability. Political process 
responds effectively to 
economic underperfor-
mance and distributive 
concerns.
Laws and ﬁ scal programs 
should maintain social 
cohesion and economic 
growth.
Mainly ﬂ ows that violate 
existing laws (for 
example, tax evasion). 
Occasionally refer to 
legal ﬂ ows where laws 
no longer reﬂ ect social 
consensus or economic 
sustainability.
Strengthen enforcement 
and regulation. At 
moments of crisis, 
attempt to bring law 
back into line with broad 
social consensus on 
economic and political 
goals.
Intermediate 
or normal 
developers
Lower average incomes, 
and politics based on a 
combination of formal 
and informal (patron-
client) redistributive 
arrangements. Achieves 
long-term stability 
without sustained 
violence.
Develop, maintain, and 
expand viable develop -
ment strategies, in 
particular the develop-
ment of broadbased 
productive sectors.
Flows that undermine 
developmental strate-
gies. Capital ﬂ ight in a 
context of a failure to 
raise domestic proﬁ t-
ability is problematic, 
but is not necessarily 
illicit. Flows associated 
with internationally 
criminalized activities 
like drugs.
Economic policies to 
enhance proﬁ tability 
primarily by addressing 
critical market failures. 
Build governance 
capabilities to enforce 
restrictions on ﬁ nancial 
ﬂ ows that make these 
policies less vulnerable to 
political contestation.
Fragile 
developing 
countries
Breakdown of existing 
political settlements 
resulting in the outbreak 
of sustained violence 
that undermines longer-
term conditions for the 
maintenance of basic 
sociopolitical order.
State building and 
reconstruction of a 
viable political 
settlement to allow 
society to embark on a 
sustainable path of 
economic development.
Not possible to deﬁ ne 
illicit ﬂ ows in a neutral 
way when elites are in 
conﬂ ict. The effects of 
ﬁ nancial ﬂ ows have to 
be judged primarily in 
terms of their effects 
on the establishment 
of a particular political 
settlement.
A viable political settle-
ment requires compet-
ing groups to accept a 
distribution of beneﬁ ts 
consistent with their 
understanding of their 
relative power. Difﬁ cult 
for outsiders to con-
tribute positively and 
easy to prolong conﬂ icts 
inadvertently.
Source: Author compilation.
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in the political settlement. This methodology allows us to derive some 
useful policy conclusions in the case of intermediate developers. By con-
trast, the use of the illicit fl ow terminology involves signifi cant dangers 
in the case of fragile countries. Policy makers should at least be explicitly 
aware of this.
In this section, we discuss a sequential approach for the identifi cation 
of feasible policy interventions to address illicit capital outfl ows that sat-
isfy our defi nition and that occur in intermediate developers.
Assume that a particular capital outfl ow from an intermediate devel-
oper is illicit according to our defi nition. The core policy concern here is 
a microlevel assessment of how any particular set of measures to restrict 
the illicit capital outfl ow affects the macrodynamics of the economy and 
society in question. While our assessment about the nature of an illicit 
fl ow has taken into account the indirect effects of blocking the fl ow, the 
implementation of any policy almost always gives rise to unintended 
consequences, and all the indirect effects may not be understood. More 
often than not, policy failure is the failure to take such unintended con-
sequences into account ex ante.
An illustration of such unintended consequences, in this case pertain-
ing to the international regulation of fi nancial fl ows, is provided by Gap-
per’s analysis (2009) of the Basel Accords I (1998) and II (2004), which 
were designed to regulate global banks essentially by setting higher capi-
tal adequacy standards and improving the measurement of leverage. 
Ironically, these standards inadvertently accelerated rather than muted 
fi nancial engineering by banks, in particular the securitization of risky 
mortgage debts. The accords raised the threshold of responsible bank-
ing, but simultaneously created incentives to fi nd a way around the 
thresholds that would prove more disastrous to the global economy. As 
Gapper remarks (2009, 1), “it would be wrong to throw away the entire 
Basel framework . . . because global banks found ways to game the sys-
tem.” The obvious implication is that one must strengthen rather than 
throw away existing regulations.
More generally, in our view, an effective policy response to illicit fl ows 
requires a step-by-step, sequential assessment of the macrolevel effects of 
blocking particular capital fl ows. To illustrate what this entails in the case 
of an intermediate developer, consider the example provided by Gulati 
(1987) and Gordon Nembhard’s analysis (1996) of industrialization 
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 policies in Brazil and the Republic of Korea from the 1960s to the 1980s. 
Both authors argue that trade misinvoicing in these countries during this 
period followed an unusual pattern in that imports tended to be under-
invoiced. Both authors explain this in terms of domestic producers and 
traders, “rather than being preoccupied with evading controls to earn 
foreign exchange, may be more concerned about meeting export and 
production targets and maximizing government plans” (Gordon Nemb-
hard 1996, 187). In these two countries (but not necessarily in others), 
there were potentially avoidable losses from trade misinvoicing, and 
these fl ows were therefore illicit. Nonetheless, the losses were signifi cantly 
smaller than the gains from the incentives created for higher investments 
in sectors promoted by the industrial policy. To decide whether or not to 
block illicit trade misinvoicing in these circumstances (and, if so, how), 
the most important aspect of policy design is to prepare a microlevel 
analysis of the impact of different ways of blocking these fl ows on the 
overall economy. This analysis has to take account of economic and 
political circumstances and the likely impact of particular regulatory 
strategies. Figure 2.2 illustrates the iterative process required to arrive at 
policy decisions that avoid unintended negative consequences.
Figure 2.2. Choosing Attainable Benchmarks for Policy Design
1.  Policy regime
ILLICIT
PRACTICES
INTERVENTION
INTERVENTION
INTERVENTION
ILLICIT
PRACTICES
4.  New policy regime
5.  New policy regime
3.  New policy regime
2.  New policy regime
6.  New policy regime
Source: Author compilation.
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Assume that the policy intervention from stage 1 to stage 2 in fi gure 
2.2 introduces an industrial policy regime to promote manufacturing 
exports. This, in turn, provides incentives for some illicit practices, giving 
rise to stage 3. Despite the presence of the illicit practices arising from the 
implementation of the industrial policy introduced in stage 2, the overall 
development outcome at stage 3 is reasonably good. There are several 
possible responses to the observation of illicit practices at stage 3. One 
option is to abandon the export-promoting industrial policies on the 
grounds that these create the incentive to underinvoice imports. This 
would be in line with the portfolio approach to capital fl ight that adopts 
competitive markets as the benchmark model. However, if critical mar-
ket failures were signifi cant to start with, developmental outcomes at 
position 1 may be worse than at position 3. Hence, an immediate response 
to the illicit fl ow problem at stage 3 that does not take account of devel-
opmental problems at stage 1 may be self-defeating. Indeed, in terms of 
our defi nitions, the fi nancial fl ows at position 3 are not illicit with respect 
to position 1, though they are illicit with respect to position 2.
An obvious option would be to run a more effi cient customs adminis-
tration to raise the transaction costs of import underinvoicing, ideally to 
the point at which this becomes unprofi table. This is the preferable policy 
option: it could shift the policy framework from position 3 to position 4. 
The result would be a reduction in underinvoicing that then takes us 
to position 5, a combination of the new policy framework and a new 
(reduced) level of illicit fl ows. The developmental outcomes at stage 5 
would be better than those at stage 3, and, so, this response to the illicit 
fl ow problem would be entirely justifi ed. Yet, to get from position 3 to 
position 5 requires a careful microlevel analysis of the costs and benefi ts 
of different policies. If import underinvoicing and the illicit profi ts asso-
ciated with it could be eliminated without jeopardizing the participation 
of private sector fi rms in the export promotion program, the policy of 
better enforcement would be effective and economically justifi ed.
In contrast, consider the case (such as Brazil in the 1970s rather than 
Korea) in which tolerating some import underinvoicing is an informal 
incentive to ensure private sector participation in a growth-enhancing 
export promotion program. If the extra incomes from this source are 
important to ensuring private sector participation in the policy, an 
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attempt to remove these rents could inadvertently result in more damag-
ing rent seeking by the private sector or the sector’s political refusal to 
participate in industrial policy programs. If either happened, the econ-
omy would be less well off and could revert to the less preferable position 
at stage 1. This assessment would depend on our understanding of the 
political settlement and the power of the private sector to resist the impo-
sition of policies that the sector perceives to be against its interests. The 
attempt to control the illicit fl ows would then have failed in a develop-
mental sense even if the illicit fl ows disappeared. The core policy task in 
this case would not be to block the illicit capital fl ows associated with 
stage 3 (import underinvoicing), but to support the creation of state 
capacities and an adjustment of the political settlement that would allow 
the effective implementation of effi cient customs administration in the 
future without reliance on informal perks such as import underinvoicing. 
More generally, this suggests that a careful sequential microanalysis of the 
macro-outcomes of blocking particular illicit capital fl ows is required, 
locating particular strategies in the context of specifi c initial conditions.
Conclusion
Our core concern has been to show that what constitutes an illicit capital 
outfl ow can vary across countries, depending on the core political and 
economic features. The number of capital outfl ows that are unequivocally 
illicit in our minimal defi nition is likely to be more limited than the num-
ber that might be defi ned as such in single-driver approaches based on 
questionable underlying economic models. Quantitative estimates of 
illicit fl ows using our defi nition are therefore likely to be considerably less 
spectacular than, for example, recent estimates of dirty money (see Kar 
and Cartwright-Smith 2008). This is precisely our point. We argue that, if 
economic development is to be the main concern in this debate, then the 
promotion of economic growth in the context of a distribution of benefi ts 
that is politically viable has to be the condition that any policy intervention 
must meet. Wider criteria than this to defi ne illicit capital outfl ows as a 
target for policy intervention by necessity rely on some broader notion of 
the social or economic good based on an abstract underlying model that 
may have little relevance in seeking development in the real world.
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Our analysis also questions the validity of a core premise of the capi-
tal fl ight literature, namely, that all fl ight capital, if retained domestically, 
will yield a higher social rate of return (Schneider 2003a; Cumby and 
Levich 1987; Walter 1987). The purpose of our analytical typology is to 
show that, from the point of view of economic and political develop-
ment, blocking all capital outfl ows from developing countries is not 
desirable. Moreover, as we outline in table 2.1, blocking some apparently 
damaging fl ows can also do more harm than good if these fl ows are 
driven by deeper problems (such as the absence of industrial policy, live-
and-let-live rules between competing political factions, or the presence 
of domestic monopolies). In these cases, we argue, it is a mistake to 
describe the resultant fl ows as illicit. The policy implication is not that 
nothing should be done in such cases. It is rather that the solution is to 
look for policies that address the underlying structural problems. In the 
case of fragile developers, our analysis points out the dangers of too eas-
ily defi ning what is illicit. Finally, our sequential impact assessment sug-
gests that there are dangers even in simplistically attacking capital fl ows 
that we do deem illicit. Even in these cases, it is possible that some policy 
responses are more effective than others, and policies that tackle illicit 
capital fl ows in isolation from the wider political settlements of which 
they are a part may leave society less well off.
Consider the following example on anti–money laundering (AML) 
policies. The cost-effectiveness of the AML regime promoted by the 
intergovernmental Financial Action Task Force is doubtful even for 
advanced economies (Reuter and Truman 2004; Schneider 2005).4 Shar-
man (2008) extends this analysis to developing countries, with a special 
focus on Barbados, Mauritius, and Vanuatu, and fi nds that AML stan-
dards have had a signifi cant net negative impact on these three develop-
ing countries. Essentially, the costs imposed on legitimate businesses and 
states having limited administrative and fi nancial capacity far out-
weighed the extremely limited benefi ts in terms of convictions or the 
recovery of illicit assets. Yet, according to Sharman, rather than rethink-
ing the policy model, its enforcement was strengthened mainly by black-
listing noncompliant countries and through competition between states 
for international recognition and imitation.
Sharman (2008, 651) highlights the case of Malawi, as follows:
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Malawi is not and does not aspire to be an international fi nancial center, 
nor has it been associated with money laundering or the fi nancing of ter-
rorism. Speaking at an international fi nancial summit in September 2006, 
the Minister of Economics and Planning recounted how his country had 
come to adopt the standard package of AML regulations. The Minister 
was told that Malawi needed an AML policy. The Minister replied that 
Malawi did not have a problem with money laundering, but was informed 
that this did not matter. When the Minister asked if the package could be 
adapted for local conditions he was told no, because then Malawi would 
not meet international standards in this area. The Minister was further 
informed that a failure to meet international AML standards would make 
it harder for individuals and fi rms in Malawi to transact with the outside 
world relative to its neighbors, and thus less likely to attract foreign invest-
ment. The Minister concluded: “We did as we were told.”
Notes
1. “The term, illicit fi nancial fl ows, pertains to the crossborder movement of money 
that is illegally earned, transferred, or utilized.” (Emphasis in original.) Global 
Financial Integrity summary fact sheet on illicit fi nancial fl ows, http://www.gfi p.
org/storage/gfip/documents/illicit%20flows%20from%20developing%20 
countries%20overview%20w%20table.pdf.
2. The most commonly applied variant of this residual measure subtracts capital 
outfl ows or uses of foreign exchange (the current account defi cit and increases 
in central bank reserves) from capital infl ows (net external borrowing, plus net 
foreign direct investment). An excess of infl ows over outfl ows is interpreted as 
indicative of capital fl ight. Nonbank variants of this measure include net acqui-
sitions of foreign assets by the private banking system in capital outfl ows.
3. Our intermediate developers should not be confused with middle-income coun-
tries. Relatively poor and middle-income developing countries can both have 
sustainable political settlements, and both can suffer from internal political crises 
that result in fragility as a result of a collapse in the internal political settlements.
4. See Financial Action Task Force, Paris, http://www.fatf-gafi .org/.
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Abstract
This chapter examines illicit capital fl ows from developing countries 
through analysis of one major component of the problem, tax evasion. 
The political economy defi nition put forward in the chapter clarifi es that 
the root cause of all illicit capital outfl ows is ultimately not poor policy or 
capacity constraints in administration, but the failure of political will. Tax 
evasion and the other major sources of illegal fl ows (criminality and cor-
ruption) fl ourish in the absence of the political ambition to build a legiti-
mate, effective state. Such effectiveness, including the effectiveness of tax 
systems, derives from formal and informal institutional arrangements 
(political settlements) that establish state legitimacy, promote prosperity, 
and raise public revenue. The commitment to these arrangements distin-
guishes illicit from illegal. It requires that political leaders and taxpayers 
perceive the need for effective tax systems to provide the state with the 
resources necessary to enforce their own property rights, deliver political 
stability, and promote economic growth. The extent and form of tax eva-
sion derive from the political consensus to tax effectively and develop the 
administrative capacity to do so. This, in turn, shapes and refl ects the 
intrinsic willingness to pay taxes (tax morale) of taxpayers. To contain 
Max Everest-Phillips
The Political Economy of 
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and Illicit Flows
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illicit capital fl ows, including tax evasion, the weak legitimacy of the state 
in many developing countries must be addressed. If regime leaders and 
elites are not prepared to tax themselves and prevent free-riding, genuine 
political ownership of efforts to curb illicit capital fl ows is problematic.
Introduction: Effective States, Tax Evasion, 
and Illicit Capital Flows
The G-8 world leaders, meeting in July 2009, recognized “the particu-
larly damaging effects of tax evasion for developing countries.”1 Effective 
states require effective, effi cient, and equitable tax systems. Creating the 
commitment of citizens not to evade taxation is a political process cen-
tral to state building; cajoling elites to pay taxes has always been an 
essential step to any state becoming effective. Bad governance manifests 
itself through an unjust tax system and rampant tax evasion (the illegal 
avoidance of paying taxation) (Everest-Phillips 2009a).2 Throughout 
history, tax has been a symbol of state authority; tax evasion an indicator 
of political resistance.3 Tax evasion is signifi cantly correlated with dis-
satisfaction with government, political interference in the economy, and 
weak governance (see, respectively, Lewis 1982; Kim 2008; Hayoz and 
Hug 2007). In modern times, widespread tax evasion remains a trigger 
for and indicator of political instability.4 Political and economic malaise 
intertwine. For instance, after the Tequila Crisis in Mexico, tax evasion 
increased from 43 percent of the total take in 1994, to 54 percent in 1995, 
and to 59 percent in the fi rst half of 1996.5
Political economy deﬁ nition: Flight or ﬂ ow? Illegal or illicit?
Considerable confusion has arisen in the nascent literature on illicit cap-
ital fl ows from the failure to develop conceptual clarity between capital 
fl ight and capital fl ows and between illicit and illegal. To establish clear 
defi nitions requires recognition that effective, legitimate states are cru-
cial for development (DFID 2006). Illicit indicates that the activity is 
generally perceived as illegitimate, which, in turn, requires the state to be 
regarded as legitimate. International capital transfers become illicit if 
they originate from an illegal source (evasion, corruption, or criminal-
ity) or are illegal by bypassing capital controls, but also immoral in 
undermining the state’s willingness and capacity to deliver better lives 
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for its citizens. (For simplicity, we treat illicit here to mean immoral and 
illegal, but there also exist potentially immoral, but not illegal capital 
fl ows, such as those arising from aggressive tax avoidance.) Flight indi-
cates exit from risk; fl ow is simply a movement of liquid fi nancial assets. 
By this defi nition, illegal capital fl ight is the rational, but unlawful, shift 
of assets away from high to low political risk, whereas illicit capital fl ows 
take place by choice despite a state’s political legitimacy evinced by a 
credible commitment to development in the national interest (table 3.1). 
The frequent confl ation of illicit and illegal loses the important moral 
dimension for developing countries and their partners in the interna-
tional community of the need to tackle poverty and deliver the United 
Nations’ Millennium Development Goals.
The three main drivers of illicit capital fl ows—tax evasion, corrup-
tion, and criminality—are, at once, both causes and effects of the fragil-
ity of state institutions and, so, challenge perceived legitimacy. Tax eva-
sion undermines the funding of the state and, thus, the legitimacy 
associated with the state through the delivery of public services; corrup-
tion weakens the moral legitimacy of the state; and criminality chal-
lenges the legitimacy of state authority. However, while the rationale for 
the illicit capital fl ows driven by these factors is clear, the relative impor-
tance of these factors in different contexts and the connections between 
them remain uncertain and unquantifi ed.6
This chapter outlines the political economy of the apparently most 
common and undoubtedly most politically complex and signifi cant of 
illicit fl ows, the fl ows linked to tax evasion. It argues that, because political 
Table 3.1. Proposed Typology: Illegal and Illicit Capital Flows and Capital Flight
Capital movement Illegal Illicit
Capital ﬂ ow (from greed) Unlawful asset transfer to hide 
wealth from the state
Asset transfer that immorally 
undermines a legitimate state’s 
capacity and commitment to 
development
Capital ﬂ ight (from risk) Unlawful asset transfer from a 
poor to a good governance 
context to reduce political risk 
(for example, from arbitrary 
autocratic rule)
Immoral asset transfer to 
reduce exposure to political risk 
(for example, from nascent 
democracy) 
Source: Author compilation.
72 Draining Development
governance is central to the problem of illicit capital fl ows, tackling the 
fl ows requires more than technocratic solutions. Domestic and interna-
tional efforts to contain illicit capital fl ows must include building state 
legitimacy through a locally credible political vision for sustainable devel-
opment. It concludes that the key policy concern in attempts to control 
illicit capital fl ows must be how to create the political interests and institu-
tional incentive structures so that political leaders and elites will tax them-
selves, thereby curtailing the potential benefi ts from those forms of illicit 
capital fl ows that may currently be funding their grip on power.
Effective states tackle illicit capital ﬂ ows
Where poor political governance refl ects and exacerbates political inse-
curity, signifi cant illicit capital fl ight may occur. Any modern state that is 
not a tax haven or an oil exporter requires resourcing through an effec-
tive tax system capable of constraining tax evasion. The state also requires 
perceived legitimacy so that taxpayers and citizens in general do not 
regard illegal capital outfl ows as licit, that is, as morally legitimate. Yet, 
many developing states are highly aid dependent and lack legitimacy 
in the eyes of their citizens; so, they need to strengthen their tax base 
and the willingness of their citizens to pay taxes (Chabal and Daloz 
1999; Everest-Phillips 2011). Overcoming this development conundrum 
requires recognition that politics shape both the root cause and the 
potential solution. Tax systems, which comprise legislation, policy, and 
administration, are part of this, refl ecting the national consensus on col-
lective action, through the political process, for resourcing essential pub-
lic goods such as security, rule of law, and the provision of basic services 
(Timmons 2005). Taxation refl ects the intrinsic legitimacy of the state 
(based on consent, manifested among taxpayers as tax morale, their 
inherent willingness to pay taxes) and funds the effectiveness of state 
institutions (manifested in actual compliance).7
The extent of tax evasion thus provides a good indicator of the com-
parative quality of governance.8 The state cannot function without rev-
enue; how that revenue is raised (the balance between coercion and con-
sent) mirrors the relationship between society and the state, but also 
shapes it: tax is state building in developing countries (Bräutigam, Fjeld-
stad, and Moore 2008; Everest-Phillips 2008a, 2010).9 While the size and 
structure of a country’s economy signifi cantly infl uence the types and 
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yield of the taxes that can be collected, the root cause of weaknesses in 
tax systems in many countries is ultimately not a limited economy, poor 
tax policy, or capacity constraints in tax administrations (Stotsky and 
WoldeMariam 1997). Rather, the problem is that taxation refl ects politi-
cal attitudes toward the state and the type of state that taxation should 
fund.10
Tax evasion and the potential illicit capital fl ows arising from it there-
fore fl ourish if there is a lack of political determination to build the legit-
imacy of the state needed to make taxation effective and deliver develop-
ment (Therkildsen 2008; Everest-Phillips 2009a).11 For example, across 
Africa, the postindependence collapse in governance was refl ected in tax 
evasion: thus, in Malawi, tax evasion increased sevenfold between 1972 
and 1990.12 Corruption also fl ourished as the state became the vehicle 
for personal enrichment by the elite, and the state’s challenged legiti-
macy encouraged institutionalized criminality (Bayart, Ellis, and Hibou 
1999).
As a result of such dynamics, containing all forms of illicit capital 
fl ows requires building state legitimacy and improving political and eco-
nomic governance. Empirical data consistently confi rm the importance 
of the perceived quality of governance for tax compliance. Public per-
ception of high levels of corruption, for example, is associated with high 
levels of tax evasion; this is both cause and effect given that higher levels 
of corruption lower the ratio of taxes to gross domestic product (GDP) 
(Rose-Ackerman 1999; Ghura 2002). Tax compliance does not depend 
solely or probably not even largely on a taxpayer’s analysis of cost, ben-
efi t, and risk of evasion (Alm and Martinez-Vazquez 2003). Instead, tax-
payers evade and illicitly move capital abroad not simply because the 
potential benefi t outweighs the perceived risk, but because they believe 
the state lacks the legitimacy of capable, accountable, and responsive 
governance (Steinmo 1993).
Indeed, in the face of rampant corruption, criminality, and waste in 
the public sector, tax evasion is seen as legitimate (Tanzi and Shome 
1993). Widespread tax evasion indicates a lack of tax effort: the state 
lacks the will to engage with its citizens, and citizens do not believe their 
interests coincide with those of the state. The fi scal social contract—
namely, a credible commitment among leaders, elites, and citizens to pay 
for and deliver sustainable national development—does not exist. The 
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popular Russian attitude toward tax evasion exemplifi es the relevant 
political context found in many developing countries, as follows:13
First, [Russian citizens] rightly did not believe that all “the other” taxpay-
ers were paying their taxes properly, so it was really no point in being “the 
only one” who acted honestly. The goods (public, semi-public or private) 
that the government was going to use the money to produce would simply 
not be produced because there were too little taxes paid in the fi rst place. 
Secondly, they believed that the tax authorities were corrupted, so that 
even if they paid their taxes, a signifi cant part of the money would never 
reach the hospitals or schools, etc. Instead, the money would fi ll the pock-
ets of the tax bureaucrats. (Rothstein 2001, 477)
Thus, tax evasion creates a vicious circle: the perception that others 
are not paying tax drastically reduces compliance and delegitimizes the 
state, fueling both capital fl ight and capital fl ows. So, for example, the 
private assets held abroad by Venezuelan citizens more than doubled, 
from US$23 billion to US$50 billion, between 1998 and 2005 as a result 
of widespread tax evasion and capital fl ight arising from the collapse of 
the political legitimacy of the state as perceived by taxpaying citizens 
under the divisive populist politics of Chavez’s Bolivarian Revolution 
(Di John 2009). Only if the state formulates an inclusive vision for eco-
nomic growth and development that is politically credible with a broad 
base of taxpayers and holders of capital, as well as the wider electorate, 
does rational capital fl ight from governance risk become illicit capital 
fl ow, that is, an immoral undermining of the state’s commitment to pov-
erty reduction, sustainable economic growth, and long-term political 
stability.
Evasion into illicit outﬂ ows: Looting, rent-scraping, 
and dividend-collecting
Illicit international capital transfers require three drivers: (1) opportu-
nity, particularly facilitated by globalization; (2) pull, that is, attraction 
to more effective governance contexts with less political risk (fl ight); and 
(3) push, that is, the lack of a credible domestic commitment to develop-
ment (fl ows). Wedeman (1997) distinguishes three political economies 
that convert tax evasion into capital fl ight and outfl ows: looting, or unin-
hibited plundering or systematic theft of public funds and extraction of 
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bribes by public offi cials, whereby political insecurity is so endemic that 
outfl ows are institutionalized; rent-scraping, or political manipulation to 
produce rents, thereby allowing the scraping off of these rents by public 
offi cials so that short-term political gain drives outfl ows; and dividend-
collecting, or transfers of a predictable percentage of the profi ts earned by 
private enterprises to government offi cials. Under this last political con-
text, the longer-term consensus on development generates the political 
security that is essential to constrain outfl ows.
These different dynamics result in the wide variations in the effective-
ness of tax systems. In a looting context such as Zaire under Mobutu, 
minimal taxation and endemic tax evasion refl ected the failure to build 
the state capacities required to enforce property rights, and the political 
settlement collapsed. In a rent-scraping environment such as the Philip-
pines under Marcos, the tax system was weak, and tax evasion was wide-
spread and increasing; the ratio of taxes to GDP fell from 12.0 percent in 
1975 to 9.6 percent in 1984 as political support for the dictatorship col-
lapsed (Manasan and Querubin 1987). The fi rst fi nance minister of the 
post-Marcos Aquino government later noted that “every successful busi-
nessman, lawyer, accountant, doctor, and dentist I know has some form 
of cash or assets which he began to squirrel abroad after Marcos declared 
martial law in 1972 and, in the process, frightened every Filipino who 
had anything to lose” (Boyce and Zarsky 1988, 191). A return to formal 
democracy did little to alleviate the problem, however, and, a decade 
later, the politics of vested interests in the Philippines continued as rent-
scraping, in which “tax avoidance and evasion are evidently largely the 
province of the rich” (Devarajan and Hossain 1995).
In these rent-seeking contexts, economic opportunities and political 
order are created and maintained by limiting access to valuable resources 
(North et al. 2007; North, Wallis, and Weingast 2009). Limited access to the 
looting of state assets, rent seeking, corruption, criminality, and ease of tax 
evasion creates the political incentives in any regime to cooperate with the 
group in power.14 Access to illicit capital fl ows and tolerance of tax evasion 
form part of this rent and are distributed to solve the problem of endemic 
violence and political disorder. The regime, lacking a broad elite coalition 
for long-term development, may tacitly or expressly allow the “winning 
coalition” of its power base to evade tax, while trying to constrain open 
access to the illicit capital fl ows and to tax evasion that would undermine 
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the rent seeking on which the stability of the state in these fragile gover-
nance contexts depends (North et al. 2007; North, Wallis, and Weingast 
2009). Repressive governments may be more inclined to restrain tax eva-
sion by simply avoiding the sources of tax that require a substantial degree 
of voluntary cooperation (Hettich and Winer 1999).
By contrast, in dividend-collecting contexts, the political importance 
assigned to building an effective state has meant that evasion has trans-
lated less into illicit outfl ows, and developmental states often emerge 
(Khan 2000). In a dividend-collecting system, economic growth and 
political stability are encouraged because political leaders and corrupt 
offi cials perceive the payoffs in the long term. This dynamic explains 
how developing countries often begin to build a national development 
project despite the initially low tax revenue that undermines their early 
capacity to deliver services to citizens, potentially reinforcing the lack of 
legitimacy and the low tax take.
Corruption and tax evasion may be rampant not least so as to fund 
political stability, but illicit fl ows are recognized as threatening to sus-
tainable development and are tackled (Khan 2005; North et al. 2007; 
North, Wallis, and Weingast 2009). This is in contrast to the short-term 
outlook of the looting model, which destroys economic value. So, while, 
in all these contexts, grand tax evasion arises from collusion among 
political and business elites and the top levels of government, the evasion–
capital fl ows process is shaped by different political dynamics. Policies 
and enforcement may be formulated to permit tax evasion in return for 
political favors, and they may operate through the overt or tacit complic-
ity of senior tax administrators and fi scal policy offi cials. Without politi-
cal support for the high-profi le prosecution of tax evaders, grand eva-
sion results in rampant illicit capital fl ows in looting or rent-scraping 
contexts, but the politics of dividend-collecting facilitates a pragmatic 
focus on controlling capital fl ows for domestic investment and political 
stability.15
Petty low-level tax evasion, by contrast, is probably insignifi cant for 
illicit capital fl ows, but affects the underlying political economy context. 
The average size of African shadow economies was estimated at 41.3 per-
cent of GDP in 1999/2000, increasing to 43.2 percent in 2002/03), though 
these fi gures hide signifi cant grand evasion because the lack of commit-
ment of elites to long-term development morphs into capital fl ight and 
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fl ows (Schneider, A. 2007; UNECA 2009). The dynamics of petty evasion 
also have political implications, however, because of what Tendler (2002) 
refers to as the “devil’s deal,” the tacit understanding in patronage poli-
tics that petty tax evasion (evasion that does not lead to signifi cant illicit 
fl ows) is tolerated as the quid pro quo for political support that allows 
grand evasion and illicit fl ows: “if you vote for me . . . , I won’t collect 
taxes from you; I won’t make you comply with other tax, environmental 
or labor regulations; and I will keep the police and inspectors from 
harassing you” (Tendler 2002, 28). This leaves both vested interests and 
the informal economy untaxed or undertaxed and deprives the infor-
mal sector of the incentive to engage in constructive political bargaining 
over taxation, the fi scal social contract.16 At the same time, rulers are left 
unrestrained to embezzle and misuse public resources to sustain their 
grip on power, while the public goods and services necessary for poverty 
reduction and development are underprovided.
This devil’s deal underpins the neo-patrimonial politics behind illicit 
capital fl ows. Political clients do not act as taxpaying citizens using their 
votes to improve governance, and political patrons exploit corruption 
and tax evasion to fund their grip on power, while protecting their long-
term prospects outside the country. So, political dynamics shape the 
capacity of the state to manage evasion and constrain the incentives for 
political and economic elites to shift the tax burden to middle-size fi rms 
and the middle class.17
The Political Economy of Tax Evasion
The dynamics outlined above indicate that the political economic deter-
minants of the extent of tax evasion in any specifi c context refl ect a com-
bination of six factors, as follows: (1) the structure of the economy that 
shapes the potential sources of government revenues; (2) the structure 
of the political system, that is, the political rules by which politicians 
gain and hold onto the power that shapes political competition and 
incentives (constitutions, party structures, electoral processes, legislative 
and executive rules shaping policy choice, and so on) (Stewart 2007; 
Schneider, F. 2007); (3) the state’s monopoly of violence as the basis for 
enforcing state tax and other authority (North et al. 2007; North, Wallis, 
and Weingast 2009); (4) the credibility of the regime’s political time 
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horizons that shape the perceptions of tax as an investment in the future 
prosperity and stability of the state; (5) the potential infl uence of collec-
tive action by taxpayers or other citizen groups to negotiate with politi-
cal leadership; and (6) the rationale for leaders and elites to build the 
broad, long-term economic development of their societies, which is 
infl uenced by noneconomic interests such as traditional ethnic, kinship, 
and communal ties and patterns of patronage, as well as other factors 
such as international pressures.18
These six political economy factors, in turn, shape citizen under-
standing of the legitimacy of taxation.19 Taxpayer attitudes toward this 
legitimacy are formed by three more immediate forces, as follows:
•  Tax morale: taxpayer civic responsibility to support or undermine 
national goals, that is, the extent to which enforcement is accepted as 
a legitimate and effective exercise of state power
•  Capacity: the capacity of tax policy and particularly tax administra-
tion, including the effectiveness of political and administrative checks 
that limit rent seeking and patronage and the political support for the 
effi ciency of the tax administration, measured by tax effort and the 
tax compliance costs imposed on taxpayers compared across coun-
tries at similar levels of development20
•  Perceived fairness: the perceived fairness and effectiveness of taxes and 
the tax authority (based both on experience and the perception of the 
extent of the compliance of other taxpayers)21
Tax evasion ﬂ ourishes in poor governance contexts
In light of the above, it is not surprising to fi nd that tax evasion is 
endemic in contexts of poor governance, for example:
•  In the Philippines in the mid-1980s, with the collapsing Marcos 
regime, income tax evasion grew to account for nearly 50 percent of 
the potential yield (Manasan 1988). The restoration of democracy 
under President Aquino was only partly successful in delivering polit-
ical stability, a weak legitimacy refl ected in corporate tax evasion on 
domestic sales tax at between 53 and 63 percent in the early 1990s 
(Abinales and Amoroso 2005).•  In Nigeria, persistent political uncertainty was refl ected in the federal 
government estimation in 2004 that, because of tax evasion, corrup-
tion, and weak administration, it had collected only around 10 per-
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cent of the taxes due and that half the revenue collected was then lost 
or embezzled (OECD and AfDB 2008).
•  In the Central African Republic, ongoing political tensions have facil-
itated evasion and kept the ratio of taxes to GDP at only 8 percent 
(World Bank 2009a).22
Tax evasion is, however, not static, but fl uctuates. A primary variation 
is the perceived strength of state legitimacy in developing countries, 
which affects evasion directly through tax morale and indirectly through 
a lower tax effort (Fjeldstad, Katera, and Ngalewa 2009). This has also 
been demonstrated in the developed world, in Italy, for example, in the 
increases in the evasion of the value added tax (VAT) during periods of 
political uncertainty such as the peak, at 37 percent in the late 1980s, or, 
in Spain, when shifting political pressures have weakened the adminis-
trative effort devoted to tackling tax evasion (Chiarini, Marzano, and 
Schneider 2009; Esteller-Moré 2005).
Nonetheless, the political roots of the tax evasion driving interna-
tional capital transfers affect particularly the developing world. In the 
international development discourse, improving tax systems is too often 
portrayed as only a technical, apolitical challenge, rather than as a pro-
found litmus test of state legitimacy. Public choice theory’s conceptual-
ization of politics as merely self-interest is unfortunately refl ected too 
uncritically in the tax literature.23 So, it is worth citing the rich evidence 
showing that tax systems everywhere refl ect shifting political legitimacy, 
as follows:
•  In Benin by the late 1990s, during the country’s turbulent post–Cold 
War transition from a Marxist dictatorship, only 10 percent of tax-
payers were regularly paying their taxes (van de Walle 2001).
•  In The Gambia, in the years immediately before the military coup of 
1994, lost revenues rose to 9 percent of GDP, and income tax evasion 
expanded to 70 percent of the total revenue due (Dia 1993, 1996).
•  In Kenya by 2001, the chaotic last year of the Moi presidency, the tax 
gap had reached at least 35 percent, suggesting signifi cant and increas-
ing evasion (KIPPRA 2004).24
•  In Madagascar, the political turmoil of the late 1990s saw the tax eva-
sion rate rise to nearly 60 percent, equivalent to 8.8 percent of GDP 
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(compared with only 8.3 percent of GDP collected in taxes) (Gray 
2001).
•  In Niger, the political chaos of the 1990s saw rampant tax evasion 
trigger a major decline in fi scal revenues (Ndulu et al. 2008).
•  In Pakistan, as the legitimacy of the state collapsed, the size of the 
informal economy increased from 20 percent of GDP in 1973 to 51 
percent in 1995, while tax evasion more than trebled over the same 
period and continued thereafter within the climate of continuing 
political turmoil and military rule; the tax-GDP ratio fell from 13.2 
percent in 1998 to 10.6 percent in 2006 (Saeed 1996).
•  In Paraguay, the political optimism and improved tax compliance 
after the end of the Stroessner dictatorship had faded by 2003, when 
increasing tax evasion and corruption were depriving the state of 
about two-thirds of potential revenues (Freedom House 2008).25
•  In West Bank and Gaza during the period 1994 to 2000, the declining 
perceived legitimacy of the Palestinian Authority refl ected an appar-
ently increasing tolerance of tax administrative procedures that facili-
tated evasion and corruption (Fjeldstad and al-Zagha 2004).
The political foundations of tax systems are apparent in the contrast 
between states in the Caribbean and states in Latin America given that 
Caribbean countries inherited parliamentary institutions rather than 
the presidential regimes of Latin America. This constitutional difference 
apparently created a broader acceptance of the need for an effective tax 
system across the Caribbean because parliamentary systems offer the 
possibility of negotiating a compromise among elites in forming a gov-
ernment. By contrast, Latin American political structures created a 
vicious circle of political instability and more regressive tax structures 
(Schneider, Lledo, and Moore 2004).
The collapse of the Soviet Union and the resulting political uncertain-
ties in the transition countries over the progress toward representation 
through taxation underline the political foundations of tax evasion 
(Gehlbach 2008).26 For instance, in Armenia, evasion became endemic as 
the tax-GDP ratio halved from 29 percent in 1991 to 14.8 percent in 
1994. Although it recovered to 17 percent in 1997, the tax-GDP ratio 
remained well below the level in other transition economies that had a 
more secure political consensus on national purpose and that had not 
 The Political Economy of Controlling Tax Evasion and Illicit Flows 81
faced such a dramatic loss of legitimacy (for example, tax-GDP ratios in 
Estonia of 39 percent or in Poland of 44 percent in 1997) (Mkrtchyan 
2001). The World Bank, in 2009, concluded that “fundamental political 
economy diffi culties such as . . . checks to the power of powerful business 
interests in evading customs and tax payments . . . remain to be seriously 
addressed” (World Bank 2009c, 4). Armenia, however, highlights the 
need for further research on the complex international dynamics of 
illicit capital fl ight and fl ows because, despite political and economic fra-
gility, it appears, in recent years, to have had sizable unrecorded capital 
infl ows that may refl ect other political economy dynamics in the region 
(Brada, Kutan, and Vukšic 2009).
Natural experiments in tax evasion and illicit ﬂ ows
Cross-country comparisons over time illustrate the political dynamics 
behind state legitimacy and the effi cacy of tax systems. In the Central 
America of the 1950s, Costa Rica and Guatemala shared similar charac-
teristics in geographical location, size, colonial history, position in the 
world economy, levels of economic development, and reliance on coffee 
exports, but showed different patterns of illicit capital fl ows (Fatehi 
1994). The Costa Rican political settlement following a brief civil war in 
1948 successfully consolidated democracy and delivered economic 
growth. Taxpayers recognized that making the state effective required an 
adequate tax base to fund public services. As a result, the political settle-
ment established the political will to tackle tax evasion and minimize 
illicit capital outfl ows. The tax compliance and collection rates in Costa 
Rica are the highest in Central America, and indicate the least evidence 
of an inclination to capital fl ight (Torgler 2003).
By contrast, Guatemala has the lowest tax take in Central America and 
has a long history of widespread tax evasion and capital fl ight (Erbe 
1985). The failure of the political class in Guatemala to develop a wider 
vision for society resulted in civil war in the 1970s and 1980s. Political 
bargaining during the drafting of the Constitution of 1985 resulted in 
three articles being inserted deliberately to weaken the tax authority; as a 
result, tax evasion in the early 1990s was 58 percent.27 The peace accord of 
1996 has yet to generate any sense of national purpose so that, in the later 
half of the 1990s, for every quetzal taxed, 65 centavos were evaded, leaving 
the Guatemalan state without the resources to improve its legitimacy by 
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providing better services for the population (Yashar 1997). The legisla-
ture has often appeared to facilitate evasion and avoidance deliberately by 
making tax laws overly complex.
Without political support to tackle evasion by powerful interests, the 
revenue authorities have instead directed their anti–tax evasion effort 
toward small taxpayers. The probability of evaders being caught has 
been low; in 2003, the Guatemalan revenue administration estimated 
total tax evasion at more than two-thirds of actual collection, with sig-
nifi cant variation across revenue bases, at 29 percent for VAT, but 63 per-
cent for income taxes.28 If tax evasion is detected, the administrative and 
legal procedures are complicated and costly for the state. Penalties for tax 
evasion remain insignifi cant because of the absence of political determi-
nation to impose administrative and judicial sanctions in any effective 
or timely manner, and tax amnesties are too frequent and generous 
(Sánchez, O. 2009). The total tax-GDP ratio rose from a low of 6.8 per-
cent when the civil war ended to 10.3 percent of GDP in 2006; citizens 
still widely regard tax evasion in Guatemala as ethical because the per-
ception remains that “a signifi cant portion of the money collected winds 
up in the pockets of corrupt politicians or their families and friends” 
(McGee and Lingle 2005, 489).29
Another natural experiment in the links between illicit outfl ows and 
the legitimacy of taxation can be seen in the contrast between Argentina 
and Chile, despite similar cultures, levels of economic development, his-
tory, and federal constitutions. Tax evasion in Argentina has consistently 
been high, the result of political instability and weak institutions (de 
Melo 2007). Sporadic efforts to crack down on evasion, including by the 
Menem presidency in the early 1990s, lacked political sustainability.30
By contrast, in the early 20th century, Chile achieved a political con-
sensus against tolerating tax evasion and in favor of alleviating poverty 
and advancing national development through an effective tax system 
(Bergman 2009). With Chile’s return to democracy in 1990, taxpayers 
were persuaded through the Concertación (the Concert of Parties for 
Democracy) that higher taxation was a small price to pay if democracy 
was to work by delivering an effective social contract (Boylan 1996; 
Vihanto 2000; Bergman 2009). Income tax evasion rates in Chile fell 
from 61.4 percent in 1990 to 42.6 percent in 1995 (Barra and Jarratt 
1998). This fi scal social contract covered indirect and direct taxation, so 
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that Chile, with a rate of 18 percent, collected almost 9 percent of GDP 
in tax revenue. By another contrast, Mexico, with a rate of 15 percent, 
collected less than 3 percent of GDP (Tanzi 2000). The mix of political 
will and administrative capacity was then refl ected in overall evasion 
rates that nearly halved in Chile during the early 1990s, from 30 to 18 
percent during the euphoria of the return to civilian rule; as the eupho-
ria wore off, evasion had increased again to 25 percent by 1998, but, sub-
sequently, because of rising political concern, matched by administrative 
effort, declined steadily to under 15 percent in 2004 (World Bank 2006).
As a result, capital fl ight and illicit capital fl ows have been consistently 
lower in Chile than in neighboring Argentina (Schneider, B. 2001; Di 
John 2006). Politics and institutions, not geography or economic struc-
ture, drive rates of capital fl ight.
Political legitimacy and illicit capital ﬂ ows
Illicit capital fl ows arising from tax evasion indicate not only the oppor-
tunity for free-riding, but also taxpayer perceptions. If the state does not 
appear to be aligned with taxpayer interests, this lack of faith in a regime’s 
current legitimacy and its future legitimacy after improving governance 
shapes the decision to hold assets abroad. However, if taxpaying elites 
believe in a locally owned political vision for the future, and regimes 
need their support, evasion may be tolerated by the state, yet not lead to 
illicit fl ows. As economic theory suggests, information asymmetries and 
higher rates of return in capital-scarce developing countries would 
retain domestic investment rather than encourage capital fl ow from the 
developing to the developed world.31 But, if citizens see no credible long-
term future political stability, savers and investors will seek to move their 
capital abroad to contexts of more effective, more stable governance, 
even at lower returns on investment and higher tax rates.32 Where the 
state lacks political legitimacy, this capital fl ight, whether legal or not, 
would, as suggested above, be widely perceived as licit.
Effective tax systems alone are therefore not enough. Bergman (2009, 
109) concludes that “moderate effi ciency in law-abiding societies gener-
ates better results than good administration in a world of cheaters.” For 
the state, the political imperative in curtailing free-riding on taxes is that, 
while core state functions such as preserving peace and upholding jus-
tice are universal expectations, transparent and fair property rights are 
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essential to the dividend-collecting transition to effective, politically 
open access states and open markets (North et al. 2007; North, Wallis, 
and Weingast 2009). The creation and enforcement of property rights 
are, however, not costless (Khan 2005). Historically, the need to raise 
revenue motivated states to defi ne property rights. In turn, this stimu-
lated economic growth (Tilly 1975). Taxpayers are politically prepared to 
pay taxes that fund the state capabilities needed to secure their property 
rights (Khan 2000). In developing polities, the allocation and defi nition 
of property rights are continuously evolving, as they did historically in 
developed countries (Everest-Phillips 2008b; Hoppit 2011). Tackling tax 
evasion and illicit fl ows is therefore part of the political bargaining over 
how and what services, including protection of property rights, the state 
will provide.
If taxpayers do not accept the legitimacy of the state and are not 
intrinsically prepared to fund the state’s services and the development of 
their own collective future prosperity, the political incentives for and 
credibility of the commitment to long-term sustainable development are 
lacking. Widespread illicit capital fl ows occur not only because the state 
is ineffectual, but also because citizens believe that the state has neither 
the political leadership nor the consensus needed to reform weak or cor-
rupt institutions that threaten peace, justice, and the long-term security 
of private property rights (Friedman et al. 2001). As van de Walle (2001, 
53) notes, the root of the problem is “the political logic of a system in 
which the authority of the state is diverted to enhance private power 
rather than the public domain.”
Despite the democratization that began in the 1990s in many devel-
oping countries, the entrenchment of vested interests has ensured that 
improvements have been modest.33 Improvements in the ratio of tax rev-
enue to GDP have also often been short-lived because technical changes 
dependent on cooperative elites and high tax morale have been over-
come by underlying political forces (Orviska and Hudson 2003; Engel-
schalk and Nerré 2002). So, rampant tax evasion remains widespread in 
many developing countries despite the seemingly endless tax policy and 
administration reforms undertaken over the intervening two decades.
Tackling illicit capital fl ows therefore requires not merely more tight-
ening of tax policy and tax administration, but a shift in citizen attitudes 
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toward the political institutions shaping the governance context. These 
operate on three layers, as follows (see fi gure 3.1):
1.  The political settlement: the informal and formal rules of the game 
over political power.34 This includes both the formal rules for manag-
ing politics (peace treaties, constitutional provisions, parliamentary 
rules, the organization of political parties, and so on) and the infor-
mal networks, family ties, and social norms that shape political 
behaviors.35 More an iterative process than a critical juncture, the 
political settlement shapes tax morale as an expression of social order, 
a collective interest, and a sense of political commitment to improve 
public institutions, constrain corruption, and deliver public goods 
(Andreoni, Erard, and Feinstein 1998). The settlement develops from 
the national political community that delivers the perceived fairness 
of and trust in a credible state; within this context, the tax system 
represents a legitimate and effective exercise of state power, while the 
effi cient provision of public goods benefi ts taxpayers and ordinary 
citizens (Lieberman 2003). Politics shapes attitudes and behaviors 
relative to tax evasion, and the differences across groups within a 
country are potentially as signifi cant as the differences across coun-
tries (Gërxhani and Schram 2002).
2.  General quality of governance: state institutional effectiveness builds on 
the political settlement. Capital fl ight (rather than capital fl ows seeking 
only higher rates of return) moves from weak to effective governance, 
Figure 3.1. The Political Economy of an Effective State and Tax System
Tax
system
Governance quality
Political settlement
Source: Author compilation.
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from the generally lower tax contexts of developing countries to the 
higher tax environment of the developed world. Given overall lower 
rates of return on such investment, the main rationale would seem to 
be fl ight because of a lack of faith in domestic rates of return that 
derives from a lack of genuine elite commitment to national develop-
ment, the political risk arising from political instability, and rampant 
corruption (Fuest and Riedel 2009). This appears to be confi rmed by 
estimates of the capital fl ight from the African continent of about 
US$400 billion between 1970 and 2005; around US$13 billion per year 
left the continent between 1991 and 2004, or a huge 7.6 percent of 
annual GDP (Eurodad 2008). So, in contexts of poor governance, the 
wide overlap between capital fl ight and capital fl ows is refl ected in the 
frequent confl ation of the two terms.
3.  Tax administrative competence: capacity to contain free-riding and 
maintain a credible commitment to paying taxes. This is critical to 
compliance; the state’s legitimacy is refl ected in the tax authority’s 
powers of enforcement (that is, accountable coercion).36 In many 
developing countries, political infl uence is often pronounced in the 
selection and promotion of staff at all levels in the revenue adminis-
tration, thereby facilitating evasion and corruption such as the case of 
Benin in the late 1990s, when 25 percent of revenues were lost (van de 
Walle 2001).37 Tax evasion is also signifi cantly infl uenced by the inter-
actions between taxpayers and the tax authorities: more respectful 
behavior on the part of tax authorities is associated with higher rates 
of tax compliance (Feld and Frey 2002). At the same time, differences 
in treatment by tax authorities arise from differences in the quality of 
political participation: “regime type matters in the explanation of the 
structure of taxation” (Kenny and Winer 2006, 183).
Vari ations in political governance away from political settlements and 
the quality of the institutions shaping administrative competence there-
fore lie at the heart of varying patterns in the tax evasion dimension of 
illicit capital fl ows.38 Citizen perceptions of the legitimacy of taxation 
and of the effectiveness of the state combine in the calculation citizens 
make of the tax cost/benefi t–burden/contribution equation. Whether 
taxation is viewed as a value-for-money contribution to society or sim-
ply an unproductive burden depends also on how it is raised and used.39 
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Alm and Martinez-Vazquez (2003, 158) fi nd that government can 
decrease evasion “by providing goods that their citizens prefer more, by 
providing these goods in a more effi cient manner, or by more effectively 
emphasizing that taxes are necessary for receipt of government services.” 
Alm and Martinez-Vazquez (2003, 163) conclude that “compliance is 
strongly affected by the strength and commitment to the social norm of 
compliance.” This is unlikely, for instance, in Malawi, where, in 2000, the 
government admitted that a third of public revenues were stolen annu-
ally by civil servants.40 At the other end of the governance spectrum, 
countries with a strong political settlement and an effective administra-
tion, as in Scandinavia, witness the coexistence of large nominal and 
effective tax rates with low levels of evasion.41 In effective governance 
contexts, therefore, taxpayers do perceive taxation as less a burden and 
more of an investment in an effective state.42
Variation in state effectiveness and, therefore, in the opportunity to 
turn evasion into illicit capital fl ows is the meeting point of the domestic 
and the international political economy (fi gure 3.2). Efforts to stem capital 
fl ight date back to the League of Nations before World War II. The political 
will to tackle illicit capital fl ows still requires the combination of effective 
national commitment to development and international coordination. 
This has been lacking, because, internationally and domestically, “[tax] is 
predominantly a matter of political power” (Kaldor 1963, 418).
Figure 3.2. The Political Economy Model of Tax Evasion Driving Illicit Capital Flows
Source: Author compilation.
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Controlling illicit capital ﬂ ows: Governance beyond technical 
solutions
“Revenue is the chief preoccupation of the state. Nay, more, it is the state.”
—Edmund Burke, quoted in O’Brien (2001, 21)
The last decade or so has demonstrated that improving governance in 
developing countries is not simply a technical task of putting capacities 
in place, but is a problem of political will shaped by institutions and 
incentives. As a result, the development challenge has evolved from good 
governance through good-enough governance to engaging with the spe-
cifi c political drivers of change (Fritz, Kaiser, and Levy 2009). Adminis-
trative and policy reforms alone cannot alter the rampant corruption 
and tax evasion typical of weak states into the strong compliance of 
 citizen-taxpayers in effective liberal democracies. Tax evasion and cor-
ruption translate into capital fl ight and illicit fl ows not only if the oppor-
tunity arises to place assets abroad. Capital fl ight arises from political 
risk; illicit fl ows arise from a perceived lack of political consensus about 
building an effective state. “A tax regime is conditioned by the power bal-
ances and struggles among the major social groups in a country, includ-
ing the relative strengths of political parties that represent their diver-
gent interests” (Di John 2008, 1). So, as Ndikumana (2004, 290) points 
out: “Tax evasion is made easier when the taxpayer is also the political 
client for the decision-maker.” Such patrimonial politics, so common in 
many developing countries, thrives on evasion, corruption, and crimi-
nality (Chabal and Daloz 1999).
Illicit capital fl ows should, as a consequence, be addressed in the con-
text of the political economy of inequality. Nontaxation and wide-scale 
tax evasion by the rich in high-inequality contexts undermine the capa-
bilities and perceived legitimacy of the state (World Bank 2008a). In 
many developing countries, extreme inequalities create potential politi-
cal instability, which, if combined with the lack of a social contract to 
pay taxes for the common good, fosters illicit capital fl ows and explains 
why achieving genuine national ownership of development often proves 
so problematic.
In such environments, tax system complexity can replace brutal 
repression as the obfuscation of political choice by elites in a situation in 
which tax morale is weak. An extreme example is offered by Honduras in 
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1991. Through legal exemptions alone, a taxpayer there would have 
required an income 687 times the average per capita income before 
being liable at the highest marginal tax rate. Given the rampant evasion, 
the rich in Honduras were, de facto, untaxed. The state consequently 
lacked broad legitimacy; development stalled; and political instability 
remained endemic.43 These dynamics were also evident in Madagascar, 
for example, where the tax-GDP ratio was only 11.8 percent in the early 
1990s. This was the outcome of political interest in permitting the tax 
system to be too complex for the country’s administrative capabilities so 
as to facilitate widespread evasion for the privileged elites of the regime. 
This had a disastrous impact on economic growth and job creation; 
trade taxes discriminated across markets, while profi ts and wage taxes 
discouraged investment and employment (IMF 2007).
Elites, in other words, often maintain their power base in highly 
unequal societies by deliberately making tax systems overly complex, at 
huge cost to long-term development, not least because this generates 
illicit capital fl ows. Successful development, however, such as has 
occurred in East Asia, is often accompanied by the political imperative to 
deliver development in the face of internal and external threats, com-
bined with tight capital controls and, thereby, the absence of global 
opportunities to hold illicit assets abroad. As globalization over the last 
few decades has created unparalleled opportunity to move capital easily 
abroad, the political imperative for leaders and elites to deliver national 
development appears to have weakened. The democratization of the 
1990s does not seem to have signifi cantly altered the incentives for cor-
ruption and tax evasion. Indeed, the contemporaneous opportunities 
that opened up with globalization often allowed the political class to 
accept political reforms, knowing that they could protect their assets by 
legally, illegally, or illicitly transferring them abroad. This has been man-
ifested in the use of capital fl ight in response to populist politics such as 
in Bolivia and República Bolivariana de Venezuela and of illicit fl ows 
from many developing countries in the absence of a political commit-
ment to sustainable development.
If controlling illicit fl ows is inherently a political problem, tax evasion 
is particularly important because tax structures are among the most 
measurable manifestations of the political settlement central to state 
effectiveness. Yet, in many developing countries, particularly the low-
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income ones, the current political dynamics create little incentive to 
make the necessary improvements in governance (Bratton and van de 
Walle 1997; Chabal and Daloz 1999). Tax evasion fl ourishes if an incom-
plete political settlement excludes many from the political system. The 
politically excluded, in turn, exclude themselves from paying taxes, while 
the lack of political accountability empowers unaccountable elites to 
exploit their position both to evade and, in the absence of faith in long-
term political stability built on legitimacy, to move evaded assets abroad. 
A weak, corrupt, and illegitimate state drives political fl ight as citizens 
disengage from the state, encouraging more illicit fl ows to escape from 
the state’s grasp.
Such dynamics explain why countries often achieve an uneasy 
 equilibrium in their fi scal systems that refl ects the balance of political 
forces and institutions and remain at this position until shocked into a 
new equilibrium (Bird, Martinez-Vazquez, and Torgler 2006). Without 
understanding the underlying political governance determinants of this 
equilibrium, reforms are unlikely to solve technical problems in the tax 
system, such as those identifi ed by Le, Moreno-Dodson, and Rojchai-
chaninthorn (2008, 16): “tax policies riddled with overly complex struc-
tures and multiple—largely ad hoc—incentives that narrow the already 
limited tax base, create more loopholes for tax avoidance and evasion, 
intensify the public perception of unfairness of taxes, and generate 
opportunity for corruption.”
As a result, tackling tax evasion is a problem of collective action: 
funding adequate public goods depends on the discount rates or time 
horizons of rulers and taxpayers, on the transaction costs involved, and 
on relative bargaining power (Paul, Miller, and Paul 2006). Intra- and 
cross-country variation in tax effort and tax-GDP ratios indicates dif-
ferences not only in the economy or in levels of development or in 
regime type, but also in the political will to tackle the collective action 
problem (Bird and Zolt 2007; Cheibub 1998).44 This applies in devel-
oped- and developing-country contexts.45 So, although low-tax coun-
tries tend also to have lower income per capita, there are signifi cant 
variations in tax effort and tax-GDP ratios. Zambia, for example, had a 
per capita income of US$785 in 2003 and collected 18.1 percent of GDP 
in tax, whereas Uganda had a per capita income of US$1,167 but col-
lected only 11.4 percent of GDP. Indonesia, with a gross national prod-
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uct per capita of US$668, collected 16.5 percent, while Lesotho, with a 
slightly lower per capita gross national product (US$624), collected 
more than twice as much, at 36.8 percent of GDP (Teera and Hudson 
2004).46 Mozambique’s tax revenue, at 13.4 percent of GDP in 2006, rep-
resents a remarkable recovery from civil war, but remains well below 
that of comparable low-income countries in the region, such as Malawi 
(18 percent) and Zambia (18 percent).47
Policy Implication: Strengthen the Political Commitment 
to Effective States
Effective tax regimes develop when political leaders need effective tax 
systems. The necessary political commitment to tackle evasion arises 
when the political costs of the tax effort are outweighed by the political 
benefi ts of delivering sustainable development, including by providing 
the state with the capacity to enforce the property rights of political 
elites, thereby helping facilitate the emergence of long-term political sta-
bility and economic growth. The political incentives around taxes, 
growth, and property rights are central to this dynamic. An effective tax 
system offers a general investment in the public goods that the economy 
and society need. Concepts such as citizenship, fairness, trust, and equal-
ity develop practical manifestation through taxation: “the tax system is 
therefore an effective way of articulating assumptions about the market, 
consumption and social structures” (Daunton 2001, 21).
Because political ideas, interests, incentives, and identities refl ect and 
are refl ected through the tax system, the evolution of tax structures 
demonstrates a state’s political and economic levels of development 
(Thies 2004; Fjeldstad and Moore 2009). For example, both Finland and 
Sierra Leone collected 31 percent of total revenue in generally progres-
sive taxation on income and property in 1990; yet, Finland was able to 
collect more than seven times the revenue take, as a share of GDP, than 
Sierra Leone (Lieberman 2002). Evasion may express politically passive 
rather than actively subversive attitudes toward government, particu-
larly where, in the Chinese phrase, “the Mountain is high and the 
emperor far away.” Focused mainly on local taxes and fees, Chinese vil-
lagers, in the 1980s, developed a moral politics of evasion (taoshui) and 
tax resistance (kangshui) around the perceived extent of reciprocity and 
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mutual obligation with different levels of government. Central to the 
moral legitimization of evasion was the extent to which the authorities 
were perceived to be delivering on their responsibilities (zeren), from 
which people then classifi ed taxes as either reasonable (heli de shui) or 
unreasonable (buheli de shui) (Ku 2003).
The quality of political institutions therefore has a strong observable 
effect on tax morale (Torgler et al. 2008; Everest-Phillips 2008a, 2009b). 
Tax morale, the practical expression of support for national develop-
ment, as noted above, is particularly signifi cant in developing countries 
with weak governance quality: citizens across the developing world 
invariably justify tax evasion through the belief that they do not get an 
adequate return for the taxes paid.48 For instance, the U.K. Department 
for International Development–World Bank survey in the Republic of 
Yemen of private sector tax morale found that 91 percent of respondents 
felt that the state had to be seen to be using revenues fairly and effi ciently 
if tax evasion was to be tackled effectively; 97 percent felt they paid a fair 
amount of tax; and 100 percent felt that tackling corruption was essen-
tial (World Bank 2008b; see also Aljaaidi, Manaf, and Karlinsky 2011).
Modern democracies aspire to achieve voluntary tax compliance, that 
is, all citizens willingly comply without the state needing to resort to any 
compulsion. In reality, all tax systems settle for quasi-voluntary tax com-
pliance, recognizing that the free-riding potential always requires some 
state authority to compel. Levi (1989, 69) categorizes quasi-voluntary 
compliance as the outcome of “the sanctions, incentives and reciprocity 
practices that produce social order and conditional cooperation with-
out central state- or ruler-imposed coercion.” Yet, the overwhelming 
focus on tackling tax evasion in developing countries is on fi scal policy 
and administrative capacity constraints, not on the political governance 
that makes tax policy and administration effective (Sánchez, O. 2006; 
Sánchez, J.A. 2008).
Policy Implication: Tackle Illicit Capital Flows by 
 Strengthening the Legitimacy of the State
So, tackling the tax evasion dimension of illicit capital fl ows requires that 
one address the underlying political economy constraints to the long-
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term building of an effective state (Fjeldstad and Moore 2009). Tax is 
conditional on political performance:
The quality of political institutions has a strong observable effect on tax 
morale . . . not only the overall index, but also the sub-factors of voice and 
accountability, rule of law, political stability and absence of violence, reg-
ulatory quality and control of corruption exercise a strong infl uence on 
tax morale. Moreover, trust in the justice system and the parliament also 
has a highly signifi cant positive effect on tax morale. (Torgler, Schaffner, 
and Macintyre 2007, 23)
In other words, every political system constantly struggles to main-
tain its fi scal legitimacy:
The achievement of signifi cant quasi-voluntary compliance within a pop-
ulation is always tenuous . . . free riding, once begun, is likely to increase. 
Once quasi-voluntary compliance has declined, it is extremely diffi cult to 
reconstitute. Its reestablishment often requires an extraordinary event—
such as war, revolution, or depression—that makes people willing to 
negotiate a new bargain. (Levi 1989, 69–70)
So, tax evasion and the resulting illicit capital fl ows must be tackled by 
strengthening the legitimacy of the state in the eyes of current and 
potential taxpayers. There is evidence in some developing countries, 
such as Ghana, Indonesia, and Zambia, that, through the messy process 
of democratic politics, this is happening (Pritchard 2009; Heij 2007; von 
Soest 2006).
Conclusion
Further research is undoubtedly needed to understand the relative 
importance and interconnection of tax evasion, corruption, and crimi-
nality in driving illicit capital fl ows in different contexts, but it is clear 
that tackling the problem will require building effective states responsive 
to the needs of their societies. Currently, there does not appear to be reli-
able data on the level of illicit capital that fl ows South-South or South-
North. What we do know is that the governance reforms needed to build 
effective states and to reduce illicit capital outfl ows require strong politi-
cal commitment. Such commitment develops if political institutional 
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incentives and interests are aligned with the goal of building state capaci-
ties. This will only occur in developing countries if a broad political con-
sensus in its favor is created. Administrative efforts to tackle illicit capital 
fl ows will only be as effective as the constantly evolving political process 
of state building allows, because “the history of state revenue production 
is the history of the evolution of the state” (Levi 1989, 1).
Notes
 1. “Responsible Leadership for a Sustainable Future,” G-8 Leaders Declaration, 
paragraph 17d, L’Aquila, Italy, July 8, 2009, http://www.g8italia2009.it/static/
G8_Allegato/G8_Declaration_08_07_09_fi nal%2c0.pdf.
 2. Recognition of the relationship between tax evasion and effective governance is 
not new. In the mid-fi fth century, the theologian Salvian the Presbyter of Mar-
seilles, seeking to make sense of the decline and fall of the Roman Empire that 
he witnessed around him, concluded that the empire’s collapse lay in the inter-
connection between poor governance and a weak tax system. Modern research 
validates Salvian’s specifi c analysis and general thesis: tax evasion was both cause 
and symptom of Rome’s decline: for example, see Wickham (2010).
 3. On the fi scal anthropology of power and reciprocal obligations, see Braithwaite 
(2003). By contrast, tax avoidance, the legal minimization of tax payments, indi-
cates weak policy and ineffectual administration.
 4. For example, on the case of Bolivia in the late 1990s, see Mosley (2007); on the 
long and continuing tradition of Chinese peasant tax evasion as revolt, see Tilly 
(2003); on Ghana’s value added tax (VAT) riots in 1995, see Pritchard (2009).
 5. This involved not merely the evasion of direct taxation; for VAT evasion: see 
Moreno-Dodson and Wodon (2008). For 1998, the estimated level of evasion 
was 37.5 percent; in May 2000, the Procuradoría Fiscal de la Federación 
announced that the overall level of evasion and avoidance represented 35 per-
cent of potential collection.
 6. Tax evasion, corruption, and criminality are all illegal activities that fl ourish in 
domestic and international climates in which personal greed is unrestrained by 
the political ambition to build legitimate, effective states. Nonetheless, there 
does not appear to be a single study that has tried to distinguish even conceptu-
ally between them, let alone provide clear evidence of their relative importance 
in different contexts. This chapter is a beginning in addressing the fi rst issue. 
That much remains to be done is suggested by the fi ndings of Reuter and Tru-
man (2004), according to which tax evasion accounted for over 55 percent of 
criminal proceeds in the United States in 1990.
 7. Tax morale is conceptually distinct from the instrumental willingness based on 
government performance.
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 8. Silvani and Baer (1997) offer a typology for the tax gap, ranging from countries 
with a tax gap at under 10 percent (for example, Denmark or Singapore), which 
refl ects high political will and strong administration, to countries with a tax gap 
at over 40 percent (for example, Kenya), which refl ects limited political will and 
weak tax administration.
 9. The Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development offers a defi ni-
tion of state building, as follows: “purposeful action to develop the capacity, 
institutions and legitimacy of the state in relation to an effective political process 
for negotiating the mutual demands between state and societal groups” (OECD 
2008, 14).
10. Musgrave (1996) offers four basic patterns: the service delivery state, the welfare 
state, the communitarian state, and the government failure state (rather than the 
market failure state).
11. Legitimacy is a signifi cant component of economic growth in developing- 
country contexts; see Englebert (2000).
12. As a percentage of actual total tax revenue and of potential tax revenue, tax eva-
sion declined between 1972 and 1974, thereafter rose rapidly, and was about 60 
percent of actual tax revenue and 37 percent of potential tax revenue in 1990, 
representing sevenfold and fourfold increases, respectively. See Chipeta (2002); 
Therkildsen (2001).
13. In 1999, only 3.4 percent of the Russian population thought they could trust the 
state (Oleinik 1999).
14. It has been calculated that, in India in the 1980s, up to 45 percent of gross national 
product was produced by distortionary government policies (for example, artifi -
cial price setting, the protection of state-owned enterprises, and government 
monopolies) (Mohammad and Whalley 1984).
15. In Bangladesh, for example, criminal prosecution for grand evasion is almost 
unknown; in India, tax evasion, estimated at from Rs 400 billion to Rs 1 trillion, 
is at the heart of the informal economy, in which politically infl uential indus-
tries operate (Vittal 1999).
16. Schneider and Enste (2000) outline the political determinants of tax evasion 
and the informal sector.
17. On the missing middle, or the absence of medium-size fi rms as a result of dis-
proportionate tax burdens, see Kauffmann (2005).
18. Wa Wamwere (2003, 176) describes this as follows: “The cream of government 
service goes to the ruling ethnic elites, the crumbs to the lesser ethnic elites, and 
dust to members of the so-called ruling ethnic community.” See also Kimenyi 
(2006).
19. For taxation, four political dimensions of the state then shape the effectiveness 
of tax systems, as follows: (a) the degree of concentration of state power (for 
example, a unitary or federal system), (b) the state’s reach into society (for 
example, the capacity to collect information and attain adequate territorial 
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 coverage), (c) the autonomy of the state (the degree of capture, isolation, or 
embedded autonomy of offi cials); and (d) the responsiveness of the state to the 
population (that is, democratic dialogue). See Hobson (1997).
20. Virmani (1987) models corruption that creates higher rates of evasion. The 
political economy of tackling corruption in the tax administration also involves 
corrupt tax policy formulation, especially in tax expenditures, through the dis-
cretionary powers of politicians and tax administrators. There is an interesting 
provision in the Lesotho Revenue Authority Act that requires the tax authority 
to report on the impact of any concessions or waivers granted during the course 
of the reporting year. Thus, if ministers wish to grant a concession to a specifi c 
investor, they may do so, but the nature and the cost of the decision will be 
reported in the public domain (Charlie Jenkins, former commissioner of the 
Lesotho Revenue Authority, personal communication, 2009).
21. Thus, the Zambia Revenue Authority has declared that it is committed to the 
objective of fairness, defi ned as performing offi cial duties in an impartial man-
ner, free of political, personal, or other bias; this combines with its mission to 
maximize and sustain revenue collections through integrated, effi cient, cost-
effective, and transparent systems that are professionally managed to meet the 
expectations of all stakeholders. See, for example, the Zambia Revenue Author-
ity’s “Tax Payer Charter,” at http://www.zra.org.zm/charter.php.
22. Decreases in the tax-GDP ratio can also arise from other factors, such as an 
increase in GDP or in tax avoidance, but the latter refl ects weak administration 
and taxpayer doubt over policy.
23. For instance, “when tax reform enters the political arena, the subtleties of the 
key issues are usually lost in the midst of self-serving arguments and misleading 
simplifi cations” (Slemrod and Bakija 1996, ix).
24. The Kenyan Revenue Authority seems to believe that it is higher, over 40 percent 
(Waweru 2004).
25. Tax collections increased from 10.3 to 11.9 percent of GDP between 2003 and 
2004 and have since stabilized at around 12 percent; see tax system diagnostics 
in World Bank (2009b).
26. Gehlbach (2008) notes that diversity not only at the national level, but also at the 
sectoral level was shaped by different political dynamics; the politically powerful 
were able to secure public goods, while also learning that it was often simpler to 
evade by running up tax arrears than to hide revenue from the tax authorities.
27. This is based on purchases reported (Guatemala, Ministry of Public Finance, 1990, 
“Análisis Evaluativo del Sistema Tributario de Guatemala y Apendice Tecnico: 
Consultoría para Administración Fiscal,” July, Policy Economics Group; KPMG; 
and Policy Research Program, Georgia State University, Washington, DC).
28. In 2006, VAT evasion was 31.6 percent; this compared favorably with the cases of 
Mexico (45.7 percent), Argentina (40.4 percent), and Bolivia (39.4 percent), but 
less favorably with the cases of Colombia (28.0 percent) and Chile (19.7 per-
cent), not least because of persisting legal loopholes (World Bank data of 2007).
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29. The Guatemalan government has attempted in recent years to address these 
problems, not least through the Anti-Evasion Law of 2006 (World Bank data of 
2007).
30. Thus, under Menem, sanctions against evasion were strengthened, and the tem-
porary closures by the tax authorities of the business premises of enterprises 
that failed to register for the VAT or to issue invoices rose from 751 in 1990 to 
5,021 in the fi rst nine months of 1991. However, this momentum subsequently 
lapsed; see Morisset and Izquierdo (1993).
31. This, for example, seems to apply to recent Chinese illicit capital fl ows in round-
tripping to benefi t from tax incentives that have existed for foreign investment.
32. For this reason, tax havens require good governance, which is often provided or 
guaranteed by the countries of the Organisation for Economic Co-operation 
and Development by proxy (for example, Monaco through France) or as colo-
nies or crown dependencies (for example, Isle of Man by the United Kingdom) 
(Dharmapala and Hines 2006). This centrality of the quality of governance may 
also help to explain why high-tax countries remain high tax, and low-tax coun-
tries remain low tax (Markle and Shackelford 2009).
33. Across Africa, for instance, Keen and Mansour (2008) note that improvements 
in tax-GDP ratios in recent years have been, overall, almost entirely the result of 
rising commodity prices.
34. A working paper on state building published by the U.K. Department for Inter-
national Development (Whaites 2008, 4) defi nes political settlements as “the 
forging of a common understanding, usually among elites, that their interests or 
beliefs are served by a particular way of organizing political power.”
35. Bratton and van de Walle (1997) assert that neo-patrimonial regimes in Africa 
have a cultural system of the quasi-taxation of fi scal-type obligations to the 
extended circle of family, friends, and tribal chiefs, thereby complicating the idea 
that evasion arises from governments acting as self-serving Leviathans rather 
than as maximizers of social welfare.
36. Virmani (1987) points out that higher penalties for evasion could reduce tax 
revenues by making collusion between taxpayer and tax collector more profi t-
able unless penalties for corruption are strengthened and their implementation 
is given full political backing.
37. Fjeldstad and Tungodden (2003) argue that discretion and fi scal corruption 
contribute to undermining the legitimacy of the tax administration and thereby 
increase tax evasion.
38. By contrast, Mahon (2004) fi nds that tax reform is predicted by the political 
drive of new administrations, more authoritarian-leaning elected governments, 
the dominance of the president’s party in the legislature, established electoral 
systems, closed-list proportional representation, less polarized party systems, 
and more numerous parties.
39. For example, the political settlement requires regional taxpayers to trust the 
state to redistribute fairly (Ndulu et al. 2007).
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40. The Nation, Lilongwe, Malawi, April 27, 2000, page 5.
41. Otherwise, high nominal taxes tend to produce considerable tax evasion, includ-
ing the unrecorded activity of the shadow economy (Schneider and Enste 2000).
42. While some authors have claimed there is causation, Friedman et al. (2001) are 
not able to fi nd evidence of a negative effect of taxes on the size of the shadow 
economy. No study has adequately addressed taxpayer perceptions of taxation 
not as a burden, but as an investment in the political settlement to tackle weak 
institutions and fund an effective state.
43. By 1997, under the pressure of the International Monetary Fund, the income 
subject to the highest marginal rate had been substantially reduced, but it was 
still at the remarkable level of 104 times the average per capita income (Shome 
1999).
44. Measurements of tax effort and tax-GDP ratios are notoriously problematic, 
but, in the absence of other clear indicators, remain the most widely used basis 
for cross-country comparisons.
45. Thus, Belgium has far greater evasion rates than the Netherlands (Nam, Parsche, 
and Schaden 2001).
46. By contrast, one of the lowest rates in the world is in Afghanistan, where the 
government, in 2008, raised only 6.4 percent of national income, or US$750 
million, in national revenue across a population of 25 million.
47. International Monetary Fund data for 2007. See Le, Moreno-Dodson, and Roj-
chaichaninthorn (2008) on tax effort variation.
48. For example, for Pakistan, see World Bank (2004). 
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Abstract
In the debate on the impact of illicit capital fl ows on developing coun-
tries, the view is widespread that profi t shifting to low-tax jurisdictions 
undermines the ability of developing countries to raise tax revenue. 
While the shifting of income out of developed countries is a widely 
debated issue, empirical evidence on the magnitude of the problem 
and on the factors driving income shifting is scarce. This chapter 
reviews the literature on tax avoidance and evasion through border 
crossing income shifting out of developing countries. We discuss 
methods and available data sets that can be used to gain new insights 
into the problem of corporate income shifting. We argue that the 
results of many existing studies on tax avoidance and evasion in devel-
oping countries are diffi cult to interpret, mainly because the measure-
ment concepts used have a number of drawbacks. We discuss some 
alternative methods and data sets and present empirical evidence that 
supports the view that profi t shifting out of many developing countries 
and into tax havens takes place.
Clemens Fuest and Nadine Riedel
Tax Evasion and Tax Avoidance: 
The Role of International 
Proﬁ t Shifting
Additional tables and fi gures from this chapter can be found at http://go.worldbank.org
/N2HMRB4G20.
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Introduction
In the debate on the impact of illicit capital fl ows on developing coun-
tries, the view is widespread that illicit fl ows undermine the ability of 
developing countries to raise tax revenue. The reason stated is that illicit 
capital fl ows may channel resources to the informal economy or to other 
jurisdictions, in particular to tax havens, so that the resources escape 
taxation. A large part of this activity takes place in the shadow economy 
and largely escapes public attention. Yet, parts of the offi cial economy, 
particularly multinational fi rms, are accused of engaging in tax avoid-
ance and tax evasion as well. They are criticized for shifting income out 
of developing countries and into tax havens to avoid paying corporate 
income taxes. Since developing countries frequently lack appropriate 
legislative and administrative resources, they are generally seen to be 
more vulnerable to income shifting relative to developed countries.
While the shifting of income out of developed countries is a widely 
debated issue, empirical evidence on the magnitude of the problem and 
on the factors driving income shifting is scarce. This chapter contributes 
to the debate as follows. First, we review the literature on tax avoidance 
and evasion through border crossing income shifting out of developing 
countries. Second, we discuss methods and available data sets that can 
be used to gain new insights into the problem of corporate income 
shifting.
There is a growing number of empirical studies on corporate profi t 
shifting in the countries of the Organisation for Economic Co-operation 
and Development (OECD). Many of these studies use appropriate data 
and sophisticated econometric methods, and the results offer valuable 
insights into corporate profi t shifting. Unfortunately, almost none of 
these studies include developing countries. The main reason is that, for 
developing countries, signifi cantly fewer data are available. A number of 
studies, mostly published by nongovernmental organizations (NGOs), 
try to estimate income shifting and the tax revenue losses suffered by 
developing countries. These studies have the merit of attracting the 
attention of a wider public to the issue of income shifting out of devel-
oping countries. However, the results of these studies are somewhat dif-
fi cult to interpret, mainly because the measurement concepts used have 
a number of drawbacks (Fuest and Riedel 2009).
 Tax Evasion and Tax Avoidance: The Role of International Proﬁ t Sharing 111
The setup of the rest of this chapter is as follows. In the next section, 
we briefl y introduce the concept of profi t shifting by multinational fi rms 
and discuss empirical approaches that have been used to detect profi t 
shifting. In the following section, we review existing studies on profi t 
shifting out of developing countries. The section builds on and extends 
our earlier work, in Fuest and Riedel (2009). The subsequent section 
discusses the particular role of tax havens. In the penultimate section, we 
suggest and discuss the pros and cons of different econometric identifi -
cation strategies and data sets that can be used to gain new insights into 
the phenomenon of profi t shifting out of developing countries. We also 
provide some evidence from one of the data sets that supports the view 
that a signifi cant amount of profi t shifting out of developing countries 
and into tax havens does take place. The last section concludes.
Multinational Firms and the Concept of Proﬁ t Shifting
Intraﬁ rm proﬁ t shifting
For purposes of taxation, the profi ts of a multinational fi rm have to be 
allocated to the individual jurisdictions where the fi rm fi les for income 
taxation. This is usually accomplished through the method of separate 
accounting. Each entity (subsidiary or permanent establishment) of the 
multinational fi rm individually calculates the income it has generated. 
Transactions between different entities of a multinational fi rm (con-
trolled transactions) should, in principle, be treated as transactions with 
third parties (uncontrolled transactions). However, multinational fi rms 
may use controlled transactions to shift income across countries. For 
instance, they may shift income from high-tax jurisdictions to low-tax 
jurisdictions using transfer pricing or intrafi rm debt.
The concept of income shifting raises the question of whether a true 
or objective distribution of profi ts earned by the individual entities of a 
multinational fi rm can be identifi ed. Achieving this is complicated for a 
number of reasons. In particular, the entities of multinational fi rms typ-
ically jointly use resources specifi c to the fi rm such as a common brand 
name or fi rm-specifi c expertise. Pricing these resource fl ows appropri-
ately is diffi cult because goods traded between unrelated parties are usu-
ally different. It is an important characteristic of many multinational 
fi rms that the individual entities jointly use resources that could not be 
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used in the same way if they were separate fi rms. If they could be used in 
the same way, there would be no reason to create the multinational fi rm 
in the fi rst place. For this reason, it is diffi cult to establish what a profi t 
distribution in the absence of profi t shifting would look like.
Most empirical studies on corporate income shifting, however, do not 
explicitly refer to a hypothetical distribution of profi ts that would occur 
in the absence of income shifting. Instead, they focus on particular fac-
tors that are likely to drive income shifting, and they try to explore 
whether these factors affect the distribution of reported income across 
countries and, if so, how large these effects are. In this chapter, we focus 
on tax-induced income shifting. Empirical work in this area essentially 
uses two types of approaches to investigate whether and to what extent 
fi rms shift income to exploit tax differences across countries. The fi rst 
approach looks directly at the use of instruments for profi t shifting. For 
instance, some studies focus on income shifting through debt and ask 
whether, all else being equal, multinational fi rms use more debt in high-
tax countries relative to low-tax countries (Buettner and Wamser 2007; 
Huizinga, Laeven, and Nicodeme 2008). Other instruments that have 
been studied in the context of international profi t shifting are transfer 
pricing and the location of intangible assets (Clausing 2003; Dischinger 
and Riedel 2008).
The second approach focuses on the result of tax-induced profi t shift-
ing: the overall profi tability of individual entities of multinational fi rms 
in different countries. In the presence of tax-induced income shifting, 
one would expect to observe a negative correlation between reported 
profi tability and tax levels (Grubert and Mutti 1991; Huizinga and Lae-
ven 2008; Weichenrieder 2009). One drawback of this approach is that a 
negative correlation between pretax profi tability and tax levels may even 
emerge in the absence of income shifting. The reason is that the location 
of economic activity itself is infl uenced by taxes. Firms have incentives to 
locate highly profi table projects in low-tax jurisdictions.
Both approaches deliver estimates of the (marginal) impact of tax dif-
ferences on income shifting behavior. Under certain assumptions, these 
estimates can be used to calculate a hypothetical profi t distribution 
across countries that would occur in the absence of tax differences. For 
instance, Huizinga and Laeven (2008) analyze a sample of European 
multinational fi rms and fi nd that, in 1999, the corporate tax base of Ger-
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many, which was the country with the highest corporate tax rate in 
Europe, would have increased by 14 percent if there had been no tax 
incentives to shift income to other countries.
Proﬁ t shifting and transactions among unrelated parties
Profi t shifting as discussed in the previous section takes place through 
transactions between entities of multinational fi rms in different coun-
tries. If two corporations located in two different countries belong to the 
same multinational fi rm or are controlled by the same interest, it is 
uncontroversial that transactions between these two fi rms may be used 
to shift profi ts across borders. However, some authors have argued that 
transactions between unrelated fi rms may also be used to shift profi ts 
across borders. This is emphasized, in particular, by Raymond Baker 
(2005) in his book, Capitalism’s Achilles Heel: Dirty Money and How to 
Renew the Free-Market System. There, he quantifi es the yearly illicit 
fi nancial fl ows out of developing countries through the business sector 
at US$500 billion to US$800 billion.
Baker’s book provides a breakdown of this number according to dif-
ferent activities. The analysis claims that slightly above 60 percent of 
these fi nancial fl ows are related to legal commercial activities, whereas 
the rest is assigned to criminal activity. Baker argues that money earned 
on legal commercial activities leaves developing countries through three 
potential channels: the mispricing of goods traded between independent 
parties, the distortion of transfer prices charged on goods traded within 
a multinational fi rm, and fake transactions.
With respect to mispricing between unrelated parties, Baker bases his 
estimate on 550 interviews he conducted with offi cials from trading 
companies in 11 economies in the early 1990s: Brazil; France; Germany; 
Hong Kong SAR, China; India; Italy; the Republic of Korea; the Nether-
lands; Taiwan, China; the United Kingdom; and the United States. 
Because Baker assured anonymity, he does not make the data publicly 
available, but argues that the data contain appropriate information on 
trading practices.
He reports that the interviewees confi rmed that collusion was com-
mon between importers and exporters to draw money out of developing 
countries. Specifi cally, he states that “mispricing in order to generate 
kickbacks into foreign bank accounts was treated as a well-understood 
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and normal part of transactions” by the interviewed managers (Baker 
2005, 169). As a result of his study, Baker estimates that 50 percent of 
foreign trade transactions with Latin American countries are mispriced 
by, on average, around 10 percent, adding to a worldwide average mis-
pricing of goods traded between third parties of 5 percent. Similar, 
slightly larger fi gures are reported for countries in Africa and Asia, sug-
gesting a level of mispricing at 5 to 7 percent.
Studies on International Proﬁ t Shifting 
in Developing Countries
Most existing empirical studies on tax-induced profi t shifting focus on 
OECD countries. Studies on profi t shifting in developing countries are 
scarce. Most studies on tax-induced profi t shifting in developing coun-
tries (as well as income shifting undertaken for other reasons) have been 
published by NGOs. Below, we discuss and criticize some of these stud-
ies. It should be emphasized, though, that these studies have the merit of 
attracting the attention of a wider public to this important issue.
The trade mispricing approach
Studies based on the trade mispricing approach start with the idea that 
fi rms may manipulate prices of internationally traded goods to shift 
income across countries. This idea is known from empirical work on 
income shifting in developed countries (see Clausing 2003 and the lit-
erature cited there). The key question is how the manipulation of prices 
is identifi ed. There are different identifi cation strategies with different 
implications.
As mentioned in the preceding section, Baker (2005) uses interviews 
to estimate the extent of mispricing in trade transactions with develop-
ing countries. He quantifi es the income shifted out of developing coun-
tries through mispricing activities by multiplying the low end of his 
interview-based mispricing estimate (that is, mispricing of 5 percent of 
import and export value, respectively) with the sum of imports and 
exports of developing countries, which is equal to approximately US$4 
trillion. Given this, he arrives at what he refers to as a lower-bound esti-
mate of US$200 billion for capital outfl ows due to trade.
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The main disadvantage of Baker’s approach to the estimation of capi-
tal outfl ows is that it is based on a relatively small number of interviews, 
and these interviews are confi dential. Therefore, the results cannot be 
replicated.
Another approach to identifying mispricing is used by Pak (2007), 
who identifi es abnormally priced import and export transactions 
through the price fi lter matrix method. For example, the method might 
rely on trade statistics that offer information on the prices of transac-
tions for individual product groups such as U.S. trade statistics that offer 
information about the prices of refrigerators imported into the country 
in a given year. One might then classify all transactions as overpriced if 
they involve prices that exceed the average price for imported refrigera-
tors by a certain amount (for instance, prices in the upper quartile of the 
price range), while classifying as underpriced all transactions involving 
prices suffi ciently below the average price in that product group. On this 
basis, one calculates the income shifted into and out of the country. Pak 
(2007, 120) does so as follows: “the dollar amounts are computed by 
aggregating the amount deviated from [the] lower quartile price for 
every abnormally low priced U.S. import and the amount deviated from 
[the] upper quartile price for every abnormally high priced U.S. export.”
The analysis in Pak (2007) leads to the estimate that U.S. imports 
from all other countries were underpriced by approximately US$202 
 billion in 2005, or 12.1 percent of total imports. The value of U.S. exports 
in the same year was overpriced by US$50 billion, or 5.5 percent of over-
all exports. Zdanowicz, Pak, and Sullivan (1999) investigate the interna-
tional merchandise statistics between Brazil and the United States and 
fi nd that the amount of income shifted because of abnormal pricing is 
between 11.1 percent for underinvoiced exports from Brazil and 15.2 
percent for overinvoiced imports to Brazil. Pak, Zanakis, and Zdanowicz 
(2003) use the same framework to investigate capital outfl ows from 
Greece because of the mispricing of internationally traded goods and 
services. The share of income shifted from Greece to the world varies 
between 2.0 percent for underinvoiced exports from Greece and 5.9 per-
cent for overinvoiced imports to Greece.
Another study using this approach has been published recently by 
Christian Aid (2009), which argues that profi t shifting out of developing 
countries through trade mispricing in 2005–07 represented above US$1 
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trillion, giving rise to a yearly tax revenue loss of US$121.8 billion per 
year. Using the same approach, Christian Aid (2008) calculates a tax rev-
enue loss of US$160 billion suffered by developing countries in 2008 
because of trade mispricing.
The mispricing approach as employed in these studies has the advan-
tage of simplicity and transparency. It uses publicly available data, and it 
is straightforward to replicate the results of existing studies. Unfortu-
nately, the results of this type of analysis are diffi cult to interpret, and 
they effectively reveal little reliable information about income shifting in 
the context of tax avoidance and evasion. This is so for the following 
reasons.
First, it is likely that, to some extent, price differences within product 
groups simply refl ect quality differences. If there are price differences 
within product groups, it would be natural to assume that developing 
countries tend to export low-end, low-price products, whereas devel-
oped countries export high-end products at higher prices. Chinese 
exports are an example of this pattern, as recently demonstrated by 
Schott (2008). How this affects the results of income shifting calcula-
tions depends on whether or not the trade volumes of different coun-
tries in a given product group are considered jointly to identify mispric-
ing. If they are considered jointly and if the quality pattern is as described 
above, the mispricing approach systematically overestimates income 
shifting from developing to developed countries. If they are considered 
separately, this cannot happen, but, in this case, goods that are classifi ed 
as overpriced in one country may be counted as underpriced in another 
country. This is inconsistent. As long as it is not possible to disentangle 
quality differences and income shifting, the interpretation of numbers 
generated by the mispricing approach is diffi cult.
Second, identifying the highest and the lowest quartile of observed 
prices as abnormal prices implies that any price distribution with some 
variance would be diagnosed to include overpricing and underpricing, 
even if the observed price differences are small or are driven by factors 
other than mispricing. Empirical analysis should normally allow for the 
possibility that a hypothesis—in this case, the hypothesis that income is 
shifted from developing to developed countries—is not supported by 
the data. This is excluded by assumption, unless all prices within a com-
modity group are identical.
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Third, the results are diffi cult to interpret because the counterfactual 
is not clear. Assume that, in one period, there is only one transaction in 
the upper quartile price range and only one transaction in the lower 
quartile price range. All other transactions are priced below the upper 
quartile price and above the lower quartile price. In this case, the coun-
terfactual, which is a hypothetical situation without mispricing, should 
be that the two mispriced transactions disappear or their prices are 
adjusted to within the inner quartile price range. But now assume that, 
in the next period, the two transactions identifi ed as mispriced in the 
fi rst period take place at corrected prices, which are between the upper 
and lower quartile prices identifi ed for the preceding period; everything 
else remains the same. In this case, the quartile price ranges for the sec-
ond period would change, and transactions that were not identifi ed as 
mispriced in the previous period are now identifi ed as mispriced. This 
inconsistency occurs because there is no well-defi ned counterfactual.
Fourth, the price fi lter method, by construction, identifi es overpriced 
and underpriced transactions, so that it always identifi es income shifting 
in two directions: into and out of the country under consideration. Yet, 
many studies using the approach only report income shifting in one 
direction and ignore income shifting in the other direction. For instance, 
Pak (2007) reports underpriced imports into the United States and over-
priced U.S. exports, but overpriced imports and underpriced exports 
(both of which would shift income out of the United States) are neglected. 
A similar approach is used by Christian Aid (2009) and other studies.
The restriction to one direction in income shifting leads to highly 
misleading results if the fi ndings are used to estimate the impact of 
income shifting on corporate income tax revenue collected by a particu-
lar country or group of countries such as in Christian Aid (2008, 2009). 
A meaningful estimate of the tax revenue effects would have to take into 
account profi t shifting in both directions. Consider the following simple 
example.
Assume that there are three exporters of a good in country A. Firm 1 
exports the good at a price of 4; fi rm 2 exports the good at a price of 8; 
and fi rm 3 exports the good at a price of 12. The mispricing approach 
would identify the transaction at a price of 4 as underpriced and the 
transaction at a price of 12 as overpriced. Assume, further, that all fi rms 
have costs of 4 in country A that are deductible from the profi t tax base 
118 Draining Development?
in country A. The goods are exported to country B, where all three are 
sold at a price of 14 to consumers in country B.
In this example, the aggregate corporate income tax base in country A 
is equal to 12. Firm 1 shifts income out of country A, and fi rm 3 shifts 
income into country A. In the absence of trade mispricing, the tax base 
in country A would be the same. The tax revenue loss of country A 
because of mispricing is equal to 0. A method that only takes into account 
fi rm 1 and neglects the implications of mispricing by fi rm 3 is clearly 
misleading. The same applies to the impact of income shifting on coun-
try B. For illustrative purposes, one might, for instance, consider a devel-
oping country with a weak political system and a low corporate tax rate. 
While some fi rms may be willing to shift profi ts into that country to 
exploit the low corporate tax rate, others may consider it benefi cial to 
transfer profi ts out of the country to hedge against expropriation risks. 
This might give rise to the heterogeneous transfer price distortions laid 
out above. While we do not necessarily want to suggest that income is, in 
reality, shifted into developing countries, we nonetheless consider that 
an empirical identifi cation approach should allow for the possibility that 
this might take place. This hypothesis could then be rejected as a result 
of the analysis.
What happens if other taxes are considered? For instance, one might 
be interested in measuring import duty revenue losses that arise because 
of avoidance or evasion. Assume that there is a proportional import duty 
in country B. In this case, it is easy to check that tax revenue is the same 
in the two cases under consideration, and it is of key importance to take 
into account both under- and overpriced imports to country B. Note 
also that, in this case, fi rms would have an incentive systematically to 
understate the import price. If this happens, income is shifted into the 
country. This is another reason why neglecting income shifting into 
developing countries is not appropriate in the context of studies on tax 
avoidance and evasion. Depending on the question asked, it may be 
meaningful to consider either net fl ows or gross fl ows, but reporting 
fl ows in one direction only and ignoring the fl ows in the other direction 
are not appropriate and may easily lead to misunderstandings.
Pak (2007) defends his approach by claiming that the price fi lter 
method he uses is also applied by the U.S. Internal Revenue Service (IRS 
regulation 482) to deal with transfer pricing issues. This is not correct. 
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IRS regulation 482 stipulates that this method can only be applied to 
uncontrolled transactions (see section 1.482-1e, iii [C]), which means 
that only transactions between unrelated parties can be taken into 
account in assessing whether or not a transfer price is acceptable. Trans-
actions within multinational fi rms must be excluded. The reason is 
that transactions between unrelated parties are more likely to refl ect 
undistorted prices. Effectively, the IRS approach compares transactions 
between unrelated fi rms to transactions between related fi rms. In con-
trast, Pak (2007) applies the price fi lter method to all transactions, includ-
ing transactions between related parties. This is fundamentally different.
An approach that uses a method consistent with IRS regulation 482 is 
applied in a study of trade mispricing by Clausing (2003). This study 
focuses on U.S. external trade, however, not on developing countries in 
particular. Clausing (2003) compares the prices in trade transactions 
between related parties with the prices in transactions between unre-
lated parties and shows that the differences are signifi cantly infl uenced 
by tax rate differences. For instance, in transactions between related par-
ties, the prices of exports from low-tax countries to high-tax countries 
are higher than the prices in transactions between unrelated parties. This 
suggests that multinational fi rms try to reduce the taxes they have to pay 
by manipulating transfer prices.
Of course, one could argue that mispricing is also likely to occur in 
transactions between unrelated parties. For instance, an exporter located 
in a low-tax country and an importer in a high-tax country could agree 
to increase the price of the transaction. This agreement could include a 
side payment that the exporter makes to the importer. Such a payment 
would have to be concealed from the tax authorities. If this happens, the 
approach used in Clausing (2003) systematically understates the impact 
of tax differences on profi t shifting through transfer pricing. However, a 
mere price manipulation in a transaction between related parties is 
much easier than a price manipulation, combined with a concealed side 
payment by which the importer would participate in the tax savings.
Proﬁ tability and proﬁ t shifting
As mentioned above, a second approach to measuring income shifting 
directly considers the profi tability of fi rms and asks whether the profi t-
ability pattern observed may be explained as a result of income shifting. 
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As in the case of mispricing, the insights provided by this type of study 
depend on how profi t shifting is identifi ed. Oxfam (2000) estimates that 
tax revenue losses arising because of corporate profi ts shifted out of 
developing countries are equal to US$50 billion per year. This number is 
calculated as follows. Oxfam multiplies the stock of foreign direct invest-
ment (FDI) in developing countries (US$1.2 trillion in 1998, according 
to UNCTAD 1999) by a World Bank estimate for the return on FDI of 16 
to 18 percent in developing countries. Oxfam argues that the true esti-
mate for the return on FDI is even higher since the World Bank fi gure 
does not account for profi t shifting activities. Thus, they set the rate of 
return to 20 percent. Next, the paper assumes an average tax rate of 35 
percent and thus derives a hypothetical corporate tax payment of around 
US$85 billion. Since the actual tax payments received are around US$50 
billion, this leaves a tax gap of US$35 billion according to Oxfam. Oxfam 
augments this fi gure with revenue forgone because of the evasion of 
income from fi nancial assets held abroad, which is estimated at US$15 
billion. This leads to the estimated tax revenue losses of US$50 billion.
This approach raises a number of questions. First, one may question 
the accuracy of the tax gap estimates. An important weakness of this 
calculation is the assumption that, with perfect compliance, all income 
from FDI would effectively be taxed at a rate of 35 percent. The issue is 
not that the average headline corporate tax rate may have been closer to 
30 percent, as Oxfam (2000) recognizes. The key issue is that this 
approach neglects the existence of tax incentives for corporate invest-
ment. In the developing world, these investment incentives play a much 
larger role than they do in developed countries (Klemm 2009; Keen and 
Mansour 2008). Many developing countries use tax incentives, for 
example, tax holidays or free economic zones that offer low or zero cor-
porate taxes, to attract foreign investment. It is controversial whether 
these incentives are effi cient from a national or global welfare point of 
view (see OECD 2001), but the related revenue impact should be distin-
guished from the impact of tax avoidance and evasion. Neglecting this 
implies that the revenue losses caused by evasion and avoidance are 
overestimated. Moreover, the return on FDI is not identical with the cor-
porate tax base. For instance, if FDI is fi nanced by debt, it cannot be 
expected that the contribution of the investment to the corporate tax 
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base will be 20 percent of this investment because interest is deductible 
from the tax base.
Second, one should note that this type of analysis is purely descriptive 
and does not investigate the factors driving profi t shifting. Thus, existing 
tax gap estimates do not help to explain why multinational fi rms may 
have an incentive to transfer profi ts out of developing economies. Taxa-
tion may not be the main factor that causes income shifting out of the 
developing world. Other factors such as the threat of expropriation or 
confi scation of private property, economic and political uncertainty, fi s-
cal defi cits, fi nancial repression, or devaluation may be the real driving 
forces, as pointed out by, for example, de Boyrie, Pak, and Zdanowicz 
(2005). The implementation of effective policy measures against profi t 
shifting from developing countries requires knowledge about the main 
motivations and incentives behind this type of activity and is thus an 
important topic for future research.
As mentioned above, there is a growing literature that investigates the 
role played by taxation as a factor driving income shifting. Unfortu-
nately, most of this work focuses on OECD countries, rather than devel-
oping countries.
Grubert and Mutti (1991) analyze profi t shifting among U.S. multi-
national fi rms and use a data set that includes developed and developing 
countries. They show that fi rms systematically report higher taxable 
profi ts in countries with lower tax rates. In their analysis, fi rms in coun-
tries with a tax rate of 40 percent would report an average ratio of pretax 
profi t and sales of 9.3 percent, whereas fi rms in countries with a tax rate 
of 20 percent would report a profi t and sales ratio of almost 15.8 percent. 
This suggests that some profi t shifting that is motivated by taxation does 
occur.
Azémar (2008) investigates how the effectiveness of law enforcement 
affects profi t shifting. Interacting a summary measure of law enforce-
ment quality and tax profi t ratios of fi rms in her regressions, she fi nds 
that a low quality in law enforcement accompanies a high sensitivity in 
tax payments to corporate tax rates. Her interpretation of this observa-
tion is that countries with ineffective law enforcement face greater diffi -
culties in effi ciently implementing anti–tax avoidance measures such as 
thin capitalization rules or transfer pricing corrections. This suggests 
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that developing countries are more vulnerable than developed countries 
to income shifting.
The Role of Tax Havens
Tax havens are widely viewed as playing a major role in the tax avoid-
ance and tax evasion by multinational fi rms, as well as by individual 
taxpayers. Empirical research on income shifting to tax havens encoun-
ters the diffi culty that data on economic activity are scarce in these 
places. Nonetheless, there are studies on tax avoidance and evasion in 
tax havens and on the impact of tax havens on tax revenue collection by 
other countries. Unfortunately, these studies usually do not focus on 
developing countries.
First, NGOs have made estimates of the tax revenues forgone because 
of the existence of tax havens. But these estimates are partly related to the 
potential impact of tax havens on tax rates set by other countries. For 
instance, Oxfam (2000) estimates that developing countries may be los-
ing annual tax revenues of at least US$50 billion as a result of tax com-
petition and the use of tax havens. It argues as follows:
Tax competition, and the implied threat of relocation, has forced devel-
oping countries to progressively lower corporate tax rates on foreign 
investors. Ten years ago these rates were typically in the range of 30–35 
percent, broadly equivalent to the prevailing rate in most OECD coun-
tries. Today, few developing countries apply corporate tax rates in excess 
of 20 percent. Effi ciency considerations account for only a small part of 
this shift, suggesting that tax competition has been a central consider-
ation. If developing countries were applying OECD corporate tax rates 
their revenues would be at least US$50 billion higher. (Oxfam 2000, 6)
The issue here is that the extent is not clear to which the decline in 
corporate income tax rates that has occurred in both developing and 
developed countries is caused by tax havens. Tax rate competition would 
exist even in the absence of tax havens. In addition, some authors argue 
that, under certain circumstances, tax havens may reduce the intensity of 
tax competition (Hong and Smart 2010). Of course, the empirical rele-
vance of this analysis remains to be investigated.
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However, the main critique of tax havens is not that they force other 
countries to cut taxes. It is the perception that these tax havens offer 
opportunities for tax avoidance or tax evasion to multinational fi rms 
and individual taxpayers residing in other countries, so that other coun-
tries suffer tax revenue losses. One estimate of tax revenue losses because 
of the existence of tax havens has been published by the Tax Justice Net-
work (TJN 2005). TJN starts with estimates of global wealth in fi nancial 
assets published by banks and consultancy fi rms (for example, Capgem-
ini and Merrill Lynch 1998; BCG 2003). This is combined with estimates 
(for 2004) by the Bank for International Settlements of the share of 
fi nancial assets held offshore, though this refers to U.S. asset holdings.1 
Based on these numbers, TJN claims that the offshore holdings of fi nan-
cial assets are valued at approximately US$9.5 trillion. This is augmented 
by US$2 trillion in nonfi nancial wealth held offshore in the form of, for 
example, real estate. TJN thus estimates that, globally, approximately 
US$11.5 trillion in assets are held offshore. Assuming an average return 
of 7.5 percent implies that these offshore assets yield US$860 billion. 
TJN assumes that these assets are taxable at 30 percent and thus calcu-
lates a revenue loss of US$255 billion per year (as of 2005).
TJN does not attempt to estimate which part of these revenue losses 
occur in developing countries. Cobham (2005) uses the TJN (2005) 
results and estimates the share of developing countries. Assuming that 
the 20 percent of worldwide gross domestic product that is accounted 
for by middle- and low-income countries represents a credible share of 
the offshore wealth holdings of the developing world, he fi nds that 20 
percent of the revenue loss can be assigned to these countries, that is, 
US$51 billion.
Other estimates of these revenue losses use similar methods. Oxfam 
(2000) calculates the revenue losses caused by the evasion of taxes on 
income from fi nancial assets held abroad at around US$15 billion per 
year. This result is mainly driven by an estimate of the foreign asset hold-
ings of residents in developing countries in 1990 (US$700 billion), which 
is now outdated. In a more recent study, Oxfam (2009) estimates that 
US$6.2 trillion of developing-country wealth is held offshore by indi-
viduals. This leads to an estimated annual tax loss to developing coun-
tries of between US$64 billion and US$124 billion.
124 Draining Development?
It is diffi cult to interpret these estimates for tax revenue losses because 
of offshore wealth holdings. They do not unambiguously over- or under-
estimate the revenue losses, but they rely on a large number of strong 
assumptions. These include the assumptions on the distribution of asset 
holdings across the developed and the developing world, as well as the 
taxable rates of return and the average tax rates. In addition, there are 
several open questions that have to be addressed. First, it is unclear 
whether all income from offshore wealth holdings is taxable on a resi-
dence basis. Some developing countries do not tax the foreign source 
income of residents because it may not be administratively effi cient to 
do so (Howard 2001). Second, even if savings income is taxable on a resi-
dence basis, the taxes paid in the source country may be deductible from 
the taxes owed in the residence country. Third, it is unlikely that all 
income from fi nancial assets held offshore evades taxation in the coun-
try of residence of the owners. There may be other than tax reasons for 
offshore holdings of fi nancial assets, and it is possible that the owners of 
these assets declare their incomes in their countries of residence. To the 
extent that these assets generate passive investment income, they will 
also be subject to controlled foreign corporations legislation, which 
means that this income is excluded from the deferral of home country 
taxation or the exemption granted to active business income.
Additional research is needed to determine, for example, the causal 
effect that the presence in tax haven countries of multinational affi liates 
has on the tax revenues paid by these affi liates in the developing world. 
Such an investigation should follow work by Desai, Foley, and Hines 
(2006a, 2006b) and Maffi ni (2009). These papers study the role of tax 
havens for the European Union and the United States. In the next sec-
tion, we discuss methods and data sets that may be used to do similar 
work on developing countries.
Data Sets and Identiﬁ cation Strategies to Assess 
Tax Evasion and Avoidance in Developing Countries
Attempts to assess whether and to what extent (multinational) fi rms in 
developing countries engage in international tax evasion and tax avoid-
ance activities have long been hampered by a lack of appropriate data. 
Thus, existing evidence on the issue is largely anecdotal with the excep-
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tion of a small number of studies reviewed in the previous section. As 
many of these papers face methodological diffi culties and their identifi -
cation strategies partly rely on strong assumptions, more research is 
needed to identify and quantify corporate tax avoidance and evasion in 
the developing world. In recent years, a number of data sets have become 
available that may suit this purpose. In the following, we review a selec-
tion of these databases and discuss potential identifi cation strategies. 
The analysis focuses on microdata sources because we consider these 
more well suited to the identifi cation of corporate profi t shifting activi-
ties than macrolevel data given that the former are less prone to endoge-
neity problems in the estimation strategy.
Identiﬁ cation strategies
The basis for a valid empirical identifi cation strategy is the development 
and testing of hypotheses that derive effects that are unlikely to capture 
activities other than corporate profi t shifting. In the following, we dis-
cuss two identifi cation strategies that, from our point of view, largely 
fulfi ll this requirement and that may be applied to microlevel data.
The fi rst identifi cation strategy builds on the notion that companies 
in developing countries differ with respect to their fl exibility and oppor-
tunities to shift income out of the host countries. For example, compa-
nies that are part of a multinational group can plausibly undertake profi t 
shifting activities more easily than fi rms without affi liates in foreign 
countries. This is because they can transfer profi ts to an affi liated com-
pany abroad. Moreover, fi rms that belong to multinational groups with 
tax haven affi liates have particularly good opportunities to transfer 
income out of developing countries. Thus, they can be expected to 
engage in even larger profi t shifting activities. Consequently, the identi-
fi cation strategy is to compare profi t shifting measures for the treatment 
group of multinational fi rms (with tax haven connections) to a control 
group of national fi rms that are expected not to engage in signifi cant 
profi t shifting activities.
To identify profi t shifting activities in this context, researchers need 
detailed information on corporate ownership structures and on com-
pany variables that are expected to capture profi t shifting activities. 
According to previous empirical studies on corporate shifting activities 
in the industrialized world, multinational fi rms use different channels to 
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transfer taxable resources out of countries, the most important ones 
being the distortion of intrafi rm trade prices and the debt-equity struc-
ture, as well as the relocation of profi table assets such as corporate pat-
ents (Clausing 2003; Huizinga and Laeven 2008; Buettner and Wamser 
2007; Dischinger and Riedel 2008). Testing for this type of profi t shifting 
therefore requires associated information on trade prices, debt levels, 
and patents. As this is often not available, researchers may also exploit 
information on corporate pretax profi ts and corporate tax payments 
because profi t shifting outfl ows are expected to lower both variables. 
Thus, following the above identifi cation strategy, we expect that multi-
national fi rms in developing countries (especially those with a tax haven 
connection) should report lower pretax profi ts per unit of assets, pay 
lower taxes per unit of assets and per unit of profi t, hold higher fractions 
of (intrafi rm) debt, and exhibit stronger distortions of intrafi rm trade 
prices (that is, enlarged import prices and diminished export prices) 
than the control group of national fi rms. The obvious challenge of this 
identifi cation strategy is to account empirically for a potential selection 
of fi rms with differing characteristics into the control group (national 
fi rms) and the treatment group (multinational fi rms [with a tax haven 
connection]). Strategies to solve this problem have been presented in 
earlier papers for the developed world (for example, see Desai, Foley, and 
Hines 2006a, 2006b; Maffi ni 2009; Egger, Eggert, and Winner 2007). If, 
after accounting for all these issues, no differences between the consid-
ered profi t shifting variables for national and multinational fi rms are 
found, the profi t shifting hypothesis is rejected.
A second identifi cation strategy starts with a question: why do com-
panies shift profi ts out of the developing world? One motive might be 
that they want to save on tax payments. A second might be that they 
draw their money out of corrupt and politically unstable countries 
where they are prone to threats of expropriation. To test for these 
hypotheses implies to determine whether companies in countries with a 
high tax rate or a high corruption rate report lower pretax profi ts per 
assets, pay lower taxes on their assets and profi ts, and show higher debt-
to-equity ratios and more strongly distorted intrafi rm transfer prices. In 
this case, the challenge is to ensure that the identifi ed effect between 
taxation-corruption and the profi t shifting measures is not driven by an 
unobserved heterogeneity of fi rms that are located in high-tax (high-
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corruption) countries and low-tax (low-corruption) countries. This 
requires the inclusion of a set of control variables that capture differ-
ences between affi liates and host countries. The most convincing 
approach involves including a set of affi liate fi xed effects into a panel 
data regression, which implies that the researcher accounts for all time-
constant affi liate differences, and the identifi cation is achieved via cor-
porate adjustments to changes in taxes or the corruption level. For this 
identifi cation strategy to be applied, stringent data requirements have to 
be met. Ideally, accounting data on pretax profi ts, tax payments, debt 
levels, or intrafi rm transfer prices should be available in panel format for 
several years; the same should be true of information on corporate taxes 
and the level of corruption and political stability.
Data sets
A number of data sets may fulfi ll the requirements associated with the 
two identifi cation strategies laid out above. In the following, we present 
a selection of these databases. In a fi rst step, we discuss one of the data 
sources, Orbis, in some depth. In a second step, we briefl y describe alter-
nate databases available for the purpose of testing tax avoidance in the 
developing world. The tables referenced in this discussion are contained 
on the website of this volume.2
Orbis. The Orbis data provided by Bureau van Dijk contain information 
on companies worldwide (see table 4A.1 on the website for a description 
of the data). While the majority of fi rms in Orbis are located in industri-
alized economies, the data also include information on countries in the 
developing world. Orbis is available in different versions, but the largest 
version of the data set comprises 85 million fi rms (as of 2011), and new 
data are added constantly. The data are collected from various (partly 
private and partly offi cial) sources that may differ across countries. Con-
sequently, it is a well-known problem of the Orbis data that the fi rm 
coverage differs across countries, and some economies are poorly repre-
sented in relative terms. This problem is especially pronounced in devel-
oping countries. While the fi rm coverage tends to be particularly limited 
in Africa, information on a suffi ciently large number of fi rms is reported 
for several economies in Asia and Latin America. Hence, we think that 
focusing on those developing economies for which good information is 
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available allows the Orbis data to be used for the purpose of identifying 
corporate profi t shifting behavior.
Orbis provides balance sheet information and data on profi t and loss 
account items. Thus, it contains detailed information on pretax and 
after-tax profi t (both operating profi ts and fi nancial, plus operating 
profi ts), as well as tax payments and debt variables. Moreover, informa-
tion on ownership links is included, especially links to all direct and 
indirect shareholders of the fi rm, as well as to subsidiaries within the 
multinational group. Finally, Orbis provides address information (postal 
code and city name), which may allow researchers to determine the loca-
tion of fi rms (or at least the headquarters) within developing countries 
and thus to identify, for instance, companies located in free economic 
zones or to determine the role of taxes levied at the regional level. It is 
important to stress that, as with other databases provided by private 
sources, there may be issues regarding the quality of the Orbis data. We 
believe these problems can be handled by rigorous plausibility checks 
and data cleaning.
In the following, we present and discuss descriptive statistics on some 
countries in the Orbis data. Note that the Orbis version available to us 
contains large fi rms only. Analyzing the full Orbis version, which also 
accounts for smaller fi rms, is likely to enhance the fi rm coverage com-
pared with our exercise. Moreover, we restrict the analysis to Asia and 
only employ data for countries with a certain suffi cient threshold of fi rm 
coverage. The economies included in the sample are China; India; Indo-
nesia; Malaysia; Pakistan; the Philippines; Taiwan, China; and Thailand. 
Our fi nal data set is a cross section of 87,561 fi rms for the year 2006 (see 
table 4A.2 on the website for the country distribution).
Because the Orbis data provide information on ownership connec-
tions among fi rms, they allow us to pursue the fi rst identifi cation strat-
egy described in the previous section. We establish the defi nition that a 
fi rm in a developing country maintains a direct link to a foreign econ-
omy if it directly owns a subsidiary in a foreign country through posses-
sion of at least 50 percent of the ownership shares or if it is directly 
owned by a parent fi rm in a foreign country through a holding of at least 
50 percent of the ownership shares. Moreover, we adopt a second, less-
restrictive defi nition of a multinational fi rm that applies if any affi liate 
within the multinational group is located in a foreign country (including 
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subsidiaries of the immediate or ultimate global owner that do not have 
a direct ownership link to the fi rm under consideration). According to 
these defi nitions, 2,202 fi rms in our data set exhibit a direct ownership 
link to a foreign affi liate, and 2,807 fi rms belong to a multinational 
group in the broader sense that at least one affi liate in the group is 
located in a foreign country (irrespective of the existence of either a 
direct or an indirect ownership link).
We face the potential challenge that information on some affi liates 
within the multinational group is missing in the data. If missing affi liates 
are located in foreign countries (from the point of view of the fi rm under 
consideration), then we might declare that a corporation is a national 
fi rm, although it is actually part of a multinational group. Such a mis-
classifi cation introduces noise into our analysis and may be expected to 
bias the results against us. This implies that the results should be inter-
preted as a lower bound to the true effect.
We undertake a similar exercise to identify fi rms with ownership links 
to affi liates in a tax haven country. A tax haven is identifi ed according to 
the OECD’s list of tax havens. We establish the defi nition that a group of 
fi rms has a direct ownership link to a tax haven country if they directly 
own a tax haven subsidiary through at least 50 percent of the ownership 
shares or are directly owned through at least 50 percent of the ownership 
shares by a foreign parent fi rm in a tax haven. In a second step, we adopt 
a broader defi nition of tax haven links that identifi es fi rms in our data 
that belong to multinational groups with a tax haven affi liate (irrespec-
tive of the existence of a direct or indirect ownership link). According to 
these defi nitions, 207 fi rms in our data show a direct ownership link to a 
tax haven country, while 691 corporations belong to groups that have a 
tax haven affi liate (directly or indirectly connected to the fi rm under 
consideration). Thus, according to the broader defi nition, 25 percent of 
the multinational fi rms in our sample have an ownership link to a tax 
haven country, while only 9 percent of the fi rms have a direct ownership 
link to a foreign tax haven.
We might face the problem that information may not be available for 
all affi liates belonging to a multinational group. Because a large fraction 
of multinational fi rms based in industrialized countries are known to 
operate subsidiaries in tax haven countries, we run a cross-check on the 
data and restrict the analysis to fi rms that are owned by immediate and 
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ultimate global owners (in foreign countries) and on which information 
on the subsidiary list of the owners is available. Among this subgroup of 
fi rms, we fi nd that 63 percent belong to multinational groups with a tax 
haven affi liate. One should note that missing information on tax haven 
connections introduces noise into the estimation and biases our results 
against our working hypothesis, meaning that it would lead us to under-
estimate the impact of tax haven presence.
Thus, we compare different corporate variables that are expected to 
capture profi t shifting activities among the subgroup of fi rms as defi ned 
above. The Orbis data contain information on a wide range of accounting 
variables, including unconsolidated corporate pretax profi t, tax payments, 
and debt levels. In table 4A.3 on the website, we provide descriptive statis-
tics that discriminate among, fi rst, all fi rms in the data; second, fi rms 
belonging to groups that own affi liates in a foreign country; third, fi rms 
with a direct ownership link via a parent fi rm or a subsidiary to a foreign 
country (this is thus a subset of the second group of fi rms); fourth, fi rms 
belonging to a multinational group with an affi liate in a tax haven coun-
try; and, fi fth, fi rms having a direct ownership link (via a direct parent 
fi rm or subsidiary) in a tax haven country. The rationale behind investi-
gating groups with direct ownership links to foreign countries and tax 
havens separately is that group affi liates connected through direct owner-
ship are presumed to be more closely tied in an economic sense. This is 
expected to facilitate profi t shifting between the entities.
As table 4A.3 shows, the fi rms included in the analysis show average 
total asset investments of US$23.3 million. Multinational fi rms possess 
larger asset stocks, with US$98.1 million and US$94.9 million for fi rms 
with any link to a foreign affi liate and fi rms with a direct link, respec-
tively. Moreover, among the multinational fi rms, corporations with a tax 
haven link are reported to have higher total asset investments than other 
multinational fi rms: at US$140.5 million for fi rms with any link to a tax 
haven country and US$172.3 million for fi rms with a direct link to a tax 
haven. All the differences are statistically signifi cant as indicated by the 
95 percent confi dence intervals around the mean.
Table 4A.3 also presents the pretax profi t per total assets reported by 
the companies in our sample. This may be considered a proxy for the 
corporate tax base of the fi rms. The average pretax profi tability of the 
fi rms in our sample is estimated at 0.092. Multinational fi rms (irrespec-
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tive of direct or indirect ownership links to foreign countries) show a 
lower pretax profi tability, at 0.071, on average, which is thus signifi cantly 
lower than the average pretax profi tability of the full sample as indicated 
by the 95 percent confi dence interval around the mean. This result may 
seem counterintuitive at fi rst sight because multinational fi rms com-
monly show larger productivity rates than national fi rms, which suggests 
that they also report larger pretax profi tability values (Helpman, Melitz, 
and Yeaple 2004). However, as indicated above, they may equally encoun-
ter more opportunities to engage in tax avoidance and tax evasion 
through international channels, and this may lower the reported pretax 
profi ts in our sample countries (that do not comprise any tax haven). Or, 
alternatively, the higher international mobility of their investments may 
endow them with greater bargaining power with respect to host country 
governments and allow them to obtain a lower tax base relative to less 
mobile national fi rms.
However, fi rms belonging to multinational groups that include tax 
haven affi liates do not report signifi cantly lower profi tability rates than 
national fi rms. Because multinational fi rms with a link to tax havens are 
presumed to face more opportunities for tax avoidance and evasion and 
probably also exhibit more willingness to take up these opportunities, 
this suggests that the operations of multinationals with a tax haven con-
nection are more profi table than the operations of other multinational 
fi rms. This picture prevails if we restrict the profi tability variable to rates 
above 0.
Table 4A.3 also shows the tax payments per total assets reported by 
the fi rms in our sample. The broad picture resembles the picture for the 
profi tability rates. While national fi rms pay the highest taxes per total 
assets reported, at an average of 0.018, the tax payments per total assets 
of multinational fi rms are signifi cantly smaller, at 0.015 and 0.014, 
respectively, for fi rms belonging to multinational groups in general and 
fi rms with a direct ownership link to a foreign country. The subgroup of 
multinational fi rms with a link to tax havens does not make signifi cantly 
lower tax payments per total assets than national fi rms. (This outcome is 
likely driven by the profi tability pattern discussed in the paragraphs 
above.)
Furthermore, we report descriptive statistics on tax payments per 
pretax profi t, which are a proxy for the average tax rate of the observed 
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fi rms. The results suggest that national fi rms face the highest average tax 
rate, at 20.0 percent, which is signifi cantly higher than the average tax 
rate of multinational fi rms, at 16.9 and 16.4 percent, respectively, for 
fi rms belonging to multinational groups in general and fi rms with a 
direct ownership link to a foreign country. Among multinationals, the 
lowest average tax rate is experienced by fi rms belonging to multina-
tional groups with a link to tax havens. These fi rms pay 13.2 and 11.2 
percent taxes on their profi ts, respectively, for fi rms with any tax haven 
link and fi rms with a direct tax haven link, which is signifi cantly lower 
than the rates faced by multinational fi rms in general and, thus, also 
signifi cantly lower than the rates faced by national fi rms. This suggests 
that fi rms with a tax haven connection manage to reduce their corporate 
tax burden signifi cantly.
To account for the fact that the characteristics of fi rms belonging to 
multinational groups with a link to tax havens might differ in ways that 
may determine the described profi t shifting measures, we also run a set 
of regressions to attempt to control for some of the potential sources of 
heterogeneity. Table 4A.4 on the website presents the results of a simple 
ordinary least squares model that regresses the pretax profi tability 
(defi ned as pretax profi ts over total assets) of the fi rms in our sample on 
two dummy variables, which indicate entities belonging to multina-
tional groups and entities belonging to groups with tax haven affi liates. 
In specifi cations (1) to (4), these defi nitions require the fi rm to have a 
direct ownership link to a foreign fi rm and a tax haven affi liate, respec-
tively, while the multinational and tax haven defi nitions in specifi cations 
(5) to (8) also allow for indirect connections. Specifi cation (1) presents 
the regression results without any control variables, which derives fi nd-
ings that are analogous to the descriptive statistics in table 4A.3. The 
results suggest that fi rms belonging to multinational groups have signifi -
cantly lower reported pretax profi ts per total assets than national fi rms, 
whereas the pretax profi tability of fi rms belonging to multinational 
groups with a tax haven affi liation does not statistically differ from the 
corresponding profi tability of national fi rms.
In specifi cations (2) to (4), we include additional control variables 
within the estimation framework to account for heterogeneity in other 
fi rm characteristics. Thus, in specifi cation (2), we add a full set of coun-
try fi xed effects that absorb time-constant heterogeneity in the pretax 
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profi tability of fi rms in various sample countries. This, for example, 
accounts for time-constant differences in accounting methods across 
our sample countries. It renders insignifi cant the coeffi cient estimate for 
the dummy variable indicating multinational fi rms and suggests that the 
pretax profi tability of multinational fi rms generally and of multina-
tional fi rms with tax haven connections in particular does not differ 
from the pretax profi tability of national entities. In specifi cation (3), we 
add a full set of two-digit industry dummies to account for heterogene-
ity in the profi tability ratios of different industries; this does not change 
the results. Finally, specifi cation (4) additionally controls for the fact that 
profi tability rates may vary according to fi rm size; it includes the loga-
rithm of the total assets of fi rms as an additional control variable. The 
coeffi cient estimate for the size effect turns out to be negative and statis-
tically signifi cant at the 1 percent level. This indicates decreasing returns 
to scale, that is, in our sample, large fi rms tend to report pretax profi t-
ability rates that are lower than the corresponding rates among small 
fi rms. Accounting for this, in turn, derives positive and statistically sig-
nifi cant coeffi cient estimates for the dummy variables indicating multi-
national fi rms (with tax haven connections). Hence, conditional on their 
size, multinational fi rms (with tax haven connections) report larger pre-
tax profi tability than their national counterparts, which is in line with 
previous evidence in the literature that suggests the higher produc-
tivity—and, in consequence, the higher profi tability—of multinational 
fi rms. Specifi cations (5) to (8) reestimate the regression model to 
account for multinational fi rm and tax haven defi nitions that capture 
direct and indirect ownership links. This derives comparable results.
In table 4A.5 on the website, we repeat the exercise and determine the 
connection between multinational ownership links (to tax haven affi li-
ates) and the corporate tax payments per assets. Analogously to the pre-
vious table, specifi cation (1) regresses the corporate tax payment ratio 
on dummy variables indicating direct ownership links to foreign fi rms 
(in tax haven countries). The results indicate that multinational fi rms, in 
general, tend to pay signifi cantly lower taxes on their total asset stock 
than national fi rms, while the tax payments of multinational fi rms with 
a tax haven connection do not signifi cantly differ. This result prevails if 
we account for a full set of country fi xed effects and industry fi xed effects 
in specifi cations (2) and (3). In specifi cation (4), we additionally include 
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a size control (the logarithm of total assets). Similar to the results in the 
previous table, the coeffi cient estimate for the size variable is negative 
and signifi cant, suggesting that the tax payments per total assets decrease 
with fi rm size. Moreover, conditional on fi rm size, the specifi cations 
indicate that multinational fi rms in general, but especially those with a 
tax haven connection report larger tax payments per total assets than 
national fi rms. This result may arise because multinational fi rms tend to 
show larger underlying productivity and, hence, earn greater profi ts per 
total assets, which lead to larger tax payments.
Last, we assess the difference in the average effective tax rate of 
national and multinational fi rms (with a tax haven connection) as mea-
sured by tax payments over the pretax profi ts of the fi rms (see table 4A.6 
on the website). To do this, we restrict our sample to fi rms that show 
both a positive pretax profi t and nonnegative tax payments. Specifi ca-
tion (1) regresses the average tax burden on dummy variables indicating 
multinational fi rms (with tax haven connections) as determined by 
direct ownership links. The regression results suggest that multinational 
fi rms, in general, are not subject to a lower average tax rate than their 
national counterparts, while multinational corporations with tax haven 
links report an average tax rate that is lower by 5 percentage points. 
Additionally, controlling for a full set of country fi xed effects and indus-
try fi xed effects equally renders the coeffi cient estimate for the multi-
national dummy negative and statistically signifi cant, suggesting that 
multinational fi rms in general and multinational fi rms with a tax haven 
connection pay lower taxes on their reported pretax profi ts compared 
with national fi rms. This result is, moreover, robust against the inclusion 
of a size control in the model, as presented in specifi cation (4). Quanti-
tatively, the results suggest that multinational fi rms pay 1 percentage 
point lower taxes on pretax profi t than national corporations, while 
multinational fi rms with a tax haven connection pay 4.4 percentage 
points lower taxes on their profi t. This means that the average effective 
tax rate of multinational fi rms with a tax haven connection is around 3.4 
percentage points lower than the average effective tax rate of multina-
tional fi rms without a tax haven connection. In specifi cations (5) to (8), 
we rerun the regression to account for indirect ownership links in the 
defi nition of the multinational dummy (with tax haven connections) 
and fi nd comparable results.
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Thus, summing up, the results suggest that multinational fi rms tend 
to report higher pretax profi ts and tax payments per assets than compa-
rable national fi rms, which may mean that they have a higher underlying 
productivity level. However, we also fi nd that multinational fi rms, espe-
cially those with a tax haven connection, face a signifi cantly lower aver-
age tax burden, that is, they make lower average tax payments per pretax 
profi ts.
Note that some caution is warranted in interpreting these results. As 
discussed above, an in-depth analysis requires that we account for the 
selection of different fi rms in the groups of national corporations, multi-
nationals, and multinationals with an ownership link to avoid producing 
results that are driven by unobserved heterogeneity between groups. In 
interpreting the results, one should also keep in mind that the majority 
of information exploited is derived from fi rms in China. Future work 
should aim to run analyses on a broader basis, including information on 
other countries in Africa, Asia, Eastern Europe, and South America. One 
important issue is also to assess to what extent the difference in the aver-
age tax rates of national fi rms and multinationals (with a tax haven con-
nection) is driven by the fact that multinationals tend to benefi t from the 
location in special economic zones or receive special tax breaks from 
governments through other avenues. This is methodologically feasible as 
demonstrated by previous studies on the industrialized countries (Desai, 
Foley, and Hines 2006a, 2006b; Maffi ni 2009; Egger, Eggert, and Winner 
2007). Moreover, it would be necessary to account for any time-varying 
differences in host country characteristics such as heterogeneity in 
accounting and tax base legislation. A rigorous analysis that accounts for 
these issues is beyond the scope of this chapter and is relegated to future 
research.
The structure of the Orbis data would also allow one to pursue the 
second identifi cation strategy, that is, determine how changes in the cor-
porate tax rate and corruption parameters affect profi t shifting variables. 
This is possible because Orbis includes rich information on fi rm and 
group characteristics that may be used as control variables, and Orbis 
is available in a panel structure that allows one to control for time- 
constant differences between affi liates. In the course of this chapter, we 
determine only the correlation between the corporate statutory tax rate 
(obtained from various sources) and a corruption index (obtained from 
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Transparency International) with the profi t shifting variables named 
above, and we fi nd small correlations only. This does not necessarily 
mean that fi rms in the sample do not engage in profi t shifting behavior, 
but it does indicate that profi t shifting measures are determined by sev-
eral factors that correlate with the tax rate and corruption indexes. These 
factors have to be accounted for in a regression framework to make 
meaningful statements about the effect of taxes and corruption on profi t 
shifting behavior. This is left to future research.
Other data sources. Apart from Orbis, several other data sets may be 
used to analyze tax evasion and tax avoidance in developing economies. 
A database that is comparable with Orbis  is Compustat Global, which is 
provided by Standard and Poor’s. The data encompass fi rm-level infor-
mation on balance sheet items and profi t and loss accounts of compa-
nies around the world. Thus, information on pretax profi ts, corporate 
tax payments, debt levels, interest payments, and research and develop-
ment expenditure is included, which allows one to identify corporate 
profi t shifting and assess the importance of different profi t shifting 
channels out of the developing world. In total, Compustat covers more 
than 30,000 companies in 100 countries, including several developing 
countries. The coverage is especially good in the Asia and Pacifi c region, 
where information on almost 16,000 fi rms is available (see table 4B.1 on 
the website for a description).
The data have some drawbacks. First, they do not cover ownership 
information, that is, it is not possible to link subsidiaries and parent 
fi rms in the data. Consequently, Compustat does not allow one to apply 
the fi rst identifi cation strategy because foreign fi rms and tax haven affi li-
ates cannot be systematically identifi ed. However, because the data are 
available in panel format for several years, they allow one to pursue the 
second identifi cation strategy to examine how tax rate changes and 
changes in the corruption index affect profi t shifting measures.
A second drawback of the data is that information is only provided for 
companies that are listed on a stock exchange. This imposes a sample 
restriction. Nonetheless, large (listed) fi rms are likely to be the main profi t 
shifters, and, thus, profi t shifting effects should still be identifi able.
Third, as stressed above, the quality of the data sets provided by pri-
vate institutions has been criticized in the past.
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To address this last concern, researchers may consider using data 
sources provided by offi cial institutions that have become available 
recently and that allow tax avoidance and evasion to be investigated in 
the developing world. These data sets encompass information on out-
ward investments by multinational fi rms. The most widely known data 
sets of this sort are the Direct Investment and Multinational Compa-
nies Database of the U.S. Bureau of Economic Analysis, the Deutsche 
Bundesbank’s Microdatabase on Direct Investment, and the U.K. Annual 
Inquiry into Direct Investment Abroad (respectively, see tables 4B.2, 
4B.3, and 4B.4 on the website). All three data sets contain information 
on multinational parent fi rms in the respective countries and their for-
eign subsidiaries, including subsidiaries in the developing world. The 
main advantage of these data sources is that the reporting is mandatory 
by national law, which suggests that the quality of the reported informa-
tion is high. Moreover, information on directly and indirectly held affi li-
ates is available. Only the U.K. data set is restricted to information on 
directly held subsidiaries. Despite some limitations, the data sets thus 
allow for studies based on the fi rst identifi cation strategy.
Moreover, the data include several variables that capture profi t shift-
ing behavior such as information on after-tax profi ts, tax payments, and 
debt ratios. Nonetheless, the data are somewhat less comprehensive than 
the data in Orbis or Compustat. Thus, both the German and the U.K. 
data sets include only information on company profi ts after taxation, 
not on pretax profi ts. This is a disadvantage because information on 
pretax profi ts is important for the analysis of profi t shifting. Unlike the 
U.K. and the U.S. data sets, the German data set also does not report any 
information on the tax bills of the foreign subsidiaries. Still, the data sets 
possess a major advantage: they include information on intrafi rm lend-
ing and intrafi rm interest fl ows, which allows one to test for debt shifting 
activities between affi liates.
Additionally, in the United States, researchers at the U.S. Treasury 
have access to confi dential U.S. fi rm-level data that are not available to 
the general public. The data cover information on U.S. tax returns and 
include variables on the tax payments, profi ts, and investments of U.S. 
multinationals in the United States and information on the income and 
tax payments of foreign-controlled companies, including subsidiaries in 
developing economies (see table 4B.5 on the website). Finally, table 4B.6 
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on the website lists other country-specifi c fi rm-level data sets that con-
tain information on the foreign activities of domestic companies.
Data on international trade prices may be exploited to investigate 
profi t shifting out of developing countries that takes place through trade 
mispricing by multinational fi rms. Previous studies reviewed above use 
the United States Merchandise Trade Databases, which contain price 
data according to import-harmonized commodity codes and export-
harmonized commodity codes.3 However, these data hardly allow for a 
clear identifi cation strategy to ferret out profi t shifting behavior. Because 
the data do not discriminate trade between related and unrelated parties, 
our fi rst identifi cation strategy is not applicable. This shortcoming can, 
however, be addressed by using a different data source. Thus, Clausing 
(2003) exploits data from the International Price Program of the U.S. 
Bureau of Labor Statistics, which publishes information on 700 aggre-
gate export and import price indexes. The data differentiate trade 
between related and unrelated parties, which makes the control group 
approach feasible. Assuming that profi t shifting via trade price distor-
tions is negligible between third parties, the trade prices of intrafi rm 
trade between multinational affi liates can be compared with trade pric-
ing between third parties (see Clausing 2003). A different strategy for the 
development of a valid identifi cation strategy would involve exploiting 
the panel dimension of the trade price data; this has not been done in 
existing studies. In this way, one might investigate how trade prices are 
affected by policy reforms such as tax rate changes or changes in the level 
of law enforcement or political stability in partner countries, which 
implies that the countries without tax reforms would serve as a control 
group.
Conclusion
Tax avoidance and evasion through profi t shifting out of developing 
countries represent an important and widely debated issue. Yet, rela-
tively little is known about the magnitude of and the factors driving 
profi t shifting in the developing world. The main reason is that the avail-
able data are limited in terms of both quality and quantity. The results of 
most existing empirical studies on developing countries are diffi cult to 
interpret because the methods used to measure income shifting raise a 
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number of problems. We have suggested and discussed several data sets, 
some of which have become available recently, and methods to under-
take more research on profi t shifting in the developing world. While 
these approaches also have limitations, they do have the potential to 
improve our understanding of this important issue and to inform poli-
cies directed at crowding back tax avoidance and evasion in the develop-
ing world.
Notes
1. The website of the Bank for International Settlements is at http://www.bis.org/.
2. See http://go.worldbank.org/N2HMRB4G20.
3. See USA Trade Online (database), U.S. Department of Commerce, Washington, 
DC, https://www.usatradeonline.gov/.
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Abstract
In Colombia, the need to send capital abroad to avoid anti–money laun-
dering (AML) controls is not particularly great. During the last few 
decades, the domestic risk has been low, and so has the incentive for out-
fl ows. This phenomenon has been associated with Colombian institu-
tional characteristics: the confl ict between the formal (legal) and infor-
mal (social) norms that characterizes the country and that serves as a 
breeding ground for illegal economic activities there. Geography has 
been a huge obstacle to economic integration and modernization and a 
main obstacle to effective central state presence in large parts of the coun-
try. The country has a large informal economy; fi nancial sector services 
are expensive and cover only a minority of the population; illegal eco-
nomic activities are widespread; and violence is frequently used to achieve 
economic goals. This environment has been fertile for the establishment 
of the illegal drug industry and provided good support for this industry’s 
resiliency. Law enforcement is a constant struggle. This explains why, 
although the country’s AML legislation is one of the most advanced in 
the world, the results have been meager. In Colombia, controlling internal 
and external illegal capital fl ows presents a daunting policy problem. 
Francisco E. Thoumi and Marcela Anzola
Illicit Capital Flows and Money 
Laundering in Colombia
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Unfortunately, as long as the confl ict between the formal (legal) and 
informal (social) norms persists, illegal economic activities will fl ourish 
in Colombia. This is why cultural change should be a main policy goal.
Introduction
Most illegal capital outfl ows from developing countries are associated with 
kleptocracy, corruption, and tax evasion and avoidance (Baker 2005). 
Since criminal gains need to be laundered to disguise their illegal origin, 
the funds are commonly channeled through scattered accounts at banks 
situated in offshore fi nancial centers that either facilitate fi nancial transac-
tions without investigating the origin of the funds or do not cooperate in 
AML investigations. Once the money is laundered abroad, the funds can 
be used as legal capital anywhere, including in the country of origin.
The need to send illicit funds abroad to be laundered may arise from 
several situations. Thus, it might arise if the country of origin has the 
capability to exercise some control over crime and illicit gains. In other 
cases, as in countries in which presidents or dictators have transferred 
billions of dollars to hidden accounts in the fi rst world, the fear of losing 
the illicit money because of political change may explain the need. Coun-
tries in which military forces control the territory and support authoritar-
ian regimes have all experienced large illegal kleptocratic capital outfl ows 
that have skimmed from the national budget and national resources. Such 
has been the case in Haiti, Indonesia, Nicaragua, Pakistan, Paraguay, Peru, 
the Russian Federation, Saudi Arabia, and several African countries (Baker 
2005).
The Colombian case differs substantially from the common pattern, 
however. In Colombia, money laundering has mainly been associated 
with the illegal drug industry, in which criminal activities cross borders, 
and payments are commonly made abroad. The main concern for the 
recipients of these funds is not only to launder the money, but also to 
bring the money to their countries, including back to Colombia. In the 
case of kleptocrats, guerrillas, and common organized criminals, even 
though the illegal funds are, in some cases, sent abroad, they are invested 
or spent directly in Colombia in most cases. The amounts of funds that 
these actors wish to send abroad likely pales in comparison with the 
amounts that traffi ckers wish to bring back in.
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This particular situation is refl ected in Colombian AML policy and 
laws (UIAF 2008). Indeed, in recent decades, the regulatory framework 
has focused on three dimensions of the effort to combat money laun-
dering in Colombia: the administrative control of fi nancial transac-
tions, the penalization of money laundering and illicit enrichment as 
separate offenses, and the development of comprehensive asset forfei-
ture legislation. In this context, fi nancial entities are responsible for 
adopting adequate and suffi cient control measures to avoid being used 
as instruments for concealing, handling, investing, and, in any other 
way, using funds or other assets originating from criminal activities or 
to give an appearance of legitimacy to criminal activities or transactions 
and funds related to such activities. Colombia has also criminalized the 
laundering of the proceeds of extortion, illicit enrichment, rebellion, 
narcotics traffi cking, arms traffi cking, crimes against the fi nancial sys-
tem or public administration, and criminal conspiracy (Law 365 of 
1997). Additionally, Colom bian law provides for both conviction-based 
and nonconviction-based in rem forfeiture.
The academic literature on illicit money fl ows in Colombia has also 
focused on illicit infl ows, particularly on the macroeconomic effects of 
these infl ows, and has disregarded illicit outfl ows (Steiner 1997; Rocha 
2000, 2005).
This situation raises a question, however: why do Colombian recipi-
ents of illicit funds have little or no incentive to send or maintain the 
funds abroad? The answer is quite simple: in Colombia, despite some of 
the most advanced AML legislation in the world, there are no real obsta-
cles to invest or spend illegal revenue. Institutional weaknesses have 
impeded the adequate implementation and enforcement of the AML 
laws, and the power of the paramilitary, guerrillas, and drug traffi cking 
organizations, particularly at the local level in many regions, and the gap 
between formal norms and culturally accepted informal norms have 
shaped an extralegal economy that is immune to traditional mechanisms 
for combating illegal economic activities.
More precisely, in the case of corruption and illegal drug income, the 
decision on where to invest the illicit revenues depends on the social and 
criminal networks in which the lawbreaker participates. For example, a 
corrupt offi cial who is not part of a criminal network and receives a large 
sum would be tempted to deposit the sum in an offshore center. However, 
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if this person is part of a group that infl uences political elections, whose 
members are friends and relatives of the political elite, and that has a 
strong private military arm, the corrupt offi cial would be tempted to 
invest locally. Indeed, doing so, the offi cial will obtain not only an eco-
nomic return, as he would abroad, but also political infl uence. So, in this 
case, there is not much incentive to invest abroad.1 This explains why 
most funds generated through corruption are likely to remain in the 
country. The exceptions are the money paid to local politicians or deci-
sion makers by transnational corporations that deposit the funds in for-
eign accounts or unusually large bribes associated with big government 
contracts.
Thus, in Colombia, where an important part of the economy is involved 
in illicit, but socially legitimate economic activities and where corruption is 
not centralized, but widespread, the need to send capital abroad to avoid 
seizures and expropriations is not particularly great. As a result, during the 
last few decades, the domestic risk has been low, and so has the incentive 
for outfl ows. Even though this might have changed recently, the incen-
tives to invest illegal capital in Colombia discourage illegal capital out-
fl ows. The most recent cases of corruption in Colombia have provided 
evidence of the existence of bank accounts and investments abroad. 
However, in many cases, it is possible that the related illicit payments 
have also been made abroad. The authorities have not yet reported any 
capital outfl ows associated with these cases.
This chapter analyzes why Colombian institutions constitute a fertile 
environment for the laundering and concealment of the proceeds of cer-
tain unlawful activities such as the illegal drug industry, kleptocracy, and 
organized crime, provide good support for their resiliency, and, as a 
result, encourage illegal capital infl ows and reduce the need to launder 
illegal capital abroad.
Using country-specifi c characteristics as explanatory variables is dis-
couraged in the social sciences because doing so opens a Pandora box that 
explains everything through these particularities. However, Colombia has 
been experiencing almost constant confl ict for at least seven decades. As 
shown below, offi cial data indicate that 9 percent of the country’s popula-
tion has been internally displaced. The International Organization for 
Migration estimates that, in 2008, there were 4.2 million Colombians liv-
ing abroad (Ramí rez, Zuluaga, and Perilla 2010). This means that about 18 
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percent of Colombians have been displaced internally or left the country. 
Colombia is the most important producer of cocaine in the world (despite 
the many other possible competitors), and, during the last 15 years, it has 
also been the largest producer of coca. Colombia also has the distinction 
of being among the foremost countries in the world in number of kidnap-
pings, assassins for hire (sicarios), child warriors, landmines and victims 
of landmines, producers of counterfeit U.S. dollars and other foreign 
exchange, exporters of Latin American prostitutes, and so on (Rubio 2004; 
Child Soldiers International 2008; United Nations 2009).2 It is the country 
where the term desechable (throw away) was coined to refer to indigents 
and other undesirables who have been socially “cleansed,” where “Not for 
Sale” signs are used widely to prevent fraudulent transactions aimed at 
stripping property from the legal owners, and where contraband is a 
socially valid way of life to the point that, in border regions, there have 
been public demonstrations to demand the right to smuggle.
All these facts have shaped the way in which markets and law enforce-
ment organizations operate. Indeed, Colombians colloquially refer to 
Colombian capitalism as savage, in contrast with capitalist markets in 
Europe, the United States, and even developing countries such as Chile. A 
study of illegal capital fl ows in Colombia that does not take into account 
the particular characteristics of Colombian markets and transactions 
runs the risk of reaching contradictory or erroneous conclusions.
The next section shows how Colombian institutions are an obstacle to 
law enforcement and help propagate illegal economic activities. The sec-
tion that follows explains how these institutions represent an obstacle for 
the enforcement of AML legislation. The penultimate section describes 
capital fl ows in and out of Colombia and shows the role of the illicit drug 
industry. The fi nal section presents a summary and conclusions.
Institutional Obstacles to Law Enforcement 
and the Upsurge in Illegal Economic Activities
The Spanish Conquest that began in 1492 was never completed in Colom-
bia. Large areas of the country have still not been settled. Local loyalties 
are strong, and the development of a national identity has been slow and 
remains unfi nished. An important U.S. historian of Colombia refers to 
the country as “a nation in spite of itself” (Bushnell 1993).
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Geography has been a huge obstacle to economic integration and 
modernization and a main obstacle to effective central state presence in 
large parts of the country.3 As a result, Colombia has a large informal 
economy, signifi cant land concentration, and a wide gap between formal 
institutions (constitution and laws) and the local culture.
The informal economy
Colombia has a large informal economy that is a principal obstacle to 
the enforcement of economic laws and facilitates money laundering 
activities. While there is no agreement on the defi nition of economic 
informality, Schneider and Klinglmair (2004), using a combination of 
statistical procedures, estimate that the informal economy accounted for 
39.1 percent of gross domestic product (GDP) in Colombia in 1999/2000. 
A World Bank study that involved the measurement of informality using 
employment classifi cations found that, between 1992 and 2005, inde-
pendent workers increased their share in total employment in Colombia 
by 17.3 percent (Perry et al. 2007). It also found that the share of infor-
mal independent workers, plus informal wage earners, in total employ-
ment in Colombia in 2006 was 66.8 percent. These are workers who do 
not comply with many legal requirements, contribute little if at all to the 
social security system, and do not have many social benefi ts.
A low level of penetration of banking services also creates an environ-
ment conducive to economic lawbreaking and money laundering. Data 
for 1990–99 and 2000–05 show that, in the fi rst period, deposits repre-
sented 14 percent of gross national product, which increased to 22 per-
cent in the second period (Rojas-Suárez 2006). These shares are about 
one-third of the corresponding shares in the developed countries 
included in the survey and about one-half of the shares in Chile. Simi-
larly, the number of bank offi ces and automated teller machines (ATMs) 
per 100,000 inhabitants is low in Colombia: about half the number in 
Brazil, Chile, and Mexico. These numbers for Colombia are only about 
10 percent or less of the numbers found in the developed world. A more 
detailed study shows that 26.5 percent of the Colombian population 
resides in municipalities that do not have banking services (Marulanda 
2006). These municipalities cover large areas of the country that have a 
strong guerrilla and paramilitary presence. Data from large urban areas 
show that only 26.4 percent of the adult population has deposits in or 
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loans from the fi nancial system. Upper-income groups account for a 
large share of this population segment.
Colombia experienced a fi nancial crisis in 1999 caused by a signifi -
cant change in the way mortgage balances were estimated. In response to 
persistent high infl ation rates, a constant value unit system was estab-
lished in the early 1970s. In essence, this set a fi xed interest rate on mort-
gages, although the principal could be adjusted according to infl ation. In 
1999 in the midst of a fi nancial crisis and high interest rates, the adjust-
ment mechanism was changed, and interest rate levels were used instead 
of infl ation. The values of the principal in mortgages ballooned, and 
many borrowers found themselves with mortgages that exceeded sub-
stantially the value of their properties; the real estate market collapsed. 
In 1999, Colombia, for the fi rst and only time in the postwar period, 
showed negative growth in GDP (−4.2 percent). After the fi nancial and 
real estate crisis, fi nancial institutions had to clean their portfolios, and 
their total credit exposure declined. Using annual data, Tafur Saiden 
(2009) shows that, during the 1990s, the ratio of credit to GDP increased, 
reaching 37.9 percent in 1998. Then it dropped sharply, to the 24–25 
percent range in 2002–05.4
A tax on fi nancial transactions that was raised from 0.002 to 0.003 
percent and then to 0.004 percent was earmarked to support the troubled 
fi nancial sector. The government, however, found it an expedient source 
of funds and maintained it after the crisis was over. Today, it gathers in 
about 1 percent of GDP (Marulanda 2006). Increases in service costs, 
including many hidden fees, were another response of the fi nancial sector 
to the crisis. Bank charges now include account management fees, fees to 
use ATM machines, and even fees to consult balances on ATM machines 
and the Internet, among many others. Moreover, the interest intermedia-
tion gap is probably the largest in Latin America.5 The penetration of 
banking services in Colombia faces other obstacles, such as the fear of 
physical assault following a deposit withdrawal or cashing a check. This 
type of crime is so common that the police are now offering protection 
on demand to bank customers who make large withdrawals.
Land concentration and the lack of territorial control
The lack of territorial control by the central state has facilitated the 
growth of power among local groups. Left-wing guerrillas (Ejército de 
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Liberación Nacional and Fuerzas Armadas Revolucionarias de Colom-
bia, more well known as ELN and FARC, respectively) and right-wing 
paramilitary groups have controlled many municipal governments and 
had suffi cient infl uence on some governments in the country’s depart-
ments to be able to extract signifi cant amounts from local budgets to 
fund their activities.
Illegal capital has been a factor in the extreme concentration of land 
tenancy and the political power of local landlords who, in large parts of 
the country, have had close ties to the illicit drug industry or have been 
active in this industry.6 Illegal drug money could not be easily invested in 
the modern economy, and drug traffi ckers purchased large amounts of 
rural land (Reyes Posada 1997). This concentration has been achieved by 
purchases, forced purchases under threat, and forced displacements of 
peasants and has been facilitated by the lack of well-defi ned, defendable 
property rights in many regions.
Moreover, in towns controlled by armed groups or local traditional 
landlords, public land and title registries (catastros) are outdated and 
incomplete, and tax assessments grossly underestimated. Municipal reg-
istries that should provide information on ownership are also inade-
quate, and, frequently, municipal staff refuse to cooperate with the Fis-
calía (Attorney General’s Offi ce) because the staff are controlled by 
people whose property rights may be challenged for money laundering. 
Land taxes are woefully low in many regions, and landed interests con-
trol municipal councils, where they block any attempts to update the 
registries and raise rural real estate taxes.
Paramilitary organizations have stripped large amounts of land from 
peasants. The lack of reliable land records and the fact that many peas-
ants have not had formal property rights to their plots make it impossi-
ble to develop accurate estimates on the extent of the plundering. Today, 
but for Sudan, Colombia has the largest number of displaced citizens in 
the world. The Internal Displacement Monitoring Centre estimates the 
number of displaced Colombians, as of June 2010, at 3.3 million to 4.9 
million in a total population of 45.7 million.7
The gap between formal and informal norms
Geography has also been a main factor in the development of diverse cul-
tures because many regions essentially represent cultural endogamies 
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based on homogeneous values, beliefs, and attitudes (Yunis 2003). This 
explains why, in Colombia, there is a wide gap and strong contrast between 
formal institutions (constitution, laws, decrees, and so on) and the infor-
mal unwritten norms recognized and followed by many social groups. 
Scholars have identifi ed this gap as a main problem in establishing the 
rule of law in Colombia (Thoumi 1987; Herrán 1987; Kalmanovitz 1989; 
Mockus 1994; Yunis 2003; Puyana-García 2005).8 One of the principal 
problems law enforcement efforts face in Colombia is the fact that most 
decent Colombians break economic laws in some form or another. Some 
do it without violence. For example, they buy contraband or evade taxes. 
Others go further and may use social and political infl uence to get govern-
ment jobs or contracts; still others may use fraud, violence, or the threat of 
violence to achieve their goals.
The persistence and diversity of the contrast and confl ict in norms, 
coupled with large internal migrations partially in response to forced 
displacement, have resulted in a signifi cant number of Colombians 
developing a deep amoral individualism; they have become anomic: the 
effects of their actions on others are simply irrelevant.9 Many Colombi-
ans tend to be selective regarding the laws that they comply with and 
those that they break. Most Colombians simply accept that they should 
obey “good” laws, but that they may disobey “unjust” laws.10
The problem of Colombia is not only the weak state, which could be 
strengthened, but, rather, that this state is embedded within a lax society 
in which social controls on behavior have been enfeebled to the point that 
they are irrelevant for many Colombians. In the Colombian institutional 
environment, the line dividing legal and illegal economic activities is 
fuzzy. Indeed, the division of activities between legal and illegal provides 
only a partial picture of reality. It is more relevant to divide the economy 
in terms of the law into four sectors: legal and socially legitimate, that is, 
activities that comply with the law and are accepted and reinforced by 
unwritten social norms; illegal and legitimate, that is, activities that 
involve lawbreaking, but that are accepted socially (purchasing contra-
band, for example); legal and illegitimate, that is, activities that comply 
with the law, but contradict social norms (abortion, for example, accord-
ing to the views of conservative religious groups); and illegal and illegiti-
mate, that is, activities that involve breaking the law and contravening the 
norms of society. Of course, the classifi cation of activities into each of 
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these categories varies across social groups. The issue is how large the 
numbers of illegal but legitimate activities are and who agrees with the 
assessment. As these numbers grow, the effectiveness of law enforcement 
agencies declines, and, if the numbers are large, law enforcement becomes 
ineffective and the risk associated with lawbreaking is low.
The Failure of Enforcement: The Gap between Formal 
and Informal Norms
Colombia has one of the most advanced AML legislative frameworks in 
the world. It is focused on attacking the assets of drug traffi ckers. How-
ever, enforcement has faced huge obstacles, and the results have been 
meager.
The Financial Information and Analysis Unit has developed a system 
to manage the risk of asset laundering and the fi nancing of terrorism. 
The system has been used effectively in the fi nancial sector. However, in 
Colombia, the fi nancial sector is not the main laundering venue because 
of its closed and oligopolistic structure and the limited penetration of 
banking services.11 The unit acknowledges, for example, that contraband 
plays a more important role as a means of laundering, and this is why the 
unit is now turning its attention to the real economy.12
The unit has also detected a signifi cant increase in the number of 
businesses that have been established specifi cally to provide specialized 
money laundering services.13 The Fiscalía fi nds a similar evolution, not-
ing that, 10 years ago, traffi cking organizations were pyramidal. Today, 
they are fragmented and more collegial. Money laundering fi rms have 
increasingly become specialized and offer their services to meet many 
types of needs. In the past, they were part of the main contraband traf-
fi cking structures; today, they are independent. Many of these fi rms have 
licit fronts and provide diverse services. In one case, for example, a fi rm 
had 1,500 cédulas, the Colombian national identity cards, that it used to 
make fi nancial transactions (smurfi ng) for various clients.14
Additionally, substantial logistical obstacles impede the adequate 
implementation and enforcement of AML legislation. The Fiscalía has a 
large backlog of cases. They have few prosecutors, and the Judicial Police 
has only 40 offi cers assigned to fi ght money laundering. Prosecutorial 
processes are time-consuming and labor intensive. Because of the preva-
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lence of testaferros (front or straw men), prosecutors have to investigate 
traffi ckers and all their family members.
In 2004, with the encouragement and support of the United States, 
Colombia changed its traditional justice system to an accusatory one. 
The shift to the new system has not been easy, and many lawyers, judges, 
and prosecutors do not understand the new system. Many young judges 
are not well qualifi ed, do not understand money laundering issues, and 
should be trained. High personnel turnover is another problem because 
it means there must be regular training programs. These have been the 
main reasons for the large backlog of cases.
Offi cials of the United Nations Offi ce on Drugs and Crime believe 
that there is a pressing need to improve the quality of justice system per-
sonnel.15 They think that personnel problems are behind a declining 
trend in AML convictions. They also think that the quality of the data 
available on judicial processes are poor. The government agencies 
involved in fi ghting money laundering have provided information to the 
judicial system for prosecutions. However, no information is available 
about what goes on during the processes.
The National Narcotics Directorate (DNE) is in charge of administer-
ing seized assets and forfeitures, but faces great challenges. Its record in 
administering, managing, and disposing of seized goods has been ques-
tionable at best. DNE regularly encounters problems because of the titles 
of seized properties. Frequently, the relevant records have disappeared. 
Because of these problems, DNE has opted to accept assets for manage-
ment only after formal precautionary measures have been completed.
DNE currently manages assets in several special categories: chemical 
substances; urban real estate; rural real estate; land vehicles; airplanes; 
boats; cash, art, and other; and businesses. DNE decides how to dispose 
of the forfeited assets. Both DNE and the Fiscalía have had great diffi -
culty separating front men from good faith asset holders. They know 
that a large share of the seized assets is in the hands of front men, but this 
is diffi cult to prove. Another problem arises because many assets are not 
productive, but must be stored and maintained and therefore generate 
substantial cash outfl ows. Others require special skills to be managed 
properly.
By the end of November 2008, DNE had received 80,860 assets to 
manage, while the forfeiture processes were advancing. Of these, 12,397 
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(15.3 percent) had been returned to their owners, who had obtained 
favorable court judgments. Only 7,734 (9.6 percent) had been forfeited, 
and the remaining 60,729 (75.1 percent) were still the subject of judicial 
processes. The forfeiture process is slow. Indeed, in early May 2008, DNE 
auctioned property seized from Pablo Escobar, who was killed on 
December 2, 1993. The fact that the share of the assets that has been 
returned to asset owners is larger than the share that has been forfeited 
also indicates the level of problems in the process. DNE offi cials suggest 
that the data are misleading because the defi nition of asset that is used 
does not refer to an individual piece of property, but to all properties 
that are seized during each seizure event and that they believe are in the 
possession of one individual. They claim that some of the forfeited assets 
include several properties. However, they do not have data to corrobo-
rate this.
Table 5.1 summarizes the results of AML efforts involving the seized 
and forfeited assets of drug traffi ckers. The offi cial data have been aggre-
gated and do not provide important details. For example, there are no 
estimates about the value of the assets seized and forfeited. Moreover, the 
defi nition of an asset is vague (see above). Despite the data defi ciencies, 
the results are clearly not encouraging.
Table 5.1. The Results of Anti–money Laundering Efforts: Number of Seized 
and Forfeited Assets
number
Asset type
Returned by 
judicial decision
In judicial 
process Forfeited Total
Urban real estate 2,571 1 1,790 2,965 17,326
Rural real estate 1,282 3,659 695 5,636
Businesses 62 2,541 287 2,890
Cash 410 5,420 327 6, 157
Controlled substances 525 9,439 653 10,617
Land vehicles 3,823 9,198 585 13,606
Airplanes and helicopters 361 660 44 1,065
Boats 179 571 99 849
Other 3, 184 17,451 2,079 22,7 14
Total 12,397 60, 729 7,734 80,860
Source: UIAF 2008.
Note: The data apply to the period up to November 30, 2008.
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Several public offi cials have proposed legal changes to allow the gov-
ernment to sell seized properties and return the proceeds if the owners 
win their cases. This would eliminate the problem of managing seized 
property, but raises the issue of how the sale price is to be determined in 
environments of extremely imperfect markets.
Capital Flows in and out of Colombia: 
The Role of the Illicit Drug Industry
Colombia began to be a player in the international illegal drug industry 
some 40 years ago. Since then, asset and money laundering and illegal 
capital fl ows have been an important policy issue in the country. Before 
1970, policy debates related to illegal capital outfl ows existed, but the 
problem did not have a high priority on the policy agenda. The outfl ows 
then were generally motivated by the foreign exchange control system 
and the protectionist policies of the government, the fear of a left-wing 
political revolution, and the desire to evade Colombian taxes.
Since the illicit drug industry started to grow in Colombia, the debate 
surrounding illegal capital fl ows and the related policies have been focused 
on capital infl ows, and the policy concern over capital outfl ows has been 
minimal. This has been particularly the case in the last two decades, since 
the foreign exchange control regime was discarded and the economy was 
opened up.
Kleptocracy is primarily a local phenomenon in Colombia; it has been 
limited by the small size of local budgets and the productive activities from 
which “commissions” may be illegally collected or benefi t may be illegally 
drawn from the associated public contracts.16 The Colombian military 
have never controlled the territory; they have relatively low social status, 
support elected governments, and play only a marginal political role.17 
Colombia has not had a caudillo (leader) similar to the ones who, at times, 
have been typical in other Latin American countries and who have grossly 
enriched themselves and taken huge amounts of wealth from the country.18 
The most publicized corruption event in Colombia in the 1990s was the 
funding of the 1994 presidential campaign of Ernesto Samper by the Cali 
cartel to the tune of some US$8 million. Despite a national scandal and a 
detailed investigation, Samper was never accused of having personally 
profi ted from the money, although some of the funds were deposited in 
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accounts of a close campaign associate in New York who had absconded 
with some money for his own benefi t.
However, this situation may be changing because of the surge in cor-
ruption in the past decade. During the eight-year presidency of Alvaro 
Uribe (2002–10), corruption increased especially in the infrastructure 
sector, where many large projects were left incomplete or barely begun. 
While media reports suggest that a large part of the funds remained in 
the country, a signifi cant, though unknown portion may have been 
invested abroad. The available information concerning this issue is frag-
mented and anecdotal, and there are no defi nitive fi gures permitting us 
to describe a pattern of behavior or to reach an acceptable conclusion. 
Future research might be able to throw light on this issue.
Capital ﬂ ows and economic policies: From a foreign exchange 
control regime to an open economy
The literature of the early 1970s describes Colombia as a foreign 
exchange–constrained economy that has a strict foreign exchange con-
trol system (World Bank 1972; Nelson, Schultz, and Slighton 1971). 
Colombia had the longest running exchange control regime in Latin 
America. The system was in place from 1931 to 1991. There were several 
traditional ways for capital to fl ee the country illegally, including import 
overinvoicing and export underinvoicing, contraband exports (coffee 
and emeralds to the developed world and cattle to República Bolivariana 
de Venezuela were favorites), and, in the case of transnational corpora-
tions, transfer prices and payments for patents and royalties.19 Tax eva-
sion and avoidance were not likely to be an important determinant of 
capital fl ight because one could keep one’s tax payments low through 
creative accounting and the frequent tax amnesties that the government 
periodically enacted.20
Colombia did not have large investments by foreign corporations; so, 
transfer pricing, another illegal capital outfl ow or infl ow modality, was 
not likely to have been signifi cant, although it was probably used by for-
eign investors.
The situation had changed drastically by the mid-1970s when illegal 
drug exports of marijuana and then cocaine grew quickly. From Decem-
ber 1974 until the change in the foreign exchange regime in 1991, the 
black market exchange rate remained signifi cantly below the offi cial one 
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because drug money was fl ooding the black market with cash. Also, the 
net mispricing of international trade changed so that, on average, 
imports were underinvoiced and exports overinvoiced to bring foreign 
exchange revenues into the country (Thoumi 1995). The exception to 
this was 1982–83, when high interest rates in the United States appar-
ently induced Colombian traffi ckers to purchase U.S. Treasury Bills and 
other interest-bearing papers abroad. This was a time of high cocaine 
prices in the United States and a sharp decline of illegal capital infl ows in 
Colombia (Thoumi 1995). Similarly, in 1982 and 1983, worker remit-
tances collapsed, but, “after 1984 Colombian expatriate workers appear 
to have been a lot more ‘generous’ with their Colombian brethren” 
(Thoumi 1995, 191).
After the exchange control regime was eliminated in 1991, the parallel 
market in foreign exchange remained alongside the offi cial one, although 
it has declined in Bogotá and other large cities in the last few years, and, 
today, it is only a couple of percentage points below the offi cial one. Sell-
ing foreign exchange in the offi cial market requires that sellers account 
for the origin of their funds. The gap between the two exchange rates 
has, at times, been explained by the taxes and fees charged in the offi cial 
market. The gap has varied not only over time, but also according to 
geography. In coca-growing regions, for example, peasants are frequently 
paid in U.S. dollars brought in the same small planes used to export 
cocaine. In these cases, the peasants sell the dollars at up to a 30 percent 
discount relative to the offi cial rate. The close current gap between the 
two exchange rates suggests that there is little if any questioning of suspi-
cious transactions and that the risks associated with money laundering 
in the country are low.
In the period before 1991, the year the economy was opened and for-
eign exchange controls were eliminated, capital outfl ows were associated 
with the incentives generated by the exchange control regime and politi-
cal risks. During the 1990s, illegal armed groups gained strength relative 
to the government, and the illicit drug industry’s control shifted from 
the old Cali and Medellín cartels to armed groups, guerrillas, and para-
military groups. The increased political uncertainty and the growing risk 
were clearly refl ected in the outfl ow of legal capital.
Colombian investments abroad are a recent phenomenon. Before 
1990, outward foreign direct investment (outward FDI) was rare, and 
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most of it was the result of the implementation of entrepreneurial strate-
gies under the Andean Pact framework. Starting in the early 1990s, 
Colombian enterprises began to invest abroad (see fi gure 5.1). Such 
investments between 1992 and 2002 were directed mainly to Panama, 
Peru, the United States, and República Bolivariana de Venezuela. The 
most important investments in the fi rst two countries—the largest 
investment recipients—were in the fi nancial sector. In 1997, the peak 
year, they grew dramatically. The fi nancial sector was a good venue for 
people to buy certifi cates of deposit and other fi nancial instruments 
abroad. The investments had a substantial component of capital fl ight 
generated by growing political instability. Indeed, the fi gures for 1997 are 
extraordinarily high, reaching US$687.4 million (see fi gure 5.1, particu-
larly the data at the bottom).
The growth of outward FDI in the fi nancial sector did not coincide with 
large investments by Colombian banks. During these years, the lion’s share 
of fi nancial investments was in other fi nancial services that included a vari-
ety of contracts and activities in which individual investors could partici-
Figure 5.1. Colombia: Outward Foreign Direct Investment, 1994–2010
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pate.21 After the launch of Plan Colombia and after the guerrilla threat had 
died down, Colombians began to regain confi dence in the economy, and, 
in 2001, fi nancial sector outward FDI was negative.
After 2002, Colombian outward FDI shifted from the fi nancial sector 
to industry, mining, and public utilities. Colombian enterprises, like 
other Latin American enterprises, tend to invest regionally, close to the 
home country (Ecuador, Panama, Peru, República Bolivariana de Vene-
zuela, and, most recently, Brazil, Chile, and Mexico). While in the 1990s, 
Colombian outward FDI could be characterized as typical capital fl ight 
explained by a loss of confi dence in the country, in the last decade by 
contrast, it has been the result of economic growth and the internaliza-
tion strategies of Colombian enterprises.
Illegal capital ﬂ ows associated with the illicit drug industry
Most of the revenues of Colombian drug traffi ckers has come from foreign 
markets. A kilogram of cocaine sold per gram in Europe or the United 
States generates revenues 50 to 100 times the export value in Colombia.
There are no data on the value of all domestic cash seizures, but most 
have been in U.S. dollars. Fiscalía staff describe a case of the seizure in 
2008 of US$3 million in cash. They found that the bills were soiled and 
smelled of soil, which indicate that they had been stored underground. 
They interpret this as a sign that the dollars had been brought into the 
country and stashed away without any intention of sending them abroad. 
They also claim that, the few times the government has found stashes of 
Colombian pesos, these have belonged to the guerrillas. These pesos are 
likely to be the product of kidnappings for ransom and extortions. When 
the fi ndings have been mixed, both pesos and dollars, the latter account 
for the vast majority of the fi nd.22 Remarkably, in Bogotá between August 
and October 2010, US$80 million and €17 million were found and seized 
altogether in fi ve locations. These monies supposedly belonged to El Loco 
Barrera, a well-known traffi cker.23
A main problem faced by traffi ckers is how to bring such resources into 
Colombia.24 The traditional money laundering system of placing the cash 
in the fi nancial sector, layering to hide the origin of the funds, and then 
integrating the resources into the legal economy is not necessarily desired 
by these people. Drug revenues have been brought into the country in 
many ways: physical cash, real sector contraband, underinvoicing imports 
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and overinvoicing exports, and fake labor remittances have been impor-
tant. Rocha (1997) fi nds that illegal fl ows hidden in the current account of 
the balance of payments show that the value of underinvoiced imports and 
overinvoiced exports, plus Central Bank foreign exchange purchases of 
fake labor and other remittances, averaged about US$1 billion a year.25 
Given that various estimates place the total value of annual illegal drug 
revenue brought from abroad in the 1990s at between US$2 billion and 
US$5 billion, it is clear that the latter methods were important.26
Physical contraband has been another important method for bringing 
drug money into the country. As noted above, contraband is socially 
acceptable for many Colombians. Every city has a San Andresito, a shop-
ping center where contraband is known to be sold openly, mixed with simi-
lar legal imports.27 Computers and other electronic equipment are favorite 
illegal imports. These and other bulky items with empty space in the inte-
rior, such as household appliances, are also used to bring U.S. dollars into 
the country. Many of these items are imported legally.
In the 1990s, cigarettes were a principal means of laundering drug 
money. The international tobacco industry was at least an implicit accom-
plice in this process. Both British Tobacco and Philip Morris exported 
huge amounts of cigarettes to Aruba, Curaçao, Margarita Island, Panama, 
and other Caribbean locations, from which the cigarettes were smuggled 
into Colombia. At almost any traffi c light, one could fi nd someone selling 
cigarettes. The case of Aruba is remarkable in this respect, as its cigarette 
imports were equal to 25 percent of the island’s national income (Steiner 
1997). For many years, the Philip Morris advertising budget in Colombia 
exceeded the value of offi cial Philip Morris cigarette exports to Colombia. 
The offi cial Philip Morris response to Colombian offi cials who ques-
tioned these advertising expenditures was simply that they were trying to 
increase their market share even though they had over 70 percent of the 
market already.28 When these facts became known, there was a public out-
cry that led to negotiations between the government and the tobacco 
companies to suppress this contraband (Thoumi 2003). Several local gov-
ernments sued the tobacco companies for tax evasion, and, in a June 2009 
agreement, Philip Morris agreed to pay US$200 million without acknowl-
edging any wrongdoing or accepting any liability. Cigarette smuggling 
was a case in which there was simultaneous capital infl ow and outfl ow. 
The tobacco companies were selling their products in Curaçao, a free 
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port, for consumption in Colombia, thereby evading import and income 
taxes in Colombia.
During the 1990s, the illegal drug industry evolved substantially. The 
area under cultivation with illegal crops grew dramatically. The govern-
ment succeeded in destroying the Medellín cartel. The Cali cartel expanded, 
but was then also destroyed by the government. Traffi cking organizations 
became smaller, and their armed branches became weaker. The paramili-
tary organizations that had developed through links with the illegal indus-
try gained ascendancy over the traditional traffi ckers because they gained 
control of areas in which cocaine was refi ned, as well as of traffi cking cor-
ridors. They also controlled some coca- and poppy-growing regions.
Another change in the industry was caused by the increased involve-
ment of Mexican traffi ckers in cocaine distribution in the United States. 
The pressure exerted by the United States on the Caribbean routes begin-
ning in the late 1980s led to the displacement of the traffi c to Mexico and 
the Pacifi c coast. Colombians started hiring Mexicans to smuggle cocaine 
into the United States, but Mexicans soon realized that they could have 
their own distribution networks and the power to gain greater profi t by 
selling directly in the U.S. market. Furthermore, as the large Colombian 
cartels weakened, the relative power of the Mexican organizations increased. 
As a result, a signifi cant number of Colombian traffi ckers now sell their 
cocaine in Mexico or in Central America to the powerful Mexican cartels. 
This has lowered the revenues of the Colombian cocaine industry and thus 
also the amount of money to be laundered in Colombia.
The use of the illegal revenues has also evolved. The early traffi ck-
ers invested in real estate and some businesses. During the surge in the 
market for marijuana in the early 1970s, there was a real estate boom in 
Barranquilla and Santa Marta, the two cities closest to the marijuana- 
growing region in the Sierra Nevada de Santa Marta. When the Cali 
and Medellín cartels gained prominence, the cities experienced another 
real estate boom. Traffi ckers, mainly from the Medellín cartel, invested 
heavily in rural land, while traffi ckers from Cali appeared to prefer urban 
real estate and investments in various industries and services.29 The con-
centration of rural land among armed groups has been substantial. 
Reyes Posada (1997) estimates that, by 1995, drug traffi ckers already 
controlled over 4 million hectares. This process has continued as the ter-
ritorial control by armed groups strengthened (Reyes Posada 2009).
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During the last decade, the control of the industry by warlords has 
meant that a signifi cant share of the illegal drug revenues has been used 
to fund the armed confl ict: the purchase of weapons, payments to the 
armed personnel in the counterinsurgency, and the like. This presents a 
problem in estimating illegal capital infl ows because it is diffi cult to 
defi ne weapons as capital. A study by the intergovernmental Financial 
Action Task Force concludes that “a project team investigated the links 
between narcotics traffi cking and terrorist fi nancing, but had to conclude 
that this subject was less suitable for analysis through publicly accessible 
information” (FATF 2005, 1). This assertion might be valid in cases of 
international terrorist organizations that implement suicide attacks or 
plant bombs, but do not have armies to support. In the case of Colombia, 
there is no question that drugs have sustained the armed personnel and 
allowed the guerrillas and paramilitary groups to grow. It is remarkable 
that, before the expansion of the coca plantings, FARC was able to sur-
vive, though it had never become an important problem or a threat to the 
establishment. Similarly, the paramilitary movement became strong only 
after coca and cocaine had come to account for important activities.
Conclusion
Over the last 35 years, the main issue in illegal capital fl ows has been the 
consequences of the entry of the foreign revenues of the illicit drug 
industry into the country. In contrast to many other countries, the main 
policy issue has been the control of illegal capital infl ows, not the control 
of illegal outfl ows.
From the 1970s onward, these revenues have been invested in the legal 
economy and have created a particularly grave problem in rural and 
urban real estate. They have also aggravated rural land concentration, 
which has been a factor in making Colombia a more violent country, with 
a displacement of people second only to Sudan in the world. There is no 
question that, although almost 80 percent of the population is urban, the 
unresolved land problem remains a key policy issue in Colombia.
The government has been unable to impose the rule of law over the 
national territory, and various regions have developed their own norms. 
Other factors, including the persistently high level of violence, have 
compounded the problem, and civil society has become increasingly 
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indifferent to the rule of law. The decision about whether to respect a law 
has become similar to an investor’s portfolio decision in which the risks 
of various actions are weighed to determine what to do.
Not surprisingly, law enforcement has become a constant struggle, 
which refl ects the gap between the law and socially acceptable behavior. 
Many government offi cials either do not believe in the laws or are unable 
to enforce them. Thus, although the country’s AML legislation is one of 
the most advanced in the world, the results have been meager, and there 
is little need to take illegal capital abroad to protect it.
Controlling internal and external illegal capital fl ows presents a 
daunting policy problem given that a large proportion of the population 
considers the law as a grey area that one may or may not respect. As long 
as the confl ict between the formal (legal) and informal (social) norms 
persists, illegal economic activities will fl ourish in Colombia. Closing 
this gap requires signifi cant institutional and cultural change.
Notes
 1. For example, Pablo Ardila, former governor of Cundinamarca Department, 
who was sentenced to jail in 2007 on kleptocracy charges, had transferred sub-
stantial assets abroad, but, his lifestyle in Colombia was incongruent with his 
reported income and caught the attention of the authorities. He regularly 
brought money from accounts in Panama and other offshore centers back to 
Colombia to support his high living standard (“Las cuentas del Gobernador,” El 
Espectador, November 27, 2007).
 2. “Colombia is a major source country for women and girls traffi cked to Latin 
America, the Caribbean, Western Europe, Asia, and North America, including 
the United States, for purposes of commercial sexual exploitation and involun-
tary servitude” (U.S. Department of State, Traffi cking in Persons Report, June 2009 
[Washington, DC, 2009], 107).
 3. “Because of its geography, Colombia was until the early XX century the Latin 
American country with the lowest per-capita international trade. Palmer (1980, 
p. 46) shows that as late as 1910 Colombian exports per capita were 77% of the 
second lowest country (Honduras), 67% of those of Peru, 52% of those of 
República Bolivariana de Venezuela, 12% of those of Argentina and 9% of those 
of Uruguay. Only the development of the coffee industry modifi ed this condi-
tion” (Thoumi 1995, 18).
 4. These data are consistent with a graph in Marulanda (2006, 50) that, unfortu-
nately, does not provide numbers. In the graph, the ratio of deposits to GDP 
follows a similar path.
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 5. One of the authors of this chapter, for example, closed a savings account in 2008 
that had a balance of about US$7,000 because the interest received was less than 
the monthly cost of the account.
 6. Rural land property has always been a key issue in Colombian society. Land has 
been a symbol of wealth and power and remains so for many Colombians 
despite the rapid modernization that the country has experienced (Zamosc 
1986; Fajardo 1986). La Violencia of the 1940s and 1950s, during which at least 
200,000 Colombians (about 1.8 percent of the population) were killed, was, to a 
great degree, a fi ght over land, and it generated large displacements of people 
because armed bands were killing peasants and forcing many others off their 
land (Guzmán, Fals Borda, and Umaña Luna 1962; Fals Borda 1982).
 7. The website of the center is at http://www.internal-displacement.org/countries/
colombia.
 8. It is remarkable that this gap was the main issue in the campaign for the 2010 
presidential election.
 9. Over 50 years ago, Banfi eld’s pathbreaking book on southern Italy (1958) 
referred to the society there as “amoral familism.” Today, in Colombia, even this 
has weakened to the point that we have “amoral individualism.”
10. These beliefs are not new. A good example is Augusto Ramírez-Moreno’s col-
umn in El Siglo on March 20, 1936, cited by Acevedo-Carmona (1995, 153): 
“The Liberal regime has declared civil war on Colombians. . . . There is a need to 
disobey. Citizens are relieved from obeying the wicked laws and the illegitimate 
authorities in power.” Remarkably, the reference was to the duly elected govern-
ment and Congress. During La Violencia, some Catholic priests, such as Monsi-
gnor Builes of Santa Rosa de Osos, incited his fl ock by preaching that killing 
Liberals was not sinful.
11. Banks have taken strong measures. Banco de Bogotá, for example, has a team of 
50 professionals, each of whom visits 50 clients a month to examine how their 
businesses operate.
12. The unit is working with Fenalco (the Colombian Retailers Association) and 
with the Chamber of Commerce of Bogotá. They all support and encourage 
investigative journalism into issues related to money laundering.
13. Author interviews with staff of the Financial Information and Analysis Unit, 
March 2009.
14. Author interviews with Fiscalía staff, March 2009.
15. Author interviews with offi cials of the United Nations Offi ce on Drugs and 
Crime, March–April 2009.
16. For example, indexes of Transparencia por Colombia show that entities in the 
municipalities and departments are at substantially greater risk of corruption 
than the central government agencies that have much larger budgets. See Trans-
parencia por Colombia, http://www.transparenciacolombia.org.co/LACORRUP 
CION/tabid/62/Default.aspx.
17. Since the new Constitution was enacted in 1991, for example, Congress has 
always had more members who have formerly been guerrillas than members 
who have formerly been in the armed forces.
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18. For example, see Naí m (2005), who covers the main cases of kleptocracy in devel-
oping countries; Colombia is not included. Jorge (2008) shows the signifi cant 
wealth stashed away by Montesinos in Peru during the Fujimori administration.
19. The International Coffee Agreement was signed in 1962 and modifi ed several 
times. Until 1994, it provided for export quotas for the producing countries, and 
this induced contraband.
20. Tax amnesties became almost routine as part of the tax reforms enacted by every 
administration. They were implemented by the López (1974), Turbay (1979), 
Betancur (1982), and Barco (1986) administrations (Thoumi 1995).
21. Disaggregated data on these investments are not public, but well-informed fi nan-
cial sector professionals agree that this was a period during which people sought 
ways to take capital out of the country and that it was possible to do so legally 
through outward FDI in fi nancial services.
22. Author interviews with Fiscalía staff, March 2009.
23. “Más de US$ 200.000 millones hallados en caletas en Bogotá, a manos del Estado,” 
El Espectador, March 31, 2011.
24. The physical weight and size of the dollars from sales abroad exceed the volume 
and weight of the cocaine itself.
25. Since the mid-1970s, the Central Bank has frequently changed its foreign exchange 
purchasing policies. These changes were particularly important before 1991 when 
the country had strict foreign exchange controls. Since then, under a system in 
which there is legal parallel market, a bank policy of easing purchasing require-
ments has lost importance.
26. Estimates of Colombian GDP in U.S. dollars vary. In the early 1990s, they were 
around the US$100 billion level. The estimates have increased substantially in 
recent years.
27. The origin of this term is consistent with the gap in Colombia between legal and 
social norms. In the mid-1950s, during his presidency, General Rojas-Pinilla 
wished to develop the Archipelago of San Andrés and Providencia in the Carib-
bean near Nicaragua, but he decided against a program to attract foreign tourists 
and promoted tourism by Colombians instead, given that the vast majority could 
not afford vacations in other Caribbean resorts. To make it attractive for Colom-
bians to visit San Andrés and Providencia, Rojas-Pinilla allowed Colombians 
who spent a few days there to purchase certain articles tax free while vacationing. 
This was a time of strict foreign exchange controls, high tariffs, import quotas, 
and prohibitions. San Andrés became a de facto smuggling-tourism center. Store 
owners underinvoiced their sales, and tourists brought back expensive and pro-
hibited goods, particularly home appliances: thus, the name San Andresitos.
28. Interview with Miguel Fadul Jr., director of the Colombian Commercial Offi ce in 
Washington, DC, August 1998.
29. The leaders of the Cali cartel were known for their investments in a large drug 
store chain, real estate management agencies, several factories, and, at one point, 
a bank.
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Abstract
Little attention has been paid to the fi nancial fl ows generated by human 
traffi cking. Nonetheless, adding the many different fl ows of money 
linked to human traffi cking together into one big number generates a 
meaningless fi gure. The socioeconomic consequences of each monetary 
fl ow are closely linked to the characteristics of the specifi c component of 
traffi cking the fl ow refl ects. Following the money fl ows can provide use-
ful information on the heterogeneity of human traffi cking.
The fl ow of money entering in the source countries and linked to 
human traffi cking is negligible if it is compared, for example, with total 
remittances. Most of the profi ts made by petty traffi ckers stay in the host 
countries. The only important fl ow of money internationally results 
from criminal organizations. It is almost impossible to distinguish the 
profi ts of human traffi cking from those associated with the core busi-
nesses of criminal organizations (prostitution, illegal drugs, counterfeit-
ing, corruption, and so on).
The research described in this chapter, even if preliminary, suggests 
that money fl ows entering developing countries and linked to human 
traffi cking are merged into broader fl ows of criminal money. There is no 
Pierre Kopp
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evidence that the fl ows have a particular, specifi c impact on the countries 
exporting the humans. Whatever the source of the criminal money, the 
impact is mostly the same.
Introduction
Human traffi cking has gained wide attention in recent years. Important 
debates have focused on the magnitude of the problem, the involvement 
of criminal organizations, and the share of sexual exploitation in the 
global phenomenon. However, little attention has been paid to the fi nan-
cial fl ows generated by this traffi cking. This is all the more regrettable 
because it seems that these fl ows should be easier to bring to light than 
the traffi cking patterns themselves, which, for obvious reasons, remain 
shrouded in secrecy. Analysis of the monetary fl ows is thus likely to pro-
vide a precious tool for the representation of a traffi c that is diffi cult to 
chart directly. Indeed, pursuing the fl ows of money provides useful 
information on the design of human traffi cking patterns worldwide. 
Furthermore, it offers an excellent ground for overturning the overly 
simplistic image of these activities that portrays them as entirely con-
trolled by transnational criminal organizations. Instead, this analysis 
allows us to construct an image of a world that is deeply fragmented and 
heterogeneous.
A refi ned understanding of fi nancial fl ows can also help build the 
structure necessary to analyze the impact of the traffi c on the developing 
countries that are home to most of the individuals who are implicated in 
the traffi c. Indeed, if formerly traffi cked individuals develop sources of 
revenue, they often channel part of this revenue back to their countries 
of origin. On a purely macroeconomic level, the impact of these fl ows of 
money is not sensitive to the origin of the victims. Incoming money 
fl ows improve the balance of payments; outgoing fl ows cause a deterio-
ration in the external position of the country. However, tracking the 
socioeconomic impact of the infl ows of money cannot be accomplished 
with any accuracy if the origin of the victims of traffi cking and of the 
money is not taken into account. The socioeconomic consequences of 
monetary fl ows are known to be determined by the characteristics of the 
activities that generate them. Social relations or a country’s reputation 
can be affected by illegal activities even if these don’t account for signifi -
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cant economic transactions and have almost no macroeconomic effect. 
This might be even truer at the provincial or city levels. For these rea-
sons, the fi nancial repercussions of the trade in human beings must be 
analyzed with an eye to the specifi cities of the various activities for which 
compensation is being received. Only a nuanced account of fi nancial 
fl ows can provide the information necessary to distinguish the various 
types of impacts human traffi cking have on source countries.
This chapter aims to structure the elements of a methodological 
framework for a nuanced analysis of the fi nancial fl ows of human traf-
fi cking. It argues that the methods used to establish global estimates are 
seriously fl awed in that they confl ate sources in such a way as to produce 
nonsensical results. If estimates of the illegal drug trade are added to the 
turnover associated with heroin and with cannabis, the result fails to 
take into account the fact that the traffi cking networks and the source 
countries are different. Such problems are compounded if it is a matter 
of estimating human traffi cking: whereas, in the case of drugs, at least 
the products are clearly identifi ed and the wholesale and retail prices 
more or less well known (Kilmer and Reuter 2009); in the case of human 
traffi cking, the modes of distribution do not allow for pertinent price 
observations and make it diffi cult to identify the various components in 
the turnover.
The contribution of this chapter will be more analytical than empiri-
cal. Our key contention is that more light on how criminal networks are 
organized and how they run their various activities will allow us to 
improve our understanding of both the origins and the destinations of 
the fl ows of money. This, in turn, will furnish two types of benefi ts. First, 
knowing where the money comes from and where it goes to illuminates 
the various strategies of those people who are active in human traffi ck-
ing. A clearer understanding of how traffi ckers conduct their business 
might provide new suggestions to the authorities who seek to control 
the trade. Second, identifying the patterns of fi nancial fl ows can provide 
a better understanding of their socioeconomic impact on the source 
countries.
The next section will give some insight into the main theoretical con-
troversies that have surfaced around the defi nition of human traffi cking. 
The subsequent section describes how the hopes of individuals to fi nd a 
promised land pushes, more or less voluntarily, millions of people into 
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the hands of criminals. Monetary fl ows are generated both by the com-
pensation demanded of people for help with illegal border crossings and 
by the revenue of those criminals who exploit the slaves, prostitutes, and 
so on that these people become after they have crossed the borders. This 
is examined in the penultimate section. The last section details the design 
of the criminal organizations involved in this traffi cking and considers 
their respective needs for money laundering. This section concludes 
with a taxonomy of the illegal fl ows generated by human traffi cking.
Conceptual Issues
Human traffi cking is a part of the shadow economy (Fleming, Roman, 
and Farrell 2000). The term traffi c in economics explicitly refers to the 
idea of transporting merchandise. However, if the merchandise is 
human, there are specifi c diffi culties in establishing defi nitions. A major 
diffi culty emerged when United Nations agencies were charged with 
establishing offi cial defi nitions of smuggling and traffi cking. Nonethe-
less, we contend that the conceptual problem with which the legal defi ni-
tions grapple is not necessarily the most relevant angle for studying traf-
fi cking from an economic standpoint.
Consider the defi nitions provided by the United Nations Protocol 
against the Smuggling of Migrants by Land, Sea, and Air and the United 
Nations Protocol to Suppress and Punish Traffi cking in Persons, Espe-
cially Women and Children. The Protocols are supplements to the Pal-
ermo convention, the United Nations Convention against Transnational 
Organized Crime, adopted by the United Nations General Assembly on 
November 15, 2000 (see UNODC 2004).
The smuggling protocol defi nes smuggling as “the procurement, in 
order to obtain, directly or indirectly, a fi nancial or other material ben-
efi t, of the illegal entry of a person into a State Party of which the person 
is not a national or a permanent resident” (article 3), and the traffi cking 
protocol defi nes traffi cking as “the recruitment, transportation, transfer, 
harbouring or receipt of persons, by means of the threat or use of force 
or other forms of coercion, of abduction, of fraud, of deception, of the 
abuse of power or a position of vulnerability or of the giving or receiving 
of payments or benefi ts to achieve the consent of a person having con-
trol over another person, for the purpose of exploitation” (article 3). The 
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main forms of exploitation are prostitution, forced labor, slavery, and the 
removal of organs.
Buckland (2008) recalls that those who gathered in Vienna to negoti-
ate the traffi cking protocol were united in mandate, but sorely divided 
when it came to choosing the road ahead. The major cleavage became 
apparent around the issue of defi nitions. Is traffi cking only about prosti-
tution? Is all prostitution traffi cking? Are men traffi cked, too? The nego-
tiators’ answer (according to Buckland) refl ects a certain ambivalence in 
the fundamental conception of traffi cking. While the protocol includes a 
broad range of activities in the defi nition, both the title and the statement 
of purpose cast traffi cked people as victims and make clear that the vic-
tims of traffi cking whom it seeks to protect are, fi rst and foremost, women 
and children in forced prostitution. The obvious consequence of overem-
phasizing the victim status is that it allows an artifi cial and tendentious 
distinction between smuggled people (painted largely as criminal by 
international institutions) and traffi cked people. As studies have shown, 
however, smuggled people may be trapped in debt bondage or subject to 
exploitative working conditions, and it therefore seems problematic to 
maintain conceptual categories that cast these people simply as criminals 
rather than victims (Andreas and van der Linden 2005).
Given that intentionality is key to determining the nature of acts in 
legal terms, it is not surprising that those who drafted the offi cial defi ni-
tions felt compelled to take a stance on the issue. Our concern, however, 
is less with ascribing legal responsibility than with reaching an accurate 
description of this illegal global traffi c. For our purposes, it seems that 
distinguishing between voluntary and involuntary immigration raises 
more problems than it solves. It seems clear that, if an organ is taken 
from a dead body and sent to another country to serve as a transplant 
without consent, this is an involuntary traffi c. Likewise, a clandestine 
migrant whose passport is confi scated and who fi nds himself enslaved 
has not chosen this situation. Yet, grouping these two movements 
together under a label of involuntary (or voluntary) obscures the differ-
ent sorts of traffi c involved in these two cases.
Furthermore, the distinction between voluntary migration in search 
of opportunity and involuntary traffi cking of human laborers may be 
conceptually satisfying, but applying this distinction in practice is close 
to impossible. While the conditions of their migration may, indeed, seem 
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shocking, it is far from clear that all migrants who are treated as goods to 
be exploited are acting involuntarily. What of migrants who turn them-
selves into transportable commodities because they expect to obtain a 
better price for their work in a target country? Classic economics theory 
would hold that such a decision may be deemed rational within a nor-
mal economic framework because no one is better placed than the indi-
vidual to know whether what he is doing is in his self-interest no matter 
whether or not his decision turns out, in the end, to have been a good 
calculation. Tens of thousands (perhaps even hundreds of thousands) of 
clandestine migrants who cross the Mexican–United States border each 
year purchase the services of smugglers and become part of the fl ow of 
smuggled human beings. The persistence of the fl ow and the fact that the 
same individuals may recross the border several times, depending upon 
the state of the employment market (and the riskiness of the crossing), 
can be taken to indicate that the decision is voluntary.
And, yet, those who might initially be thought merely to be purchas-
ing the services of smuggling networks can, in effect, become subject to 
traffi cking. Massive illegal immigration and the strengthening of con-
trols (for example, with the fence along extensive sectors of the Mexico–
United States border) have created situations in which border crossing 
has become an industry. To improve their chances of successfully cross-
ing the border, candidates for illegal immigration appeal to underground 
networks for human smuggling. Crossing the border with a network 
enables one to benefi t from the network’s investments (trucks, corrup-
tion, tunnels, and so on), but such a choice also exposes one to great 
danger. To avoid endangering their investments, or simply to skimp on 
costs, smugglers are sometimes prepared to dispose of their human 
cargo in the sea or in the desert. Furthermore, the condition of absolute 
dependence into which the individual is placed if he has put his destiny 
into the hands of people running a network exposes him to all sorts of 
risks, sometimes dramatic. Clandestine migrants can be robbed of their 
papers and money; they can be raped and killed. In such circumstances, 
it becomes disingenuous to maintain that they are not being treated as 
merchandise.
If one considers, furthermore, that the basis on which the decision to 
migrate is made may already be determined in part by the smuggling 
networks, the category of voluntary migration becomes even more prob-
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lematic. To sustain their activity, smugglers attempt to recruit new can-
didates for crossings and develop their activities in source countries. 
While they seem the best source of information, the smugglers, by pre-
senting a false image of the conditions under which illegal emigration 
can take place, increase the number of their clients and maintain a sup-
ply effect. Through this dynamic, the offer of smuggling contributes to 
an activation of the demand (Jewell and Molina 2009).1 Insofar as it is 
created at least in part by false information, even the initial demand for 
smuggling cannot simply be considered entirely voluntary.
Assessing the voluntary or involuntary character of migration is thus 
extremely diffi cult. More importantly, the attempt produces misleading 
categorizations of activity at least as regards the economic reality. Yet, the 
principle of this distinction, inherited from legal debates, underlies the 
conceptual categories used by the international agencies that monitor or 
assess these activities.
In this chapter, we use the term traffi cking in a broad sense to cover 
both smuggling and traffi cking as defi ned by the United Nations. Indeed, 
we adopt a broad defi nition of traffi cking that includes all means of 
smuggling, prostitution, organ traffi c, slavery, and so on.2 Some of these 
activities are clearly coercive; some are not; and some are partially coer-
cive. However, all must be considered if we are to establish a taxonomy 
of the different fl ows of money linked to human traffi cking.
To underline the stakes in choosing this broad defi nition, we now 
briefl y consider estimates that have been made of international human 
traffi cking using other defi nitions so as to emphasize how poor defi ni-
tions can lead to problematic numbers.
It is exceedingly diffi cult to estimate the scale of human traffi cking. 
Evaluating illegal markets is always diffi cult. Their clandestine nature 
makes them diffi cult to observe, and the absence of a uniform interna-
tional standard of illegality renders the comparison and collation of 
observations a perilous exercise. But the task of evaluating human traf-
fi cking is even more diffi cult than evaluating other illegal markets, such 
as the market for drugs. In the case of the drug market, the best estimates 
of quantities and revenues come from national population surveys (for 
example, Abt Associates 2001). In the case of human traffi cking, there is 
no comparable mass consumer market that can provide demand-side 
estimates.
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In 2001, there were an estimated 175 million people living outside 
their countries of birth, a number that had doubled since 1975 (United 
Nations 2002). Most immigrants were living in Europe (56 million), fol-
lowed by Asia (50 million), and North America (41 million), but most of 
these came legally. The International Organization for Migration (IOM) 
is unable to provide fi gures that accurately refl ect the amplitude of the 
phenomenon of human traffi cking as a whole.3 IOM’s global database 
on human trade contains information on about 13,500 victims who 
have benefi ted from IOM assistance. This fi gure in no way refl ects the 
global reality. Until IOM can collect data through a reliable and system-
atic method, the following estimates—which must be considered as 
crude guesses—are being used by IOM to evaluate the amplitude of the 
global phenomenon of the trade in humans.
According to a handbook for parliamentarians, human traffi cking 
affects 2.5 million individuals every day (UNODC and IPU 2009). This 
represents a low-end estimate of the number of victims of the trade at 
any given moment.4 The estimate is based on analysis of publicly avail-
able data published between 1995 and 2004 and presented for the fi rst 
time in 2005. It has not been updated since.
IOM considers that 800,000 victims of the trade in humans cross 
international borders every year or are authorized to leave or enter the 
territory of a country and are thereafter exploited.5 This is a high-end 
estimate. It was established by the U.S. government based on data col-
lected in 2006.
Soon, these estimates were no longer being mentioned in the annual 
report of the U.S. Department of State (2010) on human traffi cking in 
the world. In their place, the report mentioned estimates from the Inter-
national Labour Organization (ILO) on forced labor, according to which 
12.3 million people are victims of forced labor, servitude, forced child 
labor, or sexual servitude at any given moment in the world (ILO 2009). 
This is an estimate established by ILO in 2005 and represents stocks of 
forced labor on a worldwide scale. Among these 12.3 million people, 2.5 
million are considered victims of human traffi cking. According to ILO, 
the rest of the people are victims of forced labor who are not considered 
victims of the trade in humans (that is, their exploitation was unrelated 
to their entry into the destination country). ILO also indicates that the 
amount of lost wages from forced labor is US$21 billion.
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The United Nations Offi ce on Drugs and Crime has estimated the 
monetary profi ts from the worldwide trade in persons at US$7 billion 
annually (UNODC 2009). About US$3 billion is associated with human 
traffi cking involving around 150,000 victims (which means approxi-
mately US$20,000 per victim), and over US$6 billion is associated with 
the smuggling of migrants, which involves 3 million people (US$2,000 
per person). The United Nations Children’s Fund estimates the profi ts at 
US$10 billion (UNODC 2009; ILO 2009). ILO estimates that the total 
illicit profi ts produced by traffi cked forced labor in one year at slightly 
less than US$32 billion (ILO 2009). Others have estimated the profi t 
from commercial sexual exploitation at above US$30 billion a year.
None of these estimates is convincing. The estimates on the numbers 
of persons involved in human traffi cking fl uctuate between two extremes. 
At one extreme, the estimates refl ect only the number of people known 
to have been harmed; in this case, the estimates fail to account for all the 
victims who are reluctant or incapable of reporting their situation. At 
the other extreme, the estimates include all illegal migrants, thereby fail-
ing to discount for those who have not been traffi cked in any sense.
The estimates of the dollar fl ows generated by human traffi cking are 
often produced for advocacy purposes to underline the magnitude of the 
problem. However, adding fl ows together that have nothing in common 
other than the units in which they are expressed does not produce mean-
ingful values. One of the reasons many of the available data are too 
fl awed to be useful is that they are often produced with an eye to isolat-
ing human traffi cking from the illegal activities the traffi cking facilitates. 
Human traffi cking is, of course, a crime in itself, but its economic raison 
d’être is to supply a workforce for criminal or illegal activities. In this 
sense, human traffi cking is a means and not an end; it is one step in a 
complex economic subsystem. If a political agenda drives the desire to 
separate out this element, it is almost impossible to develop good data.
The dearth of international data is not offset at the national level by 
good fi eld studies. We know little about national fi gures on human traf-
fi cking. Staring (2006) is an exception; he provides some data on the 
Netherlands. He makes a distinction between human smuggling and 
human traffi cking. Human smuggling in the Netherlands increased 
between 1994 and 2002 from 4 cases per year to 201, while human traf-
fi cking increased from 63 to 201. Staring notes both that the data are 
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scarce and that, if they are available, the methods used for data collection 
are unclear.
Slavery and prostitution are other activities that derive from human 
traffi cking. One might be tempted to distinguish between criminal 
activities that violate universal social norms (malum in se) and activities 
that may be (temporarily) prohibited by law, such as homosexuality or 
cannabis smoking (malum in prohibitum). However, this distinction 
does not make a great deal of sense from a legal policy standpoint insofar 
as both sorts of activity trigger law enforcement. It therefore seems rea-
sonable to consider that all legally punishable activity involved in human 
traffi cking is criminal.
These activities do not all cause identical harm to society. Criminal 
codes refl ect these differences by modulating the severity of the punish-
ments associated with various offenses. Obtaining false papers for an 
illegal migrant or harboring a clandestine person are often only fi ned, 
while slavery or prostitution is more severely punished. Other compo-
nents of human traffi cking are even closer to the core activity of classical 
organized crime. Indeed, human traffi cking networks are sometimes 
intertwined with networks for the transportation of stolen goods or ille-
gal merchandise (stolen cars, drugs). Persons involved in one type of 
network easily pass to another.
The respective shares of the different components of human traffi ck-
ing are unknown. In the public imagination, human traffi cking is often 
linked to the sex industry, but labor traffi cking is probably more wide-
spread, given the simple fact that the world market for labor is far greater 
than that for sex (Feingold 1998, 2005).6 A detailed study by ILO (2005) 
fi nds that, of the estimated 9.5 million victims of forced labor in Asia, 
fewer than 10 percent are traffi cked for commercial sexual exploitation. 
Worldwide, less than half of all traffi cking victims are traffi cked as part 
of the sex trade, according to the same report.
Can we describe the market for human traffi cking? If we consider that 
organs or human beings are the merchandise exchanged, several inter-
connected markets for human merchandise would have to be taken into 
account: a prostitution market, an organ market, and a market for illegal 
manpower. As in any market, the suppliers put the merchandise on the 
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market, and the purchasers buy it. The overall market would have the 
specifi city that, occasionally, an individual may, if he has recovered some 
autonomy, put himself on the market and become both supplier and 
merchandise.
The market for human beings is not an ordinary market. The usual 
public policy recipes will not work in the same way they work on a clas-
sical market. Criminalization, for instance, directly affects the supply of 
and the demand for the merchandise (prostitution, organs, slaves, and so 
on), but it only has a limited and delayed impact on the fl ow of individu-
als who cross borders, whether on their own initiative or under the dom-
ination of a criminal group. The important point is that the supply of 
immigrants is not directly affected by the repression of a market seg-
ment. Thus, it takes time before repression on the markets of rich coun-
tries affects the supply of migration. Numerous buffers slow the trans-
mission of incentives.
The Hope of a Promised Land
The value of accounting is to make goods that are not homogeneous into 
goods that are homogeneous. A dollar adds to a dollar, but what is there 
in common between a dollar paid by the clandestine immigrant to his 
smuggler and the dollar spent by a prostitute’s customer? To understand 
clearly the nature of the various fl ows of money, we must examine and 
compare the corresponding components. Figure 6.1 summarizes the 
functioning of human traffi cking.
Figure 6.1 shows that the supply of and demand for services (forced 
or not) in the markets for sex, illegal X-rated movies, organ transplants, 
slaves, and so on can be provided by a direct connection between the 
suppliers and the consumers in exchange (or not) for money. The sup-
pliers of the criminal services can provide the connection. These crimi-
nal organizations or public employees corrupted by individual criminals 
can offer help to the illegal workers and services to consumers. In com-
pensation, they receive money, which will be laundered if the sums are 
big, the fl ows are repeated, or the activity is connected to a criminal 
organization.
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The motivations of illegal migrants
An act of free will may sometimes determine the decision to seek the 
help of smugglers to cross a border illegally, the use of coyotes (a smug-
gler of immigrants), for instance, at the Mexico–United States border 
(Spener 2009). In such cases, illegal immigrants momentarily place their 
destiny in the hands of the people who run a smuggling network and 
expect to recover their freedom on the other side of the border. There is 
a demand on the part of the individual immigrant and a supply of ser-
vices through a criminal network. The decision of the immigrants may 
also be forced if the prospective immigrants are recruited or abused by 
the networks of smugglers and remain dependent on the networks once 
they have crossed the border. In this case, the individual becomes mer-
chandise; the demand arises from those who want to import human 
beings, and the supply is provided by the network.
Figure 6.1.  Human Trafﬁ cking: Supply and Demand
Source: Author compilation.
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Thus, the supply and demand must be located differently according 
to whether the decision to cross the border is free or forced. Most often, 
the smugglers vaunt the benefi ts they offer. Often exaggerated and 
romanticized, the descriptions of the benefi ts are tailored to the expecta-
tions or desires of the prospective immigrants.
The economy of illegal immigration is based on the existence of two 
differentials (Cornelius et al. 2010). The fi rst differential separates the 
wage levels in the source country and the host country. The second dis-
tinguishes the standards of living in the two countries.
First, the illegal immigrant provides manpower at a price that is lower 
than the price on the market in the host country or fi lls a gap in man-
power of a particular type. This differential persists over time if anti-
immigration regulations are suffi ciently strict to remain a threat to the 
illegal immigrant. In the absence of legal barriers to entering the employ-
ment market, the wages of the illegal immigrant will tend to become 
aligned with the wages of the local employee. Recourse to illegal man-
power is also a means of exerting pressure on local employees. Histori-
cally, illegal manpower is less unionized than the legal workforce, and 
contractors have often used the supply of illegal immigrants to force 
down the average union wage rate.
The second differential concerns the living conditions of illegal immi-
grants and of the local workforce. The fact that the illegal immigrants 
accept less than average wages normally means that they also live in 
more straitened circumstances. As long as the illegal immigrants accept 
or must accept such a differential, the initial characteristics remain intact 
(the lower wage rate). Over time and in some countries (the United 
States, but not Saudi Arabia, for example), the illegal immigrants will 
escape at least some of the initial conditions and will gain professional 
qualifi cations and bargaining power that will enable them to gain access 
to better employment status than they had on arrival.
The more transient the entry barriers, the more illegal immigrants 
can hope to melt into the legal workforce and make the individual tra-
jectory of their jobs converge with that of the average employee in the 
country.
Occasionally, an individual may escape the initial conditions rela-
tively quickly. Marriage remains an important possibility. Thus, a demo-
graphic gender imbalance can create a greater demand for one gender 
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group (generally women, as in some agricultural areas in Europe). The 
online dating services that offer to organize dates and marriages between 
rural French men and women from Asian countries often operate on the 
borders of legality.
Moreover, some occupations seem always to require more manpower, 
enabling illegal immigrants to benefi t from a certain rent of scarcity. 
Maids from the Philippines benefi t from being Catholic and speaking 
English, which are valuable characteristics in the eyes of some European 
employers. These individuals manage to obtain hourly wages that are 
about 20 percent above the minimum wage. They do not have the social 
security advantages of the local workforce, but they can sometimes benefi t 
from free health care coverage (in France and some Nordic countries).
Orrenius (2001), in an informative paper, notes that the earliest mod-
els of migration emphasize wage differentials as the impetus to mobility. 
Massey et al. (1987) and Massey (1987) break down the cost of migration 
into direct monetary costs, information and search costs, opportunity 
costs, and psychic costs. They demonstr  ate that access to migrant net-
works reduces cost in all four categories. In the case of Mexico, access to a 
network gives access to more reliable coyotes, lowers the probability of 
apprehension, facilitates settlement, and shortens the job search.
It thus appears that those who become involved in human traffi cking 
in the wide sense we are using in this chapter are sometimes forced to do 
so, but may often be considered clients who voluntarily use illegal ser-
vices to immigrate. The expectation of quick improvement in earnings 
and the distorted bundle of information available through different 
channels—media, friends, family, former migrants, and smuggler net-
works—provide strong incentives for migration. During their journey or 
once in the host country, immigrants will, perhaps, recover their power 
to make free decisions. The longer they stay under the infl uence of a net-
work, a criminal organization, or an employer that forces them to work 
for almost nothing, the longer they will be part of human traffi cking. In 
the best possible confi guration, their connection with traffi cking will not 
last longer than the hours necessary to cross the border.
Monetary compensation
The monetary fl ows that accompany the fl ows of people we have 
described can be divided into three channels.
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First are the immediate payments that occur at the border. These pay-
ments may be spread among several individuals. For example, a corrupt 
employee at the consulate of a rich country located in a poor country 
who delivers a tourist visa will receive a bribe. Most often, visa traffi cking 
is the act of small groups of corrupt embassy employees. The amounts 
thus collected generally represent fringe benefi ts for low-level consular 
employees. Occasionally, the amounts are used to make small invest-
ments in the home country of the employees. More often, these amounts 
are spent locally or enable the satisfaction of vices or double lives. These 
fl ows therefore usually remain in the country that is the source of the 
manpower. Globally, they are insignifi cant.7
Second, clandestine immigrants can benefi t from the paid help of a 
network to ease the border crossing. Snakeheads (the term used for 
smugglers in China) or coyotes (at the Mexican border) are most often 
members of a network. Sums collected by these networks represent 
criminal revenue. They are typically used in the country that is the source 
of the immigration. As a general rule, police control over the monetary 
fl ow is weak, and the money is used directly by the criminal organization 
without having to develop a sophisticated laundering strategy (Amuedo-
Dorantes and Pozo 2005).
Third, illegal immigrants may be required to stay in contact with 
criminal networks after their arrival in host countries. It seems plausible 
that, particularly in the case of Chinese networks, illegal immigrants are 
forced to accept the continued collection of payments after their entry 
and during employment. Our conclusion is highly speculative, but it 
appears illegal Chinese immigrants may often be forced to pay during 
longer periods.
One explanation is that organizing the trip from China to the United 
States is more complicated than organizing the trip from Mexico. Hence, 
the price demanded for the service is higher, and the number of pay-
ments larger. It may also be that Latino workers are more prone to inte-
grate into the general workforce, while Chinese immigrants are more 
likely to be working for businesses owned by people of Chinese ethnicity. 
In the fi rst case, the workers are illegal, but are free to choose their 
employers, while, in the second case, the workers are restricted to a lim-
ited set of businesses. The latter workers often have to give a share of 
their wages to the criminal organization or repay business loans incurred 
186 Draining Development?
with the criminal organization. Furthermore, the language barriers in 
the host country are relatively greater for speakers of the many idioms of 
China than for Spanish-speaking immigrants.
If a new immigrant cannot fi nd a job independently, the connection 
with a criminal network remains strong. In such situations, the share of 
the payment made by the immigrant that is transferred to the source 
country is probably important. Indeed, the criminal organization may 
have reason to move its income as far as possible from the place where 
the criminal activity is ongoing. Another, more modest source of regular 
income for criminal organizations is the assistance provided to illegal 
immigrants in obtaining new identity papers or in gaining access to 
medical services.
Flows of money generated by human traffi cking partly vanish in the 
host country if they are one-time payments to acquire a specifi c, time-
limited service. The more personal and specifi c the illegal service, the 
more expensive it is. It is also most probably rendered by a criminal 
organization and not by an individual or small group. Additional pay-
ments are scheduled over time. The money ends up in the possession 
of a more sophisticated criminal organization, and a good part of it is 
probably channeled out of the host country and sheltered in the country 
of origin of the criminal organization.
Human Trafﬁ cking Is Also a Business
Human traffi cking is not only driven by the desire of some inhabitants 
of poor countries to emigrate to rich countries. The fl ow must be con-
sidered, in part, the creation of a demand in the rich countries. Further-
more, the illegal networks that engineer border crossings and organize 
the related manpower-intensive criminal activities in rich countries 
have shown the ability to innovate. Motivated by the desire to increase 
their profi ts, they develop new products and services. Indeed, some 
criminal organizations specialize in the production of criminal goods 
and services.
Criminal organizations are heterogeneous. Some have originated in 
the source countries and undertake operations in host countries. An 
example is the Chinese Triads. The Salvadoran Maras or Mara Salvatru-
cha, in contrast, originated in the United States and then spread to the 
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home country of many of the members. The methods of these groups, 
particularly their management of fi nancial fl ows, vary greatly. This het-
erogeneity makes it impossible to establish a strict correlation between a 
given criminal activity and the criminal fi nancial fl ows.
The criminal portfolio
From a legal perspective, any group of more than two people who are 
committing crimes together can be deemed a criminal organization. We 
will, however, use the term only to describe substantially larger groups 
working together to achieve criminal ends.
Several decades have passed since Schelling (1967) and Buchanan 
(1973) analyzed the capacity of organized crime to impose its monopoly 
on criminal activities. Since then, many scholars and law enforcement 
agencies have conceived of organized crime groups as hierarchical, cen-
tralized, and bureaucratic and have come to consider their structure 
analogous to the structure of a modern corporation; the Mafi a remains 
a paradigm (Abadinsky 1990; Cressey 1969).
Pioneer work has argued against the idea that the monopoly prevails 
as the natural structure for large-scale criminal activity. Studying the 
structure of the drug market, Reuter (1983), Reuter, MacCoun, and 
Murphy (1990), and Kleiman (1989) have underlined the diffi culties 
that criminal organizations face in effectively imposing the barriers to 
entry necessary to preserve a monopoly. Reuter has challenged the myth 
of the American Mafi a, arguing that, in the 1980s, the Mafi a was only 
able to enjoy high levels of profi t because of its prestige, but that it no 
longer possessed suffi cient power to maintain the organization at the 
level of its reputation. According to Reuter, the Mafi a is weakly central-
ized and has high coordination costs, which are structural consequences 
of illegality. Insuffi cient information and a weak defi nition of property 
rights of each of its subgroups deprive the Mafi a of some of the profi ts 
that one might otherwise expect.
The more recent view argues that the concept of organized crime 
should be abandoned in favor of a criminal enterprise model (Block and 
Chambliss 1981; van Duyne 2007). Zhang and Chin (2002) note that the 
latter model suggests that networks are fl exible and adaptive and that 
they can easily expand and contract to deal with the uncertainties of the 
criminal enterprise. Criminal organizations respond to varying market 
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demands by narrowing or expanding their size; their organizational 
structures are not so much predesigned as shaped by external social and 
legal factors. Certain criminal groups, such as those involved in the con-
struction or gambling businesses, may require an elaborate hierarchy 
and a clear division of labor. These are necessary organizational prereq-
uisites to remaining in the illicit business. In contrast, criminal groups 
such as those involved in pawnshops and the fencing of stolen goods 
must respond rapidly to changing demand in the streets and therefore 
require little or no formal organizational structure. Prostitution, porno-
graphic fi lms, the traffi c in organs, and the supply of illegal manpower 
are often monopolized by criminal organizations. These organizations 
respond to an existing demand, but they also create new demand. The 
innovative capabilities of criminal organizations enable them to convert 
individual preferences into commercial demand.
Some data confi rm that, if human traffi cking is a big business, it is 
mostly a disorganized criminal business that depends on individuals or 
small groups linked on an ad hoc basis. According to Feingold (2005), 
there is no standard profi le of traffi ckers. They range from truck drivers 
and “village aunties” to labor brokers and police offi cers. Traffi ckers are 
as varied as the circumstances of their victims. Although some traffi ck-
ing victims are literally kidnapped, most leave their homes voluntarily 
and slip into being traffi cked on their journey. By the same token, some 
traffi ckers are as likely to purchase people as they are to transport them.
Participation in a criminal organization requires specifi c talents. Not 
everyone can be a smuggler or a fl esh-peddler. Not everyone is prepared 
to risk prison or violence. The talent is therefore uncommon and attracts 
a price.
Smugglers. There is a scholarly consensus that most smugglers are not 
members of a criminal organization. Zhang and Chin (2002) and Zhang, 
Chin, and Miller (2007) write that Chinese human smuggling is domi-
nated by ordinary citizens whose family networks and fortuitous social 
contacts have enabled them to pool resources to transport human car-
goes around the world. Orrenius (2001) has studied the illegal immigra-
tion along the Mexico–United States border and emphasizes the evi-
dence for easy entry into the traffi cking industry. In theory, any migrant 
who has undertaken an illegal border crossing can use the experience to 
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work as a coyote. We disagree with Andreas (2000) for whom the expense 
involved for the traffi ckers and smugglers has led to a parallel process of 
centralization as smaller, poorer, and less sophisticated operators are 
forced out of the market.
Many specialized roles have emerged in response to the particular 
tasks required in smuggling operations such as acquiring fraudulent 
documents, recruiting prospective migrants, serving as border crossing 
guides, driving smuggling vehicles, and guarding safe houses. These roles 
correspond to the successive stages of a smuggling operation: the recrui-
ter is active at the beginning, and the debt collector at the end. Most of 
these activities take place in the host country and do not involve large 
amounts of money. The income they provide tends to stay in the host 
country and is probably quickly reinjected into the host economy 
through consumer spending.
Smuggling activities are normally carried out following negotiations 
between the smugglers and their clients that leave few opportunities for 
others to intervene. Smuggling operations consist in secretive and idio-
syncratic arrangements known only to those directly involved. Further-
more, the contacts between the organizers of a smuggling operation and 
their clients are mostly one-on-one. This special business arrangement 
serves two crucial functions in an illicit economy: (1) it maximizes the 
smuggler’s profi t by monopolizing the services critical to specifi c aspects 
of the smuggling process, and (2) it minimizes the potential exposure to 
law enforcement.
Smugglers working along the border are the least skilled people in the 
traffi cking chain. The risk is limited, and the reward is small. There is not 
a lot of evidence to document the risk. Former border agents consider 
that one in four illegal migrants is arrested, but many of these migrants 
make multiple attempts (Slagle 2004). The rates of apprehension by bor-
der patrols in Texas show large variations from one period to another 
(Orrenius 2001).
According to Orrenius (2001), in real terms (1994 U.S. dollars), the 
median reported coyote price per individual for a single crossing fell 
from more than US$900 in 1965 to about US$300 in 1994. Higher post-
1994 prices (still below US$400) are consistent with the impact of greater 
enforcement on smuggler fees.8 Large profi ts come only with the large 
numbers of people that can amortize fi xed costs (such as regular bribes, 
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safe houses, and so on). Although the value of the time devoted to smug-
gling should be taken into account, most of the revenue is profi t.
Low as the prices of single border crossings are, if they are multiplied 
by the number of illegal immigrants, they generate revenues on the order 
of US$700 million annually, which is roughly equivalent to the revenue 
generated by 30 tons of imported cocaine (300 tons are imported annu-
ally).9 In other words, importing illegal immigrants is a criminal busi-
ness equivalent in size to 10 percent of the business of importing cocaine. 
The fl ow of money generated by this business is, nonetheless, negligible 
compared with the remittances sent by Mexicans living abroad, mostly 
in the United States, to their families in Mexico. These remittances are a 
substantial and growing part of the Mexican economy: in 2005, they 
reached US$18 billion (World Bank 2006).
A coyote’s income does not create wealth in the way drug traffi cking 
does. At a couple of hundred dollars per smuggled person, coyotes make 
too little to save. This income is mostly a transfer between individual A 
and individual B. The money is quickly reinvested in the economy with-
out having a specifi c effect. Whether it is spent by the migrant or by the 
coyote, the money has the same socioeconomic impact.
Violence and other costs of trafﬁ cking. By contrast, other activities of 
criminal organizations create major costs and expose participants to the 
risk of arrest and other harms. Revenue from criminal activity should 
not systematically be interpreted as profi t.
We know little about the costs that criminal organizations face, which 
makes it diffi cult to differentiate between gross income and profi t. We 
also generally confuse accounting profi t and economic profi t. This shows 
up in our omissions of important cost elements accruing to criminal 
organizations. For example, violence is a specifi c characteristic of crimi-
nal activity. Criminals are exposed to a risk of arrest, but also to being 
attacked, injured, or killed by their clients or by other criminals. This is a 
factor in their costs.
Violence directed at migrants is not a necessary part of the illicit mar-
ket. It is attenuated by the social networks, cultural norms, and contrac-
tual relationships in which the market is embedded (Kyle and Scarcelli 
2009). Criminal organizations seem much less violent in human traf-
fi cking than in the drug market. Perhaps the reason is the absence of 
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territoriality. The fi nal distribution of drugs requires the control of a 
territory in a way that is not required in human traffi cking.10 Further-
more, the fact that drugs concentrate great value in a small volume cre-
ates a singular opportunity because it is possible to steal the stock of 
drugs from a dealer. It is impossible or, at least, more diffi cult to steal a 
stock of organs or clandestine immigrants. Violence is therefore fairly 
rare among the criminal organizations involved in human traffi cking. 
We may thus legitimately consider that the costs are mainly reduced to 
the costs associated with logistics and corruption.
The less competitive a market is, the less it will be innovative. Drug 
markets are conservative, with little product innovation relative to legal 
market counterparts.11 However, if a new drug is introduced on the mar-
ket, waves of violence are observed. We might expect the same for crimi-
nal activities based on human traffi cking, but what would constitute 
innovation in this fi eld?
The pornographic fi lm industry provides a good illustration of inno-
vation without (much) violence. Note that it is an extremely competitive 
market: production costs are low, and entry in the business is easy.12 Ini-
tially, the X-rated industry offered poor-quality fi lms. Little by little, the 
quality improved. The scenarios became more sophisticated, and the 
shots improved. Progressively, the industry covered all sexual tastes. 
Now, the catalogue of X-rated offerings allows the consumer a wide 
choice of sexual orientation and diverse sexual practices. The supply is 
thus extremely varied. Having accomplished this range, the X-rated 
industry has also been able to renew itself by offering home movies and 
then hidden cameras fi lming without the knowledge of the participants. 
There have also been fi lms involving actual violence and murder. The 
X-rated industry’s capacity for innovation is impressive.
The industry requires a lot of labor, which is frequently imported ille-
gally (Mahmoud and Trebesch 2009). Indeed, illegal immigrants often 
agree readily to perform in the fi lms.
The need for money laundering
Transnational human traffi cking is a business without territory. Unlike 
gambling and prostitution, which tend to serve regular clients and involve 
activities tied to specifi c neighborhoods, human traffi cking mostly 
involves one-time transactions. Additionally, although many people want 
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to enter the United States (for example), only a limited number are eligi-
ble because smugglers usually select clients based on ability to pay.
Each of the payments that feed the revenue of traffi cking organiza-
tions is typically small (usually only a couple of hundred dollars), but the 
revenue can accumulate quickly. The total income is proportional to the 
number of clients. Some people cross the border many times and spend 
a lot of money hiring coyotes, but most clients only cross a border once. 
The relative share of individuals using the service of a coyote only once 
is certainly higher than the relative share of individuals who use other 
criminal services, such as prostitution, only once.
The structure of the revenue fl ows associated with traffi cking within 
a criminal organization depends on the specifi c activity, whether slav-
ery, the traffi c in organs, the sex industry, and so on. In the case of 
organs, a piece of merchandise can only be sold once. The criminal 
organization involved carries out most of its activities on the territory of 
other countries besides the host country. The removal of the organs is 
usually undertaken in poor countries, and the organs are imported 
underground into developed countries where they are sold and trans-
planted. The payments are thus made in the host country, while an 
important part of the crime is committed abroad. This separation 
between the location of the crime and the location of the payment 
makes legal prosecution more diffi cult. While prosecution for organ 
traffi cking is possible in the host country, it is much more diffi cult to 
extend the prosecution to murder even if this is thought to be the source 
of the organs. We do not address this issue in depth here, but we note 
that, in this case, the fl ow of money is collected in the host country. The 
criminal organization will then either try to launder the money on the 
territory of the host country or send it back to the source country, which 
is often also the home country of many of the members of the criminal 
organization (Kopp 2004).
Prostitution is typically linked to organized crime (Zhang 2009; 
Zaitch and Staring 2009). The activity takes place in the host country, 
and the payments are collected there. The money is laundered on the 
spot or in the country of origin of the traffi ckers. The logistics of traf-
fi cking for prostitution and the sex industry are different from the logis-
tics of organ traffi cking. Smuggling dead organs and smuggling living 
beings present different problems.
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The activities linked to living beings imply that the smugglers must 
maintain contact with the people who are traffi cked because these peo-
ple must be lodged and cared for. Given that they must establish this sort 
of connection with their clients, criminal organizations take measures to 
separate manpower and money fl ows. Police raids and the arrest of pros-
titutes are almost inevitable; so, the criminal organization must protect 
its revenue by separating the merchandise (that is, the people) and the 
money. The money paid by the client is thus usually passed on immedi-
ately to a local manager, who then promptly gives it to a collector.
In contrast, organs are discretely removed in a poor country, while 
the purchasers usually live in rich countries. The transplantation may be 
carried out in a poor country with good medical infrastructure. We 
know little about this type of traffi c. It is plausible that an organ removed 
in India, for example, might be transplanted into a Swiss patient who has 
traveled to Romania for the purpose. In such a scenario, the fl ow of 
money is particularly diffi cult to chart.
Slavery requires different fi nancial circuits. Most often, the individual 
is offered assistance in entering a host country and then, after the entry, 
is deprived of his papers. He must then work for a family or, more rarely, 
a company.13 The migrant pays the criminal organization. Sometimes, 
the benefi ciary of the labor also pays a fee. The fl ows are irregular unless 
the benefi ciary wishes to change personnel.
We know little about the laundering techniques used by the criminal 
organizations involved in human traffi cking. It is possible that these 
organizations have extremely large sums of money and launder them 
successfully. It is also possible that they possess much more sophisticated 
laundering systems than anything we have seen in the domain of drugs 
(Zaitch 1998; Reuter and Truman 2004).
The taxonomy of the ﬂ ows
We note above that the modes of circulation of the revenue fl ows created 
by human traffi cking are heterogeneous. It is thus almost impossible to 
distinguish the sums that correspond to the human traffi cking segment 
of the operations of criminal organizations from the sums that corre-
spond to the pornographic industry, prostitution, or labor. Nonetheless, 
in table 6.1, we attempt to classify the various fl ows of money generated 
by human traffi cking according to the most signifi cant characteristics.
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In the table, we fi rst indicate the location of the monetary fl ow. It can 
be located in three places: the source country, the border, and the host 
country. Sometimes, fi nancial fl ows may transit through one or more 
third countries. Most of the time, however, this occurs during the laun-
dering process and does not appear in the table. The provider and the 
recipient indicate who is paying and who is receiving the money. The 
service gives an indication about what is compensated by the monetary 
fl ow. Frequency denotes whether the transaction takes place repeatedly 
or only once. Income describes whether the fl ow of money is pure profi t 
or whether the recipient must deduct costs to calculate profi t.
The fl ows of money to the source country, whether originating there 
or returning from elsewhere, are mainly generated by corruption. 
Table 6.1. The Financial Flows Generated by Human Trafﬁ cking
Provider of the money Recipient Service Frequency Income Laundering
Source country
Illegal migrants Border patrol Visas, 
passports
One time Proﬁ t No
Criminal organizations Government ofﬁ cials 
and bureaucrats
Facilitate the 
trafﬁ c
Repeated Proﬁ t Depends on 
the scale
Border
Illegal migrants Local police Passage One time Proﬁ t No
Illegal migrants Coyotes Passage One time Proﬁ t No
Illegal migrants Criminal organization Passage One time Proﬁ t, 
less cost
Yes
Host country
Illegal migrants Employers Free service 
(no wages)
Repeated Value No
Illegal migrants Service providers 
(ﬂ esh-peddlers, housing, 
administrative papers)
Protection 
services
Repeated Proﬁ t, 
less cost
Depends on 
the scale
Illegal migrants Government ofﬁ cials Protection One time Proﬁ t No
Service providers Government ofﬁ cials Protection Repeated Proﬁ t Depends on 
the scale
Criminal organizations Government ofﬁ cials Protection Repeated Proﬁ t Depends on 
the scale
Clients and illegal 
employers
Sex workers, other 
workers
Services, 
workforce
Repeated Proﬁ t, 
less cost
No
Source: Author compilation.
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Whether they will or will not be laundered depends on the level of scru-
tiny of local authorities. Political stability also plays a role. If the govern-
ment is weak, corrupt government offi cials and bureaucrats may try to 
place their assets in other countries where they might plan to go if their 
security is threatened. These fl ows are repetitive if they are oriented 
toward high-level government offi cials. Most of the time, local bureau-
crats can only be corrupted over a short period of time before they are 
removed from offi ce. There is almost no cost for those who receive the 
money. The only real cost is the risk of being prosecuted, which is not a 
monetary cost. This diminishes the economic profi t, but not the account-
ing profi t. As long as corrupt offi cials are not prosecuted, the bribes they 
collect are both income and profi t.
Corruption may occur regularly at border crossings over long periods 
without this implying that any single individual maintains an income 
from this corruption for long. Corrupt offi cials will usually be rotated 
out of their positions. While their successors may be equally amenable to 
corruption, and thus the fl ow of immigrants may be maintained, the 
window of opportunity for any single offi cer to take advantage of the 
demand for illegal border crossings is relatively brief. This implies that 
individual recipients of bribes do not accumulate suffi ciently large sums 
to be considered to represent a fl ow requiring laundering. Instead, the 
sums, which generally amount simply to additional income for local 
border guards and policemen, are usually spent on consumption or 
invested with little precaution. Only if a criminal organization estab-
lishes an ongoing relationship with a relatively high-level offi cial are the 
bribes likely to accumulate into sums large enough to warrant a sophis-
ticated laundering scheme.
In the host country, there is a missing monetary fl ow, which repre-
sents the work of those who have, in fact, become slave laborers. It 
appears in the table as a nonmonetary fl ow that corresponds to a free 
service. Another fl ow represents the services provided by intermediaries 
who offer protection, housing, and new documents to the illegal work-
ers. These payments are regular. The profi t of the intermediaries is the 
same as the payments they receive as long as they do not have to spend 
money to provide the service. If they do incur costs, these must be 
deducted from the income to establish their profi t. Generally, the larger 
the scale of operations, the more likely that intermediaries will incur 
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costs in providing services. Some illegal workers can obtain the services 
they need directly by paying government offi cials or bureaucrats. In such 
cases, the payment is usually made only once, though the corrupt offi -
cials and bureaucrats may receive money regularly from many people.
Most of the time, the corrupt offi cials do not have to pass on part of 
their profi ts to other offi cials above them in a hierarchy, though it may 
be that numerous corrupt offi cials have become involved and require 
payment for the service activity.
Criminal organizations may pay corrupt offi cials directly for visas or 
to turn a blind eye toward the border crossings. They include this service 
in the package they sell to the migrants, and it is simply a cost that must 
be taken into account in calculating profi t. The breakdown of the profi t 
among the various levels of the criminal organization is unclear. The 
protection bought from corrupt offi cials may be used in many activities 
(illegal drugs, human smuggling, prostitution, and so on). We lack infor-
mation on the level of diversifi cation in the criminal organizations 
involved in human traffi cking. The fl ows between the criminal organiza-
tions and the government offi cials are repeated. If a contact is caught 
and prosecuted, the criminal organization identifi es a new contact.
The last fl ow is composed of the direct payments of clients to illegal 
workers (prostitutes; employers of maids, housekeepers, and gardeners; 
and so on). These fl ows are permanent. The fl ows compensate the ser-
vices that are provided by the workers.
Conclusion
In this chapter, we provide a methodological contribution to the diffi cult 
task of assessing the impact of human traffi cking in economic terms. 
First, we underline the reasons to resist the temptation to add together 
all the fl ows of money that are more or less linked to human traffi cking. 
If the results of any analysis are to be meaningful, they must be grounded 
on a realistic understanding of the complex web of criminal activities 
that are involved in human traffi cking. The money fl ows associated in 
human traffi cking arise through distinct activities that have different 
implications. It is important to relate the various money fl ows to the 
specifi c criminal activities that generate them.
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Second, we point out that, in certain circumstances, it is plausible that 
human traffi cking may only generate a single fl ow of money within a 
single local setting for the benefi t of a single criminal organization. 
However, in other circumstances, for instance, if it is mostly based on 
geographical competitive advantage (villages close to the border) or if it 
is associated with a job that involves frequent border crossings (truckers, 
waterfront workers, and so on), human traffi cking is a profi table, but 
weakly organized activity. In this case, most of the criminal income is 
spent in consumption, and the remainder is invested without specifi c 
precautions. The monetary income from the criminal activity is diffused 
in the economy without noticeable effects.
Third, large criminal organizations that undertake traffi cking in ille-
gal workers, including women, are not necessarily involved in prostitu-
tion. The biggest profi ts, however, are derived from exploiting illegal 
migrants in sweatshops or houses of prostitution. Traffi cking is also nec-
essary to provide a labor force for criminal activities. Traffi cking is not a 
particularly profi table business per se. Most of the profi t is made in sell-
ing criminal services to end users, not in extorting money to help 
migrants cross borders.
Fourth, we assume that the fl ow of money entering the source coun-
tries and linked to human traffi cking is negligible in comparison with 
remittances sent back by the illegal immigrants to their home countries. 
Most of the profi ts made by petty traffi ckers stay in the host countries. 
The only signifi cant fl ows of money back and forth to source countries 
and host countries are generated by large criminal organizations. It is 
reasonable to believe that there are considerable fl ows of criminal money 
circulating internationally, but it is almost impossible to distinguish 
within these fl ows the profi ts generated by traffi cking and the profi ts 
generated by the core businesses of large criminal organizations (prosti-
tution, illegal drugs, counterfeiting, corruption, and so on).
Fifth, developing countries are already aware of the negative socioeco-
nomic impact of criminal money fl ows. We do not believe that, of this 
money, the small portion produced by human traffi cking generates any 
unique sort of harm. Good governance and civil society are harmed by 
the total fl ows of money generated by criminal activities. Distortion, lack 
of competiveness, and bad incentives are the well-known consequences 
198 Draining Development?
of criminal money. Whatever the source of such money, the impact is 
likely to be similar.
Our research is preliminary, but it already points to a somewhat mod-
est conclusion, as follows. The money fl ows linked to human traffi cking 
that enter developing countries are merged into bigger fl ows of criminal 
money. There is no evidence that these fl ows have a specifi c unique 
impact on these countries.
Notes
 1. Orrenius (2001) and Orrenius and Zavodny (2005) have documented the supply 
effects of networks; see also Mckenzie and Rapoport (2007); Sana and Massey 
(2005).
 2. Organ traffi cking is included if it refers to killings that are motivated by the desire 
to sell the organs internationally. The Palermo convention and the U.S. Depart-
ment of Justice do not consider organ smuggling a part of human traffi cking.
 3. See the website of the IOM, http://www.iom.int/jahia/jsp/index.jsp.
 4. It is unclear whether this includes only those who are enslaved or also those who 
use the services of smugglers.
 5. Such an estimate uses traffi cking in the narrow sense, that is, only those who are 
exploited.
 6. Feingold (2005) reports that statistics on the end use of traffi cked people are 
often unreliable because they tend to overrepresent the sex trade. For example, 
men are excluded from the traffi cking statistics gathered in Thailand because, 
according to national law, men cannot qualify as victims of traffi cking.
 7. In Manila, an employee at the consulate of a French-speaking country demanded 
US$500 to issue a tourist visa to an ineligible person. According to our source, 
he spent three years at his desk providing not more than 20 visas per month. 
This last number is an approximation deduced from the waiting time for the 
visas. The employee’s justifi cation for a longer wait (three months) than normal 
for the visas for the ineligible people was the necessity to merge the visas with a 
substantial fl ow of real tourist visas. Imagine that fi ve employees had under-
taken the same activity: the fl ow per year would be US$600,000. In Moscow, a 
French diplomat was questioned about the origin of the money he used to buy 
two apartments in the most sought-after location in the city. He resigned from 
his job at the embassy.
 8. The estimate provided by the United Nations Offi ce on Drugs and Crime is 
higher, close to US$2,000 (UNODC 2010).
 9. At US$300 for each of 2 million entrants (allowing for some individuals, say 10 
percent, to make two or three entries) yields approximately US$700 million. At 
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an import price of US$23,000 per kilogram of cocaine, 30 tons of imported 
cocaine would yield US$700 million.
10. Mexican drug violence is not generated by retail activities, but by the fi ght for 
territorial control, which is a broader notion than routes and gross delivery.
11. Alcohol and tobacco are extremely innovative. Products, marketing, and pack-
aging are in permanent evolution.
12. The market is less competitive at the distribution level. (Note that distribution 
over the Web is not the core of the pornographic fi lm industry.)
13. We concentrate on human traffi cking toward rich countries and exclude cases of 
servitude in low-income developing countries, forced labor in war zones, and 
so on.
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Abstract
Multinational enterprises (MNEs) are powerful actors in the global 
economy. Transfer price manipulation (TPM) is one of the benefi ts of 
multinationality. By over- and underinvoicing intrafi rm transactions, 
multinationals can arbitrage and take advantage of differences in gov-
ernment regulations across countries. This chapter explains the motiva-
tions of fi rms that engage in TPM, illustrates the ways in which MNEs 
can arbitrage government regulations, and reviews the empirical esti-
mates on TPM for developed and developing countries. We conclude 
that the strongest and clearest evidence of TPM comes from transaction-
level studies of U.S. intrafi rm import and export prices and from fi rm-
level studies using Chinese tax data. No data set is perfect; so, the various 
estimates are fl awed. Still, the balance of the evidence suggests that 
income shifting does occur through the manipulation of transfer prices. 
What is needed is greater accessibility to transaction-level data on cross-
border export and import transactions and on MNE income statements 
and balance sheets. This would enable scholars to shine more light in the 
dark corners of TPM and provide more accurate assessments of TPM 
impacts on developing countries.
Lorraine Eden
Transfer Price Manipulation
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Introduction
World Investment Report 2011 contains the estimate that there are now 
103,786 MNE parent fi rms and 892,114 foreign affi liates (UNCTAD 
2011). These numbers have grown enormously since the fi rst United 
Nations Conference on Trade and Development (UNCTAD) estimate of 
35,000 parents and 150,000 foreign affi liates (UNCTAD 1992). Not only 
are there ever-growing numbers of MNEs, their relative size as a share of 
the global economy is also growing. Of the world’s 100 largest econo-
mies, 42 are MNEs, not countries, if one compares fi rm revenues with 
country gross domestic product (GDP). The value added by MNEs con-
stitutes about 11 percent of world GDP.
Multinationals likewise bulk large in terms of international trade 
fl ows. For example, World Investment Report 2010 estimates that foreign 
affi liate exports are now one-third of world exports (UNCTAD 2010). If 
trade occurs between related parties (that is, between affi liated units of 
an MNE), the transactions are referred to as intrafi rm trade. Statistics on 
intrafi rm trade are scarce because most governments do not require 
MNEs to report their crossborder intrafi rm transactions separately from 
their trade with unrelated parties. The United States is one of the few 
countries to report intrafi rm trade statistics; the U.S. Census Bureau 
(2010) estimates that 48 percent of U.S. exports and 40 percent of U.S. 
imports represent trade between related parties. The Organisation for 
Economic Co-operation and Development (OECD) provides prelimi-
nary estimates that related-party trade represents 7–12 percent of world 
merchandise trade and 8–15 percent of OECD trade (OECD 2010).
The price of an intrafi rm transfer is called a transfer price, and transfer 
pricing is the process by which the transfer price is determined. Transfer 
pricing, once an obscure area studied only by a few academics such as 
Hirshleifer (1956, 1957), Horst (1971), and Rugman and Eden (1985), 
has now become front-page news because of recent attention to TPM, 
that is, the over- or underinvoicing of transfer prices by MNEs in response 
to external pressures such as government regulations (for instance, taxes, 
tariffs, exchange controls).
For example, Forest Laboratories, a U.S. pharmaceutical company, was 
profi led in Bloomberg Businessweek for using TPM to shift profi ts on Lexa-
pro, an antidepressant drug, from the United States to Bermuda and Ire-
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land. The headline, “U. S. Companies Dodge US$60 Billion in Taxes with 
Global Odyssey,” compared transfer pricing with the corporate equivalent 
of the secret offshore accounts of individual tax dodgers (Drucker 2010a). 
Google was similarly profi led in October 2010 for using transfer pricing 
and a complex legal structure to lower its worldwide tax rate to 2.4 percent 
(Drucker 2010b). Politicians have also become involved. The Ways and 
Means Committee of the U.S. House of Representatives held a public 
hearing on transfer pricing in July 2010. One report for the hearing, by the 
Joint Committee on Taxation, explored six detailed case studies of U.S. 
multinationals using transfer pricing to reduce their U.S. and worldwide 
tax rates.1 Sikka and Willmott summarize several recent cases involving 
transfer pricing and tax avoidance, concluding that “transfer pricing is not 
just an accounting technique, but also a method of resource allocation and 
avoidance of taxes that affects distribution of income, wealth, risks and 
quality of life” (Sikka and Willmott 2010, 352).
Several coinciding forces have raised the visibility of transfer pricing 
from the academic pages of economics journals to the front pages of 
major newspapers. All three key actors in the global economy—govern-
ments, MNEs, and nongovernmental organizations (NGOs)—now view 
transfer pricing as critically important.
Government authorities, the fi rst set of key actors, have long recog-
nized that transfer prices can be used by MNEs to avoid or evade national 
regulations. For example, by setting a transfer price above or below the 
market price for a product and shifting profi ts to an affi liate taxed at a 
lower rate, an MNE can reduce its overall tax payments and achieve a 
higher after-tax global profi t relative to two fi rms that do not have such 
an affi liation arrangement.
Most governments of industrialized nations now regulate the transfer 
prices used in the calculation of corporate income taxes (CITs) and cus-
toms duties. The worldwide regulatory standard is the arm’s-length 
standard, which requires that the transfer price be set equal to the price 
that two unrelated parties have negotiated at arm’s length for the same 
product or a similar product traded under the same or similar circum-
stances with respect to the related-party transaction (Eden 1998). The 
arm’s-length standard, fi rst developed in the United States, became an 
international standard when the OECD issued transfer pricing guide-
lines that were later adopted by OECD member governments (OECD 
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1979). The purpose behind the guidelines is to prevent undertaxation 
and overtaxation (double taxation) of MNE profi ts by national tax 
authorities (Eden 1998).
Starting in the early 1990s, the legal landscape for transfer pricing 
changed dramatically. In 1994, the U.S. Internal Revenue Service’s major 
revisions to its transfer pricing regulations became law. In 1995, the 
OECD published revised transfer pricing guidelines, which have been 
regularly updated since then (OECD 1995). While only a few govern-
ments had detailed transfer pricing regulations attached to their CIT 
laws before the 1990s, now more than 40 tax jurisdictions around the 
world—including all the OECD countries and, therefore, the bulk of 
world trade and foreign direct investment fl ows—are covered and have 
highly technical and sophisticated transfer pricing regulations attached 
to their tax codes (Eden 2009; Ernst & Young 2008).
In 1995, UNCTAD surveyed national governments about current 
developments in accounting and reporting and asked a few questions 
about TPM as part of the survey. The results for 47 countries were circu-
lated in an unpublished working paper and analyzed in Borkowski (1997). 
In the survey, 60 percent of government respondents stated that MNEs in 
their country engaged in TPM and that it was a signifi cant problem. 
Almost 80 percent of respondents believed that MNEs were using TPM to 
shift income, and 85 percent thought this was a serious problem. This 
belief held regardless of income levels: 11 of 13 low-income, 16 of 18 
 middle-income, and 13 of 16 high-income country governments believed 
that TPM was being used to shift income. TPM was seen as a problem 
because it led to distorted competitiveness between local fi rms and MNEs, 
enabled MNEs to withdraw funds from the country, and reduced tax rev-
enues. Governments perceived income shifting by foreign MNEs as more 
frequent and larger in magnitude relative to home country MNEs.
In the late 1990s, the OECD also launched a major push to deter abu-
sive tax practices, focusing on abusive tax havens (OECD 1998; Eden and 
Kudrle 2005). While tax havens and TPM are two separate topics and 
should be treated separately, there are overlaps. Tax havens can encour-
age abusive transfer pricing practices, for example, by creating CIT dif-
ferentials between countries that offer pricing arbitrage opportunities to 
MNEs. Secrecy havens provide opportunities for parking MNE profi ts 
away from the eyes of national tax authorities (Kudrle and Eden 2003).
 Transfer Price Manipulation 209
The second key actor in the global economy—MNEs—have long seen 
transfer pricing as an important international tax issue (Ernst & Young 
2010). From an international tax perspective, tax avoidance (tax plan-
ning that complies with the law) is viewed by MNE executives and the 
tax planning industry as both legal and morally acceptable (Friedman 
1970).2 Because the goal of the fi rm is to maximize shareholder wealth 
and because transfer pricing can raise the MNE’s after-tax profi ts on a 
worldwide basis, transfer pricing is a valued activity for the MNE. Trans-
fer pricing has also become an increasingly important issue for MNE 
executives because government regulations have become more complex 
and the number of governments that regulate transfer pricing, require 
documentation, and levy penalties continues to grow (Eden 2009; Ernst 
& Young 2010). In addition, recent U.S. legislative changes such as 
 Sarbanes-Oxley and FIN 48 have made transfer pricing important for 
MNE executives from a corporate fi nancial and reporting perspective 
(Ernst & Young 2008).
Lastly, with the collapse of Enron, WorldCom, and others in the early 
2000s and bankruptcies or near bankruptcies among many huge multi-
nationals (for example, General Motors) during the current interna-
tional fi nancial crisis, NGOs are now paying more attention to corporate 
fraud, in particular to abusive fi nancial behaviors that may be related to 
the global fi nancial crisis (for example, see TJN 2007; Christian Aid 
2009; Sikka and Willmott 2010). Transfer pricing has been specifi cally 
attacked by NGOs. For example, Christian Aid has published reports 
arguing that transfer pricing is tax dodging, cooking the books, secret 
deals, or scams that rob the poor to keep the rich tax-free, thereby strip-
ping income from developing countries (Christian Aid 2009). Thus, the 
third key actor in the global economy—NGOs—is now also paying 
much more attention to transfer pricing.
The purpose of this chapter is to review the literature on empirical 
estimates of TPM, focusing, where possible, on developing countries. We 
also situate this chapter within the context of the work on illicit fl ows of 
funds out of developing countries, the theme of this volume. In the next 
section, we explore the reasons why MNEs engage in TPM. The follow-
ing section examines expected manipulation patterns in response to par-
ticular forms of government regulation. The penultimate section reviews 
the empirical evidence on TPM. The last section concludes.
210 Draining Development?
Why Engage in Transfer Price Manipulation?
The primary reason why governments have developed the arm’s-length 
standard is that they believe MNEs do not set their transfer prices at 
arm’s length, but rather engage in widespread TPM for the purpose of 
avoiding or evading government regulations. TPM is the deliberate over- 
or underinvoicing of the prices of products (goods, services, and intan-
gibles) that are traded among the parent and affi liates of an MNE. Over-
pricing inbound transfers and underpricing outbound transfers can be 
used to move profi ts out of an affi liate located in a high-tax jurisdiction 
or from a country that does not allow capital remittances. Differences in 
CIT rates across countries (which are exacerbated by tax havens and tax 
deferral) create profi table opportunities for MNEs to engage in TPM. 
Below, we explore the benefi t to the MNE of engaging in TPM and the 
different ways that MNEs respond to these external motivations.
One of the less well known benefi ts of multinationality is the ability 
to arbitrage differences in government regulations across countries 
(Eden 1985). One benefi t of internalizing transactions rather than using 
the open market is that the goals of fi rms change, and this change makes 
a big difference. The goals of parties to an intrafi rm (intracorporate) 
transaction are cooperative (the purpose is to maximize joint MNE 
profi t), whereas the goals of arm’s-length parties are confl ictual (to max-
imize their individual profi ts), that is, units of an MNE collude rather 
than compete in the market. This gives them the ability to reduce overall 
tax payments and avoid regulatory burdens by under- or overinvoicing 
the transfer price, the price of the intrafi rm transaction.
The fact that two related parties (parent and subsidiary or two sister 
subsidiaries) can collude in setting the price gives an MNE the ability, 
which unrelated fi rms do not legally have, to choose a price that jointly 
maximizes their profi ts, the profi t-maximizing transfer price. The deter-
mination of a profi t-maximizing transfer price is a complex decision-
making process because the MNE must take into account both internal 
motivations (the costs and revenues of the individual MNE affi liates) 
and external motivations (the existence of external market prices and 
government regulations such as taxes and tariffs) that can affect the opti-
mal transfer price (Hirshleifer 1956, 1957; Horst 1971; Eden 1985). 
Where no external market exists, the MNE should set the transfer price 
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equal to the shadow price on intrafi rm transactions; generally, this is the 
marginal cost of the exporting division. Effi cient transfer prices for ser-
vices and for private intangibles have similar rules; they should be based 
on the benefi t-cost principle, that is, each division should pay a transfer 
price proportionate to the benefi ts it receives from the service or intan-
gible (Eden 1998). Where external market prices exist, they should be 
taken into account in setting the transfer price, that is, divisions should 
be allowed to buy and sell in the external market. In each case, the pur-
pose is effi cient resource allocation within the MNE group.
While economists focus on the TPM benefi ts in using the profi t- 
maximizing transfer price, managers of MNEs are more likely to focus 
on practical considerations. First, there may be cases where the MNE has 
no internal reasons for setting a transfer price; transactions may be small 
in volume, diffi cult to value, or occur with extraordinary rapidity. Con-
ventional accounting practice, for example, generally defers valuation of 
intangible assets until there are arm’s-length purchases or sales, creating 
the balance sheet item “goodwill,” which measures the excess purchase 
price over the fair value of the assets acquired. In such cases, the MNE 
may ignore the issue altogether and not set transfer prices.
However, in the typical case, the MNE has multiple internal motiva-
tions for setting a transfer price. Some of these internal motivations 
include the performance evaluation of profi t centers, motivating and 
rewarding the managers of foreign subsidiaries, preventing intersubsid-
iary disputes over intermediate product transfers, more effi cient track-
ing of intrafi rm fl ows, and so on (Borkowski 1992; Cravens 1997; Tang 
1993, 1997, 2002). TPM in these situations involves balancing the incen-
tives, reporting, and monitoring activities associated with setting trans-
fer prices for internal effi ciency.
MNEs typically also have a variety of external motivations for setting 
transfer prices. In a world of CIT differentials and tariffs, the MNE has 
an incentive to manipulate its transfer prices to maximize its global net-
of-taxes profi ts. The benefi ts from TPM of real fl ows, as opposed to fi scal 
transfer pricing, must, however, be traded off against internal distor-
tions. The primary purpose of setting transfer prices now becomes 
global after-tax profi t maximization; such transfer prices, however, may 
or may not look like the regulatory methods outlined by national gov-
ernment authorities.
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Transfer Price Manipulation and Government Regulations
Corporate income taxes and transfer price manipulation
The most well known external motivation for manipulating transfer 
prices is the differences in CIT rates between countries or between states 
within countries. For evidence on tax-induced motivations for TPM, see 
Li and Balachandran (1996); Eden (1998); Swenson (2001); and Bartels-
man and Beetsma (2003). There are several ways to engage in TPM in 
such cases:
•  The MNE can overinvoice tax-deductible inbound transfers into 
high-tax countries and underinvoice them into low-tax countries. 
This shifts corporate profi ts from high-tax to low-tax jurisdictions. 
Examples of inbound transfers include imported parts and compo-
nents, payments for engineering and consulting services, and royalty 
payments for intangibles.
•  The MNE can underinvoice taxable outbound transfers from high-
tax countries and overinvoice them from low-tax countries. This 
shifts corporate profi ts from high-tax to low-tax jurisdictions. Exam-
ples of outbound transfers include exports of fi nished goods, charges 
for the provision of services to other parts of the MNE network, and 
licensing and royalty payments for outbound intangible transfers.
•  If the home government allows deferral of CITs on MNE foreign 
source income, the MNE can avoid the home country CIT on foreign 
source income by not repatriating foreign source earnings to the 
home country. The funds can either be reinvested in the host country 
or moved to another country in the MNE network.
•  If the host country levies a withholding tax on the repatriated profi ts 
of foreign affi liates and the withholding tax is not fully creditable 
against the home country tax, not repatriating foreign source income 
avoids the tax. In these cases, the MNE can use the rhythm method to 
time its repatriated earnings only in tax years when the withholding 
tax is fully credited against the home tax (Brean 1985). In other years, 
no profi ts are remitted to the home country.
•  If withholding taxes vary according to the form of repatriation (for 
example, management fees, royalty and licensing payments, and divi-
dends are typically subject to quite different withholding tax rates), 
the MNE can move the funds out in the form that incurs the lowest 
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withholding tax. Note that if the MNE receives a full foreign tax credit 
against the home country tax for the withholding tax, the form by 
which the MNE moves the funds out becomes irrelevant since the tax 
is fully credited.
•  Tax holidays can also be a motivation for TPM, particularly if the holi-
day is conditional on the profi ts earned by the foreign affi liate. In China 
in the 1980s, the government offered a tax holiday for foreign fi rms as 
long as they did not show a profi t. Not surprisingly, the foreign affi liates 
did not show profi ts until after the law was changed (see below).
•  Some forms of intrafi rm transfers are more fungible than others and 
therefore more susceptible to TPM. Management fees are particularly 
notorious because the MNE parent charges each affi liate for the costs of 
services provided by the parent to the affi liates, and these charges are 
diffi cult to measure. Many host country tax authorities have specifi c 
rules limiting the deductibility of the management fees charged by an 
MNE parent to its foreign subsidiaries because governments see these 
deductions as a method to eviscerate the host country’s national tax 
base. Governments also levy withholding taxes, in addition to CITs, if 
foreign affi liates repatriate income to their parent fi rms. The withhold-
ing taxes on management fees are often in the range of 30–35 percent.
•  Some forms of intrafi rm transfers are easier to misprice simply 
because there is no open market for the product. (The product is 
never exchanged between arm’s-length parties; an example is highly 
sophisticated new technologies.) So, arm’s-length comparables are 
impossible to fi nd. Payments for intangible assets are particularly sus-
ceptible to TPM because there are often no outside transfers available 
to determine an arm’s-length comparable.
Trade taxes and transfer price manipulation
Trade taxes provide a second external motivation for manipulating trans-
fer prices. For evidence on tariff-induced motivations for TPM, see Eden 
(1998), Vincent (2004), Goetzl (2005), and Eden and Rodriguez (2004). 
Some examples of TPM motivated by trade tax include the following:
•  If customs duties are levied on an ad valorem (percentage) basis, the 
MNE can reduce the duties paid if it underinvoices imports. Specifi c or 
per-unit customs duties cannot be avoided by over- or underinvoicing.
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•  If export taxes are levied on an ad valorem basis, the MNE can reduce 
the export taxes paid if it underinvoices exports. Specifi c export taxes 
cannot be avoided through TPM.
•  Rules of origin within free trade areas offer another potential arbi-
trage opportunity. Most rules of origin are on a percent-of-value 
basis. For example, products qualify for duty-free status if 50 percent 
or more of the value added is derived from inside one of the countries 
that is a partner in the free trade area. By overinvoicing the value 
added, the MNE can more easily meet a rule-of-origin test and qualify 
for duty-free entry for its products into another country in the free 
trade area.
Foreign exchange restrictions and transfer price manipulation
A third external motivation for TPM is foreign exchange restrictions. 
For evidence on foreign exchange rate motivations for TPM, see Chan 
and Chow (1997a), who fi nd that foreign MNEs were engaged in TPM 
to shift profi ts out of China not because of CIT differentials (in fact, 
Chinese tax rates were lower than elsewhere), but to avoid foreign 
exchange risks and controls. Examples of TPM in response to exchange 
rate restrictions include the following:
•  If the host country’s currency is not convertible so that the MNE can-
not move its profi ts out, the MNE can, in effect, move its profi ts out 
despite the nonconvertible currency if it overinvoices inbound trans-
fers and underinvoices outbound transfers.
•  If there are foreign exchange restrictions on the amount of foreign 
currency that can be bought or sold in a particular time period, using 
overinvoicing of inbound transfers and underinvoicing of outbound 
transfers enables the MNE to move more funds out than would be 
permissible with currency controls.
Political risk and transfer price manipulation
Another area susceptible to TPM is political risk. For evidence on the 
capital fl ight and political risk motivations for TPM, see Gulati (1987); 
Wood and Moll (1994); Baker (2005); and de Boyrie, Pak, and Zdano-
wicz (2005). Examples of TPM in response to various types of political 
risk include the following:
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•  If the MNE fears expropriation of its assets in a host country or, more 
generally, if political risk is great, overinvoicing of inbound transfers 
and underinvoicing of outbound transfers can be used to shift income 
out of the high-risk location.
•  More generally, policy risk, that is, the risk that the government may 
change its laws, regulations, or contracts in ways that adversely affect 
the multinational, also provides an incentive for MNEs to engage in 
TPM. Policy risks, as discussed in Henisz and Zelner (2010), are 
opaque and diffi cult to hedge, and there is typically no insurance. 
Moreover, the authors estimate that policy risks have risen substan-
tially since 1990. Income shifting through TPM may well be a rational 
response to policy risk.
•  If the host country currency is weak and expected to fall, the MNE 
can underinvoice inbound transfers and overinvoice outbound trans-
fers to shift profi ts out of the weak currency.
•  Another form of political risk is the requirement that foreign affi liates 
must take on a forced joint venture partner. Foreign affi liate profi ts 
earned in a country with this rule in effect suffer a tax because profi ts 
must be split between the MNE and the joint venture partner. In these 
cases, the MNE may engage in income shifting to move funds out of 
such a high-tax location.
Empirical Evidence on Transfer Price Manipulation
Let us now turn to empirical work on TPM. The evidence that multina-
tionals engage in TPM to arbitrage or avoid government regulations 
does exist, but is fragmented and often backward induced, that is, esti-
mated indirectly rather than directly. The extent and signifi cance of 
TPM, especially for developing countries, is not clear, although, by 
extrapolating from existing studies, we now have a better understanding 
of the circumstances under which TPM is likely to occur. Below, we 
review the empirical evidence on TPM.
Evidence from developed countries
By far, the bulk of empirical research on TPM has been done using U.S. 
data sets, and almost all studies have been done on U.S. multinationals 
with controlled foreign corporations overseas.
216 Draining Development?
Income shifting studies. Perhaps the largest number of empirical studies 
has involved estimates of income shifting from high-tax to low-tax juris-
dictions. In these studies, either foreign direct investment or a profi t-
based measure such as return on assets or return on sales is the depen-
dent variable that is used to test whether MNEs shift income to locations 
with lower CIT rates (for example, see Bartelsman and Beetsma 2003; 
Grubert and Mutti 1991; Grubert and Slemrod 1998). Because TPM 
affects MNE profi ts at the country level, this approach focuses not on 
prices, but on profi t shifting. These partial and general equilibrium 
models use national CIT differentials and custom duty rates to predict 
TPM and to estimate the income moved in this fashion. These studies 
are more appropriately identifi ed as fi scal TPM because they focus on 
income manipulation and not on the pricing of products per se. Changes 
in the form of profi t remittances from royalties to dividends and the 
excessive padding of management fees, are examples. A few of the key 
studies are reviewed below.
In one of the earliest tests, Grubert and Mutti (1991) used a data set 
of manufacturing affi liates of U.S. MNEs in 33 countries to examine how 
tax differentials and tariffs generate income transfers because of TPM. 
The authors aggregated country-level data from the U.S. Bureau of Eco-
nomic Analysis on foreign affi liates of U.S. multinationals and regressed 
the profi t rates of the affi liates against host country statutory CIT rates. 
The authors concluded that the empirical evidence was consistent with 
MNE income shifting from high- to low-tax jurisdictions.
Harris, Morck, and Slemrod (1993), based on a sample of 200 U.S. 
manufacturing fi rms over 1984–88, fi nd that U.S. MNEs with subsidiar-
ies in low-tax countries pay less U.S. tax, while those with subsidiaries in 
high-tax countries pay relatively more U.S. tax per dollar of assets or 
sales. Income shifting by the largest MNEs is, they argue, primarily 
responsible for these results. These studies provide, however, only indi-
rect evidence of TPM. For example, the results of the authors can be 
explained by MNEs shifting income from high- to low-tax locations, but 
also by cross-country differences in the intrinsic location-specifi c profi t-
ability of MNE subunits. The authors are aware of this possibility, but 
show evidence that does not support this interpretation.
Grubert (2003) uses fi rm-level data on U.S. parents and their foreign 
controlled affi liates to test for evidence of income shifting. He regresses 
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pretax profi ts against host country statutory tax rates, while controlling 
for parent and subsidiary characteristics and fi nds evidence supporting 
income shifting, particularly among fi rms with high ratios of research 
and development to sales.
McDonald (2008) expands on Grubert (2003) by attempting to sepa-
rate out income shifting arising because of tangibles, research and devel-
opment, marketing intangibles, and services. In particular, he addresses 
income shifting through cost-sharing arrangements. He concludes that 
the empirical results from his tests are “not inconsistent with the existence 
of possible income shifting” and that there is some evidence that foreign 
affi liates whose U.S. parents engage in cost-sharing arrangements may 
also “engage in more aggressive income shifting” (McDonald 2008, 30).
Clausing (2009) uses U.S. Bureau of Economic Analysis data for 1982– 
2004 to test whether U.S. multinationals engage in income shifting to low-
tax locations. She argues that MNEs can engage in both fi nancial and real 
types of tax avoidance. Financial avoidance is estimated by comparing tax 
differentials across countries and foreign affi liate profi t rates, while real 
avoidance is estimated by comparing tax differentials and foreign employ-
ment. She fi nds that a host country statutory CIT rate 1 percent below the 
U.S. rate is associated with a 0.5 percent higher foreign affi liate profi t rate; 
using these estimates, she argues that US$180 billion in CIT had been 
shifted out of the United States. The losses as measured by real responses 
to income shifting, however, were about half that: about US$80 billion less 
in profi ts and 15 percent less in tax revenues.
The most recent paper on the topic, by Azémar and Corcos (2009), 
uses a sample of Japanese MNEs and fi nds greater elasticity of invest-
ment to statutory tax rates in emerging economies if foreign affi liates are 
wholly owned by research and development–intensive parent fi rms. The 
authors argue that this is indirect evidence of TPM.
TPM trade mispricing studies. A second approach to estimating TPM has 
involved examining individual transactions using huge databases of 
transaction-level import and export data (for example, see Clausing 2003; 
Swenson 2001; Eden and Rodriguez 2004). The focus of these authors is 
trade mispricing, that is, the under- or overinvoicing of imported and 
exported goods in response to CIT differences, tariffs, foreign exchange 
restrictions, and so on. Where the researcher focuses on TPM, we call 
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such studies TPM trade mispricing studies. The idea behind this research 
is to compare arm’s-length comparable prices with the reported intrafi rm 
prices to determine the extent of over- or underinvoicing of related-party 
transactions.
In the trade mispricing papers, the estimates of trade mispricing are 
typically done using regression analysis. It may be helpful for the reader 
if we explain briefl y how these models work.
If P
ijkt
 is the transaction price of product i imported by fi rm j from 
country k at time t, the researcher regresses the price (the dependent 
variable) against a vector of independent variables (product and fi rm 
characteristics and tax and tariff rates), a dummy variable for related-
party trade (1 for transactions between related parties, 0 if the fi rms are 
unrelated), and a set of control variables for other possible explanations. 
The regression equation takes the following form:
 P
ijkt
 = a + b X
ijkt
 + c I FT + d X
ijkt
 × IFT + Z, (7.1)
where X
ijkt 
is the vector of independent variables, IFT is the intrafi rm 
trade dummy variable, and Z is a vector of control variables. The IFT 
variable is interacted with the independent variables to see whether 
there are statistically signifi cant differences between arm’s-length and 
related-party trade if one of the independent variables changes, for 
example, whether IFT is sensitive to differences in CIT rates or to cus-
toms duties. All variables except IFT are normally logged so that the 
regression coeffi cients are
 
elasticities, showing the responsiveness (per-
centage change) in the import price to a percentage change in the inde-
pendent variables.
It may be helpful to also see this equation as a graph. Figure 7.1 shows 
a simple regression that relates trade prices to the volume of trade, hold-
ing other infl uential variables constant (for example, product and indus-
try characteristics). By examining and adding up the outliers, one can 
estimate the extent of mispricing. The key issue is therefore to determine 
what is an outlier. Under U.S. Code section 6662 on CIT, transfer pricing 
misevaluation penalties apply if MNEs set their transfer prices signifi -
cantly outside the arm’s-length range of acceptable prices. The arm’s-
length range, according to the section 482 regulations, is determined by 
the transfer pricing method that gives the most reliable measure of an 
 Transfer Price Manipulation 219
arm’s-length result. In establishing the range, the bottom 25 percent and 
top 25 percent of observations are normally discarded, leaving the inter-
quartile range (between 25 and 75 percent) as the acceptable arm’s-
length range. If the MNE’s transfer price falls within this range, no sec-
tion 6662 penalties apply. If it is outside the range, unless the fi rm has 
demonstrated a good faith effort to comply with the section 482 regula-
tions (for example, by fi ling complete, contemporaneous documenta-
tion of its transfer pricing policies), penalties do apply (Eden 1998; Eden, 
Juárez, and Li 2005). We have therefore used the interquartile range to 
mark outliers in fi gure 7.1 because these outliers would not normally fall 
within the arm’s-length range.
There are, of course, problems with the TPM trade mispricing 
approach, not the least of which is, fi rst, that it is critically important to 
identify which transactions occur within the MNE and which are arm’s-
length transactions. Too often, the studies attribute all trade mispricing to 
the MNE, without having the data to determine whether the trade moved 
within the MNE or not. Second, the key to TPM trade mispricing studies 
is that the data set must include both arm’s-length and intrafi rm interna-
tional transactions, with a clear marker that distinguishes transactions 
Figure 7.1. Estimating Trade Mispricing from International Trade Data
Source: Author.
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between related parties and transactions between arm’s-length fi rms. The 
huge advantage of TPM trade mispricing studies over income shifting 
studies is that the data are transaction-level (not fi rm-level) data, but the 
problem is that the marker may be wrong or missing.
Two data sets have been used in the U.S. studies of trade mispricing: 
U.S. Bureau of the Census data and U.S. Bureau of Labor Statistics (BLS) 
data. The census data tapes are raw tapes of U.S. export and import 
transactions. Export fi gures are reported directly to the Census Bureau; 
import fi gures come from the U.S. Customs Service. The data, while 
extraordinarily rich, suffer from several problems, the most important 
of which for TPM trade mispricing studies is that the intrafi rm trade 
marker is highly problematic. If the data are taken from shipping docu-
ments reported to customs authorities, such markers are widely recog-
nized to be unreliable (Eden and Rodriguez 2004). As a result, empirical 
studies of trade mispricing using the census data tapes cannot reliably 
argue that trade mispricing estimates are also estimates of TPM.
For example, Pak and Zdanowicz (1994) use the census data on 
monthly merchandise export and import prices to look for outliers; they 
estimate that the U.S. government lost US$33.1 billion in tax revenues 
because of unreported taxable income. Unfortunately, the authors can-
not identify individual transactions as arm’s-length or intrafi rm transac-
tions; so, they should not (but do) attribute the tax loss to TPM.
Moreover, simply using U.S. Census Bureau data on U.S. merchandise 
import and export transactions can be quite problematic not only 
because the intrafi rm trade marker may be missing or wrong, but also 
because prices may be reported for different quantities, leading to spuri-
ous estimates of TPM. If the comparability of units cannot be confi rmed, 
it is possible to fi nd huge variations in prices and attribute this to trade 
mispricing, though the variations are simply caused by differences in 
units (Eden and Rodriguez 2004; Kar and Cartwright-Smith 2008; 
Nitsch 2009). For example, comparing the price of a single boxed tooth-
brush with the price of a freight load of toothbrushes could lead a 
researcher to conclude that U.S. imports from the United Kingdom were 
overstated by US$5,655 per unit if the unit in each case were reported as 
a box (Pak and Zdanowicz 2002). Without the ability to clean the data 
set to ensure comparability of quantities, such estimates must be 
regarded as problematic. In addition, the method is only as good as the 
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all-else-being-equal variables, that is, the controls used to ensure compa-
rability between the controlled and uncontrolled transactions. As we 
stress above, to measure TPM, one must know what the arm’s-length 
price is for comparison purposes, which requires close comparables.
U.S. import data from the U.S. Census Bureau have also been used by 
Swenson (2001) at the product level by country to test for evidence of 
TPM over 1981–86. Swenson constructs prices by dividing reported cus-
toms values by reported quantities. She fi nds that a 5 percent fall in for-
eign CIT rates caused a tiny rise in U.S. import prices. However, she is 
unable to separate intrafi rm from arm’s-length trade; so, her study suf-
fers from the same problem as the Pak and Zdanowicz studies.
Recently, Bernard, Jensen, and Schott (2008) used U.S. export transac-
tions between 1993 and 2000 to examine the wedge between arm’s-length 
and related-party transactions and determine how the wedge varies with 
product and fi rm characteristics, market structure, and government pol-
icy. Their data set is compiled from U.S. export data and U.S. establish-
ment data from the U.S. Census Bureau, as well as U.S. Customs Bureau 
data. Because they use census data, their results also suffer from unreli-
able coding for related-party transactions. The price wedge is measured 
as the difference between the log of the averaged arm’s-length prices and 
the log of the related-party prices at the fi rm-product-country level. The 
authors fi nd that export prices for arm’s-length transactions are, on aver-
age, 43 percent higher, all else being equal, than prices for intrafi rm 
exports. The wedge varies by type of good and is smaller for commodities 
(8.8 percent, on average) than for differentiated goods (66.7 percent, on 
average). The wedge is larger for goods shipped by larger fi rms with 
higher export shares and in product-country markets served by fewer 
exporters. The wedge is negatively associated with the foreign country’s 
CIT rate and positively related to that country’s import tariff. A 1 percent 
drop in the foreign tax rate increases the price wedge by about 0.6 per-
cent. Lastly, they fi nd that a 10 percent appreciation of the U.S. dollar 
against the foreign currency reduces the wedge by 2 percent.
In two situations, however, the quality of the intrafi rm trade marker 
should be quite high, as follows: (1) if government agencies keep data on 
specifi c products that are of high salience or (2) if the government is 
concerned about related-party transactions. In these cases, more than 
normal attention is paid to data quality and therefore to whether the 
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transactions are intrafi rm or arm’s length. The most well known exam-
ple of the fi rst situation (government agencies keeping data on specifi c 
products) is the data set on crude petroleum imported into Canada and 
the United States from the 1970s through the 1980s. The most well 
known example of the second situation (concern about related-party 
transactions) is the data set on U.S. export and import transactions col-
lected by BLS, which are used to compute the U.S. export and import 
price index. We look at each in turn.
Five studies have used confi dential data from the Canadian and U.S. 
governments on crude petroleum imports to test for TPM. Bernard and 
Weiner (1990, 1992, 1996) fi nd weak evidence of TPM in Canadian and 
U.S. import prices, which may have been partly related to CIT differen-
tials. Rugman (1985), looking only at the Canadian data, concludes that 
there was no TPM in Canadian oil import prices in the 1970s. Bernard 
and Genest-Laplante (1996) examine oil shipments into Canada and the 
United States over 1974–84 and fi nd that the six largest Canadian affi li-
ates pay the same or lower prices for crude oil imports relative to the 
prices of third-party transactions; they argue this is evidence of TPM 
because Canada was a low-tax country relative to the United States over 
this period.
The second source of high-quality data on intrafi rm trade is BLS data 
on U.S. import and export merchandise transactions. BLS fi eld econo-
mists work with approximately 8,000 fi rms across the United States to 
identify the most representative export and import transactions, appro-
priate volumes, and key characteristics, including whether transactions 
involve related or unrelated parties. Once the transactions have been 
identifi ed, the fi rms voluntarily provide transaction-level data on a 
monthly or quarterly basis to BLS, which cleans the data and uses them 
to construct U.S. export and import price indexes. As a result, the BLS 
data are of much better quality for trade mispricing studies in general 
and for TPM trade mispricing studies in particular. However, there is a 
sample selection bias problem given that participation in the BLS pro-
gram is voluntary, and fi rms can and do refuse to participate.
Clausing has tested the links between CIT differentials and TPM using 
confi dential monthly BLS export and import price data for January 1997–
December 1999. She fi nds a strong relationship indicating tax avoidance: a 
“tax rate 1% lower in the country of destination/origin is associated with 
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intrafi rm export prices that are 1.8% lower and intrafi rm import prices 
that are 2.0% higher, relative to non-intrafi rm goods” (Clausing 2003, 16). 
There are some problems with Clausing’s analysis. Her test period most 
likely underestimates TPM because BLS did not include non–market-
based transfer prices until April 1998, and the CIT rate she uses is not the 
theoretically preferred rate for TPM (the statutory rate adjusted for tax 
preferences: see Eden 1998; Grubert and Slemrod 1998).
The little evidence we have involving a comparison of the BLS and 
census data sets can be found in Eden and Rodriguez (2004), who use 
BLS and U.S. Census Bureau data for January–June 1999 to estimate the 
responsiveness of U.S. import prices to CIT differentials and tariffs. The 
authors fi nd that the gap between the BLS- and census-based price 
indexes widen by 1.3 percent for every 10 percent increase in the share of 
intrafi rm trade and that these results are even stronger where govern-
ment trade barriers encouraged TPM. Their study suggests that using 
census data to estimate TPM is problematic; the BLS data set provides 
superior estimates.
Evidence from developing countries
TPM has long been seen as a way to move funds out of developing coun-
tries. The Committee of Eminent Persons at UNCTAD, for example, 
issued a 1978 report surveying studies of MNEs that use TPM to extract 
resources from developing countries (UNCTAD 1978). However, the 
empirical evidence is much more sparse for developing countries than 
for developed countries (especially in comparison with U.S. studies), 
which probably is to be expected because careful studies require data sets 
that often do not exist in developing countries.
The early studies. Most of the research has been in the form of country 
case studies; for example, Ellis (1981) looked at TPM in Central America; 
ESCAP and UNCTC (1984) in Thailand; Lecraw (1985) in the countries 
of the Association of Southeast Asian Nations; Natke (1985) in Brazil; 
Vaitsos (1974) in Columbia; and Lall (1973) at TPM involving developing 
countries in general. Some of these studies were highlighted in UNCTAD 
(1978), Murray (1981), Rugman and Eden (1985), and Plasschaert (1994). 
UNCTAD (1999) and Eden (1998) provide more recent overviews of this 
literature.
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Some researchers have compared intrafi rm prices for selected imports 
directly with world or domestic prices for the same products. Vaitsos 
(1974), for example, concluded that foreign MNEs overinvoiced 
intrafi rm imports into Colombia to avoid Colombia’s foreign exchange 
controls. Natke (1985) found that MNEs were overinvoicing imports 
into Brazil to avoid Brazil’s extensive regulations, which included price 
and credit controls, profi t repatriation restrictions, and high CIT rates. 
Lecraw (1985) concluded that tariffs, relative tax rates, price and foreign 
exchange controls, and country risk were signifi cant variables explaining 
transfer pricing behavior in the Association of Southeast Asian Nations. 
There are also studies of specifi c industries, such as petroleum and phar-
maceuticals, where profi t ratios are quite high so that TPM can be an 
important determinant of income fl ows among countries. For a recent 
study on the offshoring of business services, see Eden (2005), which 
focuses on call centers.
The China studies. China is perhaps the country where TPM has been 
studied the most frequently, certainly in recent years, primarily because 
the Chinese government has provided researchers access to fi rm-level 
balance sheets, income tax fi lings, and customs valuation data. Impor-
tant in the studies is the fact that China has offered tax holidays and 
other incentives to fi rms that locate in special economic zones and 
research parks. A few of the more well known studies are reviewed below.
Chan and Chow (1997a) provide the fi rst evidence on TPM in China. 
In 1992–93, they collected 81 tax audit cases from city tax bureaus and 
analyzed the cases for differences across industries, according to fi rm 
size, by nationality, and so on. They argue that low tax rates and tax holi-
days in China should encourage income shifting into China, but the for-
eign exchange controls and risks would work in the opposite direction. 
The tax cases, however, involved income shifting out of China (perhaps 
because that attracted the attention of tax authorities). The six minicases 
discussed in the article each involved underinvoicing of exports to 
related parties, creating losses on exports. The authors estimated the 
extent of underinvoicing by comparing the profi ts on export sales rela-
tive to the profi ts reported on domestic sales or to industry averages; 
these are crude measures, but the results are consistent with other case 
studies of TPM in developing countries.
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Chan and Chow (1997b) review the various external motivations that 
fi rms in China face and that might lead them to engage in TPM. The 
authors again argue that, while tax rates are low, which should encourage 
income shifting into China, foreign exchange controls are an important 
counterweight encouraging income shifting out of China. Assuming 
that exchange controls are more important than tax motivations, the 
authors argue that TPM by foreign fi rms in China should be visible in 
their overinvoicing of imports and underinvoicing of exports relative to 
domestic fi rms for the same or similar products, that is, foreign fi rms 
should be shifting funds out of China through transfer pricing to avoid 
the foreign exchange controls. To test this hypothesis, the authors sub-
tract the trade transactions of foreign fi rms from total trade transactions 
in 1992 to estimate trade by Chinese fi rms. Comparing foreign with 
domestic trade patterns, the authors estimate a rate of 11 percent in 
overinvoicing of imports and 12 percent in overinvoicing of exports 
among foreign fi rms relative to Chinese fi rms. Because the authors fi nd 
evidence of overinvoicing on both exports and imports, other factors 
besides foreign exchange controls may be important in this case.
An additional factor affecting transfer pricing in China was the fi ve-
year tax holiday for foreign manufacturing affi liates provided by the 
Chinese government in the 1990s (Chow and Chan 1997a; Chan and Mo 
2000). If a foreign affi liate made losses, the fi rm was exempt from the 
Chinese CIT. The normal CIT rate was 30 percent, but foreign affi liates 
in Special Economic Zones were taxed at 15 percent. The tax holiday was 
structured so that it took effect only after the affi liate declared a profi t. 
For the fi rst two profi table years, the exemption continued, and then the 
CIT rate was reduced by 50 percent for three more years. After the fi ve-
year period, the regular CIT rate would apply. Therefore, while the tax 
holiday was attractive to foreign MNEs, it was temporary; meanwhile, as 
long as the foreign affi liate made losses, the fi rm would be exempt from 
tax. Foreign MNEs therefore had a strong incentive to underreport prof-
its in China because of the peculiar structure of the tax holiday.
Chan and Mo tested this argument by examining 585 tax audits in 
1997; the authors concluded that foreign MNEs “in the pre-holiday posi-
tion often manipulate taxable income by exaggerating losses before their 
fi rst profi tmaking year, so as to extend their tax holiday” (Chan and Mo 
2000, 480). What the authors discovered is that the fi rms were using TPM 
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(mostly by infl ating the cost of sales) to prolong the period of time dur-
ing which they declared losses. The authors recommended that the Chi-
nese government should limit the preholiday window on tax losses; the 
government did change the policy and implemented a fi xed time period 
for allowable losses, closing off this particular arbitrage opportunity.
Two other studies of transfer pricing in China report on interviews 
with fi nancial controllers of 64 foreign affi liates in 2000 (Chan and 
Chow 2001; Chan and Lo 2004). Both studies fi nd that the perceptions 
of managers on three environmental variables affect their choice of 
transfer pricing methods. The more important the interests of local 
partners and the need to maintain a good working relationship with the 
Chinese government, the more likely the foreign MNE is to select a 
 market-based transfer pricing method. The more important are foreign 
exchange controls, the more likely that cost-based prices are used.
The series of Chan and Chow studies are summarized in Chow 
(2010). She argues that the policy environment in China in the 1990s 
and 2000s has had a major impact on the transfer pricing policies of 
foreign MNEs in China. In the 1990s, the combination of tax incentives 
for foreign MNEs, plus weak regulatory enforcement by inexperienced 
Chinese tax auditors created a low-tax environment that encouraged 
TPM. In 2008, China adopted a fl at CIT rate of 25 percent that applied 
to both Chinese and foreign MNEs. The CIT rate remains below the 
rates of most of China’s trading partners except for Hong Kong SAR, 
China and for Singapore; Chow therefore argues that tax motivations 
for shifting profi ts into China still exist. CIT differentials, however, can 
be offset by other policy environment factors, such as tariffs, foreign 
exchange controls, political risk, and forced equity joint venture partner-
ships. Chow discusses each of these factors, concluding that policy liber-
alization had signifi cantly reduced the impact of the factors by the time 
of her study, leaving tax incentives as the major factor affecting transfer 
pricing policies by foreign MNEs in China as of 2010.
Taking a different perspective on TPM, Lo, Wong, and Firth (2010) 
investigate the impact of corporate governance on earnings manage-
ment through TPM, using a sample of 266 Chinese fi rms listed on the 
Shanghai Stock Exchange in 2004. They measure the manipulation of 
earnings through TPM by comparing the gross profi t margin on related-
party transactions with the corresponding margin on arm’s-length 
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transactions. The authors fi nd that Chinese MNEs with higher-quality 
governance structures (for example, a higher percent of independent 
directors and fi nancial experts on their audit committees) are less likely 
to engage in TPM. Their results suggest that improving corporate gover-
nance of MNEs in emerging markets may lead to less earnings manipu-
lation through transfer pricing.
Looking across these studies of income shifting and trade mispricing, 
the evidence supports the presumption of TPM in China. Kar and 
 Cartwright-Smith (2008) suggest that China may be the single most 
important developing country to experience TPM. Perhaps this explains 
why the Chinese government is now paying so much attention to the 
development of sophisticated transfer pricing regulations and why Bei-
jing and Shanghai are two of the most rapidly growing transfer pricing 
locations for the Big Four accounting fi rms.
Conclusion
In this chapter, we attempt to contribute to the debate on illicit fl ows and 
developing countries through the lens of TPM. Based on our literature 
review, we conclude that empirical evidence for TPM exists, but is not 
overwhelming. The small number of empirical studies is perhaps not 
surprising given the fi ne-grained—individual transactions identifi ed as 
related-party or arm’s-length transactions—and highly confi dential 
nature of the data needed to test for TPM. The best empirical estimates 
come from transaction-level data collected and processed by statistical 
agencies that have paid close attention to intrafi rm trade, such as the U.S. 
data set on the prices of crude petroleum imports and the BLS data set 
used to compute U.S. export and import price indexes. In terms of devel-
oping countries, the best and largest number of currently available stud-
ies are the Chinese studies. No data set is perfect, and, as a result, all the 
various estimates are fl awed. Still, the balance of the evidence suggests 
that income shifting does occur through the manipulation of transfer 
prices.
What would be helpful is greater accessibility to transaction-level data 
on crossborder export and import transactions and MNE income state-
ments and balance sheets. This would enable scholars to shine more light 
in the dark corners of TPM, providing scholars and policy makers with 
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the ability to construct more accurate estimates of TPM and its impacts 
on both developed and developing countries. The Chinese government 
may be the most well placed to move in this regard, and the rapidly 
growing number of empirical studies using data on Chinese trade trans-
actions and tax audits suggests we may soon have more reliable estimates 
of TPM for at least one developing country.
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Abstract
As multinationals have become a larger fi xture in international trade and 
the weight of intracompany transactions has increased, the practice of 
transfer pricing has come under greater and often strident scrutiny. In 
this chapter, we review the current practice of transfer pricing and its 
impact on the ability of developing countries to collect tax revenue.
After an overview of the arm’s-length principle (ALP), the key con-
cept in modern-day transfer pricing regulations, we discuss the com-
plexities involved in determining prices for transactions between related 
parties in a context of competing interests and unique transactions. By 
means of examples drawn from specifi c real-world cases, we (1) illus-
trate the diffi culties in simultaneously assuring that companies are not 
double taxed and that competing tax authorities collect their fair share 
of tax revenue and (2) distinguish between tax avoidance and tax eva-
sion and examine the relationship of each to the illegality of fi nancial 
fl ows.
Unfortunately, the existing literature on the impact of transfer pricing 
abuses on developing countries provides insuffi cient evidence on the 
extent of income shifting and the role of transfer price manipulation and 
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few insights into the possible illicit nature of the underlying transac-
tions. We conclude by noting that (1) expanding the use of the ALP is the 
best option for a theoretically sound and globally consistent approach to 
transfer pricing, and (2) it is crucial for developing countries to adopt a 
specifi c transfer pricing regime and to engage in a higher degree of 
information sharing among tax authorities.
Introduction
Multinationals are the most successful form of business organization 
largely because of inherent advantages in the access to crucial knowledge 
and processes and in the ability to secure economies of scale. Over the 
past three decades, the number of multinationals has risen 10-fold, from 
a modest 7,258 in 1970 to nearly 79,000 by 2006 (UNCTAD 2008). 
Against the background of falling barriers to international commerce, 
these corporations have played a key role in boosting trade and foreign 
direct investment (FDI) fl ows, and, as their far-fl ung operations have 
expanded, so has the importance of intrafi rm trade.1 It is estimated that, 
globally, multinationals account for approximately two-thirds of trade 
fl ows, and fully half of these are intrafi rm transactions.2 These devel-
opments and trends have distinct consequences for international taxa-
tion, and some observers have linked weaknesses in tax collection in 
developing countries with the propensity of multinationals to use fi nan-
cial artifi ces, including favorable transfer pricing practices on intrafi rm 
trade, to shift income (illegally) around the world.
As a result, transfer pricing has been raised from the status of an 
arcane subject solely in the purview of tax administrators and practitio-
ners to a ranking as the most important issue in international taxation in 
surveys of business people. It has also become a key point of discussion 
among politicians, economists, and nongovernmental organizations. 
Technically, transfer pricing refers to the pricing or valuation of intrafi rm 
transactions (a complex task in practice) and the consequent allocation 
of profi ts for tax and other internal purposes (a complicated balancing 
act of competing national interests and public policy choices). On one 
side of these transactions, multinationals aim, fi rst, at avoiding double 
taxation (a strong deterrent to international trade) and, second, at mini-
mizing the tax burden (potentially a source of competitive advantage). 
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Meanwhile, the tax authority of the entity on the selling side of the trans-
action attempts to raise the price to maximize its own tax collection (on 
which its performance is judged), and, fi nally, the tax authority of the 
entity on the purchasing side of the transaction attempts to lower the 
price so that its own tax collections can be higher (on which its effective-
ness is evaluated). The complexity of the resulting to-and-fro necessi-
tates a specifi c set of concepts and rules (including transfer pricing regu-
lations and tax treaties) and even a specifi c interjurisdictional dispute 
resolution mechanism (the Mutual Agreement Procedure and Compe-
tent Authority process).
Following a summary introduction to the building blocks of transfer 
pricing and a brief discussion of some of the complexities of implement-
ing the ALP, the stage is set for a discussion on the signifi cant differences 
between tax avoidance and tax evasion and how these concepts intersect 
with the practice of transfer pricing. Next, we consider the existing lit-
erature on the impact of transfer pricing abuses on the tax revenues col-
lected by developing countries; unfortunately, this literature tends to 
provide, at best, indirect evidence on the extent of income shifting and 
the role of transfer pricing, but few insights into the motivation or the 
possible illicit nature of the underlying transactions. We then discuss the 
importance of developing countries adopting a specifi c transfer pricing 
regime; we note, in particular, that a globally consistent tax regime and 
higher degree of information sharing among tax authorities on the 
application of transfer pricing policies will help to ensure consistency of 
application, make the rules clearer for taxpayers, and increase the ability 
of tax authorities to act in a fair and coordinated manner. We conclude 
by noting that the ALP and ongoing efforts of the Organisation for Eco-
nomic Co-operation and Development (OECD) to expand the use of 
the ALP are the best option for a theoretically sound and globally consis-
tent approach to transfer pricing.
Throughout the chapter, we illustrate some of the implementation 
and administration complexities faced by multinationals and tax author-
ities by discussing three cases taken from actual exchanges between tax-
payers and tax authorities. In addition to tax-minimizing choices by 
management, these cases also illustrate the lack of coordination among 
tax authorities that sometimes risks compromising solid business strate-
gies and valuable commercial relationships.
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What Is the Arm’s-Length Principle?
A simple theoretical construct
In a world of multijurisdictional taxation and multinational enterprises 
(MNEs) operating across borders, intercompany transactions have 
important tax implications, primarily because the associated transfer 
prices determine the distribution of profi ts and tax liabilities by jurisdic-
tion.3 Crucially, however, such transactions are not open-market trans-
actions, which leaves unresolved the issue of the appropriate pricing 
mechanism (see box 8.1).4
For these cases, the pricing mechanism used most often is the ALP 
initially adopted by the OECD in 1979. The appeal of the ALP resides in 
its theoretical simplicity: simulate the market mechanism and set the 
transfer prices as if the transactions had been carried out between unre-
lated parties, each acting in its own best interest. This simple construct 
provides a legal framework that easily accommodates the two overriding 
objectives of an internationally consistent system: governments should 
collect their fair share of taxes, and enterprises should avoid double taxa-
Box 8.1. A Trading Intermediary: A Case of Management Foresight?
Background: A large natural resource company has vertically integrated operations in an industry 
comprised of a relatively few similarly structured ﬁ rms and with sales agreements primarily in the 
form of long-term supply contracts.
Business arrangement: An intermediary subsidiary in a low-tax jurisdiction buys 100 percent of 
the company’s production under a long-term contract and resells the product under a mix of 
long-term arrangements and spot contracts. The intermediary receives ﬁ nancing from the com-
pany, legally holds inventory, and assumes the business risks associated with the negotiating and 
reselling function.
Market developments: Because of unforeseen circumstances, the market changes (in what amounts 
analytically to an outward shift of the supply curve), and prices drop. It is during this time that the 
intermediary is set up. As the reasons for the original supply shift abate and as stronger economic 
growth boosts demand, the market changes again, and prices rise to historical highs.
Financial results: With long-term purchase contracts in place, the intermediary’s ﬁ nancial results 
beneﬁ t signiﬁ cantly from the positive developments in the spot market, and, as some of the long-
term sales contracts come up for renewal, its ﬁ nancial results improve additionally.
Bottom line: Should this outcome be attributed to management foresight (or perhaps fortune)? 
Should it be considered, ex post, as an example of abusive transfer pricing?
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tion on their profi ts. Procedurally, effective application of the ALP in a 
way that minimizes crossborder disputes requires a system of bilateral 
tax treaties, together with mutual agreement and competent authority 
procedures that encourage principled negotiations and timely resolu-
tions between the tax authorities on different sides of each transaction.
The ALP was formally defi ned in article 9 of the OECD Model Tax 
Convention on Income and on Capital and, later, in the OECD’s transfer 
pricing guidelines, as follows:
[When] conditions are made or imposed between . . . two [associated] 
enterprises in their commercial or fi nancial relations which differ from 
those which would be made between independent enterprises, then any 
profi ts which would, but for those conditions, have accrued to one of the 
enterprises, but, by reason of those conditions, have not so accrued, may 
be included in the profi ts of that enterprise and taxed accordingly. (OECD 
1995, I-3)
From this defi nition, the tax authority retains the right to adjust the 
transfer prices in a way that restores market prices. In adopting the ALP, 
a number of countries have gone further in laying out a framework of 
transfer pricing rules, including the following:
•  Specifi c provisions for recharacterization and adjustments of transac-
tions (that is, repricing carried out by the tax authority)
•  Documentation requirements (typically, on a contemporaneous and 
transactional basis)
•  Penalty provisions for noncompliance (typically focused on penaliz-
ing egregious failures of compliance rather than good faith errors)
•  Advance pricing arrangements (which allow an ex ante agreement 
between taxpayers and tax authorities on the treatment of specifi c 
transactions)
Less than an exact science at the implementation level
Notwithstanding the broadbased agreement on the underlying theoreti-
cal principle and an extensive framework for settling disputes, the appli-
cation of the ALP tends to be fact intensive and judgment-based, which 
poses challenges and opportunities for tax authorities and taxpayers 
alike (box 8.2). In other words, while the more popular discourse centers 
on potential transfer pricing abuses by MNEs, there is also no guarantee 
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of a fair application of the ALP by tax authorities. During competent 
authority negotiations, for example, offi cers and representatives of sepa-
rate tax authorities may be more concerned about protecting their 
respective tax bases than about a straightforward application of the ALP.5 
Additionally, the formal dispute resolution mechanisms do not mandate 
an outcome that necessarily avoids double taxation or even a timely con-
clusion, despite the emphasis on principled negotiations.
Consider, for example, the recent case of a company with well-known 
brands that were initially developed in the United States and that are 
legally owned by the U.S. parent, but that are marketed globally. How 
much of a royalty for the use of the brand should the U.S. parent charge 
its Canadian subsidiary, or, equivalently, how much of the operating 
profi t of the Canadian subsidiary should be attributed to the value of 
these brands? The U.S. parent continues to expend substantial amounts 
Box 8.2. A Trading Intermediary: Redux
Accounting treatment: The trading intermediary records all the revenue from its contracts, the 
cost of purchasing the goods from the parent company, and the cost of subcontracting the 
 parent company for administrative and other business functions (at the equivalent cost, plus a 
market-related markup). The remaining proﬁ t is booked by the intermediary.
Possible taxpayer’s position: The trading intermediary should be compensated for the business and 
market risks it has assumed. It trades on its own account, signs purchasing and sales contracts, takes 
legal possession of inventory, and has sufﬁ cient working capital to ﬁ nance its own operations. 
Management had the foresight to set up the business structure at an opportune time (and, if mar-
ket developments had gone in the other direction, the intermediary would have incurred losses).
Possible tax authority’s position: The trading company is recording larger than market-related 
proﬁ ts because it is overpricing the risks assumed, or, equivalently, it is underpricing the unique 
contribution of the strategic guidance provided by the parent company, particularly on the nego-
tiation of contracts.
Current debate: The ability of taxpayers to modify their business structures in conformity with 
the ALP is currently a topic of much debate. In this case, the question could be framed around the 
sufﬁ ciency of the economic substance in the trading company effectively to take on all the risks 
that the parent company ascribes to its subsidiary, where, in the opinion of some tax authorities, 
the risks necessarily follow the assets and functions. In this case, the taxpayer could argue that the 
negotiating functions are more routine (based quite simply on the widely available spot price and 
market trends), and some observers would argue that the tax authority is simply adapting its own 
conceptual framework to ensure short-term revenue maximization (which is generally not good 
public policy).
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on research and development, and it both develops and guides market-
ing campaigns around the world. Its transfer pricing policy specifi es a 
royalty of 4 percent of sales. The U.S. tax authority looked at the value of 
the brand and indicated that, based on analysis of comparable transac-
tions, a more appropriate charge would be in the range of 7–11 percent 
(thus increasing the U.S. reported income). In looking at the same trans-
action, the Canadian tax authority analyzed company functions in Can-
ada and indicated that it would disallow any crossborder royalty; it indi-
cated that the marketing campaign in Canada, together with other 
activities and investments of the Canadian entity, created local brand 
awareness and equity.
In this dispute, the MNE is essentially neutral: the Canadian subsid-
iary is 100 percent owned, and internal transfers are a zero-sum game, 
plus the tax rates in the two jurisdictions are broadly similar, and the 
business environment is suffi ciently comparable. Still, it now faces a 
conundrum on how to set its transfer prices as it is pulled by one tax 
authority and pushed by the other; failure to comply immediately with 
both demands could mean large penalties and late-interest payments.6 
Ultimately, the company could simply let the dispute go to competent 
authority, let the tax authorities decide how to benchmark the royalty 
charge, and focus on avoiding double taxation. However, there is no cer-
tainty of a settlement that fully eliminates double taxation, and the pro-
cess of appeals and arbitration is a costly and time-consuming exercise.7 
In other words, despite the focus in the public discourse on the potential 
for transfer pricing abuses, there is a fl ip side that places MNEs at risk of 
being caught between competing tax authorities and ending up with 
double taxation (a signifi cant cost if corporate tax rates are in the range 
of 30–35 percent in Canada and the United States) and large interest 
payments, as well as heavy penalties (which could amount to 10 percent 
of any adjustments proposed by a tax authority).
This case highlights the fact that the theoretical simplicity of the ALP 
is matched by judgment and complexity in implementation, but it also 
illustrates some of the tough choices faced by MNEs in navigating the 
sometimes choppy waters of a multijurisdictional taxation system. In this 
case, the underlying transaction involves a unique intangible asset and 
wide-open questions on the existence, ownership, and localization of the 
asset. In practice, the absence of exactly comparable market transactions 
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from which to extract a market price necessitates approximations from 
either a range of similar transactions (adjusted for key comparability dif-
ferences) or the use of valuation techniques that fundamentally rely on 
subjective assessments of economic contributions and company-specifi c 
fi nancial forecasts. In such cases, the transfer pricing analysis tends to 
generate a range of prices, and any point within that range may be con-
sidered an arm’s-length price.
Transfer pricing is not an exact science, and the OECD guidelines 
explicitly state as follows:
There will be many occasions when the application of the most appropri-
ate method or methods produces a range of fi gures all of which are rela-
tively equally reliable. In these cases, differences in the fi gures that make 
up the range may stem from the fact that in general the application of the 
arm’s-length principle only produces an approximation of conditions 
that would have been established between independent enterprises. 
(OECD 1995, I-19)
Furthermore, the OECD guidelines specify the following:
A range of fi gures may also result when more than one method is applied 
to evaluate a controlled transaction. For example, two methods that attain 
similar degrees of comparability may be used to evaluate the arm’s-length 
character of a controlled transaction. Each method may produce an out-
come or a range of outcomes that differs from the other because of differ-
ences in the nature of the methods and the data, relevant to the applica-
tion of a particular method, used. Nevertheless, each separate range 
potentially could be used to defi ne an acceptable range of arm’s-length 
fi gures. (OECD 1995, I-19)
To guide the process of selecting appropriate comparable transac-
tions, transfer pricing reports include extensive functional analyses of a 
company’s assets employed, functions undertaken, and risks borne.8 
Even if the product transacted is a commodity for which market prices 
are widely available, differences in circumstances and timing issues likely 
necessitate comparability adjustments. Consider, for example, a hypo-
thetical multinational oil company selling a cargo of oil from Cabinda, 
Angola. Starting with the published price of Brent crude, you need to 
adjust (at least) for differences in chemical characteristics between the 
two types of crude and for transportation costs.9 As the type of product 
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or service becomes less of a traded commodity and more of the interme-
diate good that is often the subject of intrafi rm transactions or even a 
more unique service or intangible, transfer pricing comes to rely even 
more on (1) comparability adjustments and ranges of prices obtained 
from a group of similarly comparable transactions and (2) profi t-based 
methods, rather than product-based prices.10
In practice, derived ranges for arm’s-length pricing can be quite broad. 
In a cost-markup situation, for example, it is not uncommon for a range 
with a central point (or average) at 10 percent to have a minimum of less 
than 5 percent and a maximum of around 15 percent. The range arises 
from differences in results across comparable companies and may also be 
affected by adjustments for differences in comparability between the 
tested party (the company for which the range is being calculated) and 
the comparable companies (which provide the market evidence).
In addition, to account for possible differences in the business and 
economic cycles, a three- or fi ve-year average of results is typically used 
as the market benchmark (OECD 1995). The OECD guidelines recog-
nize that, particularly in applying profi t-based transfer pricing methods, 
it is necessary to take account of business cycles and special circum-
stances, such as the startup of a business, that cannot be fully addressed 
through comparability adjustments. Absent this option, a profi t-based 
method might indicate that a transfer pricing adjustment is called for 
(simply) because the tested party is at the bottom of its business cycle 
when the uncontrolled comparables are at the peak of theirs.
Finally, differences in approach across tax authorities (for example, 
Canada with its general reliance on form and the United States with its 
general reliance on economic substance) create interstate frictions. 
Moreover, inconsistencies in domestic tax codes also create domestic 
frictions and additional opportunities for tax planning; for example, 
Canada actually blends an application of legal form for general anti-
avoidance purposes with a reliance on economic substance for transfer 
pricing regulations.11 These frictions can become either a source of con-
cern for multinationals aiming to comply with differing provisions or an 
opportunity for tax arbitrage in the presence of creative tax planning 
and a favorable fact pattern. At the least, these frictions make MNEs base 
their decisions on transfer pricing issues not only on the underlying facts 
and the legal requirements, but also on the degree of aggressiveness (and 
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capacity of monitoring) of each of the tax authorities. In other words, 
the decision framework becomes a risk-based compliance exercise driven 
by a fact-intensive and judgment-based analysis.
In summary, application of the ALP is more complex in practice than 
suggested by the relatively elegant theoretical construct. In recent years, 
the higher propensity for intrafi rm trade to involve services, as well as 
intangible and fi nancial assets, has raised particularly complex issues.
Tax Avoidance and Tax Evasion
Tax avoidance and tax evasion are fundamentally different
The courts fi rst established the difference between tax avoidance and tax 
evasion in IRC v. Duke of Westminster ([1936] 19 TC 490). In this case, pay-
ments were made by the taxpayer to domestic employees in the form of 
deeds of covenant, but which, in substance, were payments of remunera-
tion. The House of Lords refused to disregard the legal character (form) of 
the deeds merely because the same result (substance) could be brought 
about in another manner. Lord Tomlin commented, as follows: “Every 
man is entitled, if he can, to order his affairs so that the tax attaching under 
the appropriate Acts is less than it otherwise would be.” In other words, 
taxpayers are entitled to arrange their tax affairs in the most tax effi cient 
way, and this is the principle behind tax planning and tax avoidance.
Tax evasion, in contrast, involves an element of illegality and clearly 
gives rise to illicit fi nancial fl ows.12 Those participating in tax evasion 
may underreport taxable income or claim expenses that are nondeduct-
ible or overstated.13 Tax evaders generally face criminal prosecution, and 
criminals are sometimes charged with tax evasion (given their usual 
reluctance to report income from criminal activities) if there is insuffi -
cient evidence to try them on the underlying criminal action. In the con-
text of a transfer pricing system based on the ALP, income shifting could 
be characterized as illicit to the extent that it is not commensurate with 
a shift in assets, functions, and risks.
In recent years, the public debate has focused on activities that may be 
said to fall in a grey area, or situations open to an interpretation of the 
law. In this context, some commentators have described selected avoid-
ance tactics as unacceptable because they may take unfair advantage of 
tax rules or run counter to the intentions of the legislators. The behavior 
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of corporations in pursuing these more aggressive forms of tax avoid-
ance has sometimes been labeled contradictory to the notion of corpo-
rate social responsibility. Others argue that the evenhanded administra-
tion of taxation is a matter of statutory interpretation of the tax statutes 
and should not be open to appeals to the intentions of legislators or 
vague notions of corporate social responsibility.
Business restructuring as a form of tax avoidance: An old concept
In a world of mobile factors of production, signifi cant differences in tax 
rates across countries will inevitably lead to tax-based locational advan-
tages, and profi t-maximizing global companies will be at the forefront of 
securing the benefi ts of structuring their supply chain in a manner con-
sistent with business objectives and tax minimization. However, the idea 
of structuring business operations in a way that minimizes tax liabilities 
is not, by any stretch of the imagination, a new construct. In ancient 
Greece, sea traders avoided the 2 percent tax imposed by the city-state of 
Athens on imported goods by using specifi c locations at which to deposit 
their foreign goods; in the Middle Ages, Hanseatic traders who set up 
business in London were exempt from tax; and, in the 1700s, the Ameri-
can colonies traded from Latin America to avoid British taxes.
Securing tax-based advantages will sometimes mean relocating pro-
duction, development, and even administration centers to minimize the 
tax burden in a legally consistent manner. The resulting shift in assets, 
functions, and risks will inevitably also shift profi ts to those countries 
that offer an environment more consistent with profi t maximization. 
Such a shift in profi ts, as long as it is accompanied by a commensurate 
shift in assets, functions, and risks, is a legally acceptable strategy; this is 
the essence of tax planning and tax avoidance. The related fi nancial fl ows 
could not be considered illicit.
However, shifting profi ts without a business justifi cation (that is, in a 
manner not commensurate with the assets employed, the risks borne, or 
the functions provided) is clearly illegal and should be considered illicit. 
For corporations engaging in such manipulative practices (which effec-
tively means that the transfer prices employed are outside of the relevant 
arm’s-length interval), the penalties can be costly. For example, Glaxo 
SmithKline announced, in September 2006, that they had settled a long-
running transfer pricing dispute with the U.S. tax authorities, agreeing 
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to pay US$3.1 billion in taxes related to an assessed income adjustment 
because of improper transfer pricing and also agreeing not to seek relief 
from double taxation (which is available through the bilateral tax treaty 
between the United Kingdom and the United States).
A case of windfall proﬁ ts
Consider the case of a large petroleum company doing business in a 
high-risk country. During a typically turbulent period (in a recess from 
open confl ict and in the run-up to a contentious election), the govern-
ment solicits the assistance of the company’s local subsidiary in building 
an electricity generating station (not normally an activity that the com-
pany would choose) and agrees to pay in barrels of oil (from government 
stocks) valued at the spot-market price (fi xed over the term of the con-
tract).14 In the circumstances, the level of confl ict escalates; the current 
government is removed from power; and the world price of oil rises con-
siderably. For the company, the contract terms yield a windfall: it is able 
to sell the in-kind payment for roughly three or four times the fi xed 
value set in the contract. In the normal course of business, the local sub-
sidiary sells its local oil production to a foreign-related party (the group’s 
trading subsidiary), which onsells to oil traders or refi neries.
In a country with ALP transfer pricing regulations, the difference 
between the price set by the contract and the arm’s-length price for local 
crude would likely be attributed to the local subsidiary as income. In 
turn, the trading subsidiary would be accorded a normal trading profi t. 
In other words, given that the key value-driver in generating this income 
was the local contract and the related business risks assumed by the local 
subsidiary, an ALP-consistent allocation of profi ts would call for the 
bulk of the total profi t to be declared in the source country, and the trad-
ing operation would earn a return consistent with comparable compa-
nies (that provide similar services to third parties).
Additional considerations are as follows:
•  During this time period, the source country had no specifi c transfer 
pricing legislation, a marginal corporate tax rate of 60 percent, and a 
generally weak tax administration.
•  By contrast, the OECD country where the trading subsidiary resides 
had a highly competent tax administration (which would certainly 
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have pressured the MNE into an ALP-consistent treatment if the 
country roles were reversed), a substantially lower marginal corporate 
tax rate of 35 percent, and a (legal) scheme that allowed a recharacter-
ization of non–ALP-consistent inbound transactions (through a prac-
tice known as informal capital rulings).
•  The local subsidiary was generally worried about the high-risk envi-
ronment (including the possibility of expropriation) and a binding 
limit on its ability to repatriate profi ts.
In the end, the MNE managed to assign the (bulk of the) windfall 
profi ts to the trading subsidiary, which used an informal capital ruling to 
achieve a highly favorable tax treatment in the OECD country (likely at 
a tax rate of 1 percent for what was considered a capital contribution 
instead of taxable income).
Should this be considered a case of tax avoidance or tax evasion? In 
the absence of a legal requirement for related-party transactions to be 
carried out at arm’s length, the local subsidiary honored its contract with 
the government, assumed the risk of a fi xed price compensation scheme, 
benefi ted from the subsequent rise in oil prices, and onsold the oil to its 
related party at the same price it negotiated with the government. In the 
tax system of the source country, there was nothing that would label this 
transaction as illegal.15
Suppose, for instance, that the local subsidiary (which only has exper-
tise in exploration and not in trading) had presold the oil receivable 
under the contract to its trading subsidiary at the time that it initially 
entered into the contract in an attempt to hedge its position. The impact 
on the assignment of profi ts would have been similar to a later transfer 
at the contract price. Should this transaction be labeled as a cautious 
business approach, or should it be characterized, ex post, as income 
shifting and, possibly, tax evasion?
Global tax planning and transfer pricing practices in 
 developing countries
The case of the large petroleum company and its allocation of trading 
profi ts from the country of exploration to a low-tax OECD jurisdiction 
raises important questions about the tax system in developing countries 
and global tax cooperation. This discussion is particularly signifi cant for 
248 Draining Development?
resource-dependent economies that tend to have a large proportion of 
national production under the control of MNEs.
Currently, the centerpiece of international tax coordination is the 
bilateral tax treaty, which provides for specifi c tax treatment for taxpay-
ers having sources of income in both countries and, possibly, crossbor-
der transactions and generally includes certain obligations in terms of 
information sharing. Some of the key objectives for entering into such a 
treaty are the reduction of barriers to trade and investment, the reduc-
tion of double taxation (under the principle that the same source of 
income should only be taxed once), and elimination of tax evasion 
(including through information sharing). By specifying the tax treat-
ment of certain transactions and instituting mechanisms for dispute 
resolution, tax treaties generally improve certainty for taxpayers and tax 
authorities. Under these treaties, specifi c mutual agreement procedures 
are used to resolve international tax grievances, including double taxa-
tion issues arising out of a transfer pricing transaction. The government 
agency responsible for implementing these dispute resolution proce-
dures (and negotiating with other national tax authorities) is the compe-
tent authority of the country, which has the power to bind its govern-
ment in specifi c cases.
While the network of tax treaties is fairly extensive among OECD 
countries, most developing countries have relatively few tax treaties in 
place. This severely restricts the ability of their tax authorities to share 
information and coordinate enforcement across borders. In addition, 
while internationally consistent transfer pricing regulations have been 
almost universally adopted throughout the OECD, relatively few devel-
oping countries have specifi c transfer pricing regulations. This helps to 
explain the recourse in some developing countries to specifi c arrange-
ments for individual projects and individual MNEs (through, for exam-
ple, individually negotiated production-sharing contracts, which effec-
tively lay out a complete legal, tax, and customs regime specifi c to 
individual projects), although, given the general lack of negotiating 
capacity and sector-specifi c expertise, it would seem more appropriate 
to lay out one general regime by which all related projects would abide.
However, the practice of bilateral company-by-company negotiations 
raises the level of infl uence of specifi c bureaucrats and politicians. This 
situation often leads to practices that are judged as corrupt in OECD 
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countries, and companies operating in such corrupt environments face 
thorny issues on the legality and licit nature of certain transactions. In 
countries with highly corrupt regimes or stringent exchange controls 
(the two often go hand in hand), companies may consider the manipula-
tion of transfer prices—which is particularly easy in the absence of spe-
cifi c transfer pricing regulations—as an acceptable method of profi t 
repatriation. In the case above of the large petroleum company, this con-
sideration was likely important given the state of the business environ-
ment and the existence of severe restrictions on profi t repatriation at the 
time. It is questionable whether such a technically illegal attempt to shift 
income out of a corrupt regime should be considered an illicit fl ow of 
funds.
More recently, with the substantial reduction in exchange controls 
across the world, the concern of tax authorities, particularly in OECD 
countries, has shifted to how easy it has become for taxpayers to conceal 
foreign-based income on which residents should pay national tax. By 
accessing foreign jurisdictions offering low or zero tax rates and failing 
to report the proceeds to their home authorities and then not reporting 
the foreign-based income, these taxpayers evade their tax obligations 
with respect to their country of residence. Required reporting under 
exchange controls has provided information that is helpful in tracking 
the fl ows of funds and, therefore, in assessing tax obligations. Without 
transfer pricing regulations or exchange controls in the country in which 
the income is earned, taxpayers may fi nd it particularly easy to evade tax 
obligations through a combination of transfer price manipulation and 
access to a tax haven.16
Empirical Evidence on Illicit Financial Flows from 
 Developing Countries
The wide variations in tax rates across the globe certainly lead MNEs to 
respond to the incentives created by these differences. We have good evi-
dence that recorded profi ts of MNEs shift among countries after a 
change in tax rates.17 Of course, MNEs are likely to respond in a similar 
fashion to comparable arbitrage opportunities created by the different 
mix of skills and costs among different locations within countries and 
across countries. After all, their performance is judged by shareholders 
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on their ability to maximize after-tax profi ts, and economic effi ciency is 
generally raised by the search for lower costs. What is less clear is how 
much of this profi t shifting is associated with tax evasion, and, within 
that category, how much is due to transfer pricing. In other words, given 
that transfer pricing analyses typically provide a range of prices or profi t 
levels consistent with the ALP, is it the case that MNEs simply select a 
point within the range that legally minimizes their tax liability, or is it, 
instead, the case that MNEs effectively choose a point outside the ALP 
range?
The role of transfer pricing
To date, there is no direct evidence on the role that transfer pricing plays 
in tax evasion (box 8.3). It is likely true, however, that MNEs routinely 
choose prices within the ALP range in a tax effi cient manner, but this 
would be classifi ed, at most, as tax avoidance. Two recent studies, Bartels-
man and Beetsma (2003) and Clausing (2003), provide direct evidence 
on the related issue of profi t shifting associated with transfer pricing. 
Their fi ndings are broadly consistent with tax minimization strategies, 
but neither of these studies distinguishes between tax avoidance and tax 
evasion. Both studies fi nd that a 1 percentage point increase in a coun-
try’s tax rate leads to a decline in reported taxable income of roughly 
2.0–2.5 percent. These fi ndings are consistent with the interpretation 
that a lower corporate tax rate tends to encourage fi rms to anchor their 
Box 8.3. A Measure of Tax Evasion in the United States
In what is likely the most rigorous exercise of its kind, the U.S. tax authority estimated that the 
gross tax gap for the U.S. taxation year 2001 was close to US$350 billion, of which US$30 billion 
was due to the corporate sector (on account of nonﬁ ling, underreporting, and underpayment).a It 
is not clear how much of this was associated with transfer pricing issues. In any case, this estimate 
is also likely to be an overestimate given that the U.S. tax authority would not have taken account 
of the reverse situation in which a United States–resident corporation overreports income in the 
United States (because the other jurisdiction is the high-tax country).
a. The gross tax gap is deﬁ ned as “the difference between what taxpayers should have paid and 
what they actually paid on a timely basis”; it excludes the impact of penalties and late interest 
collected by the tax authority. In the U.S. study, the bulk of the tax gap arose from underreporting 
on individual tax returns (close to US$200 billion) and on employment returns (close to US$55 
billion).
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transfer pricing policy at different points within the ALP range or else to 
restructure their businesses in a way that increases reported profi ts in the 
taxing country.
For developing countries, Kar and Cartwright-Smith (2008) and 
Christian Aid (2009) provide estimates of trade misinvoicing practices 
by which profi ts are shifted out of developing countries. The former 
study suggests that, between 2002 and 2006, approximately US$370 bil-
lion in profi ts were shifted out of the developing world every year, and 
the latter study suggests that the fi gure for the period between 2005 and 
2007 is more than US$1 trillion. The headline number in these reports is 
the estimated tax revenue loss, which is calculated at close to US$120 
billion per year. (This compares with global fl ows of offi cial develop-
ment assistance of roughly the same magnitude in 2008.)
These fi gures are not widely accepted, and the academic literature 
has raised important questions with respect to the methodology and 
the strength of the conclusions.18 For our purposes, these studies do not 
allow any conclusions on the role of transfer pricing because they 
do not use company-level data; given that transfer pricing is intrin-
sically fact-dependent, the extent of non-ALP transfer pricing can 
only be determined by analyzing transaction-level data to ensure that 
apparent income shifting in the aggregate data is not caused by (1) rea-
sonable comparability differences, (2) variations in product quality, or 
(3) a refl ection of shifts in assets, functions, and risks.19 In fact, these 
studies do not even distinguish between transactions involving unre-
lated and related parties.
Impact on local economies and tax collections
What is also less clear is the impact on the economies and on tax collec-
tions of developing countries. In fact, during the recent globalization 
drive that included a substantial increase in the number of MNEs and in 
the share of intrafi rm transactions in trade fl ows, corporate tax revenues 
remained stable across the world. So, why are there differences  in the 
perceived widespread effects of transfer pricing practices and the avail-
able empirical analyses? First, the existing estimates are derived from 
studies with substantial methodological shortcomings, and, second, the 
evidence of these studies runs counter to the observed response of FDI 
to tax rates and the recent buoyancy in corporate tax revenues.
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As recently reviewed by Fuest and Riedel (2009), the existing studies are 
purely descriptive, employ the marginal tax rate to calculate the tax gap, 
and do not account for the reverse effects of profi ts shifted into developing 
countries, some of which do have signifi cantly lower corporate tax rates.20 
In addition, recent work on the demand for tax haven operations suggests 
that tax havens may not have purely negative consequences (Desai, Foley, 
and Hines 2006). This work indicates the following:
•  Multinational parent companies in industries that typically face low 
foreign tax rates, those that are technology intensive, and those in 
industries characterized by extensive intrafi rm trade are more likely 
than others to operate in tax havens.
•  Firms with growing activity in high-tax countries are most likely to 
initiate tax haven operations, and the reduced costs of using tax havens 
are likely to stimulate investment in nearby high-tax countries.
The same studies that provide estimates of large tax gaps created in 
developing countries by illicit fl ows from tax-induced manipulations 
also need to provide answers to puzzles related to (1) the sensitivity of 
FDI to tax rates, (2) the broadly similar levels of tax rates across coun-
tries, and (3) the buoyancy of tax collections in the 1990s.
Consistent with economic theory, we have good empirical evidence 
that FDI responds to statutory tax rates and other features of the tax sys-
tem.21 Meanwhile, it is popularly thought that MNEs are fi nding more 
and more ways to shift income (including by optimizing fi nancing struc-
tures, choosing advantageous accounting treatments, and using offshore 
fi nancial centers and tax havens).22 Taken together, these facts suggest that 
the sensitivity of FDI to tax factors should be decreasing over time given 
that the increasing availability of income shifting practices suggests that 
the burdens of high host country rates can be more easily avoided (with-
out the need for costly reallocations of real investment). However, the 
sensitivity of FDI to tax factors appears, if anything, to be increasing over 
time.23 This is consistent with tax avoidance rather than tax evasion.
Stöwhase (2006) fi nds that, in addition, the elasticity of FDI to tax 
incentives in the European Union differs strongly according to economic 
sector. While taxes are insignifi cant as a determinant of FDI in the pri-
mary sector, tax elasticity is substantial in manufacturing, and it is even 
greater in service industries.24 The increasing differentiation of products 
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and the growing reliance on service transactions and intangibles as one 
moves from the primary to the secondary and tertiary sectors would 
make it easier to shift profi ts simply by manipulating transfer prices, 
without the need for costly reallocations. While this fi nding, as indicated 
by Stöwhase, amounts to (indirect) evidence of income shifting, the 
responsiveness of FDI is evidence that profi ts are moving in a way com-
mensurate with FDI fl ows (that is, with shifts in assets, risks, and func-
tions). In other words, this evidence is more consistent with legal tax 
planning and tax avoidance strategies rather than with tax evasion.
We also know that corporate tax rates are broadly similar in developing 
countries and developed countries, notwithstanding differences in tax 
rates and tax structures across countries (World Bank 2004).25 For transfer 
pricing, this implies that manipulations that are purely tax motivated 
should involve a tax-evading higher import price into a developing coun-
try and a tax-inducing higher export price from a developed country as 
much as a tax-evading higher import price into a developed country and 
a tax-inducing higher export price from a developing country. In this con-
text, it is not clear why MNEs would consistently engage in tax-driven 
practices geared strictly to stripping out profi ts from developing countries. 
Yet, many studies consider only one direction in mispricing transactions, 
which results in a signifi cant overestimation of the net tax revenue losses; 
this includes estimates prepared by tax departments of OECD countries.
Finally, some commentators point out that the revenue collected 
tends to be lower in developing countries than in developed countries, 
notwithstanding broadly similar tax rates. Data of the World Bank’s 
World Development Indicators suggest that the average ratio of tax rev-
enue to gross domestic product in the developed world is approximately 
35 percent compared with 15 percent in developing countries and only 
12 percent in low-income countries.26 This gap, it is further argued, is a 
sign of a nexus of phenomena, such as encroaching globalization and 
corporate profi t shifting, that work against the ability of developing 
countries to collect needed tax revenue (generally dubbed the harmful 
tax competition argument).
Developments during the 1990s do not appear to support the argu-
ment of a race to the bottom, however. As the pace of globalization 
picked up in the 1990s, there was a substantial increase in the number of 
MNEs and a signifi cant extension of the set of options available for the 
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manipulation of tax liabilities. Concurrently, there were signifi cant 
increases in the share of intrafi rm transactions in trade fl ows, but either 
slight increases or, at worst, stability in corporate tax revenues across the 
world (despite falls in marginal tax rates).27
Thus, clear evidence on the tax motives of transfer pricing abuses 
requires a disaggregated empirical analysis using evidence on how com-
panies actually set their transfer pricing policies and a comparison with 
arm’s-length price ranges by transaction. In addition, to assess whether 
any related tax gap could be remedied by a tax-system response would 
also require evidence on the extent to which tax considerations infl uence 
transfer pricing decisions. Limited by the availability of data, the result-
ing analyses now tend to be conducted at too high a level of aggregation 
and without a suffi cient theoretical foundation to provide any direct evi-
dence on the extent of the problem or any insight into the motivation of 
the participants.28 Most careful analysts now explicitly recognize that 
care must be taken in interpreting the results of the typical regression 
analysis of subsidiary profi tability on tax rates.29 On the ground, the 
buoyancy of corporate tax revenues across the world during a period 
characterized by a substantial increase in the share of intrafi rm transac-
tions suggests that transfer pricing did not play a signifi cant role in the 
manipulation of tax liabilities.
A Plan of Action for Developing Countries
Developing countries need primarily to become more effectively inte-
grated into the international taxation regime.30 In particular, these coun-
tries should do the following:
•  Strengthen tax administration and enforcement (institutions matter)
•  Improve the exchange of tax information between governments 
(refl ecting the globalized state of business transactions and MNE 
operations and the consequent need for international coordination 
among tax authorities)31
In the area of transfer pricing, they should adopt the following:
•  Globally consistent regulations for transfer pricing (implement best 
practice)
 The Role of Transfer Pricing in Illicit Financial Flows 255
•  Contemporaneous documentation requirements (to facilitate 
enforcement)
•  The use of advance pricing agreements, which hold the promise of 
simplifying the negotiation and monitoring of transfer pricing prac-
tices, including by generating relatively quickly a much-needed body 
of locally relevant precedents32
The call to strengthen enforcement is a common refrain, but it is 
nonetheless of primary importance. Low tax collection rates occur more 
often in countries where fundamental issues of tax administration and 
institutional weaknesses tend to complicate (severely) the enforcement 
of the existing tax regime, regardless of choices on tax policy. The opera-
tional challenges include not only questions of organizational design 
(encompassing accountability mechanisms, the relationship between 
policy and administration, and risk management practices), but also 
capability in basic tools such as auditing and a sound knowledge of legal 
principles.
The fact that these economies tend to be economically less diversifi ed 
actually enhances the ability to make quick progress toward effective 
implementation of the ALP. MNEs operate in relatively few sectors in 
these economies, and tax auditors require a clear understanding of only 
a few types of business models, that is, by strengthening their degree of 
familiarity with the assets, functions, and risks deployed in only a few 
sectors, tax auditors can typically cover a signifi cant proportion of the 
tax clientele that uses transfer prices in determining tax liabilities (for 
example, see the case of Zambia in box 8.4).
The other recommendations (exchange of information and a globally 
consistent transfer pricing regime) are crucial because taxpayers tend to 
view transfer pricing (primarily) from a risk-management point of view. 
As a result, there is a natural tendency for companies to undertake more 
efforts to comply with the requirements of those countries that have 
more effective regulations (including documentation requirements) and 
enforcement capacities (so as to minimize the possibility of compliance 
penalties and negative publicity). By the adoption of clear and globally 
consistent transfer pricing regulations, developing countries should be 
able to nudge MNEs into a more balanced risk assessment, which would 
permit the revenue authorities to direct their limited resources to 
256 Draining Development?
enforcement areas where they are most needed.33 At the same time, the 
enhanced opportunities for international cooperation and access to a 
wider set of knowledge resources will tend to strengthen efforts at capac-
ity building.
Consistent with these priorities, OECD has focused its tax evasion 
work on the widespread adoption of the OECD transparency and 
exchange of information standard. In the circumstances, the number of 
tax information exchange agreements, a key platform of this approach, 
doubled to over 80 during the fi rst six months of 2009. This should make 
it easier for tax authorities to share information and cooperate on cases 
of tax evasion, and it may even lead to the increased use of simultaneous 
examinations (by different tax authorities of the same taxpayers).34
Conclusion
In discussing the role of transfer pricing in illicit fi nancial fl ows in devel-
oping countries, we start with a review of the current OECD-supported 
system based on the ALP, and we examine the differences between tax 
avoidance and tax evasion. Although an elegant and simple concept as a 
theoretical construct, the ALP becomes a fact-intensive and judgment-
Box 8.4. Zambia: Tax Collection in the Copper Sector
A recent boom in the copper sector in Zambia resulted in a substantial increase in copper exports, 
but only minimal increases in tax revenue: mining royalties received by the Zambian government 
in 2006 represented only 0.6 percent of sales. As identiﬁ ed by advocacy group Southern Africa 
Resource Watch, the culprits were the ﬁ scal terms in agreements signed by the government dur-
ing the slump experienced in the copper sector in the late 1990s. Faced with falling levels of 
investment, a collapsing state-owned mining conglomerate, and low global prices, the govern-
ment agreed to renegotiate the original contracts and include sector-speciﬁ c incentives designed 
to make mining investments more attractive (Horman 2010).
As a result, the new mining tax regime proposes to raise tax rates, reduce incentives, and 
require that transfer prices be based on the price of copper quoted at the London Metal Exchange 
or the Shanghai Stock Exchange.
For purposes of transfer pricing, the commodity nature of unprocessed copper (as exported 
by Zambia) makes the use of market-quoted prices the undisputed choice for a transfer pricing 
methodology (possibly with an adjustment for differential transportation costs). In other words, 
the simple adoption of the ALP would bring about the desired result with relatively little need for 
upfront capacity building (market quotes are widely available) and would also avoid an ad hoc 
sector-speciﬁ c approach to the problem.
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based system at the implementation level. Often, the benchmarking of 
comparable transactions and companies provides a range of acceptable 
prices and the conclusion that any point inside this range is consistent 
with arm’s-length pricing. In this context, selecting a lower (or higher) 
price within the arm’s-length range of prices, whether in response to tax 
objectives or otherwise, cannot be construed as anything other than a 
legal practice or, at most, as tax avoidance. Similarly, shifting income 
from one country to another in a manner that is commensurate with a 
shift in assets, functions, and risks cannot be construed as anything other 
than a legal way of business restructuring.
Alternative proposals for a transfer pricing system, including grandi-
ose schemes involving a global tax authority and global apportionment 
formulas, have been proposed and debated. Overall, these alternatives 
not only lack theoretical rigor, but are also less likely to win international 
agreement (which is crucial to ensuring that rules are consistently and 
fairly applied). Therefore, we argue that the current framework provides 
a construct that should help corporations avoid double taxation and 
should also help tax administrations receive a fair share of the tax base 
of multinational enterprises. While any set of rules can be potentially 
manip ulated, the OECD-led initiative to develop and extend the reach of 
transfer pricing guidelines based on the ALP represents the best alterna-
tive for a system that is theoretically sound and amenable to being imple-
mented in an internationally coordinated and consistent manner.
We also review the empirical evidence on the impact of transfer pric-
ing in illicit fl ows from developing countries. Essentially, there is no 
direct evidence of such an impact. The majority of available studies are 
conducted at an aggregate level, and even the studies that provide direct 
evidence on the extent of income shifting arising from transfer prices do 
not distinguish between ALP-consistent price changes (tax avoidance) 
and non–ALP-consistent changes (tax evasion). There is also a dearth 
of  analytically rigorous evidence on the impact of income shifting on 
developing countries and their ability to collect taxes.
Finally, we discuss the importance of introducing a specifi c transfer 
pricing regime in developing countries (rather than relying on ad hoc 
measures and general antiavoidance provisions). This would ensure that 
tax structures and policies are more well integrated with international 
best practice, and, for the private sector, it would make the rules of the 
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game more globally consistent and transparent. However, it is clear that, 
at the implementation level, developing countries face signifi cant chal-
lenges in adopting the OECD-style transfer pricing regime, owing not 
only to the malleability of the ALP concept, but also the lack of access to 
appropriate benchmarks by which to assess transfer prices. The impact 
of these diffi culties is likely to be more acute for those countries that are 
highly dependent on revenues from natural resources, a sector that tends 
to be dominated by multinationals and intrafi rm trade.
Notes
 1. Intrafi rm trade is defi ned here as crossborder trade among affi liates of the same 
multinational corporation.
 2. The coverage of data on intrafi rm trade is not comprehensive. For the United 
States, the best estimates now suggest that intrafi rm trade accounts for approxi-
mately 50 percent of all imports, and transactions involving other countries of 
the Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development (OECD) are 
signifi cantly more likely to involve related parties.
 3. For a complementary discussion, see chapter 7 by Lorraine Eden in this volume.
 4. The ability to collect tax revenues from the corporate sector is particularly 
important for developing countries, which tend to rely relatively more on cor-
porate taxes as a source of revenue. Developing countries tend to collect about 
half the tax revenue, as a share of gross domestic product, relative to developed 
countries and to rely much more heavily on indirect and trade taxes (Tanzi and 
Zee 2001).
 5. Competent authority refers to a national body entrusted with interpreting and 
implementing tax conventions. The competent authority deals with situations 
in which taxpayers are subject to taxation not in accordance with the provisions 
of the relevant tax convention, including situations of double taxation.
 6. In Canada, transfer pricing penalties effectively amount to 10 percent of the 
resulting adjustment to the transfer prices. This is a non–tax-deductible expense.
 7. The start of this process involves a tax audit that may occur up to fi ve or six years 
after the relevant fi scal year and that may take years to complete. Thereafter, 
settlements from the competent authority process typically take years to con-
clude, and the negotiation process requires multiple stages of written submis-
sions. The complexity of this process means that, in most cases, the taxpayer 
employs highly specialized tax advisers over the course of the tax audit and the 
deliberations by the competent authority.
 8. The types of risks that must be taken into account include market risks; risks of 
loss associated with the investment in and use of property, plant, and equip-
ment; risks associated with the outcome of research and development activities; 
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risks of collection of accounts receivable; risks associated with product liability; 
and fi nancial risks such as those caused by currency exchange rate and interest 
rate variability.
 9. Adjustments routinely undertaken in transfer pricing analyses account for dif-
ferences in accounting practices for inventories, intangible assets, or deprecia-
tion; level of working capital; cost of capital; level of market; treatment of 
foreign exchange gains; and impact of extraordinary items. The total of these 
adjustments can sometimes produce a substantial cumulative adjustment to 
the underlying market price, in which case the OECD guidelines question 
whether the degree of comparability between the selected companies and the 
tested party is suffi ciently high, but, in practice, there are no specifi c criteria by 
which to make this determination. Of course, in the absence of a more ade-
quate method or more comparable data, the analysis in question may remain 
the most feasible, and, in any case, it may still produce a relatively tight range 
of arm’s-length prices.
10. The OECD views profi t-based methods (such as the transaction net margin 
method or, in the United States, the comparable profi t method) as generally less 
reliable than the traditional transaction methods such as the comparable uncon-
trolled price, which is a product comparable method. The latter, however, 
requires the identifi cation of transactions involving the same product and third 
parties (to be used as the comparable uncontrolled transaction by which to price 
the related-party transaction), and, in practice, companies tend not to transact 
with a third party on the same terms as a related party. Differences in transac-
tions with related and unrelated parties include (a) volume or other size or scale 
factors, (b) level of the market, (c) temporary versus permanent relationship, 
(d) primary sourcing versus secondary sourcing, and (e) after-sales service, war-
ranty services, and payment terms. Thus, either comparability adjustments are 
necessary (if a potential comparable uncontrolled transaction can even be iden-
tifi ed) or profi t-based methods must be used.
11. In this context, form means that the legal setup or structure of the transactions 
takes precedence in terms of its characterization (and treatment) for tax pur-
poses, whereas economic substance implies that the underlying business or eco-
nomic rationale is paramount (regardless of the legal form). Where the eco-
nomic substance concept applies, for example, tax authorities may look through 
intermediate transactions and merely consider the aggregate effect for purposes 
of tax treatment. In the specifi c case of Canada and the United States, this has 
promoted the use of hybrid transactions that are characterized differently in 
each country (so that the same transaction, for example, may be viewed as a 
dividend receipt by one jurisdiction and an interest payment by the other 
 jurisdiction).
12. As defi ned in Wikipedia (http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Tax_avoidance_and_tax_ 
evasion [accessed August 31, 2009]), “tax avoidance is the legal utilization of the 
tax regime to one’s own advantage, in order to reduce the amount of tax that is 
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payable by means that are within the law. By contrast tax evasion is a felony and 
the general term for efforts to not pay taxes by illegal means.” Consistent with 
these defi nitions, the OECD has been focusing on combating tax evasion 
(OECD 2009).
13. Concerns with egregious cases of tax evasion have recently come to the fore with 
the widespread publicity accorded to the 2008 case involving LGT Bank of Liech-
tenstein. After the initial case became public in Germany, a U.S. Senate investiga-
tions committee extended the inquiry to possible abuses by American taxpayers; 
other countries followed suit; and the issue of tax evasion and tax havens has since 
become a key agenda item at various international policy forums. The report by 
the U.S. committee estimated that offshore tax havens supported tax evasion 
schemes that reduced tax collections in the United States by about US$100 billion 
per year (compared with annual gross domestic product of around US$14.2 tril-
lion, annual federal tax revenue of close to US$2.5 trillion, and annual federal 
spending on Medicare and Medicaid of some US$675.0 billion) (see Permanent 
Subcommittee on Investigations, 2008, “Tax Haven Banks and U.S. Tax Compli-
ance: Staff Report,” Report, U.S. Senate, Washington, DC, July 17).
14. In this region of the world, government routinely collects royalty and tax pay-
ments in kind. At the time the contract was signed, the price of the commodity 
was near historical lows.
15. In the absence of a specifi c transfer pricing regulation, there was no specifi c 
authority to enforce compliance with the ALP even though the tax laws included 
general antiavoidance provisions (which are typically vaguely worded, diffi cult 
to interpret without legal precedents, and cumbersome to implement).
16. Tax authorities in some OECD countries are combating the lack of disclosure 
that is part of these tax evasion schemes by accessing a wider set of information. 
In the United States, for example, the Internal Revenue Service has started rely-
ing on records from American Express, MasterCard, and Visa to track the spend-
ing of U.S. citizens using credit cards issued in Antigua and Barbuda, The Baha-
mas, and Cayman Islands. As a direct result of such information, the accounting 
fi rm KPMG admitted that its employees had criminally generated at least US$11 
billion in phony tax losses, often routed through Cayman Islands, which cost the 
United States US$2.5 billion in tax revenue, and, in 2007, the drug maker Merck 
agreed to pay US$2.3 billion to the government to settle a claim that it had hid-
den profi ts in a Bermudan partnership.
17. For example, Maffi ni and Mokkas (2008, 1) fi nd that “a 10 percentage points cut 
in the statutory corporate tax rate would increase multinationals’ measured 
[total factor productivity] by about 10 percent relative to domestic fi rms, con-
sistent with profi t-shifting by multinationals.”
18. For a review, see Fuest and Riedel (2009). Even for the United States, where more 
disaggregated and higher-quality data are available, the U.S. Government 
Accountability Offi ce recognizes that the usefulness of the available estimates 
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and our ability to interpret the results crucially “[depend] on how many of the 
important nontax characteristics have been included in the analysis” (GAO 
2008, 5). This is because the statistical relationships exploited by most studies 
are liable to be considerably affected by the researchers’ ability to control for 
signifi cant industry- and corporate-specifi c effects. The importance of these 
controls is highlighted by the U.S. Government Accountability Offi ce (GAO 
2008), which indicates that, for the United States, foreign-controlled domestic 
corporations tended to report lower tax liabilities than United States–controlled 
domestic corporations between 1998 and 2005 (by most measures), but also 
that the percentage reporting no tax liability was not statistically different after 
2001. Most importantly, these two types of corporations differ signifi cantly in 
age, size, and industry, and companies in different sectors are likely to have dif-
ferent fi nancial characteristics (including levels of assets) and therefore different 
levels of receipts and profi tability. The U.S. Government Accountability Offi ce 
does not attempt to explain the extent to which such factors affect differences in 
reported tax liabilities (GAO 2008).
19. There is, for example, empirical support for the notion that price differences 
within product groups are mostly related to quality differences, where “devel-
oping countries tend to export low-end/low-price products whereas devel-
oped countries export high-end products with higher prices” (Fuest and Rie-
del 2009, 33).
20. For more detailed considerations, see Fuest and Riedel (2009) and our discus-
sion elsewhere in the text on the incentives for mispricing on both the import 
side and the export side.
21. The empirical evidence also confi rms that FDI is responsive to other locational 
advantages such as country risk, public inputs, and skill availability.
22. For a more scholarly summary, see Altshuler and Grubert (2006). For a more 
populist treatment, see recent publications by the Tax Justice Network, Christian 
Aid, and Oxfam, among others.
23. See, for example, Mutti and Grubert (2004) and, for a brief summary, Zodrow 
(2008).
24. The results of this research are summarized in Haufl er and Stöwhase (2003), as 
follows:
•  FDI in the primary sector (consisting of agriculture, fi shing, mining and 
quarrying) has a tax elasticity of around zero, implying that FDI is not driven 
by tax incentives.
•  Investment in the secondary sector (manufacturing) is negatively and signifi -
cantly affected by an increase in effective taxation. The tax elasticity is around 
−2, implying that a 1 percent increase in the tax rate of the host country 
decreases FDI by roughly 2 percent, all else being equal.
•  Compared with the secondary sector, FDI in the tertiary sector (consisting of 
investment in service industries such as transport, communication, and 
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fi nancial intermediation) is even more strongly affected by an increase in tax 
rates, and the tax elasticity for this sector is around −3.
•  By weighing sector-specifi c elasticities with the sector’s share of total FDI, we 
obtain an average tax elasticity of −2.5. This average tax elasticity is compa-
rable to the results derived in more aggregated studies.
25. In fact, the statutory tax rates in the most economically signifi cant developing 
countries tend to be lower than the average in OECD countries (Gordon and Li 
2009).
26. See World Development Indicators (database), World Bank, Washington, DC, 
http://data.worldbank.org/data-catalog/world-development-indicators/. Econ-
omists contend that these differences in revenue collection can be explained by 
both (a) the fact that demand for public services increases more than propor-
tionally as income rises and (b) weaknesses in the ability of developing countries 
to raise the revenue required for the provision of adequate public services. On 
the latter, the World Bank (2004) emphasizes the narrowness of the tax base and 
problems in tax administration.
27. World Bank (2004) reports that the only exception to this outcome was the 
region of Central and Eastern Europe and Central Asia, where revenues fell 
because of privatization and a general contraction in the size of the state.
28. Fuest and Riedel formulate the issue as follows:
Attempts to estimate the amount of tax avoidance and tax evasion there-
fore have to build on concepts which exploit correlations between observ-
able and statistically documented variables and evasion. These data prob-
lems may explain why there is very little reliable empirical evidence on tax 
avoidance and evasion in developing countries. The existing studies mostly 
rely on highly restrictive assumptions and have to make use of data of 
mixed quality. (Fuest and Riedel 2009, 6)
29. For example, see Fuest and Riedel (2009); GAO (2008); McDonald (2008).
30. We adopt the view that, in the presence of an international tax regime, countries 
are effectively constrained to operating in the context of that regime and not free 
to adopt any international tax rules they please. This view is espoused in Avi-
Yonah (2007). The basic norms that underlie this international tax regime are 
the single tax principle (that is, that income should be taxed once, no more nor 
less) and the benefi ts principle (that is, that active business income should be 
taxed primarily at the source and that passive investment income should be 
taxed primarily at residence).
31. For a discussion on the role of information sharing in international taxation, see 
Keen and Ligthart (2004), who consider that this form of administrative coop-
eration may be a feasible substitute for the diffi cult-to-achieve target of the 
coordination of tax systems.
32. For a strong argument on the role of advance pricing agreements and tax trea-
ties in improving the current international tax regime, see Baistrocchi (2005).
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33. This behavior by taxpayers and the suggested policy response are broadly con-
sistent with economic models of tax evasion (following the work on the eco-
nomics of crime by Nobel laureate economist Gary Becker and the tax evasion 
model of Allingham and Sandmo), which contend that the level of evasion of 
income tax depends on the level of punishment provided by law. The suggestion 
herein extends this notion to the practice of tax avoidance.
34. For some developing countries, a key obstacle to effective implementation of 
information sharing is the lack of the capacity required to determine what infor-
mation should be requested from other countries and also to make proper and 
timely use of the information received. 
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Abstract
This chapter considers, fi rst, whether substantial transfer mispricing by 
major corporations that contributes to a loss of at least US$160 billion a 
year to developing countries is plausible in the context of total likely 
corporate profi ts earned worldwide in a year.1
Second, it tests whether corporate activities in developing countries 
and in the extractive industries in particular might be especially prone to 
this abuse.
Third, it considers whether this sum could be hidden from view 
within the accounts or fi nancial statements of the multinational corpo-
rations (MNCs) that might be perpetrating the mispricing.
Fourth, it explores the possibility that the MNCs might use secrecy 
jurisdictions to assist in hiding these transactions from view.
Richard Murphy
Accounting for the 
Missing Billions
Some of the data used in this chapter have been researched for the Mapping the Faultlines 
Project of the Tax Justice Network (TJN), fi nanced by the Ford Foundation, the results 
of which are being published at http://www.secrecyjurisdictions.com/. The author is 
research director of that project.
Additional tables and fi gures from this chapter can be found at http://go.worldbank.org
/N2HMRB4G20.
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In each case, it is suggested that the behavior described is plausible 
and that, as a consequence, losses of the estimated amount are also plau-
sible, although not proven to exist as a result of this work.
Introduction
Since 2000, a body of literature, mainly emanating from nongovernmen-
tal organizations (NGOs), has developed suggesting that systematic 
transfer mispricing is taking place within the world’s MNCs. This lit-
erature asserts, in the fi rst instance, that the fl ows in question abuse 
international standards on transfer pricing implicit in the arm’s-length 
pricing rules of the Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Devel-
opment (OECD) and that the abuse results in signifi cant loss in revenues 
to developing countries.2
Estimates of the loss vary. Christian Aid’s estimate (2008) fi nds that 
transfer mispricing and related abuses result in the loss of corporate tax 
revenues to the developing world of at least US$160 billion a year, a fi g-
ure that, it notes, is more than 1.5 times the combined aid budgets of the 
rich world, which totaled US$103.7 billion in 2007.
Raymond Baker (2005) proposes that total annual illicit fi nancial fl ows 
(IFFs) might amount to US$1 trillion, asserting, in the process, that these 
fl ows pass illegally across borders aided by an elaborate dirty money struc-
ture comprising tax havens, fi nancial secrecy jurisdictions, dummy corpo-
rations, anonymous trusts and foundations, money laundering techniques, 
and loopholes intentionally left in the laws of western countries.3 Of this 
amount, Baker estimates that some US$500 billion a year fl ows from devel-
oping and transitional economies. He suggests that at least 65 percent of 
these fl ows may be accounted for by transfer mispricing.
Baker’s fi ndings have been endorsed by Kar and Cartwright-Smith 
(2008), who estimate that, in 2006, developing countries lost US$858.6 
billion to US$1.1 trillion in illicit fi nancial outfl ows. Note that the term 
illicit is appropriately used in this chapter. The Oxford English Dictionary 
defi nes illegal as contrary to or forbidden by law, but illicit as forbidden 
by law, rules, or custom. The distinction is important. Transfer mispric-
ing is illicit; it is contrary to known rules or customs, but, in many of the 
transactions of concern, it is not illegal because, as noted later in this 
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chapter, double tax agreements (DTAs) that would make it so are not in 
place, nor are relevant local laws.
NGOs and civil society organizations are not the only source of litera-
ture proposing that transfer mispricing might be used to reallocate prof-
its across jurisdictions. There is a substantial body of academic literature 
asserting that this practice is commonplace, although this literature does 
not focus on developing and transitional economies in coming to its 
conclusion. For example, Dischinger and Riedel (2008) state that intan-
gible assets such as patents and trademarks are increasingly seen as the 
key to competitive success and as the drivers of corporate profi t, but also 
constitute a major source of the opportunity for profi t shifting in MNCs 
because of the highly nontransparent transfer pricing process. They 
argue that this provides MNCs with an incentive to locate intangible 
property in jurisdictions with relatively low corporate tax rates. They 
fi nd evidence to support this activity, showing that the lower a subsid-
iary’s tax rate relative to other members of a multinational group, the 
higher the subsidiary’s level of intangible asset investment.
Harry Huizinga (2009), in a wide-ranging review, indicates that 
MNCs can relocate profi ts in a number of ways. First, they could change 
real activity, that is, where they locate; second, they could manipulate 
transfer prices; third, they could choose the location of intangible assets 
and associated income such as royalties (as Dischinger and Riedel 2008 
emphasize); or, fourth, they could choose the location of their headquar-
ters to create possible favorable international double taxation conse-
quences. Having reviewed the current literature within Europe on this 
issue, Huizinga concludes that international profi t shifting erodes the 
corporate tax base in Europe, that the best approach to tackling the 
problem is to eliminate incentives for fi rms to shift profi ts, and that 
international policy cooperation is necessary to achieve this.
Notably, the academic studies, in contrast to those by NGOs, fi nd that 
the scale of income shifted is relatively small, only a few percentage 
points, at most, of the tax base. For example, in chapter 4 in this volume, 
Fuest and Riedel posit that Baker (2005), Kar and Cartwright-Smith 
(2008), Christian Aid (2008), and others all overstate the extent of trans-
fer mispricing, although all these authors reject the assertion because 
Fuest and Riedel make a fundamental error by assuming that overpriced 
infl ows and underpriced outfl ows may be netted off for the purposes of 
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assessing resulting tax losses, when, in fact, these sums should be aggre-
gated for this purpose. In chapter 10 in this volume, Nitsch also ques-
tions the same group of estimates, suggesting that the forging of docu-
mentation relating to IFFs may not be motivated by taxes. It is a curious 
argument if the consequence is tax loss whatever the motive.
There are, however, reasonable methodological grounds that explain 
why this low level of transfer mispricing is reported by academic studies, 
all these grounds deriving from signifi cant methodological weaknesses 
in the studies.
First, most academic studies on this issue use database information 
supplied by agencies that summarize accounting data; as a result, they do 
not use the accounts themselves as their data source, losing considerable 
vital information on tax as a consequence (see below).
Second, these data sets tend to result in the use of pretax profi t as a 
proxy for taxable income—which is rarely appropriate—and in the use 
of profi t and loss account tax charges as a proxy for taxes paid. This use 
of the profi t and loss account tax charge as an indicator of taxes paid is 
almost always inappropriate. This is because these charges are invariably 
made up of two parts. The fi rst is the current tax charge. This is the tax 
that a company actually believes will be paid within 12 months of a 
period end as a result of the profi t arising during the accounting period. 
It is, therefore, a reasonable measure of the tax liability accruing during 
the period. The second component of the tax charge in a profi t and loss 
account is described as the deferred tax charge. Deferred tax is not tax at 
all. Rather, it represents an accounting entry relating to taxes that may 
potentially (but will not defi nitely) be paid in future periods as a conse-
quence of transactions that have occurred in the current period. So, for 
example, if the tax relief on the acquisition of fi xed assets in the period 
exceeds the charge for depreciation on these assets in the profi t and loss 
account, there is a potential deferred tax charge in future periods if the 
situation were to reverse. The liability is provided in the accounts, even 
though it may never arise simply because the situation may not reverse. 
Similarly, if transfer mispricing can defer the recognition of profi t in a 
high-tax parent-company location by the current relocation of the prof-
its in question to a secrecy jurisdiction where tax is not currently due on 
the profi ts, then a deferred tax provision can be made for the potential 
liability arising on the eventual remittance of the profi ts to the parent 
company, but there is no guarantee that this sum will ever be due. As a 
 Accounting for the Missing Billions 269
consequence, many consider deferred tax charges as accounting fi ction 
and as unreliable, and they are, curiously, the only liability included in 
the set of accounts whether or not there is any prospect of their settle-
ment. In this case, to include them in the tax charge in considering the 
real taxation paid by corporations is seriously misleading and under-
mines many existing studies of effective taxation rates among MNCs. 
Thus, the methodology used in these studies is inappropriate for apprais-
ing the transfer mispricing that these studies survey.
Using accounting data from the companies, Murphy (2008) shows 
that the largest 50 companies in the FTSE 100 increased their net deferred 
tax provisions (that is, the cumulative provisions that are made by a 
company for deferred taxation arising over the period of trading to date 
and that are shown as a long-term liability on balance sheets) from £8 
billion to £46 billion between 2000 and 2006. This hints at the existence 
of signifi cant tax avoidance that database information on the taxation 
charges in company accounts is unlikely to reveal.
The room for disagreement is thus substantial on whether there is, or 
not, a major transfer mispricing issue that might have particular rele-
vance to developing nations and in which secrecy jurisdictions may play 
a signifi cant part in a way that policy change may need to address.4
It is not the purpose of this chapter to resolve whether the mispricing 
takes place or not. The chapter has another purpose, which is approached 
from an accounting and auditing perspective. An audit tests the credibil-
ity of reported data. This is not a test of whether the variable is right or 
wrong: fi nancial audits do not offer an opinion on this to their users. 
Instead, the audit seeks to test whether the variable may be true and fair. 
In seeking to prove or disprove the credibility of data, auditors have, for 
some time, realized that a microapproach, that is, verifi cation based on 
transactional data alone, is unlikely to provide all (and, in some cases, 
any) of the data needed to determine the likely credibility of the overall 
stated position. The alternative approach involves verifying data by test-
ing the credibility of sums in total.
This testing can take a number of forms. For example, do the data fall 
within the known range of plausible outcomes based on the third-party 
data that are available? Alternatively, are the data within the likely pat-
tern of outcomes that may be observed within the entity that is being 
tested? And are the total data plausible in that they are consistent with 
other known totals?
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Importantly and, in the current case, crucially, all such tests must take 
into consideration the broader commercial, regulatory, legal, and risk 
environments in which the transactions or balances being considered 
occur. An auditor is not allowed to consider numerical data in isolation; 
the use of such data must be contextualized.
This chapter seeks, fi rst, to test the hypothesis according to which 
transfer mispricing by major corporations that gives rise to tax losses 
amounting to at least US$160 billion a year among developing countries 
is plausible in the context of the total likely worldwide corporate profi ts 
in a year during the same period of reference (that is, pre-2008).
Second, it tests whether corporate activities in developing countries 
and, particularly, in the extractive industries may be especially prone to 
this abuse.
Third, it considers whether this sum may be hidden from view within 
the accounts and fi nancial statements of the MNCs that might be perpe-
trating the mispricing.
Fourth, it explores the possibility that MNCs may use secrecy juris-
dictions to assist in hiding these transactions from view.
The rest of the chapter is divided into fi ve sections. The next section 
explores the tax rates that MNCs have and are likely to face; it shows that 
much of the existing literature on this subject offers misleading indica-
tions of likely effective tax rates.
In the subsequent section, the state of transfer pricing regulation and 
practice within the extractive industries is explored on the basis of a 
range of sources on which the author has worked over a number of years.
The following section looks at the way in which MNCs are structured 
and how this structure interacts with the corporate and tax law of the 
locations that host some of these MNCs; it also contrasts these relation-
ships with the requirements of International Financial Reporting Stan-
dards (IFRSs), which are the standards that govern the fi nancial report-
ing of most such entities now that U.S. Generally Accepted Accounting 
Principles are converging with the standards issued by the International 
Accounting Standards Board.
The penultimate section considers the nature of secrecy jurisdictions. 
Data on the use of such locations by MNCs are presented. The role of the 
Big Four accounting fi rms is touched upon.
The evidence is drawn together in the concluding section.
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Multinational Corporations and Their Tax Rates
Data sources
This part of the chapter seeks to compare the corporate tax rates offered 
by a wide range of jurisdictions over time. The basic data source for the 
time series data on tax rates used in this report is the annual corporate tax 
rate reviews published by KPMG, a Big Four fi rm of accountants and 
business advisers. KPMG has been publishing the reviews since 1996, 
and, although the jurisdictions reviewed have varied slightly over the 
period, the data have always covered between 60 and 70 jurisdictions in 
each annual report up to and through 2008, all of which have been 
included in the current survey. The KPMG data consistently cover 30 
OECD countries and the 15 preenlargement members of the European 
Union (EU). The other jurisdictions surveyed vary widely. A consistent 
feature is that few of the places are recognized secrecy jurisdictions. The 
data on populations and gross domestic product (GDP) used in this part 
of the chapter were extracted from the CIA World Factbook in July 2009.5
As a result of the omission of tax rate data for secrecy jurisdictions, an 
alternative data source for these locations has been used. Given that the 
KPMG data were, without doubt, produced for marketing purposes, 
another, similar source has been sought. The source the author of the 
chapter has settled on is a data set downloaded from OCRA Worldwide.6 
These data, which were extracted in November 2008, relate to the corpo-
rate tax rates of secrecy jurisdictions as applied to foreign source income. 
This is relevant for the purpose of this review because one is concerned 
with transfer pricing, and the income that will pass through these loca-
tions in connection with intragroup trades is likely to be considered for-
eign source income in these jurisdictions; the tax rates provided by 
OCRA will therefore be the appropriate tax rates to consider.
Methodology
The KPMG data are summarized in table 9A.1.7 The data are categorized 
according to the following characteristics for the purposes of the 
analysis:
1.  Whether or not the jurisdiction was a member of the OECD
2.  Whether or not the jurisdiction was one of the 15 EU preenlargement 
states (the EU15)
272 Draining Development?
3.  Whether the jurisdiction was large or small (for these purposes, a 
large jurisdiction has a population over 15 million, which splits the 
data into two broadly equal parts)
4.  Whether the jurisdiction had a high or low GDP per head (for these 
purposes, a high GDP is above US$25,000 in 2009, which splits the 
data into two roughly equivalent parts)
5.  Whether or not the jurisdiction had a high proportion of govern-
ment spending in relation to GDP (in this case, 30 percent govern-
ment spending as a proportion of GDP indicates high spending)
The categories have been chosen broadly to refl ect developed and 
less-developed nations (the developed nations are the OECD members) 
and large and small jurisdictions. Categorizing according to a high or 
low tax spend also broadly refl ects the effectiveness of the tax system in 
the jurisdiction because it is likely that those jurisdictions with low 
spending had ineffective tax collection systems given that this is com-
monplace in developing countries.
The average data for each year have then been calculated for each of 
these groups. The resulting data set is reproduced in table 9A.2.8
Initial results
The initial results are best presented graphically. An overall summary of 
the data is shown in fi gure 9.1.
There is a strong and, in almost all cases, persistent downward trend 
in nominal corporate tax rates over the period under review. This, how-
ever, does not reveal much of the subtlety inherent in what is happening, 
which greater exploration of the data reveals.
First, with regard to the OECD countries (of which the EU15 are an 
effective subset), there has been a signifi cant decline in notional rates 
that has seen them converge with the rates offered by the other, non-
OECD countries. Rather surprisingly, in 2008, OECD country rates fell, 
on average (weighted by the number of countries), below the average 
rate of non-OECD countries. Given the substantial differential of more 
than 6 percentage points in 1997, this is a remarkable change. The play-
ing fi eld, much talked about in OECD circles over many years, appears to 
have been leveled.
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Figure 9.1. Corporate Tax Rates, Initial Results, 1997–2008
Average tax rate
pe
rc
en
t
40
38
36
34
32
30
28
26
24
22
20
1997 1998 1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008
Weighted average based 
on GDP of country
Average tax rate in the EU 15
Average tax rate in the OECD
Average tax rate in non OECD
Average tax rate in large 
countries
Average tax rate in small     
countries
Average tax rate in countries 
with high GDP per head
Average tax rate in countries 
with low GDP per head
Average tax rate in countries 
with high state spending
Average tax rate in countries 
with low state spending
Source: Author compilation, based on data of Tax Tools and Resources (database), KPMG, Zug, Switzerland, http://www
.kpmg.com/Global/en/WhatWeDo/Tax/tax-tools-and-resources/Pages/default.aspx.
This story is not repeated elsewhere. The data for large and small 
jurisdictions do, for example, show a persistent gap in tax rates between 
these two groups, the extent of which marginally increases during the 
period. The trend in rates seems clear: smaller jurisdictions (those with 
populations of less than 15 million people) would appear to wish to cre-
ate competitive advantage by having lower corporate tax rates.
This trend is also found by comparing jurisdictions with high GDP per 
head and jurisdictions with low GDP per head. In this case, it is, however, 
clear that the margin is closing: a level playing fi eld is being created between 
these sets of jurisdictions. This is not surprising: there is signifi cant overlap 
between the high-GDP jurisdictions and the OECD countries.
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A comparison of jurisdictions with high and low state spending in pro-
portion to GDP shows an even more marked contrast. Quite surprisingly, 
by 2008, the jurisdictions with high state spending (in excess of 30 percent 
in proportion to GDP) were offering lower notional corporate tax rates 
than jurisdictions with a lower (under 30 percent) proportion of GDP 
going to state spending. The implications of the change would appear 
clear: this is the consequence of a shift in the tax burden in high-spending 
jurisdictions from corporations to individuals that was rapid and marked.
These fi ndings are signifi cant. They confi rm what other literature (of 
which there is a considerable body) has also shown, that is, that corpo-
rate tax rates are steadily falling. However, unlike most surveys of such 
rates, which are concentrated most often solely on EU or OECD coun-
tries, these data show that the issue of changing corporate tax rates is 
more complex than one may suspect at fi rst sight.9 There are strong dif-
ferences in the trends that a simple analysis does not reveal.
Even so, the analysis noted here does not show the whole picture with 
regard to notional tax rates because a simple averaging methodology has 
been used to present the data. This means that the tax rates surveyed 
have been totaled over the set of jurisdictions and divided by the number 
of jurisdictions within the set. This standard methodology is fl awed. To 
assume that all jurisdictions stand equal in the assessment of changes in 
average tax rates is inappropriate: it would seem that weighting should 
be an essential part of any analysis.
There are a number of ways to weight these data. The usual method is 
simply to attribute an equal weight to each jurisdiction. This would be 
misleading. The method gives an undue emphasis to the tax rates of 
small economies with limited populations. Because such economies are 
frequently associated with secrecy jurisdiction activity, there is an obvi-
ous risk of inherent bias. It is precisely for this reason that an alternative 
weighting has been used in the current exercise, resulting in a perspec-
tive that is different from the one usually provided by analyses of this 
sort, which are undertaken, in most cases, by members of the accounting 
profession, who have an inherent bias (as noted elsewhere below) toward 
secrecy jurisdiction activity. As a necessary alternative, a different weight-
ing has been used here. We have weighted by the GDP of the jurisdiction 
offering the tax rate. There is a good reason for this choice: GDP is a 
reasonable indication of the size of national markets, and this is a good 
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proxy for the capacity to generate profi ts. Because this exercise is focused 
on the taxation of profi ts in particular locations, this weighting is likely 
to indicate the effective tax rates that companies are seeking to avoid by 
transfer pricing activity given that the taxation of profi ts is the motive 
for using transfer pricing. The only other viable method that might indi-
cate the impact of profi t shifting through transfer mispricing is to weight 
tax rates by the population of the jurisdictions: such an exercise would 
indicate a shift from locations with high populations, requiring taxation 
revenue to service local need, to locations with low population, requir-
ing little taxation to service the needs of the population (this is also, of 
course, a characteristic of secrecy jurisdictions). This second weighting 
method is also considered in the analysis offered below.
Weighting by GDP supplies a different picture of average tax rates, as 
shown in fi gure 9.2. The weighting in fi gure 9.2 has been carried out 
using notional 2009 GDPs expressed in U.S. dollars as a consistent rank-
ing mechanism that is unlikely to have introduced distortion because 
relative positions are unlikely to have changed materially for this pur-
pose over time.
Average tax rates fall within the ranges noted within the standard 
economic literature mentioned above. This literature gives, however, a 
misleading view. Because of the presence of the biggest economy in the 
Figure 9.2.  Corporate Tax Rates, Weighted by GDP, 1997–2008
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Source: Author compilation using 2009 GDP data taken from World Factbook (database), Central Intelligence 
Agency, Washington, DC, https://www.cia.gov/library/publications/the-world-factbook/.
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world (the United States), which has one of the highest effective tax 
rates on corporate profi ts in the world (notionally stated, as are all rates 
used here) if federal and state taxes are combined, and many other 
major countries that combine high absolute GDPs and high tax rates, 
the average corporate tax rate weighted by GDP is much higher than the 
apparent simple average; in 2008, the difference was about 5 percent.
This is signifi cant. Murphy (2008) fi nds that the effective current rates 
of corporation tax paid by the largest 50 companies in the FTSE 100 fell 
steadily, from 26 percent in 2000 to about 22 percent in 2006, both com-
pared with a headline rate of 30 percent. This closing rate differential of 
8 percent looks substantially more signifi cant, however, if it is compared 
with the worldwide weighted average tax rating of about 34 percent in 
2007 calculated on the basis noted above. A 12 percent differential, 
assuming (as is likely) that many of these companies have signifi cant 
sales in the United States, seems high indeed.
Including data from the OCRA data set on some secrecy jurisdictions—
only those secrecy jurisdictions on which OCRA provides data have been 
used in the survey discussed hereafter, and only those on which OCRA 
provides specifi c rate data have been included in the exercise—changes the 
perspective on these data once again.10 Data are only available for 2008; so, 
trend analysis cannot be offered, but, even so, the position is quite differ-
ent. The data are summarized in table 9A.3.11 The summary in table 9.1 is 
based on the 90 jurisdictions used for computational purposes. The equiv-
alent data, excluding secrecy jurisdiction locations, are shown in table 9.2.
Table 9.1. Summary Data: Corporate Tax Rate, Including Secrecy 
Jurisdiction Locations, 2008
percent
Description Rate
Notional simple average of corporate tax rates 20.30
Corporate tax rate weighted by GDP 32. 10
Corporate tax rate weighted by population 29.90
Source: Author compilation based on data of Jurisdiction Centre (database), OCRA World-
wide, Isle of Man, United Kingdom, http://www.ocra.com/jurisdictions/index.asp; Tax 
Tools and Resources (database), KPMG, Zug, Switzerland, http://www.kpmg.com/Global 
/en/WhatWeDo/Tax/tax-tools-and-resources/Pages/default.aspx; World Development 
Indicators (database), World Bank, Washington, DC, http://data.worldbank.org 
/data-catalog/world-development-indicators/ (for GDP).
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The secrecy jurisdictions all have 0 percent tax rates. They therefore 
do not change the weighted data, but they do signifi cantly reduce the 
simple average data. It is obvious that excluding secrecy jurisdiction data 
from a sampling of average corporate tax rates, as has been conventional 
in most academic reviews to date, makes a substantial difference in the 
presentation of information. If the simple averaging method is used and 
secrecy jurisdictions are excluded from review, a quite misleading per-
spective on current likely effective tax rates is presented.
There is one computation to note. For several of the jurisdictions in the 
KPMG data set, OCRA notes that a differential tax rate is available for 
foreign source income. For these jurisdictions alone and only if OCRA 
could indicate the alternative rate that was available, we have undertaken 
further analysis using this rate for foreign source income. The jurisdictions 
for which this has been done are Hong Kong SAR, China; Hungary; Ice-
land; Israel; Luxembourg; the United Kingdom, where limited liability 
partnerships are tax transparent; and the United States, where limited lia-
bility companies offer the same fi scal transparency. Singapore and Swit-
zerland offer differential rates, but we do not restate them here because 
OCRA does not indicate the alternative rate, which varies according to the 
circumstances. Our results are shown in table 9.3.
The resulting tax rate data weighted by GDP look much closer to the 
tax rate actually found if one examines effective corporate tax rates 
declared by companies, as noted by Murphy (2008), than to any tax rate 
data one may present by undertaking calculations weighted simply by 
Table 9.2. Summary Data: Corporate Tax Rate, Excluding Secrecy 
Jurisdiction Locations, 2008
percent
Description Rate
Notional simple average of corporate tax rates 26.77
Corporate tax rate weighted by GDP  32. 10
Corporate tax rate weighted by population  29.90
Source: Author compilation based on data of Jurisdiction Centre (database), OCRA World-
wide, Isle of Man, United Kingdom, http://www.ocra.com/jurisdictions/index.asp; Tax 
Tools and Resources (database), KPMG, Zug, Switzerland, http://www.kpmg.com/Global 
/en/WhatWeDo/Tax/tax-tools-and-resources/Pages/default.aspx; World Development 
Indicators (database), World Bank, Washington, DC, http://data.worldbank.org 
/data-catalog/world-development-indicators/ (for GDP).
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the number of jurisdictions based on the notional tax rates of all juris-
dictions that are not secrecy jurisdictions. Ring-fences increase the num-
ber of jurisdictions offering low tax rates. In combination with the 
weighted and secrecy jurisdiction data, this understanding adds a new 
approach to analyzing these data.
The developing-country perspective
A fi nal dimension to this issue needs to be noted. The KPMG data 
include some transition countries, but few developing countries, and 
Africa is, for example, seriously underrepresented. Keen and Mansour 
(2009) provide some data to correct this omission, although only in 
graphical form, as shown in fi gure 9.3.
The statutory corporate income tax rate plot relating to tax rates is 
relevant here. Simple averaging of the tax rates in Africa (with all the 
inherent faults in this process, which is used here, as elsewhere in most 
economic literature on this issue) shows that corporate income tax 
rates in Africa fell from 44.0 percent, on average, in 1990 to 33.2 per-
cent in 2005. The rate of 33.2 percent might compare favorably (only 
barely) with the weighted average rate noted above, but it does not 
compare well with any other. The reality is that, on the basis of simple 
weighted averages, Africa has high corporate tax rates on profi ts, at 
least 5 percent above the KPMG simple weighted average for the same 
year and much higher than the weighted average, including secrecy 
jurisdictions, in 2008.
Table 9.3. Summary Data: Tax Rate on Foreign Source Income, 
Selected Secrecy Jurisdiction Locations, 2008
percent
Description Rate
Notional simple average of corporate tax rates 18.48
Corporate tax rate weighted by GDP  20.70
Corporate tax rate weighted by population  27.20
Source: Author compilation based on data of Jurisdiction Centre (database), OCRA World-
wide, Isle of Man, United Kingdom, http://www.ocra.com/jurisdictions/index.asp; Tax 
Tools and Resources (database), KPMG, Zug, Switzerland, http://www.kpmg.com/Global 
/en/WhatWeDo/Tax/tax-tools-and-resources/Pages/default.aspx; World Development 
Indicators (database), World Bank, Washington, DC, http://data.worldbank.org 
/data-catalog/world-development-indicators/ (for GDP).
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These fi ndings are important. It is likely that the incentive to avoid 
taxes through transfer pricing is based on two considerations. The fi rst is 
the differential between the tax rates of the countries through which 
ownership of the goods might pass as part of the transfer pricing supply 
chain. The greater the differential in tax rates across jurisdictions in the 
intragroup supply chain, it may be suggested, the greater the prospect 
that a group of companies will profi t from transfer mispricing. The sec-
ond consideration likely to feature signifi cantly in the decision process 
on mispricing is the chance that the activity may take place without dis-
covery within the intragroup supply chain. The fi rst issue is considered 
here; the second, in later parts of this chapter.
The literature that fi nds evidence for substantial IFFs relating to 
transfer mispricing also fi nds evidence that this process is facilitated by 
the existence of secrecy jurisdictions, most or all of which offer no taxa-
tion on foreign source income (Baker 2005; Christian Aid 2008; and so 
on). As the data noted above show, this 0 rate tax offering has, over time, 
had a slightly diminishing impact as simple weighted average tax rates 
have fallen, but, with the rates still hovering at around 27 percent in 
many of the measures noted, the differential remains large.
Figure 9.3. Corporate Income Tax, Africa, 1980–2005
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The differential is even more signifi cant if comparison is made with 
the simple weighted average tax rates in Africa. The incentive to tax avoid 
through transfer mispricing from that continent would appear to be 
strong, a theme to which we return below.
What does need to be assessed is whether the incentive based on tax 
rate differentials is suffi cient to justify the claimed US$160 billion or 
more of transfer mispricing that is said to take place each year. Analytical 
review techniques such as are found in auditing are used here with the 
objective of testing whether the claimed audit outcome (in this case, that 
transfer mispricing results in losses to developing countries of US$160 
billion a year) is within the plausible range of data outcomes that popu-
lation information implies may be likely.
It is proposed that, in analytical review terms, the estimates of trans-
fer mispricing would be considered plausible if the total estimated 
amount of tax lost to transfer mispricing were materially less than the 
amount of tax lost as measured by the differential between weighted 
average headline tax rates (which would indicate tax due if corporations 
were tax compliant) and the tax likely actually to be paid calculated using 
likely cash paid tax rates, as noted above. In this context, tax compliance 
is defi ned as an effort to pay the right amount of tax (but no more) in the 
right place at the right time, where right means that the economic sub-
stance of the transactions undertaken coincides with the place and form 
in which they are reported for taxation purposes.
Data on tax rates have already been developed above. The other data 
needed are as follows:
•  A measure of world GDP, because the trade that is transfer mispriced 
is a proportion of world GDP, and that proportion must be credible
•  An indication of corporate profi ts as a proportion of world GDP, 
because, ultimately, it is profi ts that are shifted as a result of transfer 
mispricing
These data, if combined, will generate the following:
•  A measure of worldwide corporate taxable profi ts
•  If weighted by the tax rate data noted above, the measure of world-
wide corporate taxable profi ts will give measures of both the likely tax 
paid and the tax lost because tax rates weighted by GDP are not paid 
by major corporations, as noted above
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Worldwide GDP was approximately US$61 trillion in 2008.12 The 
IFFs that give rise to the estimated tax loss calculated by Christian Aid 
(2008) amount to between US$850 billion and US$1 trillion a year, rep-
resenting, in some cases, sums as high as 10 percent of GDP (Kar and 
Cartwright-Smith 2008). These calculations are based on actual trade 
data. Illicit fl ows of this scale are considered plausible for the purposes of 
this chapter.
As Murphy (2010a) notes, the U.K. tax authorities estimate that 15 
percent of total value added tax due on U.K. gross sales and imports in 
2008–09 was not collected (HMRC 2010). The part not collected was 
associated with what might reasonably be described as IFFs using the 
defi nitions offered by Kar and Cartwright-Smith (2008). By extrapola-
tion, the total tax loss over the entire U.K. economy was at least 5 percent 
of GDP in that case. The United Kingdom is considered a well-regulated 
economy with low levels of tax evasion, although the domestic tax 
authority acknowledges that one-sixth of total gross commercial fi nan-
cial fl ows are outside the tax system. It is widely accepted that a signifi -
cant amount of lost value added tax arises as a result of international 
unrecorded trading fl ows and illicitly recorded transactions, a matter 
that has been of considerable concern in the United Kingdom and the 
rest of the EU for many years. In this circumstance, the estimates of IFFs 
in developing countries that Kar and Cartwright-Smith (2008) provide 
appear to be well within the plausible data range based on comparison 
with alternative reliable information.
Total corporate added value in the U.K. economy represented by the 
gross operating surplus of corporations is in excess of 20 percent of 
GDP.13 In 2008, this gross operating surplus of corporations amounted to 
£339 billion. Yet, this sum is stated before charges such as interest are 
offset against profi t. Total corporation tax revenues in the same year were 
£46 billion.14 On gross value added, this implies an effective tax rate of 
13.6 percent. However, Murphy (2008) states that an effective average tax 
rate of about 22 percent should be anticipated. If this latter rate were 
applied to tax paid, the gross added value after the interest offset is 
reduced to £210 billion, a sum that was 14.5 percent of U.K. GDP in 2008.
Data on the same ratio in the United States for 2006, 2007, and 2008 
imply that corporate profi ts were lower, less than 11 percent of GDP and 
on a downward trend (12.0 percent in 2006, 10.9 percent in 2007, and 
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9.4 percent in 2008).15 Nonetheless, this excludes the profi ts of private 
companies (which are included in the U.K. data). In this case, one may 
presume that the two ratios are largely consistent, and a total profi t rate 
of approximately 10 percent of GDP might be considered to be associ-
ated with large entities likely to undertake multinational trade. This is 
probably a reasonable estimate of global corporate profi ts given that the 
United Kingdom and the United States are the two largest centers for the 
location of MNCs in the world. Assuming that this rate may be indica-
tive of worldwide rates, this leads one to suspect that, based on world-
wide GDP of US$61 trillion, corporate profi ts may be conservatively 
estimated at a total of approximately US$6 trillion in 2008.
We have used secondary sources to check this conclusion. Global data 
on profi ts are remarkably diffi cult to source. However, McKinsey has 
published a review of the after-tax profi ts of the top 2,000 companies in 
the world in 2006 and established that the after-tax earnings of this 
group in that year were US$3.2 trillion (Dietz, Reibestein, and Walter 
2008). Murphy (2008) fi nds that declared tax rates for companies regis-
tered in the United Kingdom and quoted on the stock exchange for that 
year averaged 25.8 percent (this rate refl ecting their worldwide rates and 
not merely the rate applicable in the United Kingdom), which suggests 
that the worldwide pretax profi ts of the McKinsey sample may be US$4.3 
trillion. This fi gure is, of course, somewhat lower than US$6 trillion, but 
a sample of 2,000 companies is also somewhat lower than the total pop-
ulation of MNCs. There are, for example, more than 2,200 companies 
quoted in the United Kingdom alone (London Stock Exchange 2010). 
That 2,000 companies might represent 72 percent of total global profi ts 
likely to be of concern does seem plausible, however, and this is consid-
ered strong supporting evidence that the estimates of global profi ts are 
reasonable.
On this global profi t estimate of US$6 trillion, the tax due at weighted 
average tax rates based on GDP noted above (32.1 percent) might be 
about US$1.9 trillion. If secrecy jurisdictions and ring-fences are consid-
ered, this might fall to a tax fi gure as low as US$1.2 trillion at a rate of 
20.1 percent, as noted above. The rates are selected from among those 
noted above because, fi rst, it is suggested that the average tax rate 
weighted by GDP indicates the taxes that would be due if companies 
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were tax compliant, that is, if they paid the right amount of tax (but no 
more) in the right place at the right time, where right means that the 
economic substance of the transactions undertaken coincides with the 
place and form in which they are reported for taxation purposes and that 
profi ts arise where third-party sales (for which GDP is a proxy) occur. 
Second, the rate, including secrecy jurisdictions and ring-fences, refl ects 
the reality of the tax system that, this chapter notes, MNCs can actually 
exploit, that is, the rate is used in recognition of the fact that secrecy does 
allow the relocation of profi ts and that ring-fences for foreign earnings 
might be used to apply low tax rates to profi ts reallocated by transfer 
mispricing techniques behind the veil of secrecy.
It is plausible that the differential in taxes paid, based on the varying 
assumptions, of some US$700 billion might include transfer mispricing 
effects of US$160 billion that have been claimed (Christian Aid 2008). 
Transfer mispricing abuse would represent 22.8 percent of the tax defer-
ral on this basis, and one may note that, because some of this deferral 
may be represented as deferred tax provisions in the accounts of MNCs, 
the actual impact on the tax charge in the accounts of MNCs may be 
lower than this implies without diminishing the cash loss to developing 
countries.
A ratio of this proportion allows ample margin for numerous other 
factors that may reduce declared tax rates, including advanced capital 
allowances (by far the biggest claimed factor in tax deferral noted in 
Murphy 2008), nonremittance of profi ts (perhaps transfer mispricing 
induced), tax holidays, and so on. If private company profi ts were to be 
included in the profi t base on which the calculation has been under-
taken, the margin for these other factors would obviously be higher still.
What is clear is that these data suggest that US$160 billion in transfer 
pricing abuse affecting developing counties is plausible within the frame-
work of the world economy given what we know of corporate profi ts, 
corporate tax rates, and the opportunities for corporate tax planning.
The risk of being caught
If it is plausible that transfer mispricing of the suggested order may have 
taken place, we must then ask if the transfer mispricing could have taken 
place without detection or sanction.
284 Draining Development?
First, this would not happen if all corporations sought to be tax com-
pliant (see above). While some corporations are risk averse, by no means 
all are.16 In this case, it is unlikely that all corporations are tax compliant.
The likelihood of noncompliance is increased because of the limited 
application of the OECD arm’s-length pricing rules, which are meant to 
govern transfer pricing in international trade (see above). For the pur-
poses of this chapter, transfer mispricing is considered a breach of these 
rules. Because these rules usually only apply if legislation requires or if a 
DTA is in existence requiring the trade between two jurisdictions to be 
priced in accordance with these principles, it is likely that transfer mis-
pricing is commonplace.
In EU and OECD countries, which have been used as the basis for 
much of the published research on transfer mispricing, such DTAs usu-
ally exist, as do the resources to monitor the application of these agree-
ments. As a result, it is now often said at tax conferences that mispricing 
in the trade in goods is rare or almost unknown, although the same is 
not said of intangibles. Such comments, however, ignore the fact that 
this is a select sample base that gives little indication of the opportunity 
for abuse in much of the world.
For example, even a brief review shows clearly that DTAs are notable 
by their absence in Africa. While South Africa has an impressive range of 
DTAs, other countries are in a different position.17 Botswana has 10.18 
Zambia has 17, but most are old, and none has been signed since 1989.19 
The Democratic Republic of Congo has only two DTAs.20 Angola is far 
from alone in having no DTAs. The lack of progress in developing new 
agreements implies that the resources devoted to monitoring the issue 
are limited in Africa.
Especially since the G-20 summit in April 2009, DTAs have been sup-
plemented by new tax information exchange agreements. These, how-
ever, are limited to information exchange issues, as their name implies, 
and not the regulation of transfer prices (in other words, they exclude 
standard article 9 of the OECD Model Tax Convention; see OECD 2003). 
Moreover, as research by Tax Research LLP and the Tax Justice Network 
(TJN) has shown, as of November 2009, Brazil, China, India, Japan, most 
of Africa, and almost all developing countries were notable absentees 
from the list of states that had signed tax information exchange agree-
ments with secrecy jurisdictions (Murphy 2009b). The implication is 
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obvious: the places most likely to be subject to transfer mispricing abuse 
are also the places least likely to enjoy protection from such abuse.
It is accepted that other regulation, such as controlled foreign com-
pany rules, might limit the opportunity for such abuse, but, as secondary 
protection, they do not do so effi ciently. First, they do not restore correct 
pricing between the parties that initiated the trade; so, tax remains inap-
propriately allocated to jurisdictions given that the application of these 
rules to transfer mispricing only gives rise to an additional tax payment 
in the jurisdiction in which the ultimate parent company is located, not 
in the jurisdiction that lost out initially. Second, the abuse has to be dis-
covered in the parent company jurisdiction. For the reasons noted below, 
this can be diffi cult. Consequently, the chance that transfer mispricing 
will take place without being detected is high.
The Particular Problem in Developing Countries
The issue of enforcing transfer pricing rules in developing countries is 
particularly acute, as many published reports have shown.21
Global Witness has published a report on the operations of Mittal 
Steel (now Arcelor Mittal) in Liberia. The report provides commentary 
on the tax provisions of Mittal’s mineral development agreement, noting 
that “probably the single biggest problem with this agreement is that it 
gives the company [Mittal] complete freedom to set the price of the iron 
ore, and therefore the basis of the royalty rate” (Global Witness 2006, 7).
There were no restrictions at all in the original agreement between 
Mittal Steel and Liberia on the transfer prices the company could use. As 
a result, while there is no suggestion of impropriety, the possibility that 
transfer mispricing occurred was increased by the absence of any regula-
tion intended to prevent it. In this case and as a direct result of the work 
of Global Witness, the contract was revised. The changes were noted in a 
new commentary issued by Global Witness, which reported that “under 
the amended agreement the [transfer] price is set under the arms length 
rule, which means that it will be based on the international market price 
of the ore” (Global Witness 2007, 1).
It would be pleasing to report that all such risks of transfer mispricing 
have been eliminated so speedily, but the evidence is clear that this is not 
the case. Problems with transfer mispricing have been found after similar 
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NGO studies of the extractive industries in many countries. For example, 
in Zambia, Christian Aid has stated that “in his budget speech in Febru-
ary 2006, the minister of fi nance estimated that the government was 
likely to receive less than US$11 million from royalty payments in 2006: 
that’s 0.1 per cent of the value of production in 2005” (Christian Aid 
2007, 24). Christian Aid believes that this is in no small part caused by 
transfer mispricing, which has an impact, in this case, on both royalty 
payments and declared taxable profi ts. This is unsurprising. The Invest-
ment Act 1993 of Zambia, like its predecessor, the 1991 Investment Act, 
does not address the issue of transfer pricing (Mwenda 1999). Nor, it 
seems, do many of the mineral development agreements that have been 
negotiated in Zambia. This is a situation that may have been addressed by 
amendments in the Zambian Income Tax Act, passed by parliament in 
April 2008, which stipulated that royalties are to be calculated based on 
the average monthly cash price on the London Metal Exchange, Metal 
Bulletin, or any other metals exchange as agreed with the government 
(Open Society Institute et al. 2009). The impact may be limited, however: 
most Zambian mineral development agreements have stability clauses 
exempting them from the effects of any changes in tax law for up to 20 
years (Christian Aid 2007).
In the logging sector in the Democratic Republic of Congo, Green-
peace notes as follows:
Internal Danzer Group documents show in great detail the price fi xing 
arrangements between the Group’s Swiss-based trading arm Interholco 
AG and the parent fi rm’s logging subsidiaries in the DRC and the Repub-
lic of the Congo. The DRC-based Siforco sells its wood to Interholco at an 
offi cial price below the true market value of the wood. The shortfall is 
made up through unoffi cial payments into offshore bank accounts in 
Europe. (Greenpeace 2008, 3)
A review undertaken for this report found no evidence that issues 
related to transfer pricing were addressed in fi ve mineral development 
agreements signed from 1994 to 2007 between the government of Tan-
zania and companies mining gold in Tanzania. Royalty rates were funda-
mental to anticipated government revenues from royalties and, ulti-
mately, from profi ts in each case, but on no occasion was the basis 
specifi ed for setting the price of exports. The tax base on which royalties 
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were to be charged was thus capable of discretionary determination by 
the company liable to make the payment of the taxes due. In addition, all 
the agreements include fi scal stability clauses, and most specify that the 
basis of the pricing of gold (even though unspecifi ed) should not be 
unilaterally changed, presumably by the government of Tanzania. For 
this reason, recent changes to Tanzanian law introducing transfer pricing 
regulation are likely to have little or no impact in this critical Tanzanian 
export sector.
The problem has also been found within the Extractive Industries 
Transparency Initiative. In a review of the fi rst audit of the initiative in 
Ghana, Murphy (2007, 10) notes that the audit objective to “ascertain 
the appropriateness of payments made with regards to mineral royalties; 
ground rent; dividends; taxation on profi ts and for mineral rights” had 
not, in the opinion of the reviewer, been fulfi lled, largely because of the 
use of indeterminate prices unrelated to verifi able benchmarks and the 
use of apparently uncorroborated exchange rates for valuing gold 
exports, both clear indications that proper transfer pricing controls were 
not in operation.
The evidence appears to be telling: there is a pattern of transfer pric-
ing abuse or at least the risk of such abuse in developing countries. The 
evidence from mineral development agreements implies there is no 
change in the prospects in this area even if legislation to introduce arm’s-
length pricing rules is enacted because companies in the extractive 
industries are almost entirely immune to legislative changes affecting the 
way in which their tax liabilities are computed for periods of up to 30 
years after signing mineral development agreements.
It is also important to note another key feature emphasized by this 
work: the transfer pricing abuse in these cases is highly unlikely to be 
motivated by taxes on corporate profi ts alone. The abuse is likely to 
extend to royalties, sales and purchase taxes, dividends, abuse of profi t-
sharing agreements, and more. The incentives to abuse are high, indeed; 
the consequences of not tackling the issue are considerable; and the 
prospects for tackling the abuse within current legislative and contrac-
tual constraints are not good.
Even if arm’s-length transfer pricing rules do exist in developing 
countries, there appear to be almost insurmountable problems in enforc-
ing them. As one of the rare cases of suggested transfer pricing abuse 
288 Draining Development?
ever brought to court in Africa has shown (Unilever Kenya Ltd v. Com-
missioners of Income Tax, Kenya Income Tax Appeal 753, 2003), the 
absence of the accounts of the related party with whom trade was being 
undertaken in the destination jurisdiction is a signifi cant cause of the 
failure to prove that profi t was being shifted through the transfer mis-
pricing of goods; this is what the Kenyan authorities were seeking to 
prove had occurred using the OECD arm’s-length principle. Although 
the accounts in question were necessarily available to the group of com-
panies the Kenyan subsidiary of which made the appeal in this case, they 
were not made available to the court. It is likely that the withholding of 
this accounting data, albeit entirely legal, had a material impact on the 
resulting decision of the court in Kenya.
Secrecy prevented the proper determination of a transfer pricing 
issue in this case, whether rightly or wrongly. This is a recurring theme 
of work in this area, as is the persistence of the assertion that developing 
countries are particularly vulnerable to the effects of secrecy. If this is the 
case, it is important that the mechanisms for creating this secrecy that 
permits transfer mispricing to take place undetected, unchallenged, or 
uncorrected be considered. Unless it can be shown that corporations can 
make use of secrecy to achieve this outcome, then it remains implausible 
that transfer mispricing of the alleged scale takes place. If, in contrast, 
signifi cant secrecy is available to corporations, then corporations have 
the opportunity to transfer misprice, as some believe is taking place.
How Multinational Corporations Exploit Secrecy
The modern MNC is a complex entity. This is not the place to explore all 
aspects of the nature of the MNC or the motivations for creating some 
of the structures MNCs use, but, without consideration of the interac-
tion of the corporation, jurisdictions, corporate law, and tax law, testing 
the proposition that transfer mispricing can take place within MNCs 
and be hidden from view within the accounts and fi nancial statements of 
MNCs is not possible.
The MNC is almost invariably headed by a single company, the parent 
entity, which is almost always a limited liability corporation. The parent 
entity comprises a number of other, usually similar limited liability cor-
porations spread over one or more other jurisdictions. For example, in 
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the course of researching this report, we noted that United Kingdom–
based BP plc has more than 3,000 subsidiaries in over 150 jurisdictions.
Subsidiaries need not be limited liability corporations. As noted in 
International Accounting Standard 27 (IAS 27, 2009), a subsidiary is an 
entity, including an unincorporated entity such as a partnership, that is 
controlled by another entity (known as the parent).22 Subsidiaries can 
therefore also be limited liability partnerships in any form, whether 
trusts, charities, or other arrangements, but limited liability corpora-
tions are the most common by far. The key is that the parent company 
controls the subsidiary. Control is widely defi ned by IAS 27, but most 
commonly means that the parent has direct or indirect control of a 
majority of the equity shares.
However control is established, if a parent entity governed by the 
IFRSs (which, in this respect, operate almost identically to the U.S. Gen-
erally Accepted Accounting Principles) has subsidiary entities, then IAS 
27 requires that consolidated accounts and fi nancial statements be pre-
pared. These are the fi nancial statements of a group of entities presented 
as if they were those of a single economic entity.
It is immediately apparent that, within this requirement, there is an 
obvious confl ict of interest. The parent entity of such a group may be 
required to present the group’s accounts as if the group were a single 
entity, and, yet, in practice, the group may be made up of thousands of 
entities that are under the control, but not necessarily the sole owner-
ship, of the parent entity. Thus, in substance, each entity within the 
MNC may remain legally distinct, and each may be subject to the rules 
of accounting, taxation, and disclosure of the jurisdiction in which it 
operates. In a real sense, each subsidiary is therefore without obligation 
to the other members of the group, barring the duty the directors and 
managers of the entity may owe to the owners to whom they report 
under the law of the jurisdiction in which the entity is incorporated, and 
this duty varies widely from place to place.
Curiously, according to the one nearly constant assumption in com-
pany law, the shareholders and the owner do not have the right to man-
age the entity: that right belongs to the directors. Of course, the share-
holders may have the right to appoint the directors, but, it is important 
to note, the assumption underpinning group accounts pierces the veil of 
incorporation that, in turn, underpins the notion of the limited liability 
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entity. The dichotomy is that the assumption accomplishes this in the 
effort to reinforce the division inherent in the act of incorporation 
through the presentation of the group as one undertaking distinct from 
the owners, who obtain only the limited information the directors may 
wish to supply, subject to legal constraints.
The inherent confl ict in reporting results is exacerbated by a number 
of other factors. First, the defi nition of control used for accounting may 
be different from the defi nition used by some jurisdictions for tax. So, 
some entities that are within the group for tax purposes in some loca-
tions may not be within the group in other locations. For example, tax 
may require 75 percent control, while accounting requires 50.01 percent 
in most cases. Therefore, entities that, for accounting purposes, may be 
related parties requiring inclusion in a common set of consolidated 
accounts and fi nancial statements may not be so treated for transfer 
pricing purposes.
Second, note that some entities are deliberately structured to exploit 
the rules on consolidated fi nancial reporting. In particular, the fi nancial 
services industry has become expert at creating orphan entities. These 
are companies that are created by a parent organization and that are 
deliberately structured by the parent entity so that they are off the bal-
ance sheet; thus, the assets or liabilities that the orphans own are excluded 
from consolidation in the parent entity’s accounts and fi nancial state-
ments, as are the results of the trading of the orphans.
A common way to engineer this outcome is to create a company to 
which are transferred the off–balance sheet assets and liabilities the par-
ent entity wishes to hide from view. The new entity is owned by a chari-
table trust, for example. As such, it is not considered to be under the 
ownership or control of the parent entity. This is why it is described as 
an orphan; it has become parentless, although it is utterly dependent on 
the parent entity.
These entities are hard to spot, but commonplace. While the entities 
are used to exclude liabilities from accounts, the rules that permit this 
will, in most cases, also allow them to be used for transfer mispricing, 
which may pass undetected, subject to the caveat that the proceeds must 
then be used for purposes that the group may wish to keep at quasi-
arm’s length. This purpose may be fraudulent.
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Third, it is widely assumed that consolidated accounts and fi nancial 
statements are created by adding together all the accounts of the indi-
vidual entities that make up the group and then eliminating all the intra-
group transactions and balances. This is a simplistic, but not wholly 
inappropriate view of what should happen. The reality is that MNCs can 
deliberately obscure the relationship between the underlying accounts 
and fi nancial statements of the subsidiary companies and the group 
accounts in ways that make it almost impossible to detect what is really 
happening within the group.
The fi rst method to achieve this is the use of different accounting 
year-end dates for group companies. IAS 27 (section 26) says this should 
not occur and that any differences should be explained, but the reality is 
(as the author has frequently witnessed) that noncoterminous year-ends 
are commonplace and almost never disclosed or commented upon. If 
noncoterminous year-ends are used, transfer mispricing may then be 
relied on to shift profi ts (and losses) around the group almost at liberty 
and almost entirely undetected.
Next, nonstandard accounting policies may be used in different places 
to recognize transactions even though, according to IAS 27, this should 
not occur. This is now commonplace. The parent company might 
account using IFRSs, but local entities may well account using local Gen-
erally Accepted Accounting Principles, and there is nothing to prevent 
this. Some signifi cant transactions have different tax treatments depend-
ing on the accounting standards used. There are, for example, confl icts 
between the United Kingdom and the International Accounting Stan-
dards on fi nancial derivatives for tax purposes. These differences and 
confl icts have been exploited by international banks.
In addition, entries can be made in the consolidated accounts alone, 
without ever appearing anywhere in any of the accounts of the underly-
ing entities. In principle, this should not occur because the accounts can 
then be said not to refl ect the underlying books and records of the MNC 
that is publishing them, but, in practice, if the entries are considered a 
nonmaterial adjustment in the assessment from the point of view of the 
user of the fi nancial statements, which both the International Account-
ing Standards Board and the U.S. Federal Accounting Standards Board 
defi ne as “a provider of capital to the company,” then no auditor is likely 
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to object. This can, however, disguise radically different presentations of 
profi t on trades between related undertakings in group consolidated 
accounts and fi nancial statements and individual entity accounts and 
fi nancial statements, especially if the tax implications are considered, so 
that the benefi t may be hidden from view in the accounts of the group as 
a whole. Interview-based evidence indicates that this practice may be 
commonplace. It will never be discovered by tax authorities because it is 
the accounts and fi nancial statements of the individual subsidiary enti-
ties that are used to determine tax liabilities in each jurisdiction in which 
these entities trade. The consolidated accounts and fi nancial statements 
are deemed to have no tax interest to tax authorities (although it is not 
clear that this is true), and, as such, in jurisdictions such as the United 
Kingdom, the tax authorities are not entitled to ask questions about the 
entries that make up these published accounts.
This last point is, perhaps, of the greatest signifi cance because the 
exact entries that are eliminated from view when the consolidated 
accounts and fi nancial statements are prepared are those same transac-
tions that will always have the potential to give rise to transfer pricing 
disputes. For this reason, the most useful evidence that consolidated 
accounts and fi nancial statements could provide to tax authorities—the 
data relating to transfer pricing issues, which are the data on the “most 
contentious issue in tax,” according to a poll of U.S. tax directors in 
2007—is denied to the tax authorities who need it.23
This omission is exacerbated by a number of other practices, all 
endorsed by the IFRSs and all of which make it easier to hide transfer 
pricing abuse. First, in the individual accounts and fi nancial statements 
of the subsidiaries that make up an MNC, it would seem obvious that the 
transactions with other group companies should be highlighted if only to 
indicate that they will disappear upon consolidation. This is theoretically 
required by another International Accounting Standard, IAS 24, on 
related-party transactions. Broadly speaking, IAS 24 (section 9) defi nes a 
party as related to an entity if one party directly or indirectly controls the 
other, but associates, joint venturers, and some other arrangements are 
also included in the defi nition. IAS 24 defi nes a related-party transaction 
as a transfer of resources, services, or obligations between the related par-
ties regardless of whether a price is charged (section 9). As a result, it 
would seem that all transactions among group companies must be dis-
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closed in a group’s fi nancial statements because a long list of disclosable 
transactions of this sort is included in the standard.
Unfortunately, the prospect of disclosure that this requirement cre-
ates is then dashed. IAS 24 proceeds to state that, while the disclosure 
must be made separately for the parent company, subsidiaries, and other 
identifi ed categories of related parties, the information within each such 
category “may be disclosed in aggregate except when separate disclosure 
is necessary for an understanding of the effects of the related party trans-
actions on the fi nancial statements of the company.” As a result, all trad-
ing by a subsidiary with all other subsidiaries can be aggregated into one 
number in most cases, and no indication need be given of the other 
party in a trade, what has been traded, or on what terms and where the 
other side of the transaction might be recorded.
The result is obvious: the accounts and fi nancial statements end up 
providing no meaningful information at all on transfer pricing issues. 
The information is excluded from consolidated accounts and fi nancial 
statements because related-party trades between parents and their sub-
sidiaries and between fellow subsidiaries are always excluded from these 
accounts, while the disclosure requirement on individual group mem-
bers is so limited that forming a view on transfer pricing is almost 
impossible in most cases: it is rare for the other party to any transaction 
to be disclosed, especially within a large and complex group.
This might be thought an accident. Regrettably it is not, as IAS 24 
makes clear. In the latest version of the standard, introductory note IN7 
states that “discussions [in the standard] on the pricing of transactions 
and related disclosures between related parties have been removed 
because the Standard does not apply to the measurement of related party 
transactions.”
This is an extraordinary statement. Accounts prepared under IFRSs 
and their U.S. equivalents are the basis of corporate taxation in a great 
many countries in the world, but the International Accounting Standard 
that is responsible for their promulgation says that it is not the purpose 
of the standard to assist in the measurement of matters related to trans-
fer pricing. Moreover, it offers no suggestion on how such matters should 
be considered or measured.
What is clear is that it is not the intent in the standards that the only 
other part of the IFRS environment that might provide information on 
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the issue—IFRS 8, on segment—do so. IFRS 8, by default, usually only 
applies to companies quoted on a stock exchange in a jurisdiction that 
has adopted IFRSs (as all countries in the EU have done, for example). It 
defi nes an operating segment as a component of an entity:
•  that engages in business activities from which it may earn revenues 
and incur expenses;
•  the operating results of which are reviewed regularly by the entity’s 
chief operating decision maker so as to make decisions about the 
resources to be allocated to the segment and assess its performance; 
and
•  for which discrete fi nancial information is available.
IFRS 8 requires an entity to report fi nancial and descriptive informa-
tion about the entity’s reportable segments. These are operating segments 
or aggregations of operating segments that account for more than 10 per-
cent of the revenues, profi ts, or assets of the entity. Smaller segments are 
combined until ones of this size are created, supposedly to reduce infor-
mation overload. In practice, this might, of course, hide necessary detail.
Required disclosure by reportable segments targets trading data, 
including profi t and loss, assets and liabilities, and limited geographical 
analysis. Such a summary does not, however, show the true level of prob-
lems inherent within IFRS 8, which also allows segment data to be pub-
lished using accounting rules that are not the same as those used in the 
rest of the accounts and fi nancial statements, meaning, as a result, that 
segment data may be formulated in a way harmful to the appraisal of 
transfer mispricing. In addition, IFRS 8 does not require that segments 
cover all of the MNC’s activities, meaning some information may be 
omitted, providing more opportunity for transfer mispricing to be hid-
den from view.
As a consequence, considerable support has developed for an alter-
native form of segment accounting called country-by-country report-
ing, created by the author of this report (Murphy 2009a). Country-by-
country reporting would require an MNC to disclose the name of each 
country in which it operates and the names of all its companies trading 
in each country in which it operates. Currently, these data are usually 
unavailable. Country-by-country reporting would then require publi-
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cation of a full profi t and loss account for each country in which the 
MNC operates, plus limited cash fl ow and balance sheet information. 
Radically, the profi t and loss account would break down turnover 
between turnover involving third parties and turnover involving group 
entities. Costs of sale, overhead, and fi nance costs would have to be bro-
ken down in the same way, while a full tax note would be required for 
each country, as is presently necessary for IFRSs.
In addition, if the company operates within the extractive industries, 
one would also expect to see all those benefi ts paid to the government of 
each country in which the MNC operates broken down across the cate-
gories of reporting required in the Extractive Industries Transparency 
Initiative.
As Murphy (2009a, 18) notes, “country-by-country reporting does 
not [stop transfer mispricing]. What it does do is provide data that . . . 
tax departments . . . can use to assess the likely risk that exists within the 
accounts of a multinational corporation. They can do this by
•  “Assessing the likelihood of risk within the group structure;
•  “Reviewing the overall allocation of profi ts to countries within the 
group to see if there is indication of systematic bias towards low-tax 
jurisdictions;
•  “Assessing whether the volume and fl ows of intragroup trading dis-
closed by country-by-country reporting suggests that this outcome is 
achieved as a result of mispricing of that trade;
•  “Using that information to assess where that abuse is most likely to 
occur so that an appropriate challenge can be raised.”
So far, the International Accounting Standards Board has only indi-
cated willingness to consider this issue with regard to the extractive 
industries, and current indications are that, despite the considerable lob-
bying, there is little prospect of an advance on this issue. The conclusion 
is inescapable: as one board member said when the issue of country-by-
country reporting was being discussed by the International Accounting 
Standards Board, “this looks like it deals with the issue of transfer pric-
ing, and we do not want to go there.”24 The comment is succinct and 
neatly summarizes the design of current accounting standards, which 
seem purpose-made to hide the subject of transfer pricing from view.
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The Role of Secrecy Jurisdictions
The literature that alleges substantial transfer mispricing abuse by MNCs 
also fi nds that tax havens play a signifi cant role in the process. The term 
tax haven is, however, so widely misunderstood that this chapter does 
not use it, preferring instead to use the term secrecy jurisdiction. For a 
more detailed consideration of the term, the nature of a secrecy jurisdic-
tion, and the economic signifi cance in the matters under consideration 
here, see chapter 11 in this volume. A list of the places currently consid-
ered signifi cant secrecy jurisdictions is available in table 9A.4.25
The term secrecy jurisdiction is considered more appropriate for the 
purposes of the current analysis because, although the process of trans-
fer mispricing to which this chapter refers seeks to secure a tax advantage 
(by way of reduced tax payment) for those who pursue the activity, this 
advantage is not normally available unless the abuse giving rise to the 
advantage—the artifi cial relocation of activities to one or more secrecy 
jurisdictions—can be hidden from view behind a veil of secrecy. Secrecy 
jurisdiction opacity is often, of course, linked to low tax rates (see above).
The combination of low tax rates and secrecy has obvious attractions 
for those seeking to transfer misprice. However, to demonstrate whether 
or not MNCs actually use secrecy jurisdictions and which ones they 
might use if they do, TJN has coordinated, under the direction of the 
author of this chapter, a survey of the locations of MNC subsidiaries, 
paying particular attention to the secrecy jurisdictions TJN has identi-
fi ed. The results of the study by the U.S. Government Accountability 
Offi ce of December 2008 (GAO 2008), “Large U.S. Corporations and 
Federal Contractors with Subsidiaries in Jurisdictions Listed as Tax 
Havens or Financial Privacy Jurisdictions,” have been used as part of the 
survey. Because the U.S. survey excludes data on the Netherlands, the 
United Kingdom, and the United States, these locations have also been 
excluded from the TJN survey. Austria (for practical rather than meth-
odological reasons), Belgium, and Madeira (because of diffi culties in 
isolating data independently from Portugal) have also been excluded.
The total sample of MNCs surveyed is shown in table 9.4.
It should, however, be noted that the data selection has been prag-
matic: the U.K. data should have been the entire FTSE 100, that is, the 100 
largest companies in the United Kingdom, designed to match the U.S. 
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sample. In practice, although all United Kingdom–quoted companies are 
legally required to publish the names, places of incorporation, and per-
centage of the holdings for all their subsidiary companies annually either 
in their audited accounts and fi nancial statements or as an appendix to 
their annual declaration made to the U.K. Registrar of Companies, only 
33 of the FTSE 100 companies did so. Enquiries found that no company 
had ever been prosecuted for failing to fi le this information. It is a curi-
ous example of the United Kingdom’s opacity (see table 9A.5).26
It should also be noted that substantial problems were encountered 
with all other samples. The French data undoubtedly underreport the 
number of subsidiaries because they only relate to principal subsidiaries, 
not all subsidiaries. German companies do not always make the distinc-
tion between subsidiaries and associates clear. The Dutch and Swiss data 
have been taken from databases, not original documentation, which 
implies that there are inconsistencies in approach, particularly about 
whether dormant subsidiaries are counted or not, and so on. All such 
issues do, however, reveal one consistent theme: it is immensely diffi cult 
to determine the composition of an MNC.
Detailed analysis of the regulatory requirements of the 60 secrecy 
jurisdictions surveyed by TJN highlights the issues. Of the 60 jurisdic-
tions surveyed, accounts of companies were available on easily accessible 
public record in only six.27
Table 9.4. Multinational Corporations Surveyed by 
the Tax Justice Network
number
Country MNCs sampled
France 39
Germany 28
Netherlands 23
Switzerland 20
United Kingdom 33
United States 100
Total 243
Source: Mapping Financial Secrecy (database), Tax Justice Network, 
London, http://www.secrecyjurisdictions.com/index.php (accessed 
December 12, 2009).
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Table 9.5. Secrecy Jurisdiction Locations of Multinational Corporation 
Subsidiaries
number
Rank Secrecy jurisdiction MNC subsidiaries
1 Cayman Islands 1, 130
2 Ireland 920
3 Luxembourg 824
4 Switzerland 771
5 Hong Kong SAR, China 737
6 Singapore 661
7 Bermuda 483
8 Jersey 414
9 Hungary 252
10 British Virgin Islands 244
1 1 Malaysia (Labuan) 177
12 Mauritius 169
13 Bahamas, The 156
14 Guernsey 151
15 Philippines 126
16 Panama 125
17 Isle of Man 99
18 Costa Rica 85
19 Cyprus 69
20 Netherlands Antilles 68
21 Uruguay 67
22 Malta 60
23 United Arab Emirates (Dubai) 58
24 Israel 56
25 Gibraltar 54
26 Barbados 51
27 Latvia 40
28 U.S. Virgin Islands 37
29 Monaco 35
30 Liechtenstein 32
Source: Mapping Financial Secrecy (database), Tax Justice Network, London, http://www.secrecy 
jurisdictions.com/index.php (accessed December 12, 2009).
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The situation was worse for the benefi cial (as opposed to nominal) 
ownership information on public record. Only Monaco requires that 
these data be available. In all other cases, nominee ownership may be 
recorded, or there is simply no requirement to record data on public 
record at all.28
It is readily apparent, as a consequence, that, unless data are required 
from MNCs on the companies making up or not making up their group 
and the operations of each, as shown by the audited accounts, then the 
current legal requirements for data registration within secrecy jurisdic-
tions ensure that the information required to assist in the appraisal of 
MNC activities, including those relating to transfer mispricing, will sim-
ply be unavailable to most people and, quite possibly, to many tax 
authorities if that is the MNC’s wish, as it will be if the MNC is seeking 
to hide transfer mispricing activity.
This would not be an issue if MNCs did not use secrecy jurisdictions. 
The reality is that they do use secrecy jurisdictions extensively. Of the 
European and U.S. samples, 97.2 and 84.0 percent, respectively, had 
secrecy jurisdiction subsidiaries as defi ned by the TJN. Table 9.5 indi-
cates the number of subsidiaries by location according to the TJN survey. 
(Data on the 24 additional, smaller jurisdictions have been ignored; 
these jurisdictions are immaterial for the purposes of this chapter.)
It is readily apparent that some locations stand out, but the data make 
a lot more sense if they are plotted against two control variables: popula-
tion and GDP (fi gure 9.4).
The data in fi gure 9.4 are ranked by the number of subsidiaries by 
GDP in billions of U.S. dollars. In most cases, the correlation with a 
ranking by the number of subsidiaries per head of population is clear. 
These weighted data give a much better view of the relative importance 
of these secrecy locations. It is apparent that some show extraordinary 
amounts of activity relative to their size. There is only one explanation 
for this: the secrecy jurisdictions are not creating entities for use by the 
local population, but, as the defi nition of these jurisdictions in this chap-
ter suggests is likely, for the use of people resident elsewhere. The com-
panies that are registered in these jurisdictions do little or nothing in 
these locations.
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That this must be true is indicated by the number of subsidiaries active 
in fi nancial services as a proportion of the total working population in 
the secrecy jurisdictions. As TJN has noted, this exceeds 20 percent in 
Cayman Islands, Guernsey, Isle of Man, and Jersey and 10 percent in Ber-
muda, Liechtenstein, and Luxembourg.29 Financial service sectors of this 
size crowd out the possibility of any other signifi cant economic activity 
taking place. The overlap between this list (fi gure 9.4) and the locations 
with the most MNC subsidiaries (table 9.5) is obvious, and the implica-
tion is clear: these locations do not create value. Their sole raison d’être is 
the provision of corporate and fi nancial service structures that may 
record value, but do not generate it. Of course, one way in which this 
value may be relocated into these places is through transfer mispricing.
Figure 9.4. Top 20 Subsidiaries by Secrecy Jurisdiction, Population, and GDP
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The existence of the Big Four fi rms of accountants—Pricewater-
houseCoopers, Deloitte Touche Tohmatsu, Ernst & Young, and KPMG—
in many secrecy jurisdictions in which their location cannot possibly be 
justifi ed solely by the needs of the local populations reinforces this view. 
As Murphy (2010b) shows, the Big Four fi rms are signifi cantly overrep-
resented in small secrecy jurisdictions (those with less than 1 million 
population) compared with other locations of this size (see table 9A.6).30 
As he also shows, these locations of the Big Four have an average GDP 
per head that is approximately four times greater than the average GDP 
in similar locations in which the Big Four are not present. Of course, 
cause and effect cannot be proven based on this circumstantial evidence, 
but the possibility exists, especially in the smallest of such locations, that 
the income in question is not earned in these places, but is transferred in 
through transfer mispricing, and, in that case, the Big Four fi rms, as 
Murphy suggests, facilitate the structures that allow the transfer mispric-
ing to occur.
Conclusion
This chapter has sought, fi rst, to test the credibility of the claim that at 
least US$160 billion a year may be lost by developing countries as a result 
of transfer mispricing by MNCs.
Second, it has sought to demonstrate that developing countries and, 
particularly, the extractive industries may be especially prone to this 
abuse.
Third, it has considered whether this sum may be hidden from view 
within the accounts or fi nancial statements of the MNCs that may be 
perpetrating the mispricing.
Fourth, it has explored the possibility that these MNCs may use 
secrecy jurisdictions to assist in hiding these transactions from view.
As the chapter indicates, the incentive to transfer misprice is great. 
This is because, fi rst, the differential in effective tax rates between the 
jurisdictions in potential supply chains is higher than the existing litera-
ture on tax rates suggests would normally be the case. Second, it is 
because the structure of international tax regulation at present suggests 
that the chance of detection of transfer mispricing is low.
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The chapter then shows that the risk that transfer mispricing may go 
undetected within the extractive industries that supply much of the exter-
nal earning capacity of many developing countries is great. As the chapter 
also notes, transfer mispricing in this sector is unlikely to be motivated by 
a desire to avoid taxes on corporate profi ts alone. The abuse is likely to 
extend to royalties, sales and purchase taxes, dividends, abuse of profi t-
sharing agreements, and more. The incentives to abuse for all these rea-
sons are substantial, and the consequence of not tackling the issue consid-
erable, but, as the chapter shows, the prospects of tackling the issue are 
limited given the current legislative and contractual constraints.
The chapter also reviews a number of IFRSs, in particular the standards 
addressing consolidated accounts and fi nancial statements, related-party 
transactions, and segment reporting: the three standards most likely to 
relate to disclosure of intragroup trade within the accounts of MNCs. The 
analysis shows that these standards are not designed to, and are not capa-
ble of, leading to the disclosure of these transactions and the associated 
transfer pricing. It proposes that this failure may be intentional.
The chapter defi nes secrecy jurisdiction and argues that secrecy juris-
dictions are deliberate constructs. Secrecy jurisdictions are used dispro-
portionately by MNCs as measured relative to local populations and 
GDP. In the secrecy jurisdictions most popular with the MNCs, there is 
little prospect of any real added value arising because, as the chapter 
shows, the economies of these secrecy jurisdictions are largely dedicated 
to the supply of fi nancial services, part of which activity is administered 
by the MNC subsidiaries. This pattern of use does, however, accord with 
the proposed defi nition of a secrecy jurisdiction, suggesting that the pur-
pose of these jurisdictions is to disguise the true nature of activity under-
taken elsewhere so that compliance with the regulations of other states 
can be avoided or evaded. Transfer mispricing may be only one abusive 
activity that may be occurring.
What overall conclusions may one draw from this evidence? The fol-
lowing conclusions are proposed.
First, it is apparent that there is a stronger incentive to transfer mis-
price than the existing literature has suggested. Second, developing 
countries are particularly susceptible to this activity. Third, this activity 
can be hidden from view in accounts. Fourth, secrecy jurisdictions pro-
vide an additional layer of opacity to disguise this activity. Fifth, the 
 Accounting for the Missing Billions 303
combination of the secrecy inherent in accounting rules and secrecy 
jurisdiction legislation provides a deep opacity that limits the possibility 
of discovering transfer mispricing activity. As a result, the chapter fi nds 
that transfer mispricing may be taking place undetected.
In this case, is it also plausible that the quantum of the loss to devel-
oping countries may be as much as US$160 billion per annum? As noted 
in the chapter, this seems to be quite plausible on the basis of data veri-
fi ed from a variety of sources and therefore considered a credible basis 
for the analytical review techniques common in auditing methodology.
Thus, on the basis of the methodologies noted, the chapter concludes 
that substantial transfer mispricing by major corporations contributing 
to a loss of at least US$160 billion a year to developing countries is plau-
sible in the context of the total likely corporate profi ts earned worldwide 
in a year.
Notes
 1. Transfer mispricing occurs if two or more entities under common control that 
are trading across international borders price transactions between them at 
rates designed to secure a tax advantage that would not be available to third par-
ties trading in the same goods or services across the same borders.
 2. The arm’s-length principle is the international standard that OECD member 
countries have agreed should be used to determine transfer prices for tax pur-
poses. It is set forth in article 9 of the OECD Model Tax Convention, as follows: 
where “conditions are made or imposed between the two enterprises in their 
commercial or fi nancial relations which differ from those which would be made 
between independent enterprises, then any profi ts which would, but for those 
conditions, have accrued to one of the enterprises, but, by reason of those condi-
tions, have not so accrued, may be included in the profi ts of that enterprise and 
taxed accordingly” (Centre for Tax Policy and Administration, “Annex 3: Glos-
sary,” OECD, Paris, http://www.oecd.org/document/41/0,3343,en_2649_33753 
_37685737_1_1_1_1,00.html, accessed October 13, 2011). See also chapter 7 in 
this volume.
 3. IFFs are defi ned by Kar and Cartwright-Smith (2008) as “the proceeds from 
both illicit activities such as corruption (the bribery and embezzlement of 
national wealth), criminal activity, and the proceeds of licit business that become 
illicit when transported across borders in contravention of applicable laws and 
regulatory frameworks (most commonly in order to evade payment of taxes).”
 4. Secrecy jurisdictions intentionally create regulation for the primary benefi t and 
use of nonresidents in the geographical domain. The jurisdiction regulation is 
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designed to undermine the legislation or regulations of another jurisdiction. 
The jurisdictions create a deliberate, legally backed veil of secrecy that ensures 
that those from outside who use the jurisdiction regulations cannot be identi-
fi ed by others.
 5. See World Factbook (database), Central Intelligence Agency, Washington, DC, 
https://www.cia.gov/library/publications/the-world-factbook/.
 6. Jurisdiction Centre (database), OCRA Worldwide, Isle of Man, United King-
dom, http://www.ocra.com/jurisdictions/index.asp.
 7. The table may be found on the website of this volume, http://go.worldbank.org 
/N2HMRB4G20.
 8. The table may be found on the website of this volume, http://go.worldbank.org 
/N2HMRB4G20.
 9. Devereux, Lockwood, and Redoano (2002) are typical of the other surveys in 
that they also entirely ignore the tax haven–secrecy jurisdiction issue.
10. Jurisdiction Centre (database), OCRA Worldwide, Isle of Man, United King-
dom, http://www.ocra.com/jurisdictions/index.asp.
11. The table may be found on the website of this volume, http://go.worldbank.org 
/N2HMRB4G20.
12. Based on International Monetary Fund–World Bank data summarized at http://
en.wikipedia.org/wiki/List_of_countries_by_GDP_(nominal) (accessed March 3, 
2010). In each case, the data are in the range of US$60 trillion to US$61 trillion. 
Original sources are linked through the website noted.
13. Data of the U.K. Offi ce for National Statistics.
14. HMRC (HM Revenue & Customs), 2009, “HM Revenue and Customs Annual 
Receipts,” data sheet, December, London, http://www.hmrc.gov.uk/stats/tax
_receipts/table1-2.pdf.
15. Data of the Bureau of Economic Analysis, U.S. Department of Commerce.
16. Anecdotal evidence based on conversations with high-ranking offi cials of HM 
Revenue & Customs leads us to believe that approximately 35 percent of all large 
companies in the United Kingdom are considered to have little appetite for tax-
ation risk, while at least 40 percent are considered to have exposed themselves to 
high risk in the management of their taxation affairs.
17. See South African Revenue Service, http://www.sars.gov.za/home.asp?pid=3906 
(accessed August 17, 2009).
18. Lowtax, Global Tax and Business Portal, “Botswana: Double Tax Treaties.” http://
www.lowtax.net/lowtax/html/botswana/jbo2tax.html (accessed August 17, 2009).
19. Zambia Revenue Authority, “Tax Treaties.” http://www.zra.org.zm/Tax_Treaties
_Agreemnet.php (accessed August 17, 2009).
20. See United Nations Conference on Trade and Development, http://www.unctad
.org/sections/dite_pcbb/docs/dtt_Congo_DR.PDF.
21. It is appropriate to note that the author of this chapter has acted as adviser on 
transfer pricing or contractual issues to the authors of most of the reports 
referred to in this section.
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22. See Standards (IFRSs) (database), International Accounting Standards Board, 
London, http://www.ifrs.org/IFRSs/IFRS.htm.
23. For the citation, see “US Tax Directors’ Poll: TP Is Most Contentious Issue,” 
TP Week, December 12, 2007, http://www.tpweek.com/Article.aspx?ArticleID= 
1786798.
24. Reported by Richard Murphy, September 2006.
25. The table may be found on the website of this volume, http://go.worldbank.org 
/N2HMRB4G20.
26. The table may be found on the website of this volume, http://go.worldbank.org 
/N2HMRB4G20.
27. See Mapping Financial Secrecy (database), Tax Justice Network, London, http://
www.secrecyjurisdictions.com/index.php (accessed December 12, 2009).
28. See Mapping Financial Secrecy (database), Tax Justice Network, London, http://
www.secrecyjurisdictions.com/index.php (accessed December 12, 2009).
29. See Mapping Financial Secrecy (database), Tax Justice Network, London, http://
www.secrecyjurisdictions.com/index.php (accessed December 16, 2009).
30. The table may be found on the website of this volume, http://go.worldbank.org 
/N2HMRB4G20.
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Abstract
A potential vehicle to move capital unrecorded out of a country is the mis-
invoicing of international trade transactions. Exporters may understate the 
export revenue on their invoices, and importers may overstate import 
expenditures, while their trading partners are instructed to deposit the bal-
ance for their benefi t in foreign accounts. Aiming to quantify the extent of 
trade mispricing, studies have analyzed asymmetries in matched partner 
trade statistics or examined price anomalies in transaction-level price data. 
This chapter critically reviews these empirical approaches and briefl y 
describes an alternative methodology. Overall, the accuracy and reliability 
of estimates of illicit fi nancial fl ows (IFFs) based on trade mispricing are 
questioned. In particular, it is argued that estimates of trade mispricing are 
critically dependent on assumptions on how to interpret observed asym-
metries in trade statistics. For instance, various reasons for discrepancies in 
bilateral trade statistics are discussed, and incentives for faking trade 
invoices other than capital fl ight are highlighted. Also, aggregate trade data 
may mask considerable variation in trade discrepancies at the transaction 
level. Most notably, the importance of trade mispricing as a method for the 
unrecorded crossborder transfer of capital is generally unclear.
Volker Nitsch
Trade Mispricing and Illicit Flows
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Introduction
The (in)accuracy of international trade statistics has recently (once 
more) become an issue of much debate. Trade data are often critically 
reviewed (more than other economic statistics) for at least three reasons. 
First, data on international trade are of considerable economic relevance. 
Crossborder shipments of goods and services often have sizable effects 
on a country’s economic activity. Also, for some countries, taxes on 
international trade constitute a signifi cant share of government revenue. 
Second, a country’s trade data allow, in principle, for full cross-checks 
with data from other countries. Individual trade transactions are 
recorded separately by both trading partners so that it should be quite 
easy to compare these records. As Naya and Morgan (1974, 124) note, 
“comparable double accounts are not usually available for domestic eco-
nomic transactions.” Finally, recent research has reemphasized that trade 
activities are subject to criminal behavior. Fisman and Wei (2009) show 
that the level of smuggling of cultural property is related to the level of 
corruption in the country of origin. Baldwin (2006) discusses the effect 
of value added tax (VAT) fraud on intra-European trade fi gures.
A feature of international trade statistics that has frequently attracted 
considerable attention is the potential asymmetry in partner country 
trade statistics arising from mispricing. More specifi cally, it has been 
argued that the faking of trade invoices is a commonly used method to 
move money out of developing countries. If trade declarations are 
manipulated such that the stated value of imports exceeds the actual 
value (overinvoicing) or the stated value of exports is below the actual 
value (underinvoicing), fi nancial resources are implicitly transferred 
abroad without any offi cial record of this having taken place. Conversely, 
it is assumed that, to proxy for such IFFs (often labeled capital fl ight), 
trade statistics may provide some useful empirical indication. For 
instance, Kar and Cartwright-Smith (2008) explore gaps in mirror trade 
statistics; also see Bhagwati, Krueger, and Wibulswasdi (1974) for an 
early contribution. De Boyrie, Pak, and Zdanowicz (2004) examine the 
variation of trade prices at the transaction level.
This chapter provides a detailed discussion of issues associated with 
trade mispricing. It reviews various incentives for faking trade invoices, 
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critically examines empirical approaches to quantify the extent of mis-
pricing (thereby also highlighting other potential reasons for discrepan-
cies in bilateral trade statistics), and analyzes differences in mirror trade 
statistics at the product level (which may be associated with mispricing 
behavior). It also assesses how trade mispricing may be refl ected in capi-
tal fl ight and illicit fl ow estimates.
The plan of the chapter is as follows. The fi rst section reviews evi-
dence on asymmetries in international trade statistics. IFFs are typically 
generated by underinvoicing exports and overinvoicing imports. How-
ever, dozens of other reasons for the over- and underinvoicing of trade 
activities have been identifi ed in the literature; these reasons include 
overinvoicing of exports to benefi t from export subsidies and underin-
voicing of imports to avoid payment of import tariffs. As a result, some 
of these misinvoicing activities may offset each other. In addition, there 
are other reasons for incorrect trade invoices and, thus, discrepancies in 
offi cial trade fi gures. These manipulations may be the result of intended 
(criminal) behavior such as smuggling or carousel fraud (explained 
below). Similarly, however, they could simply refl ect inaccuracies in 
compiling trade fi gures (for example, because of the Rotterdam effect) 
and thus result from unintended behavior.
Based on the discussion of incentives for misreporting trade fl ows, 
the chapter next analyzes empirical approaches to quantifying the extent 
of mispricing. The trade-based approach in Kar and Cartwright-Smith 
(2008) and the price-based work by Pak and Zdanowicz (with various 
coauthors) are critically reviewed.
The chapter then examines how trade mispricing fi ts into the illicit 
fl ow estimates. Kar and Cartwright-Smith (2008) use the gap in trade 
statistics (along with other approaches) to provide detailed estimates of 
IFFs by country. This section examines the robustness of their fi ndings. 
For instance, results are compared with estimates derived from the 
 product-level approach of Fisman and Wei (2009). Similarly, it may be 
useful to relate Kar and Cartwright-Smith’s estimates of illicit fl ows to 
other country characteristics that have been found to be associated with 
trade mispricing, such as corruption.
The fi nal section concludes.
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Discrepancies in Trade Statistics
Conceptually, country i ’s exports to country j are equivalent to j’s 
imports from i. In practice, however, recorded trade fi gures differ in offi -
cial matched partner country trade statistics. The reasons for asymme-
tries in trade statistics are manifold, but they can be broadly grouped 
into two categories: legitimate statistical reasons and intended misdecla-
rations. For illustration, this section briefl y summarizes some of the 
main explanations for the discrepancy in offi cially reported export and 
import fi gures. Morgenstern (1950), in a classical paper, provides a more 
detailed account.
Statistical reasons
The most notable source of discrepancy between the exports of one 
country and the imports of the other is the conceptual difference in val-
uation. Exporting countries report the value of goods at the initial point 
of departure (free on board [f.o.b.]), while import values refer to the 
value at the point of fi nal destination, thereby including cost, insurance, 
and freight (c.i.f.).1 As a result, the c.i.f.–f.o.b. ratio has been frequently 
used in the literature as a measure of transportation costs. Limão and 
Venables (2001) provide a recent application of this approach; see Hum-
mels and Lugovskyy (2006) for a detailed critique.
Apart from the different treatment of shipping costs, there are other 
methodological diffi culties in matched partner trade statistics. For 
instance, the correct identifi cation of the source or destination country 
may be a problem. If the country of fi nal destination is not known at the 
time of exportation, the exporter declares the country of last shipment; 
the country of fi nal destination, in contrast, classifi es its imports by 
country of origin. Herrigan, Kochen, and Williams (2005) provide an 
illustration of this “Rotterdam effect” in trade statistics whereby import 
and export statistics are distorted because of the transit through inter-
vening countries. They note as follows:
Crude oil is imported from the UK via Portland, Maine in the USA, and 
then sent by pipeline to Canada. This is recorded in Canada as [an] import 
from the UK, whereas the UK records an export to the USA. The USA do 
not record either fl ow, as it is simple transit. Thus the UK records more oil 
exports to the USA [than] they record importing, and [records] less oil 
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exports to Canada [than] they record importing. (Herrigan, Kochen, and 
Williams 2005, 9)
Another potential issue of importance is timing. Because there are 
often notable time lags between the departure and arrival of a shipment 
(for example, arising from long-distance sea cargo, a delay in customs 
declaration, or temporary storage in a warehouse), trade may be recorded 
in different calendar years. More importantly, statistical offi ces in the 
source and destination countries may value goods at different prices or 
exchange rates. Finally, recorded trade at the commodity level may differ 
because of the omission of individual transactions in one of the partner 
countries (for example, because of varying thresholds for the low value 
of trade across countries), the exclusion of certain product groups in a 
country’s trade statistics (such as military material or repair trade), or 
differences in commodity classifi cations (for example, a regrouping of a 
transaction into chapter 99, which covers “items not elsewhere classi-
fi ed,” for reasons of confi dentiality).
Fraudulent trade activities
Discrepancies in trade statistics may also result from intended misdecla-
ration of trade activities. Transactions may be hidden completely (so 
that offi cial statistics underreport trade), purely imaginary (so that trade 
is overstated in the data), or mispriced in trade invoices (with, a priori, 
unknown effects on trade statistics).
Unreported trade. For unreported trade activities (that is, smuggling) to 
affect asymmetries in partner country trade statistics, the transactions 
have to be recorded by one of the partners. This is the setup that Fisman 
and Wei (2009) have in mind. For antiques and cultural property, there are 
often strong export restrictions such that there is an incentive to smuggle 
the goods unrecorded out of a country. Imports, however, are properly 
declared since there are generally no constraints for the entry of such 
goods, and there is even the risk of seizure if there is a false declaration.
Fictitious trade. An example of imaginary trade transactions (where 
offi cial trade fi gures are artifi cially infl ated) is missing trader VAT fraud 
in intra–European Union (EU) trade. For intra-EU trade, for which no 
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barriers to trade exist, and, thus, there are no customs declarations, trade 
statistics rely on the VAT system; that is, fi rms declare to fi scal authori-
ties, as part of the VAT return, trade activities with customers and sup-
pliers in EU member countries. Trade statistics are then affected by two 
types of VAT fraud. In acquisition fraud, goods are regularly imported 
VAT free and then sold on the home market (for example, to the next 
trader) at a price that includes VAT. Instead of paying over the VAT to tax 
authorities, however, the importer disappears. As a result, because of the 
missing VAT declaration, imports also remain unrecorded. A more elab-
orate version of this form of criminal attack on the VAT system is carou-
sel fraud whereby, after a series of sales through home companies, the 
imported goods are reexported to the country of origin (or any other EU 
member country) and, thus, move in a circular pattern. The exports are 
properly declared, while the imports are not captured in trade data, 
which may lead to substantial asymmetries in partner country trade sta-
tistics. When, in 2003, the United Kingdom’s Offi ce for National Statis-
tics made corrections to trade fi gures for VAT fraud, real growth in gross 
domestic product for previous years was lowered by up to 0.2 percentage 
points.2
Misreported trade. Finally, trade may be recorded, but invoices are faked 
such that the declared value of a trade transaction deviates from the true 
value. A plausible explanation for trade mispricing is capital fl ight. If 
there are exchange restrictions, overinvoicing of imports and underin-
voicing of exports are popular methods for the unrecorded movement 
of capital out of the country. However, there are other reasonable expla-
nations for mispricing. Some of these explanations work in a similar 
direction. For instance, underreporting of exports allows fi rms to acquire 
foreign exchange that is not disclosed to national authorities; the foreign 
currency can then be freely used by exporters without complying with 
controls and regulations (for example, a potential option may be the sale 
of foreign currency in the parallel exchange rate market). Furthermore, 
authorities may use information on the export activities of fi rms to infer 
the production of these fi rms. As a result, fi rms that seek to hide output 
(for example, to evade domestic taxes) will automatically also seek to 
hide exports. Dabla-Norris, Gradstein, and Inchauste (2008) provide a 
description of informal activities by fi rms.
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Others work in the opposite direction. For instance, if there are 
import restrictions, there is an incentive to underinvoice imports; the 
misdeclaration of cargo is an obvious solution to circumvent these trade 
restrictions. Bhagwati (1964) provides an early empirical assessment of 
such activities. Similarly, to benefi t from export subsidies, exports can be 
overinvoiced. Celâsun and Rodrik (1989) argue that a sizable share of 
the increase in Turkish exports after 1980 is caused by a change in invoic-
ing practices among domestic entrepreneurs (to take advantage of gen-
erous export subsidies).
Summary
The fi nding that offi cial trade statistics may suffer from misreporting 
and faked declarations is a fact well known not only to statisticians of 
international trade. Bhagwati (1964, 1967) provides an early economic 
discussion of incentives for misinvoicing in trade; Bhagwati and Han-
sen (1973) develop a trade model to examine the welfare effects of 
smuggling.
Using trade statistics to quantify the extent of misreporting, however, 
appears to be diffi cult. Misreporting can work in either direction, so that 
some activities may offset each other in aggregate trade statistics. Also, 
the extent to which transactions are reported at all (and thus show up in 
the trade statistics of at least one of the trade partners) may vary. 
Increased surveillance of trade transactions have apparently little mea-
surable effect.3 Finally, discrepancies in trade statistics may simply arise 
from statistical factors. A quantitative assessment of such factors in a 
bilateral context has been provided for trade fl ows between Australia and 
the EU; reported trade fi gures differ, on average, by about 10 percent 
between the two trade partners. Table 10.1 summarizes the results. As 
shown, the largest source of discrepancy between recorded exports and 
imports is the difference in (c.i.f.–f.o.b.) valuation, which infl ates Euro-
pean import data by, on average, about 9 percent. In contrast, goods that 
are imported by Australia and are subsequently reexported to the EU 
may have initially artifi cially lowered the discrepancy (since they are 
recorded in Australia’s exports, but not in the EU’s imports). In view of 
all these diffi culties, the EU, though aiming to reduce the declaration 
burden on businesses, still refrains from using mirror (single-fl ow) trade 
statistics.4
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Trade Mispricing and Illicit Financial Flows
IFFs are, by defi nition, unobservable in offi cial statistics. However, 
based on the assumption that trade mispricing is an important method 
for the unrecorded movement of capital out of a country, a number of 
papers have examined trade statistics to provide a rough empirical 
indication of the magnitude of IFFs. In the following, two of these 
approaches are discussed in detail: the analysis of asymmetries in trade 
statistics and the analysis of price anomalies in transaction-level trade 
data.
Table 10.1. Asymmetries in Australia–European Union Trade: A Statistical 
Practitioner’s Assessment
Indicator 1992 1993 1994 1995 1996 1997
a. Australian exports (f.o.b.)
($A, millions)
7,71 1 7,476 7,247 8,007 8,381 8,678
 Adjustments
  Country classiﬁ cation
   Australian reexports −400 −417 −327 −451 −394 −333
   EU indirect imports 101 133 120 137 242 185
   EU reimports 215 195 240 245 275 315
  Exchange rate −25 −4 7 −1 1 −28
  Ships 80 — — — — —
Adjusted Australian exports 7,682 7,383 7,286 7,937 8,504 8,815
 b. EU imports (c.i.f.) ($A, millions) 8,721 7, 159 7,979 8,813 8,526 9,570
 Adjustments
  Valuation −728 −605 −658 −737 −708 −795
  Timing −93 25 81 54 62 23
  Exchange rate −41 13 −7 — −6 –15
  Ships — — — — 236 —
  Nonmonetary gold 63 484 126 −4 1 19 —
Adjusted EU imports 7,922 7,077 7,520 8,124 8,228 8,782
c. Discrepancy
 Unadjusted 1,010 −316 732 806 145 892
  percent 13 −4 10 10 2 10
 Adjusted 240 −306 235 187 −276 −34
  percent 3 −4 3 2 −3 —
Source: ABS 1998.
Note: — = not available.
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Conceptual issues
It may be useful to address briefl y some conceptual issues on the defi ni-
tion of IFFs. In describing capital fl ows, one often applies different con-
cepts to classify capital transactions. For instance, as noted by the Inter-
national Monetary Fund (IMF), there is an occasional tendency to 
identify any capital outfl ow from a country as capital fl ight (IMF 1992). 
Kar and Cartwright-Smith appear to follow this (broadest possible) 
approach for capital outfl ows from developing countries; they argue that 
“the term fl ight capital is most commonly applied in reference to money 
that shifts out of developing countries, usually into western economies” 
(Kar and Cartwright-Smith 2008, iii).
While this approach may be applicable, a possible shortcoming of this 
general defi nition is that it also covers all standard (or normal) crossbor-
der capital transactions. Therefore, a number of authors prefer to take a 
more restrictive approach that includes only a subset of capital move-
ments and also justifi es the negative connotation (capital fl ight). Walter 
(1987), for instance, emphasizes the importance of motivations for fl ight 
(such as macroeconomic mismanagement or fear of confi scation) by 
arguing that fl ight capital is capital that fl ees. Cumby and Levich (1987) 
focus on the type of transaction by excluding all freely organized legal 
transactions from their defi nition of capital fl ight. It might thus seem 
reasonable to distinguish capital transactions along various dimensions, 
such as the source of capital, the method of transfer, and the motivation 
for the transaction.
A similar reasoning may also apply to the defi nition of IFFs. Kar and 
Cartwright-Smith (2008, iv) provide a comprehensive approach, treat-
ing all unrecorded capital transfers as illegal and note, more generally, 
that “illicit money is money that is illegally earned, transferred, or uti-
lized.”5 Another plausible defi nition, by contrast, also takes into account 
the motivation for such behavior. IFFs may then be defi ned as any capital 
transaction that intentionally moves capital out of a country in a man-
ner that is not recorded; trade mispricing is therefore one of (potentially 
many) possible conduits for such conduct.6
Examining asymmetries in trade data
A prominent approach to quantifying the extent of misinvoicing is the 
analysis of matched partner country trade statistics. Based on the principle 
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of double counting in trade statistics, a country’s exports to a partner are 
compared to what the partner reports as its imports (mirror statistics). 
The difference may then provide a reasonable indication of illicit fl ows 
that occur through mispricing. A recent application of this approach is 
Kar and Cartwright-Smith (2008); an early contribution is Bhagwati, 
Krueger, and Wibulswasdi (1974).
Trade asymmetries  mispricing. Any estimate of IFFs derived from 
asymmetries in trade statistics has to deal explicitly with three types of 
problems. The most notable issue is related to the accuracy of trade sta-
tistics in general. As noted above, partner country trade data typically 
differ for various reasons. As a result, trade fi gures have to be adjusted 
before any possible remaining statistical asymmetry can be reasonably 
interpreted as deriving from mispricing. At a minimum, trade data have 
to be corrected for differences in valuation, which is most likely to be the 
main reason for a discrepancy in mirror statistics. However, the infor-
mation on transportation costs that is needed for the conversion from 
f.o.b. to c.i.f. values is rare; for precisely this reason, some trade econo-
mists have used the c.i.f.–f.o.b. ratio as a proxy for transportation costs.7
Two approaches have frequently been applied in the literature to deal 
with this issue. First, the analysis may focus particularly on episodes in 
which f.o.b. export values exceed the corresponding c.i.f. import values. 
Because the latter include additional price components (transportation 
costs) and, therefore, should, by defi nition, be larger than the former, 
such perverse statistical fi ndings may indicate that mispricing has 
occurred; this argument was fi rst made by Bhagwati (1964) in an empir-
ical analysis of the underinvoicing of imports. Capital outfl ows through 
trade mispricing, however, work exactly in the opposite direction; these 
activities are associated with overinvoicing of imports and underinvoic-
ing of exports, which tend to infl ate the observed difference between 
c.i.f. and f.o.b. values so that this approach is of little help.
Second, a number of papers apply a fl at c.i.f.–f.o.b. conversion factor. 
Typically, with reference to conventions by international organizations, a 
10 percent difference between c.i.f. and f.o.b. values is assumed. For 
instance, in using partner data to supplement their trade database, the 
IMF generally applies a c.i.f.–f.o.b. factor of 1.1. Any discrepancy in mir-
ror statistics that exceeds this correction might then be attributed to 
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mispricing; for instance, see Bhagwati, Krueger, and Wibulswasdi (1974). 
However, this approach provides, at best, only a crude empirical indica-
tion of the potential presence of misinvoicing because the assumption of 
a fi xed conversion factor that varies neither over time nor among trading 
partners is clearly challenging.
Mispricing  illicit ﬂ ows. To the extent that discrepancies in trade statis-
tics indeed refl ect mispricing, over- and underinvoicing of trade trans-
actions may be completely unrelated to IFFs (narrowly defi ned). An 
obvious reason to underinvoice trade is to avoid the payment of trade 
taxes; similarly, overinvoicing allows a trader to benefi t from trade sub-
sidies. More specifi cally, if export duties are ad valorem, the motive to 
reduce the effective tax rate by underinvoicing exports is indistinguish-
able from a fl ight-motivated capital outfl ow in the analysis of mirror 
statistics in international trade. In similar fashion, the overinvoicing of 
imports (for other reasons than capital fl ight) may occur if a fi rm seeks 
to reduce its before-tax profi ts (and, hence, the effective tax on profi ts) 
by overstating the cost of imported inputs. As a result, an assumption 
has to be made about the extent to which trade mispricing is, indeed, a 
channel for illicit fl ows.
Illicit ﬂ ows  trade asymmetries. Conversely, it is questionable whether 
the extent of illicit fl ows is detectable from asymmetries in aggregate 
trade data. Various incentives to fake trade invoices that work exactly in 
the opposite direction relative to the capital fl ight motives can be identi-
fi ed. The effects of these explanations on trade (that is, underinvoicing 
of imports and overinvoicing of exports) have been widely documented. 
For instance, Celâsun and Rodrik (1989, 723) note that the introduction 
of export subsidies in Turkey in the early 1980s led to substantial overin-
voicing: “Turkish entrepreneurs, never too shy in exploiting arbitrage 
opportunities, used the wedge [between the profi tability of manufac-
tures exports and the profi tability of other means of earning foreign 
exchange] to their advantage.” Celâsun and Rodrik conclude (1989, 729–
30) that, “once fi ctitious exports are eliminated, the average growth rate 
of Turkish exports . . . is not nearly as spectacular as [that] . . . calculated 
from offi cial statistics.” The existence of obvious incentives for underin-
voicing imports has been recently documented empirically by Yang 
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(2008), who examines an increase in enforcement in Philippine customs 
that targets a specifi c method of avoiding import duties. He nicely illus-
trates that increased enforcement (by lowering the minimum value 
threshold for preshipment customs inspection for shipments from a 
subset of origin countries) reduced the targeted duty-avoidance method, 
but caused substantial displacement in an alternative method (shipping 
via duty-exempt export processing zones).
In sum, there are various motives for mispricing in trade invoices. 
Table 10.2 lists some of these motives. As these effects partly work in 
opposite directions, they may easily cancel each other out at the aggre-
gate trade level. For instance, if a shipment is underinvoiced in the 
exporting country to move capital unrecorded out of the country, and 
the shipment carries the same mispriced invoice in the importing coun-
try to evade import tariffs, no discrepancy in mirror trade statistics will 
occur.8 Reviewing the various motives, Bhagwati, Krueger, and Wibuls-
wasdi (1974) argue that underinvoicing of exports, rather than overin-
voicing of imports, is more often used as a vehicle of capital fl ight, also 
because export controls are less restrictive. Gulati (1987) even fi nds that, 
if trade invoices are faked, the underinvoicing of imports more than out-
weighs the underinvoicing of exports so that, for a number of countries, 
(illicit) capital infl ows are observed.
Kar and Cartwright-Smith (2008). In view of these diffi culties, it is inter-
esting to review recent estimates by Kar and Cartwright-Smith (2008) of 
capital fl ight arising because of trade mispricing.9 These authors analyze 
international trade statistics, address the above-mentioned relevant issues 
in a consistent and transparent way, and estimate, based on this analysis, 
the volume and pattern of IFFs. While their efforts have provoked useful 
debate, it should also be clear that the reliability of the estimates crucially 
hinges on the assumptions made and the conventions chosen.
Table 10.2. Motives for Mispricing in International Trade
Trade Overinvoicing Underinvoicing
Exports Capturing export subsidies Capital ﬂ ight, avoiding export taxes
Imports Capital ﬂ ight, lowering domestic proﬁ ts Evading import duties
Source: Adapted from Dornbusch and Kuenzler (1993). 
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A fi rst set of methodological issues in Kar and Cartwright-Smith 
(2008) relates to the interpretation of observed asymmetries in matched 
partner trade statistics. As noted above, trade asymmetries may arise for 
a variety of reasons and, therefore, do not necessarily refl ect trade mis-
pricing. Kar and Cartwright-Smith (2008) acknowledge the diffi culty in 
properly identifying mispricing from trade data by providing a defi nition 
for trade asymmetries of interest. Specifi cally, after a careful discussion of 
the limitations of various models in estimating illicit fl ows, they provide 
two sets of estimates of trade mispricing by country. In their baseline 
model, they apply a gross excluding reversals method. This method is 
based on the assumption that episodes of bilateral export underinvoicing 
and import overinvoicing refl ect capital outfl ows, while they argue that 
episodes of pair-wise trade gaps in the opposite direction (possibly repre-
senting capital infl ows) are spurious because of data issues (and therefore 
simply set to zero). As a result, if a country reports low export fi gures rela-
tive to recorded imports in the corresponding partner country, this dis-
crepancy is defi ned, according to Kar and Cartwright-Smith, as mispric-
ing. In contrast, a statistical discrepancy similar in magnitude that results 
from the same country’s relatively large exports relative to another part-
ner’s imports is, by defi nition, ignored. This selective interpretation of 
trade asymmetries appears to infl ate estimates of IFFs artifi cially. Indeed, 
if offsetting capital fl ows are additionally taken into account, a country’s 
net position is obtained, which is often sizably lower than the estimated 
gross excluding reversals result. With this extension, many aggregate 
country estimates even change signs. However, Kar and Cartwright-
Smith argue that results derived from such an approach are distorted and 
unrealistic and focus instead on their method.
Kar and Cartwright-Smith’s (2008) interpretation becomes particu-
larly troublesome if one also takes the treatment of transportation costs 
in their analysis into consideration. A major source of discrepancy 
between exports and the corresponding imports is the difference in val-
uation concepts, so that c.i.f. imports must be converted to f.o.b. values. 
Kar and Cartwright-Smith apply a c.i.f.–f.o.b. conversion factor that 
is fi xed (at 1.1) across all bilateral country pairs (irrespective of trade 
distance and the commodity composition of trade) and over time. In 
practice, however, c.i.f.–f.o.b. ratios in international trade statistics often 
lie outside a reasonable range of variation. According to Hummels and 
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Lugovskyy (2006), roughly half of all observations in the IMF’s Direc-
tion of Trade Statistics database lie outside a (1, 2) range (which would 
be consistent with ad valorem transportation costs between 0 and 100 
percent); the remaining observations contain substantial errors in lev-
els.10 Still, Kar and Cartwright-Smith classify, after a fl at 1.1 correction, 
any c.i.f.–f.o.b. ratio larger than 1 as evidence of trade mispricing, while 
ratios below this threshold (often covering substantial fractions of trade) 
are treated as noise.11
Another set of issues refers to the diffi culty of identifying mispricing 
and estimating IFFs from aggregate trade data. Mispricing occurs at the 
level of the individual trade transaction, whereas Kar and Cartwright-
Smith (2008) examine trade asymmetries at the country level. Their 
focus on aggregate trade, however, is likely to produce inconsistent 
results. Assume, for instance, that trade gaps at the commodity level can-
cel each other out at the aggregate level; these trade gaps remain uncap-
tured by Kar and Cartwright-Smith, potentially leading to aggregation 
bias. More realistically, if trade gaps are concentrated in a few product 
categories with serious diffi culties in properly reporting trade fl ows (for 
example, crude oil), the resulting trade asymmetries at the country level 
are taken as evidence of trade mispricing (and, thus, IFFs).
Moreover, any pooled estimate of asymmetries in aggregate trade 
data may mask considerable variation in export and import behavior. 
Therefore, if one computes trade gaps for a large set of countries, it 
appears particularly helpful to distinguish between and report results 
separately for the underinvoicing of exports and the overinvoicing of 
imports. In principle, there should be no difference between the two 
methods: both activities involve faking of trade declarations, and both 
activities may be instruments to facilitate illicit capital fl ows. In practice, 
however, there are typically large differences in the observed degrees of 
export underinvoicing and import overinvoicing; see, for instance, 
Gulati (1987). Bhagwati, Krueger, and Wibulswasdi (1974) argue that, 
especially, the incentive to overinvoice imports as a vehicle of capital 
fl ight is often overcome by other motives to fake trade invoices. As a 
result, there is an asymmetry of conduit behavior for IFFs that should be 
documented in empirical fi ndings to aid the proper interpretation of the 
results.
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Examining transaction-level price data
In a series of papers, Simon Pak and John Zdanowicz analyze price data 
in transaction-level trade statistics. In a typical analysis, such as de Boyrie, 
Pak, and Zdanowicz (2005), the authors examine information from indi-
vidual export declarations and entry forms in U.S. external trade. The 
data set is huge; it contains about two million records per year.12 Specifi -
cally, Pak and Zdanowicz are interested in the product code, the partner 
country involved in the trade, and the price quoted in the trade docu-
ment. With this information, it is possible to analyze, for each product-
country pair, the range of prices recorded in trade transactions. More 
notably, based on this price range, transactions with abnormal prices can 
be identifi ed; Pak and Zdanowicz defi ne prices that fall outside the inter-
quartile range as abnormal. These improperly priced transactions are 
then assumed to constitute illegal capital fl ows, and the capital outfl ow is 
determined by the dollar value of the over- or underinvoicing of a trans-
action based on its deviation from interquartile prices.
What is a product? Although Pak and Zdanowicz’s idea of using micro-
level trade data is generally intuitive, their approach is not without dif-
fi culties. An obvious issue is the defi nition of a product. Pak and Zdano-
wicz rely on the harmonized classifi cation of products in international 
trade statistics. At the most detailed level (for U.S. external trade), this 
commodity code system contains about 20,000 product categories. It is 
unknown, however, whether these products are, indeed, homogeneous; 
there may be considerable differences in product characteristics (such as 
quality) and, thus, in product prices within categories. As a result, the 
price range within a category may be wide so that mispriced transactions 
remain undetected. Alternatively, a transaction may be mistakenly iden-
tifi ed as improperly priced if most transactions within a category are in 
low-value products, while a single transaction is in an expensive high-
quality product.
The relevance of product defi nitions has been recently highlighted by 
Javorcik and Narciso (2008), who argue that there is broader scope for fak-
ing invoices in differentiated products because it is diffi cult to assess the 
quality and thus the price of such products. Examining trade gaps in mir-
ror trade statistics for German exports to 10 Eastern European countries, 
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they fi nd that the responsiveness of the trade gap to the level of tariffs is 
greater for differentiated products than for homogeneous goods.
In addition, it should be mentioned that the product categories are 
defi ned for customs purposes. This implies, for instance, that some 
products are properly and tightly defi ned, while there are plenty of prod-
uct codes that simply collect all other types of products. For illustration, 
consider the description of the 2009 harmonized tariff schedule.13 The 
tariff schedule lists 28,985 product categories (including subheadings), 
of which about half (12,581 categories) contain the catchall “other” in 
the description. Examples are shown in table 10.3. As indicated, the fi rst 
category of heading 4901 covers printed material in single sheets. This 
material is categorized into “reproduction proofs” and all “other” single-
sheet material; the other single-sheet material may range from plain 
black-and-white leafl ets to expensive art prints on special paper, and 
there is no further qualifi cation in the customs statistics. The category 
“art books” is divided into subcategories by price alone: less than US$5 
or more than US$5 for each book. However, it is obvious that art books 
that cost more than US$5 may still vary considerably in style, format, 
and quality (and therefore also price). Finally, the unit of quantity for 
“tankers” is the number of ships; differences in the size and equipment 
of such ships may imply considerable price differences per unit.
Abnormal prices. Another challenge facing the Pak and Zdanowicz 
approach is the arbitrary defi nition of abnormal prices.14 The focus on 
the interquartile price range appears to be taken from U.S. legal regula-
tions aimed at detecting transfer price manipulation in trade between 
related parties. However, there is no economic reason to describe prices 
above or below a certain threshold level as abnormal a priori. In fact, 
even for products with minor variations in prices, the method may, 
under specifi c circumstances, identify improper pricing.
More importantly, any analysis that is based on the distribution of 
prices appears to be sensitive to the number of observations. For exam-
ple, transactions involving products for which a similar range of traded 
prices is observed may be classifi ed as normal or abnormal depending 
on the number of trade transactions. Alternatively, the occurrence of an 
additional data point may lead to a reclassifi cation of a transaction from 
normal to abnormal or vice versa. In general, the distribution of prices 
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Table 10.3. Examples of Product Categories in the U.S. Tariff Schedule, 2009
Heading/subheading, 
statistical sufﬁ x Description
4901 Printed books, brochures, leaﬂ ets and similar printed matter, whether or not in 
single sheets
4901.10.00  In single sheets, whether or not folded
 20   Reproduction proofs
 40   Other
 Other
4901.91.00   Dictionaries and encyclopedias, and serial installments thereof
 20    Dictionaries (including thesauruses)
 40    Encyclopedias
4901.99.00   Other
 10    Textbooks
 20     Bound newspapers, journals and periodicals provided for in Legal Note 3 
to this chapter
 30    Directories
   Other
 40     Bibles, testaments, prayer books, and other religious books
 50     Technical, scientiﬁ c, and professional books
    Art and pictorial books
 60      Valued under US$5 each
 65      Valued US$5 or more each
    Other
 70      Hardbound books
 75      Rack size paperbound books
     Other
 9 1       Containing not more than 4 pages each (excluding covers)
 92        Containing 5 or more pages each, but not more than 48 pages 
each (excluding covers)
 93       Containing 49 or more pages each (excluding covers)
8901 Cruise ships, excursion boats, ferry boats, cargo ships, barges and similar vessels 
for the transport of persons or goods
8901.10.00 00  Cruise ships, excursion boats and similar vessels principally designed for the 
transport of persons; ferry boats of all kinds
8901.20.00 00  Tankers
8901.30.00 00  Refrigerated vessels, other than those of subheading 8901.20
8901.90.00 00  Other vessels for the transport of goods and other vessels for the transport of 
both persons and goods
Source: Author compilation based on data of United States International Trade Commission, “Ofﬁ cial Harmonized Tariff 
Schedule,” http://www.usitc.gov/tata/hts/index.htm.
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should become more representative, the greater the number of price 
observations available. For many products, however, there are typically 
few bilateral trade transactions.
Price variations over time. Prices above or below a certain threshold are 
mechanically classifi ed as faked, but the results are potentially diffi cult to 
interpret. Differences in prices at the transaction level may arise for var-
ious reasons. These reasons may be trivial, such as mistakes in fi lling the 
form. However, there may also be differences in prices across markets 
(within the United States or internationally). Also, if variations in prices 
are analyzed over a longer time horizon, transaction dates may matter. 
For instance, seasonality may lead to considerable price fl uctuations.15
Quantity faking. An issue that remains untouched by the Pak and Zdan-
owicz approach is misinvoicing of quantities. Instead of faking prices or 
unit values, a trader may fake the invoice by misstating the quantity 
shipped, that is, the container holds a quantity that is different from the 
invoiced quantity. Although the method is perhaps more detectable than 
unit value faking, Bhagwati (1981, 417) notes that this is a “rather com-
mon form of illegality.” In addition, there are other ways of misinvoicing, 
including, for instance, the omission of invoiced spare parts.
Trade pairs. Since Pak and Zdanowicz’s results are exclusively based on 
data from U.S. customs, it is unclear to what extent they can be general-
ized. Anecdotal evidence suggests that the faking of trade invoices occurs 
especially in trade with a main trading partner that is not necessarily the 
United States. For instance, Celâsun and Rodrik (1989) fi nd strong evi-
dence of misreporting only in Turkey’s trade with Germany. For African 
countries, trade with South Africa, the regional economic and fi nancial 
center, may be the preferred target for misdeclaration.
Trade Asymmetries: An Empirical Analysis
For illustration, this section briefl y examines trade asymmetries at the 
commodity level.16 This empirical exercise relies on the United Nations 
Comtrade database for export and import data at the 4-digit (harmonized 
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system [HS]) product level.17 The database contains detailed (annual) 
trade statistics reported by statistical authorities of close to 200 countries 
or territories and standardized by the United Nations Statistics Division. 
Among the records of shipments to the fi ve largest importing nations in 
the world (China, Germany, Japan, the United Kingdom, and the United 
States), there are more than 1,200 product categories at the 4-digit level. 
We use the most recent commodity classifi cation (HS 2002); the data are 
available for fi ve years, covering the period from 2002 to 2006.
We begin by exploring the full sample of annual country pair-specifi c 
trade gaps at the 4-digit product level, that is, we compute, for each 
country pair and product, the percentage difference between reported 
imports and corresponding exports. Table 10.4 lists the fi ve largest dis-
crepancies in bilateral trade by importer, along with the exporter and 
the 4-digit product code. A few empirical regularities emerge from this 
rough tabulation. For instance, most experiences where recorded import 
values greatly exceed corresponding exports appear to be concentrated 
in a single product category, “petroleum oils, crude” (HS code 2709). As 
Yeats (1978) notes, this discrepancy is often associated with problems in 
valuing petroleum and the frequent diversion of petroleum exports 
from their original destination during transit. For other product catego-
ries, in contrast, the export values (even though transportation costs 
are disregarded) are considerably larger than the imports in mirror 
 statistics. These categories include “other aircraft (for example, heli-
copters, aeroplanes), spacecraft” (8802), “cruise ships, excursion boats, 
ferry-boats, cargo ships, barges and similar vessels for the transport of 
persons or goods” (8901); and “gold (including gold plated with plati-
num)” (7108). A possible explanation is that, especially for bulky items 
characterized by low-frequency trading, the time lag between exporta-
tion and importation may be particularly important. Also, to the extent 
that there is any geographical pattern in misreporting, the overinvoicing 
of exports appears to be a more frequent problem in trade with neigh-
boring countries.
 To analyze the geographical pattern in misreporting, we examine dif-
ferences in trade gaps across countries in more detail. In particular, we 
aim to identify countries that consistently understate their exports (and, 
thus, appear to be particularly prone to trade mispricing or smuggling). 
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Table 10.4. Largest Trade Gaps, 2004
a. Underreporting of exports
percent
Importer
United States Germany China United Kingdom Japan
Exp. Prod. Gap Exp. Prod. Gap Exp. Prod. Gap Exp. Prod. Gap Exp. Prod. Gap
SAU 2709 23.8 LBY 2709 22.0 PHL 8542 22.4 BWA 7102 21.5 SAU 2709 23.4
VEN 2709 23.7 GBR 8803 21.2 AGO 2709 22.3 SAU 2710 20.6 QAT 2709 22.4
NGA 2709 23.5 DNK 9999 21.2 SAU 2709 22.3 KWT 2710 20.4 IDN 271 1 22.3
IRQ 2709 22.9 SAU 2709 20.7 OMN 2709 22.2 PHL 8542 20.3 KWT 2709 22. 1
AGO 2709 22.2 SYR 2709 20.7 IRN 2709 22.0 EGY 2709 19.7 ARE 271 1 2 1.6
b. Overreporting of exports
percent
Importer
United States Germany China United Kingdom Japan
Exp. Prod. Gap Exp. Prod. Gap Exp. Prod. Gap Exp. Prod. Gap Exp. Prod. Gap
DEU 8901 −19.9 CHN 8901 −20.3 HKG 8703 −20.8 USA 8803 −21.2 SWE 8802 −18.9
FIN 8901 −19.9 BEL 0803 −19.8 HKG 4101 −19.3 DEU 8802 −21.0 SGP 2204 −18.5
PRT 8802 −19.2 AUT 8901 −19.7 HKG 7108 −19.2 HKG 7108 −20.8 SGP 2208 −18.0
MEX 8602 −19.1 DNK 2716 −19.1 JPN 7108 −18.6 CAN 7108 −20.7 NZL 2709 −17.9
KOR 8901 −18.7 BLR 2709 −18.7 ARE 9999 −18.5 USA 8802 −20.7 BHR 7604 −17.6
Source: Author computation based on data of UN Comtrade (United Nations Commodity Trade Statistics Database), Statistics Division, Department of Economic and Social Affairs, United 
Nations, New York, http://comtrade.un.org/db/.
Note: Exp. = exporter. Prod. = 4-digit HS product code. Gap = percentage difference between reported imports by the country listed in the top row and the corresponding exports 
reported by the country listed in the columns.
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In a fi rst exercise, we compute, for each exporter, the average trade gap 
across all products. Because there may be sizable product-specifi c differ-
ences in reported trade values between the exporting and the importing 
country, taking the arithmetic mean of these reporting gaps over often 
hundreds of products is a simple way to identify (hopefully) country-
specifi c differences in trade reporting. Table 10.5 lists the fi ve countries 
with the largest average percentage share of missing exports by importer. 
As shown, we fi nd, indeed, a strong and consistent mismatch in interna-
tional trade statistics, with continuous underreporting, for instance, by 
Equatorial Guinea, Indonesia, and the Philippines. More importantly, 
reviewing the full distribution of exporting countries, we fi nd that the 
extent to which countries tend to misreport exports is broadly similar 
across trade destinations. The correlation of exporter-specifi c average 
trade gaps across importing countries is astonishingly high, on the order 
of about 0.9. Table 10.6 reports a set of simple bivariate correlation 
 coeffi cients; Spearman rank correlations (unreported) provide similar 
results. These consistent patterns of misreporting in trade appear to pro-
vide a useful basis for further research.
In Berger and Nitsch (2012), for instance, we use regression analysis 
to examine the association between observed trade gaps and country-
specifi c corruption levels. Holding constant a variety of other determi-
nants of discrepancies in trade statistics, we fi nd that the reporting gap 
in bilateral trade is, indeed, strongly associated with the level of corrup-
tion, especially in the source country. In countries with corrupt bureau-
cracies, it seems easier (and perhaps even common practice) to ignore 
legal rules and procedures. To the extent that this misbehavior also 
affects international trade transactions, our fi ndings suggest that report-
ing gaps in offi cial trade statistics partly refl ect illegal activities for which 
the illicit movement of capital may be one motivation.
Conclusion
A potential vehicle to move capital unrecorded out of a country is the 
misinvoicing of international trade transactions. Exporters may under-
state the export revenue on their invoices, and importers may overstate 
import expenditures, while their trading partners are instructed to 
deposit the balance for their benefi t in a foreign account.
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Table 10.5. Underreporting of Exports by Country, 2002–06
percent
Importer
United States Germany China United Kingdom Japan All ﬁ ve
Exporter Gap Exporter Gap Exporter Gap Exporter Gap Exporter Gap Exporter Gap
Libya 14.5 Equatorial 
Guinea
12.1 Equatorial 
Guinea
14.9 Indonesia 12.1 Iraq 16.3 Equatorial 
Guinea
12.6
Lesotho 13.5 Indonesia 1 1 .9 Congo, Rep. 13.5 Lao PDR 1 1.5 Equatorial 
Guinea
14.0 Indonesia 12.4
Indonesia 13.3 Ukraine 1 1 .4 Congo, 
Dem. Rep.
12.7 Myanmar 1 1 .5 Western Sahara 13.7 Philippines 1 1 .6
Philippines 12.7 Philippines 1 1 .2 Chad 1 1.8 Falkland Islands 1 1 .2 Indonesia 13.2 Iraq 1 1 .4
Iraq 12.5 Serbia and 
Montenegro
1 1 .0 Rwanda 1 1 .8 Philippines 1 1 .5 Botswana 12.8 Western Sahara 1 1 .3
Source: Author computation based on data of UN Comtrade (United Nations Commodity Trade Statistics Database), Statistics Division, Department of Economic and Social Affairs, United 
Nations, New York, http://comtrade.un.org/db/.
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This chapter critically reviews empirical approaches to quantify the 
extent of trade mispricing. There are at least two sorts of problems. First, 
mispricing behavior is hard to identify. The analysis of discrepancies in 
bilateral trade statistics appears to be of generally limited value because 
gaps in trade statistics also typically arise for reasons unrelated to mis-
pricing. The second set of issues refers to the motivations for fraudulent 
trade behavior. Even if mispricing is properly identifi ed, there are incen-
tives for faking trade invoices other than the desire to transfer capital.
Overall, the accuracy and reliability of estimates of IFFs based on trade 
mispricing are questioned. This fi nding is in line with Bhagwati (1967, 
63), who argues that, “whereas it is easy to establish the conditions under 
which the faking of trade values . . . will occur, it is in practice extremely 
diffi cult to set about determining whether such faking is actually occur-
ring. It is further impossible to fi nd out how much faking is going on.”
Notes
 1. This difference is based on agreed guidelines for international trade statistics as 
published by the United Nations (1998). Some countries, however, also report 
imports on an f.o.b. basis (for example, Australia).
 2. Ruffl es et al. (2003) provide a more detailed description.
 3. Winston (1974, 64) argues that, “regardless of the sincerity of efforts, it is virtu-
ally impossible to control overinvoicing considering the myriad ways it can, in 
fact, be done.”
 4. For an early attempt, see the European Commission’s initiative Simpler Legis-
lation for the Internal Market, which is documented at http://ec.europa.eu/ 
 internal_market/simplifi cation/index_en.htm.
Table 10.6. Correlation of Exporter-Speciﬁ c Average Trade Gaps
Country United States Germany China United Kingdom Japan All
United States 1.0000
Germany 0.9245 1.0000
China 0.8357 0.7824 1.0000
United Kingdom 0.9368 0.9571 0.7986 1.0000
Japan 0.9015 0.8572 0.8963 0.8582 1.0000
All ﬁ ve importers 0.9700 0.9494 0.9120 0.9564 0.9548 1.0000
Source: Author computation based on data of UN Comtrade (United Nations Commodity Trade Statistics Database), Sta-
tistics Division, Department of Economic and Social Affairs, United Nations, New York, http://comtrade.un.org/db/.
Note: The table is based on 202 observations.
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 5. Kar and Cartwright-Smith (2008, iii) argue that “by far the greater part of unre-
corded fl ows are indeed illicit, violating the national criminal and civil codes, tax 
laws, customs regulations, VAT assessments, exchange control requirements and 
banking regulations of the countries out of which unrecorded/illicit fl ows occur.”
 6. For instance, for some transactions, the avoidance of trade taxes rather than 
capital transfer may be the primary motivation.
 7. For an early critical assessment of this approach, see Moneta (1959).
 8. A more fundamental issue revolves around the fact that illicit fl ows through 
trade mispricing may not necessarily show up in trade invoices (for example, if 
there are unoffi cial agreements).
 9. Kar and Cartwright-Smith (2008) also apply other methods (such as the World 
Bank residual model) to derive estimates of IFFs. Since one term in the compu-
tation of the World Bank residual is the current account balance, which may be 
distorted downward by trade mispricing, both results are added to obtain an 
aggregate estimate.
10. Direction of Trade Statistics (database), International Monetary Fund, Washing-
ton, DC, http://elibrary-data.imf.org/FindDataReports.aspx?d=33061&e=170921.
11. Hummels and Lugovskyy (2006) note that, for New Zealand and the United 
States, episodes in which f.o.b. exports exceed corresponding c.i.f. imports con-
stitute about one-third of the IMF data.
12. The data are obtained from the U.S. Merchandise Trade Databases; see USA 
Trade Online (database), U.S. Department of Commerce, Washington, DC, 
https://www.usatradeonline.gov/.
13. See the archive section at United States International Trade Commission, “Offi -
cial Harmonized Tariff Schedule,” http://www.usitc.gov/tata/hts/index.htm.
14. See also the discussion in Fuest and Riedel’s contribution to this volume (chap-
ter 4).
15. Gopinath and Rigobon (2008) examine monthly price data for approximately 
20,000 imported goods and fi nd that the (trade-weighted) median price dura-
tion in the currency of pricing is 10.6 months.
16. This section draws on Berger and Nitsch (2012).
17. UN Comtrade (United Nations Commodity Trade Statistics Database), Statis-
tics Division, Department of Economic and Social Affairs, United Nations, New 
York, http://comtrade.un.org/db/.
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Many citizens of developing (and developed) countries now have easy 
access to tax havens and the result is that these countries are losing to tax 
havens almost three times what they get from developed countries in aid. 
If taxes on this income were collected billions of dollars would become 
available to fi nance development.
—Jeffrey Owens, Director, Centre for Tax Policy Administration,
Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development, 
January 2009
We will set down new measures to crack down on those tax havens that 
siphon money from developing countries, money that could otherwise 
be spent on bed nets, vaccinations, economic development and jobs.
—Gordon Brown, Prime Minister, United Kingdom, March 2009
We stand ready to take agreed action against those jurisdictions 
which do not meet international standards in relation to tax 
transparency. . . . We are committed to developing proposals, by end 
2009, to make it easier for developing countries to secure the benefi ts of 
a new cooperative tax environment.
—G-20 Declaration, April 20091
Alex Cobham
Tax Havens and Illicit Flows
Additional tables and fi gures from this chapter can be found at http://go.worldbank.org
/N2HMRB4G20.
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Abstract
Only limited research has been carried out on the links between tax 
havens and developing countries. This chapter provides a brief, critical 
survey of the state of knowledge on the impact of tax havens on develop-
ment and then uses existing data to extend that knowledge by examining 
bilateral trade and fi nancial fl ows between havens and developing coun-
tries to identify the exposure of developing countries of different types.
Three key results emerge. First, the chapter shows that the exposure of 
developing countries to tax havens is on a par with, if not more severe 
than, that of high-income countries of the Organisation for Economic 
Co-operation and Development (OECD). This supports efforts to 
ensure that developing countries benefi t from initiatives to require 
greater transparency, particularly in terms of international tax coopera-
tion. Second, the differences in developing-country exposure across dif-
ferent income groups of countries and regions are substantial, and rec-
ognition of this must lead to more detailed and careful study and, over 
time, appropriate policy responses. Finally, the research has been repeat-
edly blocked by a lack of high-quality, internationally comparable data. 
An agenda for research and for data collation and dissemination is pro-
posed that would allow greater certainty of the scale of the impact of tax 
havens on development.
Introduction
In the wake of the fi nancial crisis, a consensus emerged that interna-
tional measures were required to limit the damage caused by tax haven 
secrecy and that developing countries must be included to ensure that 
these countries also benefi t.
Research demonstrating the damage caused by havens, especially to 
developing countries, remains limited, however. If international policy 
efforts are to be well directed and, ultimately, to be effective in removing 
obstacles to development, then further work is needed. It is regrettable that 
policy research at multilateral institutions has almost completely neglected 
these issues until now. The research that has been carried out, at least until 
recently, when these issues began moving rapidly up the policy agenda, has 
largely been conducted by academics and civil society researchers.
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This chapter sets out the key questions on this important research 
agenda that has now become an urgent one also for policy. There are 
three main areas requiring further analysis: the defi nition of tax havens, 
the broad development impact of tax havens, and the specifi c impact on 
particular developing countries in different regions and at various 
income levels. An additional issue that should be addressed urgently is 
the lack of data to examine these questions.
The chapter addresses these questions in turn. We begin by consider-
ing three related, but distinct concepts—tax havens, offshore fi nancial 
centers, and secrecy jurisdictions—and the various defi nitions that have 
been offered for each. The lack of clarity in defi nitions has been a signifi -
cant barrier to greater understanding, and it emerges from our discus-
sion that the fundamental feature of these concepts relates not to the 
provision of low(er) tax rates, nor to the provision of fi nancial services 
to nonresidents, but to the secrecy associated with each provision. The 
fi nancial secrecy index (FSI) is therefore identifi ed as a potentially valu-
able tool for further research.
We then briefl y survey the literature on the development impact of 
secrecy jurisdictions. This serves to highlight two main points. First, the 
key damage appears to stem from the functions attributed to secrecy 
jurisdictions, rather than to the functions of the alternatively defi ned 
entities discussed. Second, the literature identifi es a range of powerful 
arguments about the impacts, but does little to differentiate among 
developing countries and tends to treat the experience of these countries 
as homogenous. Greater evidence of direct causality is also required.
The next section takes the fi rst steps toward providing a more differ-
entiated analysis of development links. By considering a range of bilat-
eral fl ows and stocks in trade and fi nance, we identify the key areas in 
which different types of developing countries are most exposed to the 
damage that relationships with secrecy jurisdictions can engender. The 
claim sometimes made that developing countries are less at risk than 
richer economies fi nds no support in terms of the recorded scale of 
developing-country exposure. In addition, important differences in 
exposure emerge among developing countries in different regions and at 
different income levels.
This chapter does not set out to prove causal links between the expo-
sure to secrecy jurisdictions and damage to development. It does, how-
340 Draining Development?
ever, close by setting out a clear agenda for future research that would 
address the need for more information on these links. Without such 
research by academics and policy researchers not only at nongovern-
mental organizations, but also at international fi nancial institutions, 
there can be no guarantee that the well-meaning efforts of the G-20 or 
other international policy coordination groups will generate the poten-
tially substantial benefi ts for development. The requirement for more 
research must be addressed without delay.
Tax Havens: Offshore Financial Centers 
or Secrecy Jurisdictions?
To undertake serious analysis of the impact of tax havens, the analyst 
must assert a specifi c defi nition that is objectively quantifi able and 
directly related to the harm believed to occur. This is necessary if the 
impact of those jurisdictions designated as tax havens is to be evaluated 
statistically. On this issue, there is a broad literature focusing on aca-
demic interests, advocacy, and offi cial policy positions and encompass-
ing a range of views.
Deﬁ nitions
The most common term—tax haven—is probably also the most prob-
lematic. As long ago as 1981, the Gordon Report to the U.S. Treasury 
found that there was no single, clear objective test that permits the iden-
tifi cation of a country as a tax haven (Gordon 1981). While originally 
intended, presumably, to indicate a jurisdiction with lower tax rates than 
elsewhere, the term came to be used to cover jurisdictions with a great 
range of functions, many largely unrelated to taxation.
Eden and Kudrle (2005), for example, draw on the literature to identify 
two categories of havens: one based on type of taxation, and one based on 
activity. The fi rst category, following Palan (2002), separates havens into 
“countries with no income tax where fi rms pay only license fees (e.g., 
Anguilla, Bermuda), countries with low taxation (e.g., Switzerland, the 
Channel Islands), countries that practice so-called ‘ring-fencing’ by tax-
ing domestic but not foreign income (e.g., Liberia, Hong Kong), and 
countries that grant special tax privileges to certain types of fi rms or 
operations (e.g., Luxembourg, Monaco)” (Eden and Kudrle 2005, 101).
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The second category, following Avi-Yonah (2000) and Kudrle and 
Eden (2003), distinguishes among production havens, which relocate 
real value added (for example, Ireland in the 1990s); headquarters 
havens, which provide incorporation benefi ts (for example, Belgium and 
Singapore); sham havens, which provide little more than addresses for 
fi nancial companies in particular (for example, Cayman Islands); and 
secrecy havens, the main advantage of which is opacity (and which 
include most sham havens).
Analysis under the heading tax haven tends to focus, understandably, 
on tax aspects. This view is most commonly associated with the OECD. 
While an earlier report (OECD 1987) focused on reputation (“a good 
indicator that a country is playing the role of a tax haven is where the 
country or territory offers itself or is generally recognised as a tax haven” 
[cited in OECD 1998, 21]), there is somewhat more precision in the 1998 
report. Specifi cally, the 1998 report emphasizes no or only nominal taxes 
as the starting point for the identifi cation of a tax haven, but allows, in 
addition, lack of an effective exchange of information, lack of transpar-
ency, and no substantial activities as further key factors.
The overarching rationale for the existence of tax havens that emerges 
from this approach is the provision of relief to businesses or individuals 
from the rates of tax that apply elsewhere. If real economic activity (in 
substance) is not moved to a new location from the original jurisdiction, 
then taxing rights have to be transferred by other means (manipulation 
of the form). This may involve taking advantage of genuine legal differ-
ences (for example, the distinction between the tax liabilities of corpo-
rate headquarters and the tax liabilities associated with locations where 
real economic activity takes place), of the absence of coordinated inter-
national tax policy (for example, exploiting differences between the 
 calculation of domestic and foreign tax liabilities in two or more juris-
dictions), or of asymmetric information across jurisdictions (for exam-
ple, hiding information about the true ownership of assets or income 
streams and, therefore, responsibility for the associated tax liabilities).
The second frequently used term is offshore fi nancial center (OFC). 
This term is preferred, for example, by the International Monetary Fund 
(IMF), the mandate of which is more closely aligned to issues of interna-
tional fi nancial regulatory oversight and stability than to issues of tax. 
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Palan explores some of the diffi culties of consistent defi nition in this 
case, as follows:
In fi nancial literature, . . . offshore is used . . . to describe unregulated 
international fi nance. . . . Rather confusingly, however, the International 
Monetary Fund and the Bank for International Settlements consider only 
tax havens as Offshore Financial Centres, though the City of London, 
which does not qualify as a tax haven, is considered the hub of global 
offshore fi nance. (Palan 1998, 64)
 Palan goes on to distinguish between spontaneous OFCs, which have 
grown up as entrepôts over time, such as the City of London and Hong 
Kong SAR, China, and international banking facilities that have been 
more recently created as part of a deliberate strategy, such as New York 
and Singapore.
An important IMF Working Paper by Ahmed Zoromé (2007) dis-
cusses the defi nitional issues in some detail and proposes new criteria 
(discussed in the following subsection). After surveying most of the key 
references, Zoromé concludes that “three distinctive and recurrent char-
acteristics of OFCs have emerged from these defi nitions: (i) the primary 
orientation of business toward nonresidents; (ii) the favorable regula-
tory environment (low supervisory requirements and minimal informa-
tion disclosure); and (iii) the low- or zero-taxation schemes” (Zoromé 
2007, 4).
This shifts the focus onto specifi c actions taken by jurisdictions, 
whereas other defi nitions tend to emphasize specifi c results. Zoromé’s 
subsequent application of these criteria offers one solution to Palan’s 
point about the City of London: Zoromé classifi es the United Kingdom 
as an OFC.
The third main term used—increasingly so since it was promoted by 
Murphy (2008)—is secrecy jurisdiction. The focus remains on specifi c 
actions taken, but is more explicit in emphasizing the legal steps. In this, 
it follows the logic of Palan (2002), who discusses the commercialization 
of sovereignty: the decision by certain jurisdictions to obtain economic 
advantage by allowing selected political decisions (over, for example, the 
taxation of nonresidents) to be dictated by likely users (for example, 
fi nancial, legal, and accounting practitioners). The term jurisdiction is 
therefore used, rather than, for example, center or some other less spe-
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cifi c term, because it is precisely the legal system that is the locus of the 
specifi c actions.
The emphasis on secrecy is necessary, Murphy argues, so that nonresi-
dents can take advantage of favorable changes in the jurisdiction’s legal 
framework with the confi dence that they will not fall foul of the legal 
system in the place where they reside. There are thus two key character-
istics that defi ne a secrecy jurisdiction:
•  “The secrecy jurisdiction creates regulation that they know is primarily 
of benefi t and use to those not resident in their geographical domain”
•  “The creation of a deliberate, and legally backed, veil of secrecy that 
ensures that those from outside the jurisdiction making use of its 
regulation cannot be identifi ed to be doing so.” (Murphy 2008, 6)2
By focusing on what makes them attractive, the secrecy jurisdiction 
concept therefore relies, above all, on an assessment of the comparative 
advantage of the jurisdictions in question. The route the secrecy juris-
dictions have chosen to attract (the declaration of) foreign economic or 
fi nancial activity is the provision of relatively favorable terms to users. In 
effect, this indicates a reliance on regulatory arbitrage (potentially, but 
not necessarily including tax regulation).3 Because some arbitrage is 
inevitable in the absence of comprehensive global standards, this also 
runs the risk of excessive breadth; the damaging element relates to arbi-
trage that is effective because it frustrates the intentions behind regula-
tory standards in other jurisdictions in regard to activities that remain 
substantially in those other jurisdictions.
Criteria and approaches
The success of attempts to identify the jurisdictions of concern has been 
mixed. Table 11A.1 reproduces a set of lists compiled by Murphy in 
chapter 9.4 The table outlines most of the main efforts by academics and 
institutions over the last 30 years. For the most part, these have drawn on 
defi nitions that, while generally made explicit, lack a basis in objective, 
measurable criteria.
To consider how such criteria might be created and applied, it is use-
ful to start with Zoromé (2007). Having established key characteristics 
of OFCs, Zoromé proposes a defi nition, as follows: “an OFC is a country 
or jurisdiction that provides fi nancial services to nonresidents on a scale 
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that is incommensurate with the size and the fi nancing of its domestic 
economy” (Zoromé 2007, 7).
He proposes to identify such OFCs by examining the ratio of net 
fi nancial service exports to gross domestic product (GDP) from IMF 
balance of payments data and by looking at jurisdictions with especially 
high values.5 In practice, the limited data availability on these fl ows 
means that the data search must be supplemented with data interpolated 
from stock variables using proxy indicators created from data on vari-
ables refl ecting crossborder holdings of portfolio investment assets (the 
IMF Coordinated Portfolio Investment Survey) and international invest-
ment positions (using data from International Financial Statistics).6
The key difference between the IMF’s existing list and Zoromé’s fi nd-
ings can be seen by comparing the columns denoted “IMF (2000)” and 
“Zoromé (2007),” respectively, in table 11A.1. Most of the defi nitions 
coincide (for those jurisdictions for which Zoromé had data), but an 
important addition to the latter’s list is the United Kingdom. While there 
are some issues with the proxy indicators and the interpolation from 
stock to fl ow data, the approach illustrates clearly the value of using 
objective criteria: a level playing fi eld (including politically uncomfort-
able fi ndings) may be more likely to emerge.
In keeping with the emphasis on the OFC discourse, Zoromé (2007) 
relies on the relative intensity of the provision of fi nancial service to 
nonresidents by scaling for jurisdictional GDP. Alternative criteria 
include the following:
•  Openness to international trade in fi nancial services (that is, taking 
the sum of exports and imports as a ratio to GDP, which might cap-
ture more about the role of jurisdictions as conduits)
•  Net exports of fi nancial services (exports, minus imports as a ratio to 
GDP), as an indicator of specialization
•  Netted trade in fi nancial services (the lower of exports and imports, 
as an indicator only of the extent to which the jurisdiction acts as a 
conduit)
•  The absolute contribution to the global provision of fi nancial services 
to nonresidents (that is, each jurisdiction’s provision of fi nancial ser-
vices to nonresidents as a ratio to the total global provision of services 
to nonresidents across all jurisdictions, rather than as a ratio to the 
jurisdiction’s own GDP)
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If we are looking for a measure to capture the relative importance 
of jurisdictions so as to consider the appropriate policy response at a 
global level, this last criterion may be appropriate. Table 11A.2 com-
pares the results of the use of the relative approach of Zoromé and the 
use of the absolute approach, showing the top fi ve jurisdictions identi-
fi ed by each approach.7 Taking global contribution rather than relative 
intensity in the provision of fi nancial services to nonresidents leads to 
quite a different picture: per 2007 data, the former criterion points to 
Cayman Islands, Luxembourg, Switzerland, the United Kingdom, and 
the United States, while the latter points, instead, to Bermuda, Cayman 
Islands, Guernsey, Jersey, and Luxembourg.
Finally, however, we may consider the implications of the secrecy 
jurisdiction approach. While the relative or absolute approach to off-
shore specialization may capture something about the success of juris-
dictions in following this path, it has nothing directly to say about the 
secrecy or otherwise with which this has been achieved.
The ideal objective criteria for the identifi cation of secrecy jurisdic-
tions might therefore contain two separate components: one refl ecting 
each jurisdiction’s importance in the global provision of fi nancial ser-
vices to nonresidents (the absolute contribution approach) and one 
refl ecting each jurisdiction’s (objectively measurable) performance 
against one or more key indicators of secrecy.
A fi nal advantage of such a composite approach is that it would allow 
users to step away from reliance on lists, which, by necessity, dictates that 
a given jurisdiction either does or does not meet certain criteria. More 
powerful both for policy making and for research might be a measure 
that falls on a sliding scale. A method of measuring progress that is more 
nuanced than a blacklist may eventually produce more positive responses; 
see, for example, Kudrle (2008, 16), who, on the limitations of blacklist-
ing, writes that “the evidence does not suggest that blacklisting made an 
important systematic difference.”
The FSI jointly produced by Christian Aid and the Tax Justice Net-
work refl ects this analysis.8 The FSI combines a secrecy score based on 
objectively measurable criteria that refl ect the secrecy or otherwise of the 
jurisdiction in key areas (for example, banking secrecy, the exchange of 
tax information) with a quantitative measure of the absolute contribu-
tion as discussed above, here labeled the global scale weight (table 11A.3).9
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By combining measures of secrecy and measures of the importance to 
global offshore fi nance, the index presents a picture that is different from 
the one commonly envisaged. First, many of the usual suspects do not 
feature as signifi cantly as they do in policy discussions. For example, 
Guernsey does not make the top 20, while Monaco ranks only 67th. 
Among developing countries, many oft-named Caribbean jurisdictions 
also rank low; thus, for example, Antigua and Barbuda ranks 58th, and 
Grenada 61st.
At the same time, many other usual suspects do feature at the top of 
the index; for example, Switzerland, Cayman Islands, and Luxembourg 
occupy the top three places, in that order. However, the top fi ve also 
include the United States, despite powerful statements in recent years 
about the damage done by fi nancial opacity. The United Kingdom and 
the United States each account for around a fi fth of the global total of 
fi nancial service provision to nonresidents, but the United Kingdom 
ranks only 13th because of a substantially better secrecy score.
It seems uncontroversial that a measure of the global damage caused 
by fi nancial secrecy would include measures equivalent to both the 
secrecy score and the global scale weight. Less likely, however, is agree-
ment on the relative importance of the two in establishing a fi nal rank-
ing. The value of the FSI resides less in providing a categorical fi nal 
ranking than in focusing the attention of policy makers on the two ele-
ments, instead of on the opacity measures alone, which has historically 
supported a perhaps unjustifi ed concentration on smaller, less econom-
ically and politically powerful jurisdictions. From the global perspec-
tive, strong opacity in a major player may do more damage than com-
plete secrecy in a tiny one.
A particular concern is that the FSI may exclude the possibility that 
no jurisdictions legitimately offer high-quality banking, accounting, and 
legal services, but also rely on a transparent regulatory framework. The 
United Kingdom is often cited by those who have such concerns because 
it is said to have a genuine comparative advantage that does not depend 
on lax regulation. This chapter does not offer the space to explore this 
issue in detail, but the role of the United Kingdom’s network of tax 
havens in the development of London as a key fi nancial center is cer-
tainly worth considering (Shaxson 2011).10 Establishing appropriate 
counterfactuals about the development of fi nancial centers, absent opac-
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ity, especially in the presence of signifi cant agglomeration benefi ts in 
fi nancial services, is inevitably challenging.
In the penultimate section of this chapter, we use the existing list 
approach to identify links between developing countries and secrecy juris-
dictions. However, we believe the FSI has the potential to provide valuable 
new insights on the issue of links, and the relevant research is under way. 
Econometric analysis of the differential impact of commercial and fi nan-
cial links with more or less extreme secrecy jurisdictions may offer much 
more powerful and illuminating results, and we explore some suggestions 
here. Additionally, an anonymous referee has suggested the value of creat-
ing sub-FSI indexes that refl ect the relative importance of jurisdictions in 
specifi c types of fi nancial services, which would allow analysis of the ben-
efi ts or damage attributable at this more granular level. Data constraints 
are a major obstacle, but such an analysis, if possible, would be revealing.
The terms tax haven and secrecy jurisdiction are used interchangeably 
hereafter.
Development Impact
Before assessing the extent of the links between development and secrecy 
jurisdictions, we survey the literature on the potential development 
impact. Our intention is to establish the key relationships that require 
empirical testing.
The literature is unfortunately somewhat limited; it has two general 
characteristics: a focus on developed-country impact, accompanied by 
the study of havens, and a general neglect of tax as a development policy 
issue (see Cobham 2005a on the latter). A recent assessment by an expert 
commission reporting to the Norwegian government represents a useful 
step forward in outlining the key claims and much of the existing evi-
dence.11 Seven major claims are considered, the fi rst three of which (at 
least) will affect all countries, while the other four may be especially rel-
evant to developing countries:
1.  Tax havens increase the risk premium in international fi nancial 
 markets.
2.  Tax havens undermine the functioning of the tax system and public 
fi nances.
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3.  Tax havens increase the inequitable distribution of tax revenues.
4.  Tax havens reduce the effi ciency of resource allocation in developing 
countries.
5.  Tax havens make economic crime more profi table.
6.  Tax havens can encourage rent seeking and reduce private incomes in 
developing countries.
7.  Tax havens damage institutional quality and growth in developing 
countries.
Of these, 1 relates to systematic global fi nancial risk, 2–4 relate pri-
marily to the damage done to effective tax systems, 5 relates to the dam-
age done through crime, and 6 and 7 relate to distortions to economic 
activity, including corruption. We treat these in turn and also the major 
positive claim that tax havens can encourage investment in developing 
countries.
Aside from the systemic stability issue, the Norwegian commission’s 
breakdown is in line with the most widely quoted analysis of illicit glo-
bal fi nancial fl ows, which suggests that the volume of outfl ows from 
developing countries reaches US$500 billion–US$800 billion a year 
(Baker 2005; subsequently revised upward by Kar and Cartwright-Smith 
2008). Of this amount, 60–65 percent is estimated to be associated with 
commercial tax evasion (overwhelmingly in the form of mispricing and 
misinvoicing in trade both between unrelated parties and within multi-
national groups), 30–35 percent to the laundering of criminal proceeds 
(for example, drug and human traffi cking), and around 3 percent to the 
corruption of public offi cials.
The Norwegian commission summarizes these important estimates 
and a good deal of additional literature that deals with the general scale 
of illicit capital fl ows. We do not treat this broader literature in more 
detail here, but concentrate only on those contributions that specifi cally 
address the role of tax havens. The subsections below survey the litera-
ture on the main areas of development impact, considering efforts at 
quantifi cation and broader arguments about the channels of impact.
Systemic ﬁ nancial risk
Christian Aid (2008) advances the argument that the fi nancial crisis was, 
effectively, a capital account liberalization bust, following a classic boom 
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(see Williamson and Mahar 1998). Over a quarter of a century or more, 
the richer economies engaged in competitive deregulation of fi nancial 
markets. Secrecy jurisdictions took this to an extreme, exploiting the 
gaps left by the national regulation of global fi nance.
The key regulatory arbitrage occurred around the regulation of banks 
and other fi nancial institutions, particularly regulation that, to protect 
depositors from undue risk, limits the amount of assets banks may acquire 
as a proportion of their own capital base. The Basel II capital accord allows 
assets of US$1,250 for each US$100 of capital. In merely one example of 
an excess, Stewart (2008) has discovered that the Irish holding company of 
the now-collapsed U.S. bank Bear Stearns held US$11,900 in assets for 
each US$100 of capital. The late-2011 collapse of broker-dealer MF Global 
revealed a ratio in excess of 80:1 (Christian Aid 2011).
The crisis was driven by two key factors that allowed an unsustainable 
expansion in credit. One was the complexity of the new fi nancial instru-
ments, which confused investors and regulators about the true ownership 
of assets and liabilities. The other was the opacity of the shadow banking 
system, that is, fi nancial activities outside the traditional banking system, 
from hedge funds and private equity to the structured investment vehicles 
and other conduits of investment banks and others, all taking advantage of 
regulatory arbitrage to operate through secrecy jurisdictions.
U.S. Treasury Secretary Timothy Geithner (then president of the New 
York Federal Reserve Bank) has estimated that only a portion of these 
activities exceeded the total assets of the entire U.S. banking system: 
“Financial innovation made it easier for this money to fl ow around the 
constraints of regulation and to take advantage of more favorable tax 
and accounting treatment” (Geithner 2008, 1).
The genesis of the crisis was undoubtedly complex, and attempts to 
strictly apportion blame are likely ultimately to be futile. It does seem clear, 
however, that the role of secrecy jurisdictions was nonnegligible at the 
least. An important policy response to the specifi c problems posed by reg-
ulatory arbitrage was the decision by G-20 fi nance ministers in September 
2009 to call for “the setting of an overall leverage ratio, which will take into 
account off-balance-sheet activities, in order to limit the amount of bor-
rowing conducted by institutions outside the formal banking regime.”12
While researchers will continue for many years to reexamine the gen-
esis of the crisis and the long period of deregulation and liberalization 
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that underpinned the crisis, a successful and sensible attempt to quantify 
the role of tax havens is diffi cult to imagine. Yet, without such a quanti-
fi cation, a credible estimate of the cost of tax havens to developing coun-
tries through increased systemic fi nancial risk is also unlikely. It does not 
follow, however, that this channel of impact should be ignored.
Tax systems
The most high-profi le and clearly quantifi ed claims made about the 
damage done by tax havens to developing countries relate to the 
undermining of tax systems, both in the ability of these systems to 
deliver the revenues needed for the provision of public services and for 
growth-enhancing investment in, for example, infrastructure and 
high-quality administration and in their ability to meet social prefer-
ences for redistribution.
The importance of tax systems for development is becoming more 
widely recognized in policy-making circles, although much remains 
to  be done. Ultimately, tax can make a great contribution to the four 
Rs: most obviously, revenues and redistribution, but also the repricing 
of  economic and social “bads” and political representation (Cobham 
2005b; on the important links between taxation and governance, see 
Bräutigam, Fjeldstad, and Moore 2008).
There are multiple reasons why tax systems in developing countries 
fail to deliver these contributions, as follows:
•  A damaging tax consensus pushed by donors and the IMF, in particu-
lar (Heady 2004; Cobham 2007)
•  Lack of capacity in domestic tax administrations
•  Lack of engagement by civil society to hold governments to account 
for tax policies and practices
•  The opacity of corporate accounting (on the scale of profi t shifting 
within Europe, see Huizinga and Laeven 2008; on the scale of trade 
mispricing and revenue losses in the developing world, see Christian 
Aid 2009; on a key policy option, see Richard Murphy’s contribution, 
chapter 9, to this volume)•  The opaci y of secrecy jurisdictions in facilitating profi t shifting, 
but also in facilitating the underdeclaration of income or assets by 
 individuals13
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Note that these issues are largely independent of the additional prob-
lem of the smaller per capita tax base in developing countries because of 
lower per capita GDP, while the problems associated with large informal 
sectors are primarily a result, rather than a cause, of these other issues 
(see the discussion on compliance below).
There have, as yet, been no serious attempts to estimate the cost of 
secrecy jurisdictions in terms of forgone redistribution, repricing, or 
representation. Useful attempts have, however, been made to address the 
revenue effects.
The systemic impact of tax havens on development was fi rst addressed 
not by researchers at international fi nancial institutions, but by a non-
governmental organization, which relied on academics and haven insid-
ers to build its analysis. The report, by Oxfam (2000), included an esti-
mate that developing countries were losing around US$50 billion a year 
to tax havens. This estimate draws on global fi gures for foreign direct 
investment and the stock of capital fl ight, combining these with esti-
mated returns to investment and interest income, along with estimated 
tax rates: the sum is around US$35 billion in untaxed foreign direct 
investment and US$15 billion in untaxed personal income.
Subsequent work by the Tax Justice Network (TJN 2005) suggests that 
the global revenue loss to the untaxed savings incomes of individuals 
may be as much as US$255 billion annually, and Cobham (2005b) notes 
that proportions equivalent to the shares of world GDP would imply a 
loss to developing countries of around US$50 billion a year. As Fuest and 
Riedel (2009) clarify, this would imply a potential tax haven total of 
US$85 billion a year, which is close to the total of aid received for the 
period in question. A subsequent Oxfam study puts the estimated loss 
on individual income alone at US$64 billion–US$124 billion (Oxfam 
2009). More recently, Ann Hollingshead (2010) has estimated that 
US$98 billion to US$106 billion is the developing-country tax loss on 
some form of the trade mispricing that Christian Aid assesses and notes 
that her Global Financial Integrity study therefore well supports the 
work of Christian Aid.
This is the extent, currently, of attempts to quantify the revenue dam-
age done by havens to developing countries. Two main criticisms can be 
made. First, the assumptions involved are necessarily nontrivial. Global 
estimates of asset return, for example, are open to criticism because 
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opacity shields both the likely motivations and the actual portfolio 
choices of those holding assets in secrecy jurisdictions. Criticisms of this 
nature have not, however, been made, in general, by scholars offering 
superior alternative approaches.
The second major criticism of these approaches is that no reasonable 
counterfactual is put forward. Imagine, for example, that there are two 
main channels for illicitly reducing tax liabilities in developing coun-
tries. If the second is, say, 95 percent as effective as the fi rst, then shutting 
down the fi rst is likely to yield only a small revenue benefi t. In a world 
with multiple channels of illicitly reducing tax liabilities, it is unrealistic 
to expect a defi nition of an appropriate counterfactual to estimate the 
benefi t of closing down any particular channel. In effect, however, this 
criticism applies not to the quantifi cation approaches, but to a popular 
interpretation that the resulting estimates represent readily available 
revenues.
In addition, such assessments of the impact of secrecy jurisdictions 
do not do justice to the impact on tax compliance more broadly. The 
experimental economics literature strongly suggests that compliance is 
heavily infl uenced by the perceptions of the compliance of others, so 
that high-profi le noncompliance—fueling, for example, the perception 
that all rich citizens or multinational companies are hiding their incomes 
and profi ts in havens—is likely to have substantial multiplier effects on 
compliance and revenue throughout a whole economy and over the long 
term, given how slowly compliance is observed to shift in practice (Bosco 
and Mittone 1997; Mittone 2006).
While refi nements in these approaches can be envisaged, the key con-
tribution of the literature on revenue losses has been to establish that 
there exists an obstacle to the development of suffi cient scale in esti-
mates to warrant serious attention from civil society and from policy 
makers. It is not immediately clear at this stage what additional value 
could be offered to the policy debate by alternative estimates of global 
scale; more nuanced work, as suggested in the sections below, may be 
more valuable now.
Few would argue that the United Nations Development Programme’s 
human development index is a truly appropriate measure of human 
development in all its complexity. The index has, however, undeniable 
benefi ts in shifting the emphasis in media reporting and policy discus-
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sions on poverty away from unhelpfully narrow GDP per capita mea-
sures and toward a broader and more human-level analysis. A similar 
argument may apply to Oxfam’s seminal 2000 report. The value of the 
report in drawing attention to the issue is certain, not least by catalyzing 
the emergence of the Tax Justice Network, which has played a central 
role in raising awareness among policy makers, civil society, and the 
public.
A number of potential approaches to quantifying the scale of revenue 
losses on a country-specifi c basis are worth consideration, although they 
suffer from certain weaknesses also. One approach would involve pursu-
ing the Huizinga and Laeven method (2008) using data from multina-
tional companies on the performance of their subsidiaries to estimate 
the extent of profi t shifting on a global basis, rather than only in Europe. 
The data have been questioned by those more familiar with corporate 
accounting (see, for example, Richard Murphy’s contribution in this vol-
ume, in chapter 9), but are standard in the corporate fi nance literature; 
so, they may at least provide some benchmark estimate of the revenue 
losses occurring specifi cally because of the behavior of multinational 
companies.
The other avenue available is to use data on the fi nancial positions of 
secrecy jurisdictions with regard to specifi c developing countries and, 
given the relative secrecy and administrative capacity of each, to make 
estimates about the likely extent of returns and income declarations. 
Current political processes through the G-20 and bilaterally mean that 
more data will become publicly available about the secrecy jurisdiction 
location of hidden assets and income streams (of richer economies at 
least) and, importantly, about the actual forgone tax yields. These data 
will provide a practical backstop to ensure that estimates for developing-
country revenue losses are demonstrably anchored in reality.
Neither approach seems entirely satisfactory from an academic stand-
point. However, as long as secrecy is the issue under study, any impact 
assessment will be subject to considerable margins of error.
In the longer term, a more promising avenue may be to work toward 
a better understanding of the nature of the problem, rather than specifi c 
quantifi cations of the scale in revenue terms alone. In particular, if a 
consistent indicator is available to capture the secrecy of jurisdictions, 
then it will be possible to use panel data regression analysis to estimate 
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the various impacts of economic and fi nancial links between secrecy 
jurisdictions and developing countries. (This is explored in greater detail 
in the following sections.) Potentially, this would allow the assessment 
not only of revenue effects, but, for example, also of the impact on the 
extent of redistribution, channels of political representation, standards 
of governance, and so on.
An additional reason to consider broader impacts, even if the focus is 
revenue, is a point stressed by the Norwegian commission: tax treaties 
between havens and developing countries are typically negotiated with 
the former in a position of strength, and, as a result, the havens receive a 
transfer of taxing rights from the developing countries, which hope that 
greater investment (and subsequent economic benefi ts) will follow.
The three hypotheses that make up this argument should be the sub-
ject of empirical scrutiny. First, do revenue patterns refl ect such effects as 
a result of newly signed treaties? Second, do investment patterns respond 
as predicted? Third, does such investment deliver economic benefi ts? (If 
so, it would be interesting to consider whether the benefi ts are suffi cient 
to offset any revenue losses discovered in the shorter term.)
Governance
We will not revisit the range of arguments on the importance of effective 
taxation for improvements in governance and channels of political rep-
resentation (see Christian Aid 2008 and chapter 3, by Everest-Phillips, in 
this volume for more details, including considerable empirical evidence). 
Nor do we consider the generic arguments about the contribution of 
illicit fl ows to making crime pay (see chapters 6 and 12, by Kopp and 
Levi, respectively, on aspects of money laundering and crime). The spe-
cifi c role of tax havens with regard to the laundering of the proceeds of 
crime is relatively well explored, not least because it has been the focus of 
some of the more effective international coordination efforts; for exam-
ple, see Hampton and Christensen (2002) for a discussion of the estab-
lishment, in 1989, of the intergovernmental Financial Action Task Force 
and its subsequent impact in terms of promoting anti–money launder-
ing legislation at least in havens.14
There is, however, little academic analysis of the links between the 
opportunities provided by havens and the damage done to developing 
countries. Perhaps the main innovation offered by the Norwegian com-
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mission is in this area. Torvik (2009) goes beyond the generic arguments 
about tax and governance to make a specifi c case against havens by 
drawing parallels with the well-established literature on the paradox of 
plenty (the poor economic performance often associated with a coun-
try’s natural resource wealth). Torvik argues that havens distort develop-
ing countries, above all, by changing incentives. First, the balance 
between productive activity and rent-seeking behavior is pushed toward 
the latter because of the availability of secrecy, which allows the capture 
of higher returns to rent seeking. This process can occur in any context, 
but may be particularly potent in the presence of natural resources.
The secondary effects may be even more powerful because they relate 
to the institutional and political context. Most narrowly, the availability 
of haven services can support the undermining or disestablishment of 
institutions by politicians so as to conceal corruption and fi nancial mal-
feasance generally. Furthermore, the incentives of politicians to achieve 
a shift toward political systems that make elite capture easier (that is, 
presidential rather than parliamentary systems) will also be strength-
ened by haven opportunities. Finally, if havens support the returns to 
narrow self-interest over more broadly based progress, Torvik argues 
that they may increase the chances of confl ict and contribute to the 
weakening of democratic processes.
Torvik summarizes his conclusions thus:
The negative effects of tax havens are greater for developing countries 
than for other countries. There are many reasons for this. Reduced gov-
ernment income will have a greater social cost for developing countries 
than for industrialized countries. In addition, other mechanisms make 
themselves felt in countries with weak institutions and political systems. 
(Torvik 2009, 188)
While the theoretical arguments set out are compelling, what remains 
unavailable at this point is empirical verifi cation of the haven links in the 
series of hypotheses that connect natural resource wealth, political sys-
tems, and institutional quality with particular outcomes. Research should 
build on the valuable insights of Torvik (2009) and test a range of hypoth-
eses in two directions: to assess the impact of natural resource wealth, 
political systems, and institutional quality on the extent of economic links 
with tax havens and to assess the impact of economic links with tax havens 
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on the growth-reducing effects of natural resource wealth on the develop-
ment of political systems and on institutional quality.
Haven beneﬁ ts
A common argument made by defenders of offshore fi nance is that the 
key service provided by secrecy jurisdictions is not secrecy, but a tax-
neutral platform from which investors based in a range of jurisdictions, 
with potentially quite different tax treatments, can join to make an 
investment in another, particular jurisdiction. The tax neutrality is gen-
erally claimed to represent a safeguard against double taxation, rather 
than a tool for avoiding or evading taxation altogether.
Internet searches for “tax-neutral platform” identify those jurisdic-
tions that most commonly make this claim, but a somewhat more ana-
lytical approach is offered by the Big Four accounting fi rm Pricewater-
house Coopers, which proposes a set of criteria for an investment platform 
(in a briefi ng recommending Ireland as such), including that it have an 
“attractive tax regime for holding and fi nancing activities” and “an attrac-
tive treaty network and low or zero statutory withholding tax rates on 
interest and dividend fl ows” (Arora, Leonard, and Teunissen 2009, 1).15
Leaving aside the question of whether such a platform is likely to 
facilitate or encourage the avoidance or evasion of single taxation, the 
hypothesis that follows from such claims is that the existence of havens 
makes investment in other jurisdictions more profi table. The Orbis 
database on the accounts of the subsidiaries of multinational companies 
would allow a partial testing of this hypothesis using the Huizinga and 
Laeven approach (2008), but this would miss the phenomenon of fi nan-
cial vehicles relying on multiple investors in different jurisdictions.16
Because the opacity of such jurisdictions and fi nancial vehicles mili-
tates against direct testing in this case, a less direct hypothesis may be 
needed. If profi tability is, indeed, raised by the use of haven platforms, 
then the level of investment should respond accordingly and be higher 
where havens are involved.
One paper claims to have tested this hypothesis: Desai, Foley, and 
Hines (2006a). Using results from their longer paper (2006b), the authors 
offer a different interpretation, which, they claim, shows that “careful use 
of tax haven affi liates permits foreign investors to avoid some of the tax 
burdens imposed by domestic and foreign authorities, thereby main-
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taining foreign investment at levels exceeding those that would persist if 
tax havens were more costly” (Desai, Foley, and Hines 2006a, 223).
The model is dismissed by the Norwegian commission. The model is 
based on “the assumption that an investor can make real investments 
with a real level of activity in a tax haven,” the commission states on page 
72 of its report.17 “In fact, foreigners who use the preferential tax regime 
are not permitted to invest locally, have local employees or use the coun-
try’s currency. The Commission accordingly takes the view that the 
assumption underlying the analysis is based on ignorance of investor 
regulations in tax havens.”
The empirical results can be criticized because they are based on a lim-
ited sample of U.S. multinationals and therefore, as indicated above, may 
not capture the main benefi ts claimed. Certainly, the results are insuffi -
cient to support the claims made for the benefi ts of tax havens. As with the 
claims about damage discussed above, they require closer scrutiny.
Further research should assess more carefully whether any causal 
relationship can be established between haven origin investment and 
(1) the total level of inward investment and (2) the total level of invest-
ment from any source (because round-tripping may lead to artifi cially 
infl ated declarations of inward investment with no necessary associated 
increase in actual investment levels). Additional research should also 
examine whether investment received through havens has different eco-
nomic and political impacts relative to other investment fl ows.
Economic and Financial Links
There are three main issues in the emerging research agenda on the links 
between havens and development: fi rst, that assessments of the extent of 
these links are lacking; second, that empirical verifi cation is needed of 
the key claims surveyed above about the impact of these links; and, third, 
that little work has been done to analyze whether different developing 
countries are affected differently, which seems to be a key issue, not least 
for policy makers, in prioritizing responses. This section lays out some 
evidence relating to the fi rst issue, the extent of the links, and highlights 
additional sources that can be tapped for future research. The data pre-
sented will also form the basis for econometric analysis to address the 
second issue, the extent of the development impact of the links.
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The third issue is perhaps the most interesting. One aspect of dealing 
with it would involve assessing whether the links vary quantifi ably across 
developing countries and whether there are systematic differences accord-
ing to income group or region. Some attention is given to this question 
here. Another aspect, which will remain for future research, is whether 
the strength of the impact of the links differs from country to country, 
whether, for example, the impact of haven access in undermining gover-
nance is strongest in low-income countries, natural resource countries, 
countries with presidential systems, South Asian countries, and so on.
Two broad sets of competing hypotheses could usefully be examined: 
fi rst, whether lower-income countries are generally less closely linked to 
and less affected by havens because their institutions, including their tax 
systems, are suffi ciently weak that haven structures are not required to 
facilitate rent seeking, for example, by reducing tax payments (or avoid-
ing other regulation), and, second, whether lower-income countries are 
more closely linked to and affected by havens because they are less able 
to respond to the associated challenges.
According to a more nuanced and interesting hypothesis, there are 
certain groups of (probably developing) countries in the middle of the 
income distribution that are the most closely linked to and affected by 
havens, while the poorest countries and the developed economies may 
be relatively less affected for different reasons (respectively, the simplic-
ity of fi nancial abuse in the former and the capacity of tax authorities 
and the relative political power of the latter).
The following subsection discusses data issues in examining bilateral 
links between developing countries and secrecy jurisdictions, while the 
subsequent subsection presents initial fi ndings.
Data
Ideally, to capture the full range of economic links, data would be avail-
able on a bilateral basis on each relevant (trade) fl ow and (fi nancial) 
stock, as follows:
•  Trade in goods. UN Comtrade provides bilateral data, on the basis of a 
detailed commodity breakdown if necessary, for most countries and 
for up to around 30 years.18 Here, we take data for the period 1995–
2008, by Standard International Trade Classifi cation (SITC), revision 
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3.19 Limitations include the absence of certain reporting jurisdictions 
of interest, for example, Channel Islands, which are counted with the 
United Kingdom for overseas trade purposes. This data set consists of 
some 580,000 observations dealing with total trade only (that is, no 
commodity breakdown below the SITC 3 total). Future work could 
expand this data set by combining totals reported on different SITCs 
and other bases and, eventually, by exploring patterns in particular 
commodity codes (for example, natural resource codes).
  By coding each reporter and partner country individually and 
according to groups (for example, regions, income groups, or various 
secrecy jurisdiction lists), one may obtain values for the share of 
trade carried by each country with members of other groups. To 
present the data, we have partially aggregated the jurisdictions into 
groups by income level and region, according to World Bank classifi -
cations. The key information is the share of trade carried out with 
secrecy jurisdictions.
•  Trade in services. The United Nations also provides bilateral data on 
services trade, but this database is relatively recent and currently has 
much weaker coverage. We do not use it here, in part because of the 
especially weak coverage of bilateral reporting by developing coun-
tries. Future work should investigate in more detail the availability 
and value of these data, possibly with a view to encouraging reporting.
•  Portfolio investment. The IMF Coordinated Portfolio Investment Sur-
vey reports stocks of the following categories of portfolio investments 
on an annual basis: equity securities (for example, shares, stocks, par-
ticipations, and similar documents such as American depositary 
receipts, where these denote the ownership of equity), long-term debt 
securities (for example, bonds, debentures, and notes, where these 
generally give unconditional rights to a fi xed future income on a given 
date and have an original maturity greater than a year), and short-
term debt securities (for example, treasury bills, commercial paper, 
and banker acceptances, with an original maturity of less than a year).20
  For 2007, 74 jurisdictions reported; these were the most recent data 
available when this chapter was presented, and we use them here. 
Data are provided on the assets and liabilities of jurisdictions, but 
based only on reporting from the creditor side. Because each reporter 
therefore provides data for all other jurisdictions in which they have 
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investment positions, investment is reported in a total of 237 jurisdic-
tions. There are relatively few developing countries among the report-
ing jurisdictions, but a good many smaller secrecy jurisdictions do 
report. In contrast to the goods trade data, there is better direct cover-
age of links originating in secrecy jurisdictions, but less direct cover-
age of links originating in developing countries. No data set examined 
offers comprehensive coverage from both angles. As with the goods 
trade data, the 2007 IMF Coordinated Portfolio Investment Survey 
was coded to allow summary of the links by group.
•  Foreign direct investment. The United Nations Conference on Trade 
and Development provides bilateral data on foreign direct investment 
positions, but at greater expense than was possible for this research.21 
Future work should seek to obtain these data and assess their coverage 
and quality.
•  Claims on foreign banks. The Bank for International Settlements pro-
vides data on the extent of foreign claims on banks of reporting juris-
dictions. These data are available on a quarterly basis with a short lag. 
We use the December 2008 data, the most recent confi rmed data 
available when this chapter was presented (BIS 2008). Sadly, these 
data are available only on a bilateral basis for consolidated, rather 
than locational, statistics. This means that apparent links between a 
developing country and a particular secrecy jurisdiction must be 
interpreted with caution, because, for example, Argentine deposits in 
a Bermudan bank operating out of Buenos Aires would be recorded 
as a Bermudan liability. Until locational statistics are made available 
by the Bank for International Settlements, which would be a valuable 
contribution to transparency, this is the only possibility; so, this 
strong caveat should be borne in mind.
Main ﬁ ndings
As noted elsewhere above, it would be preferable if we could judge juris-
dictions using an indicator of secrecy on a sliding scale, thereby allowing 
us to measure gradual change where appropriate. For the moment, how-
ever, we make do with the range of existing lists. To present the results 
simply, we report trade shares for two groups: the larger group of secrecy 
jurisdictions identifi ed by the Tax Justice Network (see table 11A.1 and 
the note to table 9A.4) and a narrower group closer in composition to the 
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usual suspects. The latter are defi ned as those jurisdictions that feature on 
a majority of the 11 lists shown in table 11A.1 (that is, on six or more).22
Table 11A.4 and fi gures 11.1 and 11.2 present the main results.23 If the 
results for narrow and broad secrecy jurisdiction lists are examined and 
different stocks and fl ows are compared, a number of interesting pat-
terns emerge. There is considerable variation among developing country 
groups both by income and by region. Analyses that fail to take this into 
account will be incomplete. We highlight a few other key points below.
First, the trade fl ows of developing countries are generally more 
exposed (as a share of total economic links) to the effects of secrecy 
jurisdictions than are the trade fl ows of high-income OECD countries, 
which we take as a benchmark throughout. This is particularly pro-
nounced in developing-country exports and in East and South Asia most 
of all. The differences in exposure between narrow and broad secrecy 
Figure 1 1.1. Intensity of Economic Exposure: Implied Ratios of Secrecy Jurisdiction Shares to 
GDP, by Income Group
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jurisdiction lists are often driven, as in the case of Latin American trade, 
by the inclusion of the United States in the latter list.
Striking examples emerge from the underlying country-level data. 
One example is highlighted in fi gure 11.3, which shows the total value of 
Zambian trade from 1995 to 2008, as well as the shares attributable to 
only one secrecy jurisdiction, Switzerland.
Note that the share of declared Zambian exports to Switzerland in the 
total declared exports of Zambia (that is, exports declared at and subse-
quently reported by Zambian customs) rise from a fraction of 1 percent 
in 1995–98 to more than 50 percent in 2008. The growth in exports over 
the period refl ects Zambia’s emergence as a major copper producer. 
However, copper is not a product for which particular demand or pro-
cessing capacity is noted in Switzerland, although relatively opaque metal 
trading does take place there. This highlights a major concern about the 
data and emphasizes the need for transparency. If one were to assume 
Figure 1 1.2. Intensity of Economic Exposure: Implied Ratios of Secrecy Jurisdiction Shares 
to GDP, by Region
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that Zambian copper is of the same quality as any copper in the Switzer-
land trade data in the same detailed commodity categories (for example, 
coils of copper at thicknesses of less than 0.35 millimeters), so that Zam-
bian copper exports to Switzerland should be priced at the same level as 
the declared Swiss trade in the same items, then the implied illicit capital 
fl ow out of Zambia is in the region of 30 times the declared export value. 
Clearly the impact on Zambian GDP would also be dramatic.
However, the declared Swiss imports from Zambia and the declared 
total exports from Zambia are a tiny proportion of the Zambian-declared 
exports to Switzerland; so, such an estimate of the illicit fl ow cannot be 
supported on this basis. The use of Switzerland for transit in commodi-
ties in this way is well known, but remains highly opaque (for example, 
see Berne Declaration 2011). What is absolutely clear is that declared 
Zambian copper exports, on which the country depends economically, 
effectively disappear once they leave the country. The potential for this 
opacity to undermine the country’s development is equally apparent.
Figure 1 1.3. Zambian Trade: Swiss Role, 1995–2008
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The second broad result is that developing countries in general are 
more exposed to (more reliant on) secrecy jurisdictions in portfolio 
investment stocks. East and South Asia are especially exposed, refl ecting 
the regional location of particular secrecy jurisdictions (for example, 
Hong Kong SAR, China; Singapore). To take an arbitrary example, the 
U.K. Crown Dependency of Jersey was responsible, in 2007, for more 
than 30 percent of the declared portfolio investment in six countries: 
Algeria, Guinea, and the Syrian Arab Republic (between one-third and 
one-half of declared investment), and Djibouti, Libya, and Turkmeni-
stan (99.5 percent or more).
Third, the picture is somewhat more mixed if bank claims are con-
sidered. With respect to the narrow secrecy jurisdiction list, this is the 
one set of results in which high-income OECD countries are notably 
more exposed than each developing country group. On the broad 
secrecy jurisdiction list, however, developing countries are a little more 
exposed, particularly countries in South Asia and Sub-Saharan Africa. 
An arbitrary example: more than 20 percent of the revealed foreign 
claims of Eritrea and neighboring Ethiopia at the end of 2008 were 
against banks in one country, Switzerland. However, this may be the 
result of a Swiss bank operating out of, for example, Addis Ababa and 
taking deposits. The available data do not allow us any certainty about 
the locational aspects.
Table 11A.5 presents the results on a different basis: the implied per-
centage of GDP.24 We use additional data on economic aggregates and 
then extrapolate on the assumption that the shares of bilaterally reported 
trade (or other fl ows and stocks) that are associated with secrecy juris-
dictions are equal to the shares of these jurisdictions in total trade (or 
other measures). This may be somewhat heroic, and it would clearly be 
preferable to have full data available. Nonetheless, for this exercise, which 
involves making broad comparisons across different country groups, 
there seems no particular reason to expect that our method would intro-
duce a systematic distortion.
The main results are twofold. First, the trade exposure of developing 
countries to secrecy jurisdictions relative to the total size of the econo-
mies of these countries is notably greater than that of the high-income 
OECD countries. Second, the reverse pattern holds with regard to port-
folio investment and foreign bank claims. It is important to understand 
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the difference that allowing for GDP makes: developing countries gener-
ally have a much lower ratio of portfolio investment to GDP; so, while 
secrecy jurisdictions are responsible for a much higher proportion of the 
investment received (table 11A.4), the secrecy jurisdiction investment as 
a proportion of GDP (table 11A.5) is much lower in developing coun-
tries than in high-income countries. As might be expected, the interna-
tional fi nancial integration of developing countries is broadly correlated 
with the per capita income levels of these countries. The results in table 
11A.4 show that the intensity is not signifi cantly different (that is, the 
share of secrecy jurisdictions in the existing level of fi nancial integra-
tion), but the lower levels of integration mean that the total secrecy 
jurisdiction exposure through these channels is less.
Next steps
Subsequent work should extend these fi ndings in three ways. First, 
researchers (and research funders) should prioritize the construction of 
a consistent data set containing as much information as possible on 
bilateral trade and fi nancial fl ows and stocks. Major actors such as the 
IMF, the Bank for International Settlements, the OECD, and perhaps 
even the World Bank should aim to emulate, for various fi nancial fl ows, 
the trade transparency that the United Nations has achieved. The 
absence of detailed results in this fi eld can largely be blamed on the lack 
of transparency not of individual jurisdictions, but of the major play-
ers in the economic system. An effort to achieve a greater understand-
ing of the global economy, as well as of the major elements that form 
illicit fl ows, calls for an economic transparency initiative of the type 
being pursued by the Task Force for Financial Integrity and Economic 
Development.25
This would facilitate more detailed comparisons of this sort, but it 
would also help fulfi ll the second requirement: rigorous econometric 
work to establish whether there are, indeed, systematic impacts on devel-
oping countries because of their exposure to secrecy jurisdictions, such 
as impacts, in particular, on tax revenues, on economic growth, on 
inequality, and on governance outcomes. Finally, this work should be 
extended along the lines argued in this chapter, that is, to include the FSI 
or equivalently nuanced tools for capturing the relative opacity of 
jurisdictions.
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Conclusion
This chapter has drawn together the literature on the impact of tax 
havens on development and considered the need for further research in 
this neglected area.
It is clear that the data on bilateral trade and fi nancial fl ows, while 
frustratingly limited in some areas, do provide a suffi cient basis on which 
to draw quite clear conclusions about the relative exposure of developing 
countries to tax havens or secrecy jurisdictions, specifi cally: in general, 
developing countries do not appear to be any less exposed than high-income 
OECD countries to secrecy jurisdictions, and, in some cases, they are much 
more highly exposed. Therefore, the G-20 and others are correct in 
demanding that developing countries be included in any mechanism to 
require increased transparency from secrecy jurisdictions.
In addition, there are clearly important differences in the exposure of 
developing countries across different income groups and regions. This 
warrants further investigation and analysis, which is likely, ultimately, to 
lead to the identifi cation of distinct policy recommendations.
Although this brief summary of the state of research makes clear that 
there are more questions than answers, there can be no doubt that 
secrecy jurisdictions are an important issue for developing countries and 
that the damage done by them to development is also potentially large. 
For researchers, research funders, and policy makers, this is an area of 
work that must be given an increasingly greater priority.
Notes
 1. See, respectively, Owens (2009, 2); Gordon Brown, quoted in Christian Aid 
(2010, 22); and Declaration on Strengthening the Financial System, G-20 Lon-
don Summit, April 2, 2009, 4–5, http://www.g20.org/Documents/Fin_Deps
_Fin_Reg_Annex_020409_-_1615_fi nal.pdf.
 2. The second criteria is related to the characteristic that the OECD’s Towards a 
Level Playing Field Initiative seeks to measure through the consistent assessment 
of jurisdictions on a range of legal and regulatory features (OECD 2006).
 3. See Christian Aid (2008) for a discussion of how this process of regulatory arbi-
trage caused secrecy jurisdictions to play an important role in the unfolding of 
the fi nancial crisis.
 4. The table may be found on the website of this volume, http://go.worldbank.org 
/N2HMRB4G20.
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/external/np/sta/pi/cpis.htm. For International Financial Statistics, see Interna-
tional Financial Statistics (database), IMF, Washington, DC, http://elibrary-data
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Abstract
Much of the attention to the link between corruption and money laun-
dering understandably has focused on the developed world, given that it 
is the businesses of the developed world that mostly pay the bribes and 
that it is the banks and other institutions of the developed world that 
receive and recycle the bribes. However, this is not the whole picture. 
Substantial sums arising from corruption are often retained or even 
imported into developing countries to pay off political rivals, satisfy 
obligations to families, friends, and clans, and invest in local businesses 
and property. Kleptocrats usually wish to retain power and therefore 
require such funds.
Historically, the principal benefi t of anti–money laundering (AML) 
regimes in developing countries has been the international political and 
economic acceptance and the avoidance of sanctions that they bring. 
This has to be set against the substantial costs of introducing such 
regimes in human resource–poor countries. If nations are to be required 
to have AML measures, one component of optimizing the benefi ts 
involves using these measures to combat corruption, especially corrup-
tion at a high level. Namibia and Nigeria excepted, there do not appear 
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to be any cases in which internal AML reporting within developing 
countries has led to major cases against in-favor politically exposed per-
sons (PEPs). However, suspicious activity reports (SARs) can be useful 
against out-of-favor PEPs and in helping to accumulate information 
about assets held in the actual or benefi cial ownership of in-favor and 
out-of-favor PEPs. If no recording systems are in place, fi nancial investi-
gators in the aftermath of criminal cases would face greater diffi culty in 
identifying assets.
Unless the national fi nancial intelligence unit (FIU) is believed to be 
both discreet and independent of the government, potential whistle-
blowers might be afraid of exposure as sources of information. If suspi-
cions are communicated to the FIU, what could the FIU plausibly do 
with the report? This highlights the importance of the relationship 
between FIUs and effectively independent investigation and prosecuto-
rial bodies, which may be needed if AML regimes in developing countries 
are to have a signifi cant impact on domestic grand corruption. Local and 
foreign investigations running in parallel might produce benefi ts; so, too, 
might better domestic coordination with anticorruption bodies. Achiev-
ing this level of competence and independence is a major task.
Introduction
AML is a major element in the standard list of interventions with appar-
ent potential to reduce the fl ow of illicit funds both into and out of 
developing countries and into developed ones, usually for the purpose of 
storing wealth or for expenditure on conspicuous consumption. It is the 
fi rst such intervention that has been put into place on an almost univer-
sal basis. This chapter represents an assessment of what is known about 
the effects of AML regimes within developing countries in dealing with 
internal money laundering and kleptocratic wealth.
The international AML system is over 20 years old, but, prior to 2001, 
it was primarily focused on the countries of the Organisation for Eco-
nomic Co-operation and Development (OECD) and on fi nancial havens 
(OECD or not) in which funds from drugs and fraud were laundered. 
Since 2001, it has been implemented in most countries, partly with the 
aim of protecting the West from the export of terrorism, but also to deal 
with grand corruption and organized crime, often arising from crimes 
 How Well Do Anti–Money Laundering Controls Work in Developing Countries? 375
committed outside a jurisdiction, but also from crimes within it. In 
many developing countries, the system is new. For example, most Afri-
can countries have only passed AML laws since 2005, usually under pres-
sure from the developed world, and some jurisdictions have adopted 
such laws irrespective of the insignifi cance of their fi nancial service sys-
tems domestically or internationally. Examples of the latter include 
Malawi, Namibia (the Financial Intelligence Act 2007), and the formerly 
blacklisted (by the Financial Action Task Force [FATF]) South Pacifi c 
island of Nauru, where, in the last few years, more than a third of the 
laws passed have related to AML, even though Nauru is no longer any 
sort of fi nancial services center, and there is nothing left there to regulate 
that could plausibly cause serious harm.1 The fact that a country is not a 
fi nancial center does not, of course, mean that there is no money laun-
dering there. All countries have domestic crime and the possibility of 
both transnational and domestic bribery in contract negotiations and 
may be conduits for terrorism and the fi nancing of terrorism. Given the 
broad defi nitions of laundering generally in place, this creates scope for 
AML. The question is: How much impact can we expect in such coun-
tries to justify the expenditure of scarce resources that AML requires?
Given the recency of these laws in many parts of the developing world, 
it would be unreasonable to expect much evidence of effectiveness yet. 
Moreover, the empirical links between reductions in serious crime for 
gain and any measures against serious crime (including AML) are diffi -
cult to demonstrate (Levi and Maguire 2004; Levi and Reuter 2006). The 
arguments about the effective implementation of AML can be tautologi-
cal in both the developed and the developing worlds. The waters are fur-
ther muddied by the fact that most of the grand kleptocracy cases that 
are known occurred before the signifi cant implementation of AML in 
developing countries in Africa, Asia, or Central and South America, so it 
would be improper to deduce that AML failed in these regions.
This chapter, then, has an important speculative element with respect 
to effectiveness. For example, it examines the plausibility of a klepto-
cratic regime allowing a local FIU to be effective and fulfi lling any other 
requirement to enable this effectiveness to be translated into broader 
preventive or criminal justice action. It briefl y describes the historical 
evidence that anticorruption agencies that have had signifi cant success 
(such as in Kenya, Nigeria, and Zambia) have generally been dismantled 
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either by the governments they have attacked or by successor govern-
ments (Ribadu 2010). This refl ects the political economy reality of AML: 
it requires the support of the powerful who, in a corrupt country, have 
the most to fear from its effectiveness.
The chapter also examines the role of domestic AML in dealing with 
(1) the proceeds of corruption and (2) those proceeds of crime and licit 
activities that are used to fi nance corruption within developing coun-
tries. It suggests that dictators and elected kleptocrats usually plan on 
staying in power and expect to do so. For these purposes, they require 
funds, as well as career positions to distribute to those who are useful in 
maintaining their power and gaining rent-seeking opportunities. They 
may also purchase vehicles and properties in their domestic jurisdictions 
in excess of their offi cial incomes. So, opportunities exist for AML inter-
ventions locally, as well as in the rich world.
The Goals of AML Policies in Developing Countries
Looked at historically, the growth of AML measures has been motivated 
largely by the desire of rich countries to reduce the impact of crimes 
upon their own citizens, residents, and businesses.2 The theory is that 
AML will demotivate offenders, shorten criminal careers, and disrupt or 
prevent the loose construct known as organized crime. It does this by 
incapacitating organizational growth and stripping those assets under 
the control of criminals that offenders cannot demonstrate they have 
acquired by legitimate means.3 Another aim of AML is to increase public 
satisfaction with criminal justice and administrative regulation and to 
reduce the attractiveness of criminals as role models by showing that 
crime does not pay.4 Note, however, that past lifestyle expenditure can-
not, in practice, be recovered. The applicability of this model to grand 
corruption is taken for granted in the literature, and, in particular, it is 
assumed that, if PEPs and their close families cannot deposit large sums 
in rich countries, they will not commit corruption.
The mechanism for achieving these goals is to develop an interna-
tional chain with no weak link, making it impossible for people to retain 
the proceeds of multifarious crimes both outside and inside their own 
jurisdictions. Though most mutual legal assistance is requested by rich 
countries from other rich or from poor countries, this also tends to be 
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true, paradoxically, in most grand corruption cases, though rich coun-
tries do not always help as much as they could. AML is also available for 
purely domestic cases, in which offenders try to conceal their criminal 
income within the local fi nancial sector.
Whether from corruption or not, some alleged proceeds of crime can 
make a signifi cant difference to welfare within developing countries, 
though it may be countered that—as with some Russian oligarch émigrés 
in the West—people are seeking to buy their immunity from extradition 
by courting popular support. Kobi Alexander, an Israeli technologist 
whose extradition from Namibia has been sought by the United States 
since 2006 on charges of stock options securities fraud related to his fi rm 
Comverse Technology (and who agreed to a U.S. Securities and Exchange 
Commission civil settlement in 2010 for US$54 million), brought sub-
stantial, if disputed funds with him to Namibia and has invested or given 
away millions to fi nance low-cost high-technology housing projects and 
endow educational funds for Namibians.
Alexander transferred 120m. Namibian dollars (N$16.9m.) from Israel to 
Namibia and was granted a two-year work permit on a pledge to spend 
N$300m. in the country. . . . He had invested N$11m. in the country, 
including N$3.4m. in low-cost housing in the western town of Swakop-
mund, because of demand created by the opening of the Langer Heinrich 
uranium mine. . . . Alexander invested another N$5.9m. in an auto-body 
shop business in Windhoek and bought a N$3.5m. house on a golf estate. 
He also enrolled his children in the 275-pupil Windhoek International 
School, where fees last year ranged between N$18,000 and N$118,000 a 
year. . . .
“I have invested responsibly and with a view to engaging previously 
disadvantaged Namibians,” Alexander said.5
There is no extradition treaty between Namibia and the United States, 
and, as of November 2011, Alexander is out on bail of N$10 million 
pending a High Court challenge to the United States.
In addition to governmental pressures, AML has, in recent times, 
been regularly supported by large international banks. These have the 
capacity to implement the required sophisticated control systems. They 
have successfully called for an extension of such controls to their smaller 
commercial competitors (including money transmission businesses), 
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driving up the latter’s costs of doing business and the cost of remittances 
by expatriates to poor countries. However, cooperation over tax issues by 
some banks (and some governments) remains an item of serious con-
tention (Chaikin 2009; Sharman 2011; Shaxson 2011).
In regard to the methods of laundering, the conventional wisdom 
since the 1980s is that they entail a three-stage process of (1) the place-
ment of funds into the fi nancial or other sector, (2) layering steps to 
make the money trail harder to follow, and (3) integration of the cleansed 
capital into the legitimate economy after the illegitimate origins have 
been obscured. This process does not necessarily involve international 
money fl ows, especially not in cases of self-laundering (see below). 
Nonetheless, the existence of international fl ows of funds, criminal pre-
cursors (such as chemicals), and international illicit markets (such as 
drugs, people smuggling, and human traffi cking) provides leverage for 
peer pressure between states in the form of mutual evaluations (Levi and 
Gilmore 2002). Such evaluations have long been extended to corruption 
through the Council of Europe’s Group of States against Corruption 
and, more tentatively, to those nations that have ratifi ed the United 
Nations Convention against Corruption (UNCAC). A different form of 
expert evaluation occurs within the framework of the OECD Conven-
tion on Combating Bribery of Foreign Public Offi cials in International 
Business Transactions (more well-known as the OECD Anti-Bribery 
Convention).
To implement AML controls, a broad network of FATF-Style Regional 
Bodies has been developed; AML legislation has been adopted; and an 
ever-widening range of private sector businesses and professions has 
become involved. These last include car dealers, jewelers, money exchanges 
and transmitters, real estate vendors, and, in Europe, but in few places 
elsewhere, lawyers who are required to make reports to their national FIUs 
on their subjective suspicions about their clients. Much less commonly, 
they also include objective cash receipts that exceed a modest level.6
The privacy of high net worth individuals with regard to their own 
governments, foreign governments, and the risk of criminal extortion is 
a matter of great political sensitivity. Thus, the person who runs an FIU 
(for example, typically, the central bank, the attorney general, or the 
police) makes a great difference in the extent to which the FIU is trusted 
by those it regulates and with whom it has to cooperate.7 This also makes 
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a difference in how effi cient an FIU is in follow-up action. As of July 
2010, there were 127 members of the Egmont FIU Group, including the 
richest jurisdictions and poorer countries. FIUs are absent altogether 
only in the poorest countries, and some of these countries are not admit-
ted to Egmont or have been suspended from the group because, it is felt, 
they have not reached a suffi cient standard of competence and indepen-
dence. Hitherto, most of the attention has been paid to laundering and 
the fi nancing of terrorism because these affect developed countries (and 
their associated commercial and security interests worldwide). The 
interest of developed countries in developing countries has mainly taken 
the form of reviewing the ways in which the tolerance or alleged toler-
ance of the latter is inhibiting the success of efforts to control drugs, 
organized crime, human traffi cking, and terrorism.
There are signs of increased systematic action against grand corrup-
tion and laundering. The G-20 Seoul Summit Action Plan of November 
2010 requires an annual follow-up.8 These corruption-related reputa-
tional issues and collateral harms and benefi ts arguably have become 
part of the goals of AML. Swiss regulators and investigative judges might 
have expected even greater credit for their ingenious use of their powers 
and creative applications of the law from Marcos onward (for a more 
skeptical view, see Chaikin and Sharman 2009). The Swiss use this as 
political capital to compare themselves favorably with the United King-
dom, the United States, and the latters’ “satellite states,” while continuing 
to advertise Swiss banking secrecy unless criminal investigations yield 
suffi cient evidence to generate mutual legal assistance.
Measurement and Patterns of Laundering Relative 
to Corruption
One of the diffi culties faced by any study in this area is that the defi nition 
of corruption may be narrowly interpreted to include only bribery (as 
the criminal law and criminal statistics do) or—as is now more common 
in analytical discourse—may be more broadly interpreted to include the 
misuse of offi ce to steal funds or to acquire assets for private gain at sig-
nifi cantly below true market value. If a PEP has a substantial measure of 
control over a country’s treasury, there is no need to bribe treasury staff: 
in addition to the custom of obedience, threats—including the threat of 
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unemployment or homicide or any form of harm to relatives—can be 
suffi cient to induce compliance. The PEP may bypass domestic controls 
anyway, for example, when Marcos instructed the Philippine Central 
Bank to generate large disbursements from its account at the New York 
Federal Reserve, rather than using the bank’s Manila offi ce (Briones 
2007). Analytically satisfactory estimates are affected by the defi nitional 
problems that bedevil white-collar crime studies generally: acquitting 
former President Chiluba in August 2009, the Zambian court appeared 
to accept the defense that Zambian law did not lay down any upper limit 
on the gifts the president could accept.9 The Zambian authorities did not 
proceed with an appeal against this ruling, but this would mean that 
what to some might look like kleptocracy does not constitute criminal 
corruption. Unless one is imposing an objective standard of corruption 
that disregards the legal requirements of the mental element to prove 
crime, one presumably should drop such sums from the total in esti-
mates. Such considerations do not appear to be incorporated in the cor-
ruption estimates embodied in the governance indicators developed by 
Kaufmann (2005) or others. To focus only on criminal corruption or 
laundering cases that have passed through the fi nal stages of appeal 
would be too strict a test. On the other hand, to allow anyone to impose 
their own judgment of whether any given conduct was corrupt would 
likely generate many different estimates without any clear way of adjudi-
cating among them. This is not an appropriate place to rehearse corrup-
tion defi nitions, but depending on whether or not the private sphere is 
included in the victim category, corruption might be the use of illegal 
means for private gain at public expense or the misuse of public trust or 
authority in private enterprises or nonprofi t organizations.
Sums transferred might be referred to as funds rather than bribes to 
express the possibility that large tranches of profi t might arise (1) from 
transfers for fi ctitious or partly fi ctitious goods and services (that is, false 
accounting) or (2) from undervalue privatizations (including land sales) 
to nominees of the offi cials or to apparently independent third parties as 
part of patron-client relationships. Noncash payments could take many 
forms, including (1) electronic funds, which are less anonymous than 
cash because, excepting some prepaid cards for which there is no serious 
know-your-customer effort, they leave audit trails; (2) jewels, real estate, 
vehicles, and so on regulated under the European Union’s third anti–
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money laundering directive and other legislation; or (3) education or 
health payments to family and friends, which can be substantial and can 
be paid from corporate or third-party funds, usually overseas. An impor-
tant question is what proportion of bribes is retained internally (from 
domestic sources) or imported (from external sources); conversely, what 
proportion is exported (from domestic sources) and retained overseas 
without being imported (from external sources)? Unfortunately, data 
are unavailable to examine this, and it is unclear what proxies could 
defensibly be used instead.
It is conventional to start with a discussion of the extent to which the 
proceeds of corruption are laundered, but, because the issue is dealt with 
elsewhere in this volume, I make only cursory reference here. Thus, 
Goredema and Madzima (2009), Chaikin and Sharman (2009), and 
Shaxson (2011) reiterate the estimated global fi gure of US$1 trillion in 
bribes, which itself derives from Baker (2005) and Kaufmann (2005).10 
This fi gure is at risk of becoming a “fact” by repetition, but, irrespective 
of arguments about its validity, the numbers are big enough to matter to 
developing countries. Most of it may well go to routine low-level bribes, 
incidental to the hazards of everyday interactions with offi cials in many 
poor countries; these rarely lead to a demand for money laundering ser-
vices, but simply help to fi nance the modest daily lives of low-level offi -
cials. It is the high-level corruption that is salient to AML measures.
It is often asserted that large sums have been exported by kleptocratic 
public offi cials, but much smaller sums are usually detected in overseas 
accounts, and even smaller sums are recovered. This is true even if no 
deals are done, as they were with the Abacha family, thereby allowing 
family members to keep many millions, while they agreed to return 
larger sums to the national treasuries (see Maton and Daniel’s chapter 
13, in this volume). Some of the attrition may result from sophistication 
in the layering of benefi cially owned corporate secrecy vehicles, as well as 
from inadequacies or corruption in the pursuit of the money trail. In 
addition to secrecy over the value of exports in the extractive industries, 
cases in different parts of the world indicate that the nontransparency of 
contracts in the security and intelligence areas offers great scope for cor-
ruption and the nondetection of corruption in the awarding of contracts 
both for goods and for protection services, overriding whatever normal 
internal audit controls may exist (Daniel and Maton 2008; Salonga 2000; 
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Wrong 2000, 2009). The same is true of the privatization of public assets 
at below value.11 The 18 contracts that were awarded by the Kenyan gov-
ernment to Anglo-Leasing totaled US$751 million (Wrong 2009). Many 
of the contracts were for illusory supplies, but the literature does not 
discuss what proportion of the bribes (or the marginal difference 
between the purchase price and the proper market price) reached the 
domestic parties locally.12
Some defi nitional discussion may be helpful in illuminating the 
dimensions of the phenomenon. There are at least two signifi cantly dif-
ferent ways in which people use the term money laundering. The fi rst way 
refers to the act of hiding the illicit origins of funds so as to make tainted 
wealth look suffi ciently legitimate to withstand signifi cant scrutiny 
(which it may never receive). This plausibly is what most people who 
encounter the term would expect money laundering to mean. The sec-
ond way refers to the act of acquiring, possessing, using, or disposing of 
the proceeds of crime and covers all acts that fall within the criminal 
laws and regulations against money laundering. These laws and regula-
tions are intentionally framed broadly to stimulate business, fi nance, 
and the professions to develop and report their suspicions, thereby mak-
ing it more diffi cult for criminals to legitimize their wealth in the fi rst 
sense above. It also penalizes broadly defi ned self-laundering by those 
who commit the primary money-generating crimes (in this case, giving, 
receiving, or extorting bribes, locally and transnationally) to such an 
extent that almost anything the offenders do with the proceeds consti-
tutes laundering. This can generate some legal complexities if, as is com-
mon in developing and many developed countries, successful mutual 
legal assistance and prosecution depend on an act being criminal in both 
countries in which the money laundering process occurs.13
A fi gure one might consider using is the total assets available for asset 
recovery, which would be a combination of the saved proceeds of cor-
ruption, the total value of the contract (under English law, for example), 
and the criminal and regulatory fi nes imposed on the fi nancial interme-
diaries (though such fi nes are not usually available as compensation for 
the developing country). Here, to avoid confusion, we examine only the 
total proceeds of corruption. We divide these into PC (E), representing 
the total paid and stored or spent outside the developing country, and 
PC (I), representing the total internally stored or spent, though PC (I) 
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may originally have been paid externally. PC (I) might be anticipated to 
vary positively with the desire and the expectation of kleptocrats to 
remain in power and need the funds so stored to sustain political and 
military support.
One component of the AML regime involves steps to prevent people 
from integrating the proceeds of crime into the legitimate economy; 
though this may act as a deterrent to the involvement of people in crime 
or shorten the length of criminal careers, it may also prevent people 
from “going legit” (becoming actually respectable rather than only 
apparently respectable). It is a tenable explicit policy aim to show crimi-
nals that, however much they may reform, they can never enjoy the fruits 
of their crimes, including the fruits derived from legitimate investments 
made possible through crime (the doctrine of the fruit of the poisoned 
tree). This would nullify the personal ambition to become socially inte-
grated of persons such as the bankruptcy fraudster who was interviewed 
by Levi (2008) and observed that he only wanted to make enough money 
to be able to afford to be honest.14 The netting out of harms lies outside 
the scope of this chapter, but the interviews conducted for this report 
with a convenience sample of public offi cials in some developing coun-
tries (including countries in the former Soviet ambit) since 1988 suggest 
that some of the offi cials are privately ambivalent about whether it is a 
bad thing to accept tainted funds into their economies. Such thoughts 
might invite negative reactions if expressed in offi cial meetings and are 
normally suppressed for that reason.15 Irrespective of personal greed and 
benefi ts, politicians may obtain political and social credit from inward 
investment, whatever the source of the funds, if it creates employment 
and a multiplier effect from expenditure. In major fi nancial centers in 
the developed world, it is diffi cult to acknowledge infl ows of criminal 
funds as an acceptable economic benefi t, and the OECD Anti-Bribery 
Convention expressly excludes economic interests as justifi cations for 
not prosecuting transnational bribery.
Informal value transfer systems, including hawala-type money move-
ments, have received some signifi cant interest, especially post-9/11 (Pas-
sas 2005; Rees 2010).16 Most of this interest has focused on the transmis-
sion of terrorist fi nance to operational sites from Muslims in developing 
and developed countries and on terrorist fi nance and the proceeds of 
organized crime remittances from developed countries to developing 
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countries. However, the signifi cance of informal value transfer systems 
for the proceeds of corruption has received scant attention. Perhaps 
this is because grand corruption payments from multinationals seem 
unlikely to be sent in this way—though there is no reason, in principle, 
why they cannot be so sent—and partly because they seem an implau-
sible conduit for payment into the large international banks in the West 
on which the substantial legal actions and popular protests have focused. 
There is no evidence from published investigations such as the case of 
the French Elf-Aquitaine frigates purchased by Taiwan, China, and simi-
lar cases in which informal transfer channels have been used (beyond the 
cash smuggled in diplomatic bags and containers or on private planes). 
Large corporations would have to unlaunder the money, turning it from 
white to black money, prior to sending it over informal channels (as they 
might also have to do with cash bribes). To the extent that informal value 
transfer is unattractive for grand corruption, its signifi cance for money 
laundering generally is reduced.
One reason this area is important is the fact that, to maintain power, 
corrupt leaders may have to engage in patron-client deals to purchase 
support locally or regionally (Wrong 2000). There is no motive, in prin-
ciple, why such formal or informal political funding should have to come 
from the money laundering circuit in the developed or the fi nancial 
haven world. What can we learn from cases such as Abacha, Marcos, 
Mobutu, Montesinos, and Suharto about this local distribution and 
about the extent to which the existence of local FIU regimes and legisla-
tion targeting the proceeds of crime might be drivers for international 
outfl ows of corrupt fi nance now or in the future? Logically, for the inter-
nal proceeds of corruption regimes to drive funds to leave countries 
because these countries reject accounts or actively share information, 
the regimes would have to be more draconian than the regimes existing 
in money centers elsewhere.17
This chapter focuses on the fl ows of corrupt funds into and circulat-
ing around developing countries, rather than the more usual issue of 
estimates of the amount of money stored overseas in major fi nancial 
centers. One component is the question of how funds obtained through 
corruption are spent. This has not received much systematic attention in 
research; the inference in high-profi le cases is that corrupt funds are 
spent on affl uent lifestyles in the West, including homes and so on, and 
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are stored in American, British, and Swiss banks as a part of a strategy, 
presumably, to avoid confi scation should there be an unfriendly regime 
change at home. However, because many regimes involve political clien-
telism, it seems likely that some of the funds, even if they originate in 
Western fi nancial institutions, are recycled domestically in developing 
countries (Warutere 2006; Wrong 2000, 2009; ongoing allegations in 
Nigeria). Although Mobutu (like other high-living suspect African, 
Asian, Caribbean, and Latin American leaders) undoubtedly required a 
great deal of money to purchase and maintain properties overseas, 
Wrong (2000) makes a convincing case that he was more interested in 
power than in money. Mobutu needed large amounts of cash in what is 
now the Democratic Republic of Congo, as well as the ability to confer 
well-remunerated government posts on the grands légumes (big vegeta-
bles: the elite) who sought to feed at his table without actually doing 
anything other than not opposing him. The redistributed bribes gave 
Mobutu the ability to defuse threats and monitor and act effectively 
against internal abuses by potentially rival rent seekers.
It may be hypothesized that some institutional variables may affect 
the relationship between fi nancial institutions and the vulnerability to 
corruption, though a report of the Eastern and Southern Africa Anti–
Money Laundering Group discusses the variables as a static preordained 
classifi cation rather than as a dynamic process that can change over time 
and place.18 It seems plausible that an additional cultural-personality 
variable is whether the bribe recipients are—in the typology of the 
Knapp Commission investigation into police corruption in New York in 
1973—meat-eaters (actively in search of rent-seeking opportunities) or 
merely grass-eaters (passively accepting the bribes offered to them).
Another important dimension of the visibility of the corruption-
laundering link is the origin of the corrupt funds. Large blocks of funds 
from bribes in the awarding of large contracts to transnational corpora-
tions might be more visible than smaller, more frequent insider con-
tracts to non–arm’s-length companies. Import monopolies or privileges 
among family members or party members might be one important 
route for rent seeking. There might, however, be nothing wrong, on the 
surface at least, with the awarding of national or transnational contracts 
to the relatives of senior public offi cials directly or through companies 
that may be known to be associated with such offi cials or more obscurely 
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held.19 Whereas, in other cases, bribes, shares, or charitable donations 
may be given in return for permission to engage unmolested in illegal 
enterprises such as drug traffi cking, and these bribes may sometimes, 
ultimately, help fi nance terrorism, as in Afghanistan (U.S. Senate 2009), 
the privileges assigned to family members as in the cases described above 
may, at the other ideological extreme, merely fi nance conspicuous con-
sumption, private education (schools and universities), and health care 
overseas. How and in what countries and currencies are the latter paid 
for? A typology is proposed by the Eastern and Southern Africa Anti–
Money Laundering Group (see table 12.1).
This typology leaves out the fact that fi nancial institutions may sim-
ply be afraid of or feel loyal to the national leadership—who may belong 
to the same ethnic group—and may benefi t from the trickle down sym-
bolized by the fi rst part of the title of Wrong’s book (2009) It’s Our Turn 
to Eat: The Story of a Kenyan Whistle-Blower. Therefore, the bank may 
continue to launder money for its friends or may avoid doing so out of a 
fear of capricious closure or other economic detriment caused by those 
in power.
This typology also assumes that the fi nancial institution has detected 
the laundering (or is in a position to do so with modest effort). If the 
Table 12.1. Vulnerabilities in Financial Intermediation
Category
Characteristics of a 
ﬁ nancial intermediation institution Comment
A The institution involved is corrupt from 
inception.
The institution is primed to be a vehicle for 
money laundering; its use to launder the 
proceeds of crime is thus inevitable.
B The institution is corrupted by subsequent 
changes in ownership or management or 
in the operating environment.
Although not at ﬁ rst intended to be a 
vehicle for money laundering, it eventually 
drifts in that direction.
C The institution has corrupt employees who 
provide money laundering on an ad hoc 
and noninstitutionalized basis.
The institution could be separated from the 
corrupt employees.
D The institution unwittingly facilitates money 
laundering because it has no mechanisms 
to detect money laundering.
Although the institution may not beneﬁ t 
from money laundering, it sabotages the 
AML system.
Source: Goredema and Madzima 2009.
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funds are prelaundered by placement in a real business venture (rather 
than a shell company, the benefi cial ownership of which may not be 
transparent), then how they may be identifi ed as proceeds of corruption 
or any other form of crime is not obvious. This is yet another note of 
caution: it would be unwise to assume that the within-country identifi -
cation of the proceeds of corruption is easy whether the country is a 
poor one or a rich one. It may be that the families of corrupt politicians 
in developing countries fi nd it easier than corresponding families in rich 
countries to integrate the proceeds of corruption (including political 
and economic extortion) into their businesses. This issue will require 
more analysis.
Alternatively, one might adapt Levi’s typology (2008) of bankruptcy 
(and other) frauds to the involvement of individuals and businesses in 
money laundering. The typology is as follows:
•  Preplanned frauds, in which the business scheme is set up from the 
start as a way of defrauding victims (businesses, the public sector, 
individuals)
•  Intermediate frauds, in which people start out obeying the law, but 
consciously turn to fraud later
•  Slippery-slope frauds, in which deceptions spiral out of control, often 
in the context of trying—however absurdly and overoptimistically—
to rescue an essentially insolvent business or set of businesses, thereby 
escalating the losses of creditors
By analogy, some schemes are set up principally for the placement, 
layering, or integration of the proceeds of crime; some existing busi-
nesses knowingly hire themselves out or are pressured into selling out to 
would-be launderers; and others drift into occasional part-time laun-
dering by assisting large corporations or full-time criminal enterprises if 
they need the business to keep going, but never intending to become 
full-time launderers. Given the absence of systematic data collection and 
the low probability that laundering schemes will be detected and acted 
against, it is plausible that intermediate and slippery-slope laundering 
will occur more often during economic downturns. In short, the motiva-
tion to defraud and the motivation to launder are heterogeneous rather 
than a single phenomenon.
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Situational opportunity models of corruption
It is illuminating to examine the different conditions under which situ-
ational opportunities for corruption are created and exploited. Public 
corruption cases typically involve either (1) a legal or natural person 
outside the government (the corruptor) who pays a person inside the 
government (a corrupt PEP) in exchange for a government benefi t, or 
(2) a PEP who (with or without active collusion) embezzles public funds. 
In the second type, corruptors outside the government are not usually 
involved in the scam, though they may set up corporate or other non-
transparent vehicles and act as bankers or other types of value transfer-
ors. The price extracted for the corrupt benefi t may be modest in the 
view of the corruptor, but signifi cant in the view of the recipient, or it 
may be signifi cant for both. The potential funds transfers are a function 
of this and other expenditures. The development of land for tourism—
the alleged source of corruption that, not for the fi rst time, led to the 
suspension of local government in the Turks and Caicos Islands and has 
been the subject of a major criminal investigation by the U.K. govern-
ment (Auld 2009)—may generate substantial rewards for all parties, 
though only if the infrastructure actually is developed.20
Gordon (2009) argues that, in almost all grand corruption cases, the 
corrupt proceeds are already within the fi nancial system at the time of 
their generation (that is, no cash is involved), while, in two cases, much 
of the proceeds may not have been in cash. This is not surprising given 
that the sources of corrupt proceeds are primarily kickbacks on govern-
ment contracts and bribes to receive a government benefi t. The corrup-
tor might therefore normally be a businessperson who receives the gov-
ernment benefi t in the form of checks or wire transfers directly from the 
state. If—before or after the award of the contract, depending on the 
level of trust and other factors—the corrupt government contractor 
withdraws cash and transfers it to a corrupt PEP, this would break the 
chain of bank records connecting the two. However, a new problem is 
generated because the corrupt PEP may be required to deposit cash back 
into the fi nancial system. If the problems associated with this redeposit 
of cash by the corrupt PEP are considered to outweigh the benefi ts of 
breaking the chain of fi nancial records, the PEP and the “donors” often 
attempt to mask their association with the funds by hiding the identity 
of the benefi ciary.21 The donor—who may be at risk of being discovered 
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by prosecutors because of offenses connected with the OECD Anti- 
Bribery Convention—and the corrupt PEP need to (1) hide the owner-
ship and control of the assets, (2) disguise the fact that the assets are 
illegitimate, or (3) do both. One of the most effective ways of accom-
plishing this is to interpose accounts under different names or separate 
legal persons or other secrecy vehicles or between the origin of the illegal 
funds and the ultimate control by the corrupt PEP. Alternatively 
expressed, the successful corruptor simply utilizes the benefi t granted to 
him (for example, contract, franchise, license, permit, and so on) in a 
legal way, including tax payments that lawful tax planning requires, 
while the corrupted offi cial (or bribe-demander) may receive benefi ts 
the legitimacy of which will appear dubious if a serious, high-quality 
investigation occurs and must therefore launder the benefi ts or have 
them prelaundered. Of course, if the corrupted (or extorting) offi cial is 
bypassed because the briber pays the offi cial’s associates or political sup-
porters on the offi cial’s behalf, then the connection with the corrupt 
benefi t may be diffi cult to prove.
We now consider case studies of grand corruption, irrespective of 
whether or not the AML framework might have made a signifi cant con-
tribution to the prevention, investigation, prosecution, or recovery of 
the proceeds. To the extent that the AML framework lacks utility, our 
understanding of the conditions under which the framework is or is not 
effective may need to be nuanced.
Case studies
The Montesinos case offers an unusual amount of insight because of the 
video recordings systematically made by Montesinos and recaptured 
(and retransmitted on television to a fascinated public). A valuable study 
on Peru by Dumas (2007, 3) notes as follows:
It was estimated that during Fujimori’s administration more than US$2 
billion were stolen from the state, a fi gure equal to nearly 9 percent of 
Peru’s current stock of external public debt. A total of US$1 billion is 
believed to have been sent overseas, while Montesinos alone is suspected 
to have amassed a fortune worth US$800 million.
Dumas focuses on the US$1 billion believed to have been sent over-
seas, of which US$184 million had been repatriated at that time (mostly 
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from Cayman Islands, Switzerland, and the United States), while a fur-
ther US$56 million had been frozen. The fate of the missing US$1 billion 
estimated to have been looted, but not sent abroad, is not discussed 
explicitly, nor can it be deduced readily from the data. Dumas (2007, 7) 
clarifi es as follows:
Through bribery and extortion, Montesinos was able to capture the Judi-
ciary, the Media and the Legislature. . . . the average bribe given to a 
Supreme Court and Superior Court judge was between US$5,000 and 
US$10,000 a month. Members of the print media received initial payments 
as high as US$1.5 million, and also requested additional sums for manipu-
lating headlines ($3,000–4,000), and stories on the inside pages ($5,000). 
The television media received bribes that ranged between US$2 [million] 
and US$9 million. Fujimori undermined all checks and balances and was 
able to concentrate executive, legislative and judiciary powers in himself. 
The manipulation of the press and the capture of other watchdog groups 
within civil society further reduced Fujimori’s public accountability.
If bribes were collected within Peru, the cash was transformed into 
bearer certifi cates (now almost unavailable anywhere because of ex post 
FATF pressure), which were then given to Montesinos. As the custodian 
of the certifi cates, Montesinos would use a local bank to wire the certifi -
cates to a foreign bank that would remit monies to a fi nancial haven or 
acquire assets abroad (see fi gure 12.1). If this were to happen today, it 
would arouse concerns or SARs from compliance offi cers because the 
funds so exceeded Montesinos’s known income and wealth. Given his 
control over the state apparatus, however, reporting might have proved 
hazardous for the bankers (and might have been considered dangerous 
by them), and successful action against Montesinos would have been 
extremely unlikely at that time.
Inbound laundering operations greatly benefi ted from a domestic 
law, the Repatriation of Foreign Currency Act, that came into force in 
1988 in the context of balance of payments diffi culties. This law allowed 
the repatriation of foreign currency without tax and information 
requirements. Using different legislative measures, Fujimori kept this 
practice legal and, so, facilitated the repatriation of illegal funds for the 
purpose of election campaign fi nancing and the bribing of judges, mem-
bers of Congress, and the mainstream media.
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The Philippine literature tends to focus more on the international 
than on the internal aspects, but Briones (2007, 10) summarizes it well 
when she observes that “a part of the Marcos ill-wealth stayed in the 
Philippines and included corporations which were acquired on his 
behalf by his cronies, land, machinery, etc.” One might add that trust 
enables benefi cial ownership to be disguised more easily, especially if this 
is achieved by noncompetitive tendering. The Marcoses might have had 
to rely on their network’s informal sanctions and friendships to secure 
benefi ts in the event of their fall from power. One anonymous source has 
observed to this author that Imelda Marcos has experienced signifi cant 
diffi culty in resuming control of assets placed in the hands of some 
nominees: one of the problems of using clandestine laundering meth-
ods. In the event, Briones states, the assets taken domestically from the 
Marcos network—mainly by sequestering 69 benefi cially owned corpo-
rations—totaled US$11.8 billion, though this fi gure may relate only to 
assets frozen rather than sequestered.22
An indicator of the size of the assets taken by Marcos is the fact that 
the Agrarian Reform Program of the Philippines is funded in part from 
the illicit gains of the Marcos regime. According to an unpublished 2010 
report of the Philippine Institute of Development Studies, approxi-
mately P74.5 billion was recovered over the period 1987–2008 by the 
Presidential Commission on Good Government, that is, US$1.6 billion 
Figure 12.1. The Case of Montesinos: Laundering Maneuvers if Monies Were 
Collected in Peru
Cash
Bank transformed cash 
into certificates issued to 
the bearer.
Montesinos kept
custody of the
certificates.
Montesinos
transferred
certificates to
foreign bank
through a
local bank.a
Monies were remitted 
to financial havens.
Assets were
acquired for 
money laundering
purposes.
Local
banks
Foreign
banks
Financial
haven
Vladimiro
Montesinos
Source: Dumas 2007.
a. In Peru, Banco de Comercio handled over US$220 million in transfers for Montesinos.
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has been recovered in total. Given that this fi gure includes at least US$600 
million recovered from Swiss accounts, this would mean that less than 
US$1 billion has been recovered from domestic sources.
Gordon (2009) has generated some 21 case studies on corruption. Of 
these, we have excluded from our examination all developed-country 
cases and, with the partial exception of the Salinas case (discussed 
below), those cases in which payments were primarily made to offshore 
accounts and in which there is no evidence (in Gordon or elsewhere) 
that signifi cant funds were reimported. Thus, if a bribe-payer sets up a 
foreign credit card that is used to pay the expenditures of a kleptocrat 
overseas (as was alleged in relation to Swiss accounts of former Russian 
President Yeltsin), we exclude the case as irrelevant, though some of the 
purchases may be physically imported into developing countries. Our 
aim is not merely to demonstrate corruption laundering mechanisms, 
but also to analyze bribes and laundering that may or may not have been 
detected and acted against.
It is important to think of AML as a dynamic process over time. If an 
AML system is having any effect, then bribe-payers and bribe-takers or 
bribe-demanders will adapt their modes of laundering to changes in the 
methods of control. As in the areas discussed elsewhere above, one may 
wonder what has changed other than risk aversion, which is generating a 
growing preference for corporate vehicles as intermediaries. The num-
ber of PEPs reported on to FIUs is not disclosed in public reports, so we 
do not know if this subcategory is an exception to Takats’s (2007) eco-
nomic model of a rising trend in defensive SAR disclosures. We return to 
this topic below.
The cases below are adapted from Gordon (2009). In some of the 
cases (for example, the funds given by Japanese donors to Apenkai, a 
charitable foundation, for the rebuilding of Peru), the moneys appear to 
have simply been stolen by Fujimori factions after they had been handed 
over to the Embassy of Peru in Japan and passed on to Apenkai.
Case 1. When he was president of Nicaragua, Arnoldo Aleman misap-
propriated millions in public funds for his personal benefi t, as well as for 
the benefi t of his family and associates. Many of the offi cers in his cabi-
net were his close personal friends and assisted in the theft and launder-
ing of state funds. Most of the funds that Aleman misappropriated were 
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funneled through the Nicaraguan Democratic Foundation (FDN), a 
nonprofi t organization incorporated in Panama by Aleman and his wife.
The Nicaraguan Directorate of Income was headed by Byron Jerez, a 
close friend of Aleman. He set up a system whereby ENITEL, the main 
public telecommunications company, would pay for the operation of the 
directorate. A number of shell and real companies set up by friends of 
Aleman provided the necessary goods and services. As compensation for 
this expenditure, ENITEL received a tax benefi t equal to the amount 
expended. ENITEL transferred funds to the shell companies, which had 
opened bank accounts for their accounts receivable. From there, these 
companies transferred the funds to a consultancy fi rm, and eventually 
the funds were transferred to the FDN.
ENITEL also guaranteed a loan to a state-owned insurance company. 
These funds were later transferred to an account of the Ministry of the 
Presidency; under Nicaraguan law, the funds could be spent at the com-
plete discretion of the president. The president invested the money in a 
company controlled by Jerez and his wife. This entity also received funds 
from a secret account of the Nicaraguan Treasury set up by the director of 
the Treasury; these funds were then donated to a nonprofi t organization 
controlled by Aleman and his wife and subsequently donated to the FDN.
The state agency in charge of privatization also funneled funds from 
winning bids into the FDN, as did the state-owned Channel 6 station. At 
a low price, the government sold a telecommunications frequency to a 
company controlled by Aleman associates. The sale was fi nanced using 
funds from Channel 6, which gave a fake commercial rationale for the 
origins of the money. Aleman used the FDN to pay for the personal 
credit cards of himself and his family. The FDN also purchased a build-
ing and then transferred the title to a company controlled by Arnold 
Aleman. Finally, the FDN gave a loan to a company owned by Aleman 
and his associates that held many of Aleman’s real estate purchases, and 
the loan was never called in.
These are all examples of the embezzlement of public assets, but they 
also represent methods of laundering the proceeds from the thefts via 
commercial entities in the reasonable expectation that no one would be 
attempting seriously to oppose the conduct. It seems unlikely that these 
actions would have been picked up by an AML process, though a com-
petent tracking investigation did eventually detect them.
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Case 2. Upon the election of his brother as president of Mexico, Raul 
Salinas was appointed to several positions, one of which was to manage 
Conasupo, a store set up to sell basic goods to the underprivileged at 
subsidized prices. Raul Salinas used this position to create disguised 
profi ts that he diverted to himself, often by reporting prices for Cona-
supo’s purchases that were higher than the sums actually paid or by sell-
ing subsidized products at market rates. In one case, at an extremely low 
price, Conasupo imported 39,000 tons of powdered milk contaminated 
at Chernobyl and then sold the milk to the poor at a profi t. In another 
case, corn provided by the United States for distribution to the poor was 
sold by Conasupo at market rates; the corn was made into tortillas and 
sold back to the United States. The hidden profi ts were then transferred 
to personal accounts in Mexican banks.
Raul may also have profi ted by fi nancing winning bids during priva-
tization. An example of this was the government sale of Azteca Televi-
sion to Ricardo Salinas Pliego through Salinas Associates. Profi ts from 
Azteca were used to make payments to Raul, which Pliego claimed were 
repayments on a loan Raul had made to him to fi nance the acquisition. 
The loan was provided at a suspiciously low interest rate.
To show that there had been a loan and that the payments were not 
kickbacks, Raul made payments from his account to fi nance the loan, in 
effect showing he was only an intermediary. Raul would deposit the 
funds into Mexican banks. Then his wife, Paulina, acting under the alias 
of Patricia Rios, would withdraw the funds and transport them to a 
Mexican branch of Citibank. This money would be transferred into a 
mass concentration account used by Citibank to transmit internal funds. 
A vice-president at the Mexican Division of Citibank would then extract 
these funds from the concentration account and transfer them to Lon-
don and Switzerland to Citibank accounts of Trocca, a shell corporation 
formed by Cititrust in Cayman Islands and controlled by Raul through 
nominees.
Raul Salinas may have used his infl uence over two banking groups, 
Grupo Financiero Probursa and Grupo Finaciero Serfi n, both purchased 
from the Salinas government during privatization, to convince them not 
to apply extended (or indeed any) due diligence to accounts controlled 
by him and his confederates. In any event, under current rules that 
require identifi cation only of foreign and not domestic PEPs, he would 
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not have been classifi ed as a PEP by a domestic bank, and it is implausi-
ble that domestic regulators or prosecutors would, in that era, have taken 
action against bankers for failing to conduct AML actions in relation to 
Raul’s businesses.
Case 3. Joseph Ejercito Estrada served as vice president to Fidel Ramos 
and then as president of the Philippines. He began his term on June 30, 
1998, but was ousted in less than three years, having been accused of 
amassing over US$11 million in kickbacks from illegal gambling and 
tobacco excise taxes. Proceeds from these kickbacks were allegedly used 
to fi nance companies formed to purchase real estate for Estrada.
One of these companies was allegedly St. Peter’s Holdings, which was 
99.8 percent owned by Jose Luis Yulo, the former president of the Philip-
pine Stock Exchange and a close associate of Estrada. On October 6, 
1999, a P142 million check was allegedly drawn from an account of 
Velarde, a friend of Estrada at Equitable PCI Bank, and deposited into 
Yulo’s personal account at the Bank of Philippine Islands branch. Yulo 
then withdrew P50,000 from his account to open a corporate account 
for St. Peter’s Holdings, where he later deposited the P142 million. 
St. Peter’s Holdings purchased the Boracay Mansion in New Manila, 
Quezon City, for P86 million. The home was then used by Laarni 
Enriquez, allegedly one of Estrada’s mistresses. Yulo also executed three 
cashier’s checks made payable, one, for P86,766,960.00, to Vicente AS 
Madrigal (a former senator and power industrialist whose daughter cur-
rently serves in the Senate) and two others. The St. Peter’s Holdings bank 
account only had P2,000–P5,000 after the P142 million transaction. It is 
not clear if or how illicit funds were acquired by Velarde to make pay-
ments to Yulo’s account.
Estrada allegedly acquired over 18,500 square meters of real estate in 
luxury subdivisions, as well as other valuable property using similar 
transactions through other corporate vehicles. On the other hand, he did 
not appear to engage in the massive development contract corruption 
schemes that were a noted feature of the Marcos regime.
Case 4. Following the election of the Workers Party candidate Luiz Iná-
cio Lula da Silva as president of Brazil, the government attempted to 
solidify its power in the legislature, where it did not have a working 
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majority. To accomplish this, it allegedly began paying certain legislators 
an amount that eventually reached around US$12,000 per month. To 
fi nance some of these payments, senior Workers Party leaders allegedly 
contacted Marcos Valerio, a wealthy Brazilian businessman, to assist in 
making the payments. In exchange for a sham contract from the Brazil-
ian government for his advertising fi rm, SMP&B, Valerio was asked to 
guarantee a loan made to the Workers Party by Bank BMG. The Workers 
Party defaulted on this loan, and Valerio paid the loan with funds from 
SMP&B, creating a kickback payment from Valerio to the Workers Party. 
Cash payments were then made from the party directly to legislators.
Comments on the cases. These cases illustrate the variety of ways that 
regimes generate corrupt moneys and use them internally, including—
in Estrada’s case and in other cases about which the risk of suit for defa-
mation induces caution—local property, suggesting that the perceived 
danger of subsequent sequestration was low. Leaders and extended fam-
ily or clan members may also enjoy and want to be seen to enjoy a higher 
standard of living within their own countries (though this does not 
emerge in the case studies above). Also, though infrequently, the cases 
show the drip-feed of funds for local patronage. Wrong’s account (2000) 
of the Mobutu regime and the ever-increasing number of grands légumes 
whom Mobutu found expedient to buy off and neutralize expresses this 
particularly vividly. Given the investigations and prosecutions in France 
relating to deal making in recent decades, it would be a mistake to view 
patron-client relationships and their corrupt manifestations as a feature 
restricted to developing countries; nor is a developing country necessar-
ily prone to heavy corruption and such relationships. It is important to 
analyze carefully what an AML regime would require in developing and 
developed countries (including parallel cross-country investigations) to 
identify such activities and engage in appropriate preventive or criminal 
enforcement actions. It must be emphasized that the integrity and con-
fi dentiality of national FIUs, though important, is not suffi cient for a 
system to work. There must also be confi dence among potential SAR-
writers that information will not leak to those on whom they are report-
ing or to their allies. The risk of the use of personal violence by klepto-
cratic regimes is real both against those who submit SARs and any 
investigators and prosecutors who are not corrupt.
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Accounting for the Lack of Impact
It is not only in the rich world that strategic approaches have been applied 
to address serious crimes. Governance issues have been signifi cant among 
development activists for some time. Corruption and the related fi nanc-
ing and fi nancial consequences have ascended the ladder of political 
attention in the 21st century, exemplifi ed by the more active profi le of the 
OECD Working Group on Bribery in International Business Transactions 
and by development of the UNCAC, now in force. Nonetheless, until 
recent G-20 pronouncements and the Seoul Action Plan 2010 and the 
follow-up in 2011, there has been comparatively little talk, at least in the 
developed world, about the need for a war on corruption and only a 
modest, though increasing focus among offi cial mainstream AML bodies 
on the role that AML can play in combating corruption (FATF 2010). 
Stimulated by nongovernmental organizations such as Transparency 
International and Global Witness, as well as a succession of major scan-
dals, greater attention has been focused on the role of major offshore 
fi nancial centers in laundering the proceeds of grand corruption, as inter-
mediary transit points in concealing bribes, or as the site of accounts held 
by or on behalf of kleptocrats.23 Prior to the development of a variety of 
scandal-driven regulations introducing PEP regimes, offshore fi nancial 
centers offered two advantages to corrupt public servants and to their 
(offi cial and unoffi cial) families with respect to the deposit and long-term 
storage of large sums of money: (1) trustworthiness toward their clients 
and (2) a studied lack of interest in the origins of the capital. The new 
AML regime should have removed the latter advantage by making it dif-
fi cult for people to store and transform the proceeds of corruption (and 
other crimes) without risky, active criminal conspiracy by fi nanciers, 
which might be detected by regulators or criminal investigators (police or 
anticorruption offi cials) in their own countries or elsewhere. Other chap-
ters in this volume deal with the extent to which this may still be the case.
However, the discussions among nongovernmental organizations on 
grand corruption and AML have understandably focused exclusively on 
the role of fi nancial institutions in the developed world in holding the 
accounts of PEPs and failing adequately to scrutinize outgoing bribe 
payments and the incoming proceeds of bribery. Partly because of this 
political pressure and partly because of the way that corruption has been 
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conceptualized as a poor-to-rich country process of capital fl ight, the 
public and professional debate has focused exclusively on the laundering 
links between rich and poor countries, the bribes paid by companies 
based in the former to leaders in the latter, and the return of the bribe 
money to fi nancial institutions or as investments in rich countries. In 
this process, laundering that is largely internal to the poor world has 
been neglected. Indeed, this is implicit in the way that most poor (and 
rich) countries defi ne PEPs: most include only foreign, not domestic, 
public offi cials, and few include subnational politicians, the military, the 
police, and so on, though the rent-seeking capacities of these may be 
great (see Chaikin and Sharman 2009, for a critical review of such legal 
differences). According to the current FATF defi nition, PEPs are indi-
viduals who are or have been entrusted with prominent public functions 
in a foreign country, for example, heads of state or of government, senior 
politicians, senior government, judicial, or military offi cials, senior exec-
utives of state-owned corporations, or important political party offi cials. 
Business relationships with family members or close associates of PEPs 
involve reputational risks similar to those with PEPs. The defi nition is 
not intended to cover middle-ranking or more junior individuals in the 
foregoing categories. Thus, although poor countries are expected, almost 
required, to have AML legislation and FIUs, their fi nancial institutions 
and other regulated bodies are not expected to pay extra due diligence to 
their own de facto and de jure political leadership, who are precisely the 
people most likely to be corrupt.24
Whatever the legal requirements may be, international fi nancial insti-
tutions generally use commercially compiled global lists such as World-
Check or LexisNexis, and these include relatives and associates of PEPs.25 
Many FIUs, at least in jurisdictions that can afford the commercial 
fees, also use these. However, such lists do not include companies of 
which PEPs are undisclosed benefi cial owners, nor do many countries 
assist by publishing lists of all government offi ceholders on the Internet 
or even in print. This has not been an internal priority for countries, 
nor—at least until the FATF began to focus recently upon benefi cial 
ownership—has it been the subject of signifi cant pressure from the 
FATF or the International Monetary Fund–World Bank monitoring pro-
cess. Neither developed nor developing countries currently collate lists 
of PEP holdings in their countries (and major international banks claim 
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that this is impracticable), though there is pressure upon them to do so. 
It would take a major transformation in the current frailties of the global 
AML system to trap corrupt funds paid in developing countries or to 
link most bribes paid elsewhere to corrupt public offi cials through the 
nominees of these offi cials.
Analysts of the corruption-laundering nexus typically explain the 
persistence of the nexus in terms of the following:
•  The relative lack of FATF interest in the subject, though this has 
changed recently
•  The lack of passage or implementation of AML legislation on 
c orruption
•  Political infl uence on offi ces of prosecutors and the judiciary either to 
prosecute regime opponents and fi nancial institutions or not
•  The disconnect between anticorruption and AML bodies that may 
not even be aware of each other, let alone working cooperatively 
(ADB and OECD 2007; Chaikin and Sharman 2009; Goredema and 
Madzima 2009; Sharman and Mistry 2008)
The general theme is missed opportunities for control and what might 
be needed to generate tougher controls. Thus, Goredema and Madzima 
point to fi ve countries in the region that have included unexplained 
wealth provisions in their legislation, but none of which has established a 
record of enforcement, principally, it is claimed, because the privately 
held fi nancial data are “not normally within the purview of an anti- 
corruption agency” (Goredema and Madzima 2009, 26). This leads to 
recommendations to combine or coordinate FIUs, anticorruption agen-
cies, and similar bodies and to ensure their autonomy from government, 
though the method by which these aims are to be achieved (and the way 
in which the unmentioned necessary confi dence of fi nancial and other 
regulated institutions to make reports is to be attained) remains vague. It 
would be surprising if there were not an inverse relationship between 
transparency and the exploitation of corrupt opportunities.26 Under 
such circumstances, the prospects for the local impact of AML on grand 
or even mesolevel corruption are poor: the degree of political control 
(and the democratization of proceeds in terms of the bribery of judicial 
authorities) might protect corrupt PEPs against serious action.27 Gore-
dema and Madzima state as follows:
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Member countries have generally not adopted the identifi cation and 
application of enhanced scrutiny of fi nancial transactions linked to Polit-
ically Exposed Persons as required by the narrow approach [foreign PEPs 
only] in the FATF prescriptions or the broad [national, as well as foreign 
PEPs] prescriptions of the UNCAC. Only [Tanzania] requires reporting 
institutions to conduct enhanced due diligence of transactions conducted 
with PEPs. It also requires that such institutions consider the fact that a 
PEP is based in a country with no AML measures as a red fl ag. Unfortu-
nately there are no explicit penalties for non-compliance. (Goredema and 
Madzima 2009, 60)
One might counter that so few countries have no AML measures that 
this is too generous a baseline. Indirect indicators might be the number 
of SARs aimed at suspected public offi cials and activities connected with 
them and submitted by fi nancial and other regulated institutions within 
developing countries and the number of developing-country FIUs inves-
tigating these SARs or requesting assistance from fi nancial centers over-
seas. The legal secrecy that (appropriately) surrounds SARs in most 
jurisdictions makes it diffi cult for the authorities to demonstrate their 
impact to skeptical outsiders or, alternatively, for skeptical outsiders to 
demonstrate that nothing signifi cant is happening. After all, the FIUs 
cannot, in most circumstances, prosecute PEPs or even regulated per-
sons for failing to implement AML; so, they can argue that it is unfair to 
blame them or the AML system (narrowly construed) for failures. This 
raises the question of how one might evaluate the effi ciency or effective-
ness of AML. In politically sensitive cases, anonymization would be 
impossible without neutering the value of case studies, but, in principle, 
there could be some global quantifi cation of fl ows of requests without 
risking the identifi cation of the people or institutions submitting SARs.
The Development and Processing of Anti–Money 
Laundering Suspicions
Under the money laundering recommendations of the FATF, fi nancial 
Institutions and other regulated bodies must do the following:
• Identify customers (and benefi cial owners, if these are different).
• Establish and maintain up-to-date customer profi les.28
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• Monitor transactions to determine if they match customer profi les.
•  If they do not match, examine the transactions to determine if these 
might represent the proceeds of crimes, including by examining the 
sources of funds.
•  If they do appear to represent the proceeds of crimes, report the trans-
actions to the FIU.
These institutions must apply enhanced due diligence in the case of 
higher-risk customers (of which PEPs are a required category) and 
reduced due diligence in the case of lower-risk customers. However, this 
is not self-implementing; there is much discretion, for example, on how 
far compliance offi cers must go to ascertain the identity of benefi cial 
owners.29 The FATF preventive measures do not describe with any preci-
sion at what point in the risk continuum fi nancial institutions should 
identify transactions as suspicious (a term that, analytically, should be 
redefi ned as suspected) and report them; nor is it clear whether fi nancial 
institutions should report to the FIU those people they decline to accept 
as customers so as to alert the FIUs. Discussions with compliance offi cers 
indicate that they do sometimes turn away PEPs altogether or, if the 
PEPs have accounts, bar them from particular activities that are viewed 
as inconsistent with their offi cial roles and incomes. However, many 
PEPs have access to numerous banks, and barring them from making 
particular transactions may not be effective overall.30 PEPs also have 
local accounts in developing countries, though a developing country 
may not require institutions to apply enhanced due diligence to national 
PEPs, at least formally. Little is publicly known about the perceptions of 
risk among compliance offi cers and regulators in developing countries.
One of the few clear-cut cases where a SAR has been used by a 
 developing-country FIU to prosecute grand corruption locally occurred 
in Namibia, which took action against local elites for massive alleged 
corruption involving the airport security technology fi rm run by a son 
of Chinese leader Hu Jintao (see box 12.1).31
Although he was not a PEP, another example of success by an AML 
system in a developing country is the case of Kobi Alexander, wanted by 
U.S. authorities since 1996 for alleged securities fraud. A Namibian bank 
report arising from a large transfer into Alexander’s recent Namibian 
account may have triggered his arrest.
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A clerk at the Namibian supervisor of banks’ offi ce noticed an unusual 
infl ux of capital into the country—in fact, tens of millions of dollars—into 
accounts that Alexander had opened. The clerk thought that suspicious, 
especially since Alexander was not a resident and had no business contacts 
in Namibia, and he had only arrived a few days earlier. The clerk lodged a 
query with Interpol, which contacted the FBI, and the rest is history.32
Box 12.1 A Suspicious Activity Report Leads to a Transnational 
Corruption Investigation
According to press reports, the Chinese government gave a loan to Namibia of US$100 
million through the Export-Import Bank of China (Exim) for the purchase of scanners 
for airports in Namibia after a visit by Chinese President Hu Jintao in 2007. The loan 
was given at a low rate on the condition that the Namibian government subsequently 
buy the scanner technology from Nuctech under a US$55.3 million contract (although 
less-expensive options were available from competitors).
It was arranged that the Namibian government would make a down payment of 
US$12.8 million, and the rest of the contract was ﬁ nanced by Exim. After the down 
payment had been paid from government coffers, a payment was made by Nuctech 
to Teko Trading for facilitating the contract. It was alleged that Nuctech had negoti-
ated with Teko Trading to receive 10 percent of the contract if the average price of one 
scanner was US$2.5 million. If the selling price was over this amount, the company 
would receive 50 percent of the difference, and a subsequent negotiation ﬁ xed the 
payment for this agreement at the equivalent of the Namibian government’s down 
payment.
According to a report in the New York Times, the scam was discovered “because 
of a new money laundering law that requires Namibian banks to routinely report large 
money transfers to investigators.”a An ofﬁ cial from the Windhoek bank implemented 
the procedure and alerted the Finance Ministry when a large amount was received into 
the account of Yang Fan, the Chinese Nuctech representative for Africa.
Yang allegedly deposited US$5.3 million into the account of Teko Trading on 
March 11, 2009. Teko then sent invoices to Nuctech for US$12.8 million, which was the 
amount of the down payment paid by the Namibian Ministry of Finance. Yang and the 
Namibian owners of Teko Trading—Teckla Lameck (a public service commissioner) and 
Jerobeam Mokaxwa—were arrested and charged with corruptly accepting gratiﬁ ca-
tion for giving assistance in the procuring of a contract with a public body.b
Yang also transferred US$2.1 million into an investment fund, while the other two 
accused spent large amounts of funds purchasing vehicles and houses. The Namibian 
court subsequently froze the assets of the accused and US$12.8 million of Nuctech’s 
assets under Namibia’s Organized Crime Prevention Act.
a. Wines, M., “Graft Inquiry in Namibia Finds Clues in China,” New York Times, July 21, 2009.
b. As of July 2010, the case was still ongoing, but Chinese authorities were reportedly cooperating 
with the local investigation in Namibia.
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Developing-country reporting bodies and FIUs might theoretically 
have an effect in any area except external sources and external account 
deposits. Yet, developed countries almost never receive requests from 
developing countries on their own domestic PEPs unless PEPs have 
fallen from political favor.33 There are few economies similar to Botswana 
and Hong Kong SAR, China, where the anticorruption regimes are 
widely claimed to have been a success and where international jurisdic-
tional reputation is high. However, the political conditions of autonomy 
are rarely appropriate for pursuing elites while they are in power; not 
even in Hong Kong SAR, China, before (or after) its absorption into 
China as a special administrative region, where police and administra-
tive corruption were undoubtedly endemic at the time of the formation 
of the Independent Commission against Corruption, were business and 
political elites the targets of the enforcement and prevention efforts. 
Financial investigation powers were probably used against the commis-
sion’s targets, but the proactive volunteering of suspicions by regulated 
bodies characteristic of the ideal-typical AML regime was rare at that 
early period. Rather than being triggered by suspicious activity reports, 
investigations relied on classic intelligence-led policing operations and 
the application of fi nancial investigation tools.
There are plausible fears that government knowledge about the wealth 
and bank holdings of prominent individuals will increase the risk of kid-
napping and the levels of extortion in some countries. Banks have made 
reports to FIUs on leading national politicians, and the information has 
leaked back to the politicians. Part of the political capital of leaders such 
as Fujimori of Peru, Mobutu of Zaire, and Suharto of Indonesia was that 
their intelligence apparatus was omnipresent, and, whatever the formal 
constitutional status of FIUs, beliefs about the penetration of offi cial 
bodies are bound to have a chilling effect on AML reporting (and on the 
audit of institutions within the country), as, indeed, it is intended to 
have. The need to fi nance this internal intelligence apparatus and to buy 
subservience, if not loyalty, demonstrates why not all the proceeds and 
fi nancing of corruption fl ow from poor to rich countries: substantial 
sums may be needed internally to retain power. One expert source has 
observed that, whereas President Estrada gave contracts and other ben-
efi ts to a modest number of his media circle, President Marcos, lacking 
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this level of popular support and legitimacy, lavished huge cash sums, as 
well as contracts on a wider range of potential threats and needed sup-
porters. In environments where economic power is more concentrated 
and where investigative and criminal justice institutions may be seen to 
be and may actually be less independent of government than in most 
(but not all) developed countries, how can police, anticorruption com-
missions, prosecutors, and judges be expected to deal properly with 
reports on elites? How can local FIUs in developing countries deal effec-
tively with SARs that are reported to FIUs in developed countries and 
passed on to authorities in the developing countries for intelligence 
development? Such action may not be necessary in the developing coun-
tries if money laundering charges can be made in developed countries 
against the foreign PEPs, but prosecutions are not always successful; 
those undertaken in English courts have been subject to serious delays 
and diffi culties exacerbated at the intersection between the human rights 
of the defendants and transnational investigative powers.
Conclusion
This chapter represents a diffi cult venture into an underdeveloped litera-
ture on a policy area that has been caught up in a process of permanent 
expansion over the past two decades. It is clear that the substantial fi nan-
cial proceeds arising from corruption are often retained or even imported 
into developing countries to pay off political rivals, satisfy obligations to 
families, friends, and clans, and invest in local businesses and property. 
The steps necessary so that local AML measures can be used to identify 
and act against such activities remain somewhat uncertain. If suspicions 
are communicated to national FIUs or, conceivably, by international 
banks to foreign FIUs, what could these FIUs plausibly do with the 
reports if investigators and prosecutors are not truly independent? (In 
the latter case, it seems unlikely that the kleptocracy would have devel-
oped in the fi rst place.) However, the combination of local and foreign 
investigations running in parallel might yield more than the sum of the 
two. The inward movement of cash or the corporate and charity vehicles 
can be a way of bringing funds into, as well as out of, developing coun-
tries. Estimating the size of these internal-internal and external-internal 
fl ows has not been attempted here.
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Key questions remain about the implementation and impact of AML 
controls in developing countries in relation to corruption and other 
crimes that depend on corruption. For example, how do AML controls 
function in environments in which fi nancial institutions and profession-
als—those expected to submit SARs and cash deposit and transfer 
reports—may be afraid of leaks reaching powerful private sector and 
state actors, gain profi t from dealings with them, or have relatively few 
alternative sources of profi t?
The Western powers have, arguably, considered AML and its associ-
ated legislative infrastructure mainly as a device to ensure mutual legal 
assistance. Perhaps AML also helps prevent criminal activities from 
harming developed countries, though the crimes have been thrust on the 
developing world. (However, within the developing world, there are 
huge variations in implementation levels and diffi culties, as well as in the 
support for the idea of AML.)34 The amount of evidence collected sys-
tematically is modest, but not only the FATF, but also the FATF-Style 
Regional Bodies have been encouraged to develop their own money 
laundering typologies and assess trends in laundering and the impact of 
controls.35 Both of these present serious analytical challenges, not least in 
disentangling the extent to which the visible tip of the crimeberg refl ects 
real changes or merely or mostly investigatory foci. The decision to have 
a typology on a particular subject (such as the use of the timber trade or 
e-gambling) can generate a sharper analytical focus among member 
states that can bring to light issues not formerly addressed. This can cre-
ate the illusion that there is a trend, but may merely have revealed more 
of the dark side of this sort of activity. Typologies also present commu-
nicative challenges because anonymization can easily render cases 
unmemorable, defeating the object of the typology. Without a greater 
understanding of these elements of implementation and impact, it is dif-
fi cult to gauge the extent to which the continuance of corruption (and 
other serious crimes for gain, including tax fraud, at least in principle) 
may be due to theory failure or to implementation failure in the AML 
regime.
It is arguable that the principal benefi t (and perceived benefi t) of 
AML regimes in developing countries is the political and economic 
acceptance that AML brings, allowing membership in the international 
economic community, rather than anything more specifi c. This has to be 
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set against the substantial costs of introducing such regimes in countries 
poor in human resources. The travel and associated costs of participat-
ing in Egmont, FATF-Style Regional Bodies, and so on—often paid for 
out of aid or budgets for law enforcement assistance—are substantial.
Under certain circumstances, such as the plethora of reforms that fol-
lowed Montesinos and, to a lesser extent, Marcos, a plausible case can be 
made that economic benefi ts outweigh economic costs, but this is rarely 
the trend in the evidence. Their case studies of Barbados, Mauritius, and 
Vanuatu led Sharman and Mistry (2008) to express the judgment that 
the international AML regime has imposed undue costs on small com-
monwealth (and, by inference, other) jurisdictions. One expert inter-
viewed for this project noted that at least one-fi fth of the qualifi ed 
accountants in Niger were employed in the FIU there, but had little to 
do. This (and the Malawi and Nauru examples cited elsewhere above) 
looks like an egregious waste of resources to avoid even more damaging 
external economic sanctions. Perhaps the Sharman and Mistry analysis 
took insuffi cient account of the damage done not only to their case study 
jurisdictions, but to other jurisdictions as a result of regulatory defi cien-
cies, for example, through the use of corporate secrecy vehicles to com-
mit fraud or grand or meso corruption embezzlement elsewhere. AML, 
after all, is about reducing global sociopathy in sanitizing the proceeds of 
crime elsewhere. What does seem clear is that some regimes receive a 
small proportion of their gross domestic product from fees from the 
corporate and fi nancial service sector and that maintaining serious AML 
capability makes this of little net value to a country.
If regimes are to be required to have AML measures in general, the 
case is undeniable that they should optimize the benefi ts by using them 
to combat corruption, especially corruption at a high level. This would 
require not only better liaison with anticorruption bodies within their 
own jurisdictions, but also with fi nancial crime investigators and intel-
ligence units abroad, perhaps in parallel or in tandem. Namibia and 
Nigeria excepted, there do not appear to be any cases in which internal 
AML reporting in developing countries has led to major cases against 
in-favor PEPs, but this does not rule out the utility of SARs against out-
of-favor PEPs or in accumulating evidence of assets directly or benefi -
cially owned by national or international PEPs. In one middle-income 
non-OECD country, corruption and fraud-related SARs triggered the 
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prosecution of senior in-favor politicians even though, as national fi g-
ures, they were not formally classifi ed as PEPs.36 However, this is a juris-
diction in which confi dence in the independence of the FIU and the 
prosecutorial process is high.
More generally, what is required is to work out the details of how the 
identifi cation, reporting, investigation, and intervention processes might 
produce fewer false positives and false negatives and of how the launder-
ing indicators of corruption differ from or resemble those for other 
offenses. In short, as the example of the Nigerian Economic and Finan-
cial Crimes Commission demonstrated (before changes were imple-
mented among key personnel), a vigorous developing-country FIU, 
combined with an independent investigative and prosecutorial body, can 
receive SARs from and transmit SARs to foreign countries and use these 
to investigate corrupt senior fi gures at home and abroad (Ribadu 2010). 
However, such examples are rare, especially in the long term, and the 
impact of AML within developing countries in controlling grand cor-
ruption remains limited. The policy implications of this merit further 
refl ection, and, although there are welcome signs that the international 
community appreciates the need for risk-based resource allocation in 
poor countries, the transformation of this into AML evaluations requires 
more subtlety than has been evident to date (de Koker 2009).
Notes
 1. “Malawi is not and does not aspire to be an international fi nancial center, nor 
has it been associated with money laundering or the fi nancing of terrorism. 
Speaking at an international fi nancial summit in September 2006, the Minister 
of Economics and Planning recounted how his country had come to adopt the 
standard package of AML regulations. The Minister was told that Malawi needed 
an AML policy. The Minister replied that Malawi did not have a problem with 
money laundering, but was informed that this did not matter. When the Minis-
ter asked if the package could be adapted for local conditions he was told no, 
because then Malawi would not meet international standards in this area. The 
Minister was further informed that a failure to meet international AML stan-
dards would make it harder for individuals and fi rms in Malawi to transact with 
the outside world relative to its neighbors, and thus less likely to attract foreign 
investment. The Minister concluded: ‘We did as we were told’; the country 
adopted the standard package of AML policies.” (Sharman 2008, 651)
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 2. A parallel argument could be made about mutual legal assistance treaties, 
including extradition.
 3. The national proceeds of crime confi scation schemes vary. The most common 
are postconviction schemes that either (a) require offenders who wish to retain 
assets to show that the assets have been acquired legitimately for value or 
(b) require the prosecution to prove that the specifi c assets have been illicitly 
acquired by the convicted persons. The latter was the conventional approach 
until the 1990s. However, there are, additionally, civil forfeiture–asset recovery 
schemes that require proof that assets have been illicitly acquired only on a bal-
ance of probabilities test. These include some, primarily, common law jurisdic-
tions in the developed world such as Australia, Ireland, the United Kingdom, 
and the United States, but also legislation of the newly established AML regimes 
of developing countries, such as Lesotho, Namibia, and South Africa.
 4. The lifestyle of the grand corrupt (and other offenders) may excite admiration 
and emulation (as well as fear and hatred) even if their savings are confi scated 
or frozen.
 5. Kaira, C., and V. Wessels, “Namibian Firm Formed by Ex-Comverse Chief Alex-
ander,” Jerusalem Post, February 26, 2007, http://www.jpost.com/Home/Article.
aspx?id=52744.
 6. It should be borne in mind that threshold reporting sums such as US$10,000 or 
€15,000, which are modest in rich countries, may represent large sums in poor 
ones.
 7. This is not merely a question of the perception of corruption within the FIU 
(the police are often mistrusted in developing countries); it is also a question of 
whether the FIU can be trusted to be discreet if reports are submitted on PEPs 
or local business elites.
 8. A White House press release (2010, 1) nicely expresses the issues, as follows:
Under the Action Plan, G-20 Leaders agreed to lead by example in key areas, 
including: to accede or ratify and effectively implement the UNCAC and pro-
mote a transparent and inclusive review process; adopt and enforce laws 
against the bribery of foreign public offi cials; prevent access of corrupt offi -
cials to the global fi nancial system; consider a cooperative framework for the 
denial of entry to corrupt offi cials, extradition, and asset recovery; protect 
whistleblowers; and safeguard anticorruption bodies.
 9. The acquittal of Chiluba was appealed by the prosecutor, but the Zambian gov-
ernment of the time (defeated in the 2011 elections) dismissed the prosecutor 
and withdrew the appeal for undisclosed reasons. It also declined to enforce an 
order against Chiluba and others in the London High Court for the return of 
US$46 million in stolen funds. (See Attorney General of Zambia for and on behalf 
of the Republic of Zambia (Claimant) and Meer Care & Desai (a fi rm) & Ors 
[2007] EWHC 952.) In 2011, Chiluba died, and the future of these funds remains 
uncertain despite the change in government.
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10. Kaufmann notes that the range is US$600 billion–US$1.5 trillion; so, US$1 bil-
lion is (almost) at midpoint. The methodology is set out in his appendix.
11. One of the common mistakes is to equate the losses arising from corrupt con-
tracts with the bribes (and the sums laundered therefrom). Logically, the bribe-
payer’s income and the bribe recipient’s income both count as proceeds of cor-
ruption. So, in the context of this chapter, it is what happens to the profi ts and 
where the funds are disbursed and distributed that count.
12. Technically, under some legislative systems, such as in England and Wales, the 
entire purchase price constitutes the proceeds of corruption and is liable to 
postconviction confi scation. However, analytically, such sums are not available 
in bribes and certainly not for redistribution or savings, unless the goods or 
services supplied are wholly fi ctitious. See also the discussion of the meaning of 
laundering in the text.
13. This can be a particular problem for offenses such as illicit enrichment, which is 
a criminal offense in many former British colonies and mandated in the Con-
vention of the Organization of American States, but not implemented by Can-
ada or the United States because of an assessed incompatibility with the consti-
tutions of these two countries. The OECD Anti-Bribery Convention aims to 
make transnational bribery criminal whether or not the act is criminal in the 
receiving country.
14. Whether such claims are true, even if believed by their authors, remains an open 
question. It is diffi cult to generalize from ex post statements about motivations 
and future intents.
15. It is important to bear in mind, though, that we may misjudge or be misin-
formed about the likely consequences of accepting criminal money.
16. Hawalas are informal systems for transferring money that are traditional in 
Arab countries and South Asia.
17. The longer-term impact of the UBS settlement with the U.S. authorities over 
money fl ows from Switzerland, of the information leaks from Bank Julius Baer 
in Zurich and from LGT Bank in Liechtenstein, of the subsequent tax settle-
ments with Germany, and of the market anticipation of the more general effects 
of such cases remains to be determined.
18. The report (Goredema and Madzima 2009, 29) notes as follows:
If endemic, corruption can render the AML system dysfunctional by clogging it 
with a large volume of cases to deal with:
•  Because of its connection to money laundering, corruption will try to pre-
vent the adoption of effective measures against money laundering, and may 
succeed in doing so if not detected and confronted;
•  The implementation of AML measures that have been adopted can be 
impeded by corruption, such as by interfering with the capacity of mandated 
institutions to perform their duties, or infl uencing the relevant offi cials;
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•  By corrupting institutions in the private sector on whose co-operation pre-
vailing AML systems increasingly rely, to secure their collusion in sabotaging 
the effective implementation of AML measures;
•  Corruption will take advantage of differences in levels of implementation of 
AML measures in different countries to frustrate trans-national co-operation 
to investigate money laundering or track proceeds of crime.
19. No wrong has been done, that is, except through the process by which the con-
cessions are granted.
20. Wrong (2000) identifi es the nonperformance of the extraction industry in the 
postcolonial period as a key problem in Mobutu’s Zaire.
21. In cases of extortion by PEPs, the normal normative model of a bad corporation 
and a less bad bribe-taker is, arguably, reversed. However, in both cases, public 
welfare is diminished. The relative impact of models such as “publish what you 
pay” is not clear if government personnel are the extortionists rather than the 
more passive recipients of bribes.
22. This might appear like a good recovery rate, though, in common with data on 
the seizure or confi scation of the proceeds of crime generally, it is often diffi cult 
to disentangle what is seized or frozen from the assets that are merely ordered to 
be confi scated and the assets actually recovered. Chaikin (personal communica-
tion) notes that, according to the Report of the Presidential Commission on 
Good Government’s Accomplishments for the year 2001, there were 24 civil 
cases (involving over 100 companies) pending before the Anti-Corruption 
Court in the Philippines to determine ownership of alleged illicit assets con-
nected with the Marcos regime. These cases concern equities and domestic real 
properties worth a total of P208 billion. (At current prices, this amounts to 
about US$4.5 billion.) The 2001 fi gures are not current, but other sources state 
that there have been few if any new domestic cases, and the Philippine govern-
ment is likely to have lost some cases in court. The data problems are indicative 
of the diffi culties in externally tracking evidence in even well-attested cases.
23. Offshore fi nancial center, fi nancial haven, and secrecy haven have been replacing 
the more limited, older term tax haven.
24. The European Union third anti–money laundering directive refers to “natural 
persons who are or have been entrusted with prominent political functions and 
immediate family members or persons known to be close associates of such per-
sons.” (Article 3 [8]). Article 2(a) of the UNCAC states that “public offi cial” shall 
mean: (a) any person holding a legislative, executive, administrative, or judicial 
offi ce of a State Party, whether appointed or elected, whether permanent or tem-
porary, whether paid or unpaid, irrespective of that person’s seniority; (b) any 
other person who performs a public function, including for a public agency or 
public enterprise, or provides a public service, as defi ned in the domestic law of 
the State Party and as applied in the pertinent area of law of that State Party; (c) 
any other person defi ned as a “public offi cial” in the domestic law of a State Party.
25. See “Wolfsberg FAQ’s on Politically Exposed Persons,” Wolfsberg Group, http://
www.wolfsberg-principles.com/faq-persons.html.
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26. Though the declaration of interests can simply demonstrate a sense of impunity 
by elites.
27. There is a useful typology of levels of corrupt penetration and possible responses 
(see table 12.1).
28. Presumably, if a customer profi le suggests the proceeds of crime are involved, 
the fi nancial institution should skip directly to the penultimate step.
29. After the event, regulators may apply hindsight standards, but the collateral con-
sequences of bringing down large multinational or national fi nancial institu-
tions may deter heavy corporate sanctions beyond fi nes and restrictions on the 
access of particular individuals to fi ll banking posts that need to be approved.
30. The fact that PEPs may have accounts with several institutions means that 
counting PEP accounts within a jurisdiction is a poor guide to the number of 
PEPs because there will be double counting unless the names and other personal 
and corporate account identifi ers are available. Meanwhile, undisclosed benefi -
cial ownership may generate an undercount.
31. In 2011, a similar deal was concluded between Chinese fi rms and Namibia, 
but without the involvement of Teko Trading. See Smit, N., “Namibia: Tender 
Exemption for Chinese Firms,” AllAfrica.com, November 18, 2011, http:// 
 allafrica.com/stories/201111180336.html.
32. Yom-Tov, S., “Kobi Alexander Will Be Facing Charges of Money-Laundering,” 
Haaretz, September 29, 2006.
33. Confi dential interviews by the author among FIU staff, 2009.
34. The levels of support for AML are hard to determine. One of the interesting 
aspects of the phenomenon, notable more strongly in discussions about terror-
ist fi nance, is the way—even in Islamic countries—the perception that money 
laundering is harmful and that AML is needed have become the conventional 
wisdom. One consequence is that it is diffi cult to fi nd offi cials who express skep-
ticism about keeping the proceeds of crimes out of their economies, though 
critical discussion is commonplace about the impracticality of mechanisms to 
develop and report suspicions and act upon them.
35. “Money laundering typologies” is rather an elastic construct lacking in the rigor 
normally associated with the noun typology in scientifi c usage. In the AML 
world, a typology normally refers simply to a method of laundering. See Gore-
dema and Madzima (2009) for a review of money laundering and measures 
against corruption in that region (for example, table 12.1): these connections 
are found in other FATF-Style Regional Bodies.
36. Personal communication to the author.
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Abstract
This chapter contains fi ve corruption case studies relating to politically 
exposed persons (PEPs) from Indonesia, Kenya, Nigeria (two cases), and 
Zambia; two of these PEPs were heads of state. It details the methodol-
ogy of amassing corrupt fortunes and the ways in which the politicians 
and offi cials involved have sought to put those fortunes beyond the reach 
of the law using a variety of jurisdictions perceived as havens for illicitly 
acquired funds. It tracks the efforts made to recover these funds and the 
obstacles encountered, resulting in success in some cases and failure in 
others. It emphasizes the importance of utilizing civil asset recovery 
powers, in conjunction with the compulsion powers of criminal law 
enforcement agencies. International mutual assistance is vital to success-
ful recoveries in this area, but is by no means a given in cases that are, by 
their nature, politically high profi le. Shortcomings in the law in this area 
are regularly exposed by lawyers acting for defendants who are frequently 
more well funded than the people pursuing them. International conven-
tions recognize the need for concerted action, but, ultimately, the leaders 
in individual states have to summon the political will to tackle those who 
have gone before them and resist the temptation of simply following 
James Maton and Tim Daniel
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them, or nothing will ever change for the disadvantaged of this world. 
This chapter shows that the effective use of the law has the power to 
bring about change: it aims to share experiences that may help those 
dedicated to the pursuit of assets stolen from the people of too many 
nations by their corrupt leaders.
Introduction
The U.K. lord chancellor and minister for justice introduced the United 
Kingdom’s new foreign bribery strategy at Chatham House in January 
2010 with these words:
By defi nition, it is hard to assess the costs of bribery. But the estimates we 
do have are staggering. The World Bank estimated that around US$1 tril-
lion is paid each year in bribes. Transparency International estimates that 
15% of companies in industrialised countries have to pay bribes to win or 
keep business. In Asia it is estimated that 30% do so. . . .
Politicians and offi cials in developing and transition states alone are 
estimated to receive between US$20 [billion] and US$40 billion in bribes; 
the equivalent of 20 to 40% of development assistance. And this is bribery 
alone. It does not include wider forms of corruption; embezzlement of 
public funds; theft or misuse of public assets; distortions in public pro-
curement. And it takes no account of fraud in the private sector.
These are dreadful fi gures. And beyond these fi gures lie innumerable 
individual tragedies. . . .1
Great steps forward to combat bribery and corruption have been 
taken, particularly in the last 10 years, by a variety of international actors, 
including the United Nations, the Organisation for Economic Co- 
operation and Development (OECD), and the World Bank.2 Guidelines 
have been established; individual states have been urged to bring their 
own legislation into order; and peer review mechanisms have been set 
up. These measures have had as their objective not only successful pros-
ecution of bribery offenses, but also, and at least as importantly, the pre-
vention of bribery and corruption. Chapter V of the United Nations 
Convention against Corruption (UNCAC) and the Stolen Asset Recov-
ery Initiative have as their focus, however, the recovery of assets paid in 
bribes or embezzled by offi cials, generally high-ranking ones, politicians, 
and, most egregiously, heads of state.
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The chapter considers four cases from Africa, and one from Southeast 
Asia. It addresses the acts generating the corrupt funds and the mecha-
nisms and techniques by which corrupt funds were transferred and then 
held and managed. It identifi es where the corrupt funds ended up in the 
developed world and examines the assistance provided by fi nancial insti-
tutions and professional advisers in the transfer and maintenance of the 
funds and assets. The chapter then details mechanisms by which some of 
the corrupt funds have been recovered and looks at some of the hurdles 
faced and why recovery efforts sometimes end in failure.
The importance of understanding the issues involved was recently 
underlined in the United States by the work of the Levin Committee, 
which, in February 2010, released a 330-page report on four other case 
histories (U.S. Senate 2010), all relating to African PEPs who “used gaps 
in U.S. law and the assistance of U.S. professionals to funnel millions of 
dollars in illicit money into the United States.” The report makes a series 
of recommendations, for, as Senator Levin says, “Stopping the fl ow of 
illegal money is critical, because foreign corruption damages civil soci-
ety, undermines the rule of law, and threatens our security.”3
The case studies considered in this chapter now follow.
Sani Abacha, Head of State of Nigeria, 1993–98
Overview
It is estimated that Abacha stole between US$3 billion and US$5 billion 
during his four and a half years in offi ce. To date, approximately US$2.3 
billion has been or is in the course of being recovered. Of this sum, 
approximately US$750 million was handed over voluntarily by the Aba-
cha family following Sani Abacha’s death in June 1998. Contrary to 
their assertion that everything that had been stolen had been handed 
back, it was discovered that there were substantial additional funds in 
bank accounts situated mainly in Europe. Thus, protracted litigation in 
Switzerland ultimately resulted in a judgment in favor of Nigeria, and 
over US$500 million worth of assets were repatriated to Nigeria. Pro-
ceedings in the United Kingdom, in England, resulted in a payment of 
US$150 million.4 Funds held in Jersey by Abubakar Bagudu, who was 
the right-hand man of Mohammed Abacha, the eldest son and master-
mind of the entire enterprise, amounted to about US$160 million. 
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Bagudu was allowed to keep US$40 million in return for unconditional 
surrender of the balance.5 Sums of the order of US$400 million were 
held by banks in The Bahamas and Luxembourg, and US$200 million 
was held in Liechtenstein.6 In November 2010, the court in Geneva 
ordered confi scation of the US$400 million held in the banks in The 
Bahamas and Luxembourg in accounts controlled by Mohammed’s 
younger brother, Abba, and imposed a two-year suspended jail sen-
tence, but, in March 2011, the sentence was quashed and a retrial 
ordered on the grounds that Abba had been unable to attend court 
because his visa had not come through in time.7 It is anticipated that 
these funds, as well as those held in Liechtenstein, will be repatriated to 
Nigeria in due course.
Acts generating corrupt funds
On July 23, 1998, following Abacha’s death in June, the interim govern-
ment of Abdulsalami Abubakar set up a special investigation panel under 
the direction of Peter Gana, a deputy police commissioner and a member 
of the National Security Council. The panel was instructed to ascertain 
whether Abacha and his entourage had embezzled public funds and, if so, 
to seek to recover them. In November 1998, the panel published a report, 
according to which Abacha and his accomplices (namely, among others, 
Ismailia Gwarzo, the national security adviser; Anthony Ani, the former 
minister of fi nance; Bagudu; and Mohammed Abacha) had arranged 
payments to themselves between January 1994 and June 1998 of sums in 
excess of US$1.5 billion and £415 million (equivalent in all to US$2.3 bil-
lion) from the Central Bank of Nigeria (CBN).8 These sums were made 
up of cash, traveler’s checks, and interbank transfers. The report states 
that the panel was able to recover a total of US$625 million and £75 mil-
lion. This was the “voluntary” return of monies by the Abacha family.
The panel report stated that records from the CBN revealed that a 
total of US$2.25 billion had been withdrawn from the CBN on the 
approval of General Abacha and Ismailia Gwarzo and largely diverted 
into foreign bank accounts and the acquisition of real estate and other 
assets. The modus operandi was for Gwarzo to use security needs as a fake 
reason for applying to the CBN for funds. These monies are thus gener-
ally referred to as the security vote monies.
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The methodology was almost comically simple. Between March 1994 
and April 1998, Gwarzo wrote some 45 letters to Abacha. The fi rst, dated 
March 25, 1994, was, as the letter itself stated, “very modest”; it read:
Request for Special Allocation
I am constrained to request very modestly US$2m (Two million dol-
lars) for very urgent operation (sic) overseas.
I will appreciate your kind approval for this amount to enable this 
imperative operation to commence immediately.9
The entire sum was approved by Abacha, who countersigned the let-
ter, which was then taken to the CBN, and the CBN paid out to Gwarzo 
six tranches of traveler’s checks totaling US$2 million on the same day. 
Thomas Cook traveler’s checks issued by the CBN under license were a 
favorite instrument used extensively by government ministers to make 
overseas payments during the time of the Abacha regime.
The scheme with the traveler’s checks worked so well that Abacha and 
Gwarzo moved on to obtain direct cash withdrawals from the CBN. 
Between February 1995 and May 1996, 33 cash withdrawals or tele-
graphic transfers were made. The cash withdrawals were made mainly in 
large denomination dollar bills delivered personally to Gwarzo. The tele-
graphic transfers were made mainly to accounts held at European banks 
by offshore entities benefi cially owned by the Abachas.
By April 1998, Gwarzo’s letters were much more ambitious: the last of 
these letters referred to Abacha’s “charismatic leadership and a vote of 
confi dence from all fi ve political parties.” However, it said there were 
“insincere voices” that felt “others should be given a chance to run the 
race with you. These sorts of characters,” the letter said, “are being aided 
and abetted by some foreigners who do not wish this nation any good.” 
Therefore, the letter went on, “we should put on an aggressive public 
enlightenment and mount strategies of countering these miserable mis-
creants with a view to furthering the solidity of your teaming (sic) 
admirers both at home and abroad.”
The letter fi nished by stating: “A lot of resources will be needed for use 
both at home and abroad. I recommend as follows one hundred million 
US Dollars ($100m), fi fty million-pound sterling (£50m) and fi ve hun-
dred million Naira (N500m). Kindly consider and approve.”
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Before that single-candidate election could be held, Abacha was dead; 
this was in June 1998. It was claimed subsequently that one of the rea-
sons Abacha amassed all that he did was to build up his war chest to fi ght 
the elections.
The total security vote withdrawals comprised US$1.13 billion and 
£413 million in banknotes, US$43.3 million and £3.5 million in trav-
eler’s checks, and US$328.5 million in telex or telegraphic transfers 
abroad. A small fraction (US$15 million) of the cash was given in aid to 
some neighboring African states, and around US$100 million may have 
been lost in currency exchanges. The balance of unrecovered funds was 
put at US$748 million and £341 million.
Mechanisms and techniques used to transfer funds. The Abachas had to 
fi nd ways to manage the colossal sums they had stolen. Mohammed 
Abacha admitted in evidence in other proceedings that, sometimes, 
there was as much as US$50 million–US$100 million in banknotes at his 
house in Abuja. These monies were then either retained by the Abacha 
family and used for their personal purposes or passed on to associates to 
be laundered and concealed.
Cash shipments out of Nigeria were sometimes intercepted. In August 
1995, US$7.5 million and £250,000 in cash and US$1.5 million in trav-
eler’s checks were intercepted by the Nigerian customs service in transit 
from Union Bank of Nigeria to the bank’s London branch. As a result, a 
directive was issued that, in future, currencies “evacuated” from the 
country should be transferred through the CBN. Bagudu said, in evi-
dence, that, despite this directive, individuals could still buy currency 
and take it out of the country in cash and that this means of removal 
from Nigeria was still practiced on a widespread scale.
In February 1998, a Mr. Daura of Sunshine Bureau de Change was 
caught with US$3 million in cash after he had landed at Heathrow in a 
private jet. HM Customs & Excise then made an application for the 
money to be forfeited, assuming it to represent the proceeds of drug traf-
fi cking.10 Daura and his Bureau de Change were big recipients of security 
vote monies. He deposited the monies with the local branch of First 
Bank and other Nigerian banks. He then exchanged the amounts held in 
the accounts that were in his name in Lagos and had them transferred to 
branches of the same banks abroad. These were then transferred from 
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Daura’s overseas accounts to accounts held in the names of the Abachas 
and their associates. As much as US$100 million was thus exported by 
Daura.
Another method used was for cash and traveler’s checks to be depos-
ited in accounts held with local commercial banks in Nigeria, including, 
in particular, accounts held in the name of Bagudu with Inland Bank of 
Nigeria and Union Bank of Nigeria. The funds were then transferred on 
to accounts maintained at banks outside Nigeria in the names of entities 
owned or controlled by the Abachas.
Following the CBN directive, the Nigerian banks were used to under-
take what Bagudu referred to as “cash swaps.” Bagudu made deposits of 
foreign currency and traveler’s checks at local Nigerian banks. These 
were then deposited by the local bank with the CBN, which made a cor-
responding transfer from one of its overseas foreign currency accounts 
to the overseas domiciliary account (held by banks such as Commerz-
bank and Citibank) of the relevant local bank. The sums held in the rel-
evant bank domiciliary accounts would be held for their clients, the Aba-
chas or their associates, who would then give transfer instructions to the 
relevant banks to effect transfers from the domiciliary accounts to recip-
ient accounts. Huge sums were transferred this way.
Structures through which corrupt funds were transferred, held, and man-
aged. The Abachas and their accomplices used traditional methods to 
launder the monies stolen from the CBN, such as multiple accounts. 
Estimates vary, but it is thought that probably around 1,000 different 
accounts were opened in different jurisdictions. These accounts were all 
owned or controlled by members of the Abacha family and their accom-
plices or by persons who were not readily identifi able. The use of multi-
ple accounts is a recognized device used by money launderers because it 
impedes the monitoring and tracing of client activity and assets by 
banks, allows the quick and confi dential movement of funds, disguises 
the true extent of an individual’s assets, and hides and facilitates illicit 
activities.
Shell companies incorporated in offshore locations such as The Baha-
mas, British Virgin Islands, Isle of Man, and others where there is little 
publicly available information in relation to ownership, control, or 
fi nancial position were used liberally. None of these companies had any 
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commercial business of their own; they were simply incorporated or 
acquired to receive and transmit monies through recognized banks.
Many of the companies utilized by the Abacha family and their 
accomplices were also bearer share companies. All of these were incor-
porated in British Virgin Islands, and the shares were generally held by 
Bagudu or Mohammed Abacha. Bearer share companies are used by 
money launderers because, unless a bank maintains physical possession 
of the shares, it is impossible to know with certainty who, at any given 
moment, is the company’s true owner.
Many of the accounts owned or controlled by the Abachas were spe-
cial name accounts, that is, accounts held under a special name or pseu-
donym, thus disguising the identity of the real account holder from 
those who make transfers to or receive transfers from the accounts. 
These accounts were generally set up in London or New York by Citibank 
Private Bank. Numbered accounts were used extensively in Switzerland, 
at about a dozen different (well-known) banks. A number of trusts were 
also set up in Guernsey (with bank accounts in London), British Virgin 
Islands, and Nassau, in The Bahamas, with bank accounts in Switzer-
land. Apartments purchased by the Abachas in Kensington (London) 
were owned by companies incorporated in Isle of Man.
Finally, security vote monies were used to purchase Nigerian par bonds. 
These par bonds were issued by Nigeria in exchange for rescheduled bank 
loans. The government paid interest by way of coupon payments on the 
bonds, and the government would purchase the bonds at face value on 
expiry. In the meantime, there was a limited market in the par bonds.
Destinations, assistance, and the recovery process
On September 30, 1999, four months after democratically elected Presi-
dent Obasanjo took offi ce, Nigeria informed the Federal Police Offi ce in 
Switzerland of its intention to request mutual assistance from Switzer-
land for an ongoing investigation against the friends and family of the 
late Sani Abacha. The original Nigerian request was accompanied by a 
request for interim freezing orders made by Enrico Monfrini, a Swiss 
lawyer in Geneva instructed by the Nigerian government. The freezing 
orders were made two weeks later.
However, as the investigation showed later, many of the bank accounts 
identifi ed in the original request for assistance had been closed, and the 
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assets transferred to other jurisdictions such as Jersey, Liechtenstein, Lux-
embourg, and the United Kingdom. Had Nigeria waited for the transmit-
tal of evidence by Switzerland through the formal mutual legal assistance 
route, it would only have received the documents necessary to send addi-
tional requests to those jurisdictions in about August 2003. Such delays 
would have repeated themselves in those jurisdictions, and Nigeria would 
probably never have been able to freeze any meaningful assets.
To avoid these delays, Monfrini lodged, in late November 1999, a 
criminal complaint alleging fraud, money laundering, and participation 
in a criminal organization, with the attorney general of Geneva. A list of 
the suspects and their companies was provided, and Nigeria also made a 
formal request to be admitted in the criminal proceedings as a civil party 
suing for damages. The attorney general opened a criminal investigation, 
and, within a matter of days, Nigeria was also admitted as a civil party.11 
A blanket freezing order was sent by the Swiss authorities to all Swiss 
banks and fi nancial institutions (at that time, there were about 11,000), 
listing the names of the suspects, their aliases, and their companies.
Following the lodging of the criminal complaint, dozens of accounts 
with assets totaling more than US$700 million were frozen in Switzer-
land in the context of the domestic criminal proceedings. This was the 
consequence of banks reporting all suspicious accounts following the 
blanket freezing order and the media coverage of the investigation.
Accounts and insurance policies were found to be held at a number of 
leading banks, including Warburgs, Union Bancaire Privée, Crédit Suisse, 
Baring Brothers, Crédit Agricole Indosuez, UBS, and Goldman Sachs. 
These accounts were held in the names of Abacha family members and 
the companies set up by them. In the court proceedings that followed in 
Switzerland, it was clear that all these banks had been all too willing to 
assist the Abachas.
After several years of litigation in Swiss courts, the matter reached the 
Swiss Federal Supreme Court. The accounts in question had the charac-
teristics of what the court called “transitional accounts,” which do not 
relate to any identifi able activity and have a high frequency (at intervals 
of only a few days) of payments of signifi cant sums, apparently unre-
lated to any consideration. These accounts were used to transfer on 
(launder) the sums sent in checks and cash either by Bagudu himself or 
his accomplices, all of whom were Swiss nationals.
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The court was in little doubt that the sums in question were derived 
from withdrawals from the CBN. The main perpetrators undoubtedly 
remained the Abachas themselves, particularly Mohammed and Bagudu. 
To a large extent, they duped the banks. How they did this emerges in the 
Swiss Federal Supreme Court judgment.12
The court noted that certain accounts were held by unidentifi ed Nige-
rian nationals calling themselves such names as Sani Mohammed, Abba 
Muhamad Sani, Ibrahim Muhammad Sani, Abba Sani, Sani Abdu 
Mohammed, Sani Ibrahim, Ibrahim Muhammad, Sani Abba Muham-
mad, and Sani Abdu Muhammad. Abacha’s three sons were named Ibra-
him, Mohammed, and Abba.
The defendants stated that, in accordance with the traditions of Mus-
lim families of northern Nigeria, from which they originated, their real 
surname is Sani. They claimed, further, that it is usual to reverse the 
surname and forename or to use nicknames to distinguish persons bear-
ing the same forename (sometimes as between brothers in the same fam-
ily). The evidential value of the legal opinion to which they referred on 
these points was queried because it came from a person who had close 
links with the defendants. The court stated that, interesting though the 
considerations expressed by the expert on customs relating to personal 
names in Nigeria might be, they were not of such a nature as to explain 
the fact that three individuals opened the accounts in question under 
different identities and presented different passports on each occasion. It 
was clear to the court that the persons who opened the accounts in ques-
tion not only used false names, but deliberately sought to mislead the 
banking institutions they approached by causing confusion over their 
real identities. The defendants did not attempt to indicate to which of 
them the various surnames and forenames used in combination every 
time they opened an account specifi cally belonged; they also did not 
contest that they were all known under their usual name of Abacha in 
the criminal proceedings against them in Nigeria.
The repatriation of funds. The investigations conducted by the Geneva 
authorities, with the cooperation of Nigeria, enabled the Swiss Federal 
Offi ce to have a clear view of the origin of the frozen funds and deter-
mine that it was manifestly criminal. Consequently, in August 2004, the 
Federal Offi ce, utilizing a provision in the Federal Law on Mutual Assis-
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tance in Criminal Matters, decided to transmit to Nigeria all the assets in 
Switzerland benefi cially owned by the Abacha family, about US$500 mil-
lion, waiving the need for a prior judicial forfeiture decision in Nigeria.
That decision was upheld by the Swiss Supreme Court, which also 
confi rmed that Abacha, his sons, and accomplices formed a criminal 
organization within the meaning of the Swiss Penal Code and that any 
asset controlled by such member should be forfeited unless it could be 
shown to have been legally acquired, that is, there was a reversal of the 
burden of proof relating to these funds. All funds in Switzerland have 
now been repatriated.
In the event, Switzerland was reluctant to exercise its jurisdiction to 
hold the main criminal trial of the members of the Abacha criminal 
organization, deeming that it was more appropriate that such a trial 
should take place in Nigeria. However, the criminal trial of the Abacha 
sons, who were charged in September 2000 before the High Court of 
Abuja, has yet to begin because of the innumerable appeals lodged in the 
Nigerian courts by the Abachas’ massive team of attorneys and their 
apparent ability to delay or halt any legal process in Nigeria.
Mutual legal assistance. Based on the information and documents dis-
covered through the Geneva criminal proceedings, requests for mutual 
legal assistance were lodged by Nigeria in Jersey, Liechtenstein, Luxem-
bourg, and the United Kingdom.13 In the following months, an additional 
US$1.3 billion was frozen in those jurisdictions at the request of Nigeria.
The results then obtained in those jurisdictions depended much on 
whether their respective authorities initiated their own criminal investi-
gation into money laundering or not. Thus, in Jersey and Liechtenstein, 
the local law enforcement authorities, with the active participation of 
Nigeria, identifi ed and froze more accounts than simply those desig-
nated in the requests for mutual legal assistance.
In Luxembourg, no such investigations took place, and only the 
accounts in the banks designated in the Nigerian request of February 
2000 were frozen. The assets in these accounts have been forfeited by the 
Luxembourg authorities, and recognition of that decision is being sought 
in the Luxembourg courts. Nigeria, as victim, should be entitled to 
receive the proceeds of the forfeiture. This outcome is, however, once 
again, being contested by the Abacha family.
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In October 2006, a criminal trial of Mohammed Abacha began in 
Vaduz, Liechtenstein. Because in absentia criminal proceedings do not 
exist in Liechtenstein, and Mohammed Abacha did not appear at the fi rst 
hearing, the proceedings have been converted into autonomous forfei-
ture proceedings, targeting the US$200 million frozen in Liechtenstein. 
At the end of the proceedings, Nigeria, as victim of the crimes, should 
again be entitled to the forfeiture proceeds. There have been legal obsta-
cles to the process both in Liechtenstein and Nigeria, but it is hoped they 
will be resolved soon.
The United Kingdom. Virtually no action was taken by the U.K. authori-
ties following Nigeria’s request for mutual legal assistance that was lodged 
in June 2000. The Financial Services Authority, which was involved in the 
early part of the enquiry in the United Kingdom, only reprimanded the 
banks involved in laundering US$1.2 billion through the City of London; 
it took no steps to initiate a domestic criminal investigation into money 
laundering, nor would it disclose the names of the banks involved.14 
When the Home Secretary fi nally announced that an investigation would 
be undertaken, the Abachas challenged the decision by way of judicial 
review. They failed, but another three years were to pass before the U.K. 
authorities announced they were ready to transmit to Nigeria the evi-
dence they had gathered; at which point, the Abachas requested a judicial 
review of the decision to transmit. They failed again, but the evidence 
regarding the targeted accounts, which had, for the most part, been 
closed in the meanwhile, was ultimately only transmitted by the U.K. 
authorities in December 2004 and was insuffi ciently complete to allow 
outgoing transfers to be traced.
In September 2001, frustrated by the lack of progress on the offi cial 
front, Nigeria’s counsel acted. Separate civil proceedings, making propri-
etary claims on behalf of Nigeria to the monies, were commenced in Lon-
don against more than 100 defendants. The embezzlement was claimed 
of US$2 billion from the CBN under the false pretense that the monies 
were needed for security purposes. The monies were said by Nigeria to be 
held on constructive trust for the state. The civil proceedings sought and 
obtained freezing and disclosure orders against the fi rst 20-odd respon-
dents (all banks) of their books and records, in particular bank state-
ments, relating to the accounts held in the names of the remaining 90 
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respondents. These respondents were incorporated in jurisdictions such 
as British Virgin Islands, Ireland, Isle of Man, and Liechtenstein (there 
were also quite a few Nigerian corporations). No satisfactory explanation 
was ever given by Mohammed Abacha as to the provenance of the mon-
ies: he relied on the privilege against self-incrimination.
Full disclosure was made by the banks named as defendants in the 
U.K. proceedings, and, within six weeks, all the information that it had 
taken the U.K. authorities four years to transmit had been obtained. 
However, only about £50 million remained in the U.K. bank accounts. 
This money was frozen, but, over the ensuing years, the court allowed 
much of it to be disbursed to pay the Abachas’s legal fees, which had been 
substantial.
This being the case, little effort went into pursuing the named compa-
nies in offshore jurisdictions. The value of such an exercise would, in any 
event, have been highly dubious. There was suffi cient evidence from 
Switzerland to show that these offshore entities were connected with the 
Abacha enterprise. Expending time, effort, and money on trying to 
establish the benefi cial ownership of these offshore entities would there-
fore have been a largely futile exercise. The assumption that these were 
Abacha-related companies was never challenged by the Abachas in such 
evidence as they saw fi t to fi le in the various proceedings.
The U.K. action never proceeded beyond freezing all the Abacha 
assets held by the named banks and disclosing all the account informa-
tion. The freezing order was a worldwide one and remains in force. 
Although such orders made by the U.K. courts can be diffi cult to imple-
ment overseas, they do have the effect of putting major international 
banks on notice all around the world, and, in practice, banks avoid 
breaching such orders in case it opens them up to liability before the 
U.K. courts. Continuing the action might have yielded further informa-
tion, and it might ultimately have led to a judgment. This could have 
been useful for enforcement purposes in other jurisdictions, but, in 
practice, other ways have been found to secure compliance.
Conclusion
Abacha is probably still the single most successful case in terms of assets 
recovered by a state. Some of the hurdles faced have been referred to 
above. Recovery efforts continue.15 Perhaps as much as US$3 billion may 
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one day be repatriated to Nigeria. Success has been the result of the rapid 
establishment of an investigative process in Nigeria, followed by the 
cooperation of the (offshore) Swiss authorities who instituted criminal 
proceedings, demanded the disclosure of information by all Swiss fi nan-
cial institutions, and then joined Nigeria as a civil party to the proceed-
ings, thus allowing Nigeria’s own lawyer access to all the criminal evi-
dence, enabling him to assist the investigating magistrates in a direct 
fashion and to obtain rapid cooperation in other havens, notably Jersey, 
Liechtenstein, and Luxembourg. This shows the value of identifying a 
proactive lead jurisdiction to demand action in such cases.
It has taken the U.K. common law system a while to learn the lessons 
the Abacha case has taught, but the next case study in this chapter, on 
Alamieyeseigha, is testimony to some of the lessons learned.
Governor Alamieyeseigha of Bayelsa State, Nigeria
Introduction
Diepreye Peter Solomon Alamieyeseigha was elected governor of Nige-
ria’s Bayelsa State in May 1999 and reelected in 2003. His term of offi ce 
was supposed to run until May 2007, but was cut short by impeachment 
for corruption in December 2005.
Between the start of his period of offi ce in May 1999 to late 2005, 
Alamieyeseigha accumulated (outside Nigeria) known properties, bank 
accounts, investments, and cash exceeding £10 million in value.
His portfolio of foreign assets included accounts with fi ve banks in 
the United Kingdom and additional accounts with banks in Cyprus, 
Denmark, and the United States; four London properties acquired for a 
total of £4.8 million; a Cape Town harbor penthouse acquired for almost 
£1 million; possible assets in the United States; and almost £1 million in 
cash stored at one of his London properties.
Some of the foreign assets were held in his name and the name of his 
wife, but the bulk were held by companies and trusts incorporated in the 
following jurisdictions:
•  The Bahamas: Falcon Flights Incorporated, the company that main-
tained the bank account with UBS AG in London
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•  British Virgin Islands: Solomon and Peters Limited, the company that 
acquired the four London properties
•  South Africa: Royal Albatross Properties 67 (Pty) Limited, the com-
pany that acquired the South African property
•  Seychelles: Santolina Investment Corporation, the company that held 
the bank accounts in Cyprus, with Barclays Bank plc; in Denmark, with 
Jyske Bank A/S; and in London, with the Royal Bank of Scotland plc
The companies used to hold the assets were established and managed 
by third parties. Solomon and Peters Limited was incorporated for 
 Alamieyeseigha by a Nigerian associate resident in London. Santolina 
Investment Corporation was incorporated for Alamieyeseigha by a Lon-
don trust and companies service provider, which also opened and man-
aged at least some of the accounts. Falcon Flights Incorporated was 
established and managed by the private banking department of UBS 
Bank plc.
The source of the funds
Alamieyeseigha’s wealth derived from a combination of the theft of pub-
lic funds, principally from the Bayelsa State Development Fund, and 
bribes paid by contractors for the award of public contracts by Bayelsa 
State. Evidence of the illicit activities was obtained during criminal 
investigations by the Economic and Financial Crimes Commission in 
Nigeria and the Metropolitan Police in London in the form of docu-
ments and witness statements from contractors and fi nancial institu-
tions. Foreign banks and advisers were variously told that Alamieyesei-
gha’s wealth derived from inheritances, property sales, and businesses 
said to have been operated prior to his election as governor. No evidence 
of this was ever produced.
The U.K. criminal proceedings
In September 2005, Alamieyeseigha was arrested in London by offi cers 
of the Proceeds of Corruption Unit of the Metropolitan Police, ques-
tioned, and subsequently charged with three counts of money launder-
ing contrary to the Criminal Justice Act 1988 and the Proceeds of Crime 
Act 2002.
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On the day of his arrest, police offi cers searching one of his London 
properties discovered almost £1 million in cash. A worldwide criminal 
restraint order over his assets was obtained under the Criminal Justice 
Act 1988 from the English High Court by the U.K. Crown Prosecution 
Service and was enforced in Cyprus and Denmark through requests for 
mutual legal assistance.16 A criminal restraint was also obtained in the 
United States.
Alamieyeseigha was initially remanded in custody after failing to per-
suade the court that he should be permitted to return to Nigeria for four 
weeks to attend to the affairs of Bayelsa State. After three weeks in cus-
tody, he was released on bail on conditions, including the surrender of 
his passport, the payment of £1.3 million into court by sureties, and 
daily reporting to the police.
He then sought to challenge his arrest and prosecution in the United 
Kingdom on the basis that, as a Nigerian state governor, he enjoyed sov-
ereign immunity under English law. That argument was robustly rejected 
both by the English Crown Court and on appeal by the High Court.
In November 2005, despite his bail restrictions, Alamieyeseigha man-
aged to fl ee the jurisdiction and return to Nigeria. He was subsequently 
impeached and charged with various corruption offences.
His fl ight led to the confi scation of the bail monies put up by his associ-
ates. (Subsequent scrutiny of the fi nancial affairs of one of these associates 
led to the associate’s prosecution and conviction in the United Kingdom 
for mortgage fraud and the confi scation of his London property.)
Proceedings to recover the assets
A variety of criminal and civil mechanisms were used to recover Alami-
eyeseigha’s assets.
After he had absconded, criminal confi scation of U.K. assets on con-
viction was no longer possible. Alternative mechanisms were necessary.
The assets that had been frozen comprised cash, properties, and bank 
balances. The cash was straightforward. The United Kingdom has an 
uncomplicated procedure for the forfeiture of cash representing the pro-
ceeds of unlawful conduct, under the Proceeds of Crime Act 2002. An 
application can be made to a magistrates court by the police, among 
others, and, in cases of theft or fraud, the true owner of the cash can 
intervene under the Proceeds of Crime Act to seek its return. This proce-
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dure was successfully used. The Metropolitan Police applied for the con-
fi scation of the cash seized from Alamieyeseigha, and Nigeria intervened 
to seek an order as victim for its return. The police did not oppose Nige-
ria’s application for the return of the funds. The court ordered the cash 
to be forfeited and returned to Nigeria.
That left the properties and bank balances in London (and Cyprus 
and Denmark), to which the simple cash forfeiture mechanism could 
not apply.
Nigeria brought civil proceedings in the English High Court against 
Alamieyeseigha and others for the recovery of bank balances and prop-
erties in Cyprus, Denmark, and London.
The civil proceedings faced an initial diffi culty. The Metropolitan Police 
had obtained a mass of evidence of Alamieyeseigha’s corrupt activities in 
Nigeria and the laundering of the proceeds of those activities internation-
ally. Nigeria needed that evidence to advance its proceedings. However, the 
evidence had primarily been obtained under compulsion from banks, 
solicitors, and other advisers using investigatory powers granted to the 
police by statute. The police owed duties of confi dence to the owners of 
the documents, which prevented them voluntarily from handing over that 
evidence for use by Nigeria in private civil proceedings.
The English rules of civil procedure permit the court to compel third 
parties to disclose documents if they are likely to support the case of the 
applicant and if disclosure is necessary to permit a claim to be deter-
mined fairly or to save costs. Those powers can even be exercised against 
the police, provided it is in the public interest to do so.
The civil proceedings therefore commenced with an application by 
Nigeria for a court order requiring disclosure by the police of the evi-
dence that the police had collated. That application was made without 
the knowledge of Alamieyeseigha or any other defendants on the basis 
that to allow them knowledge could cause Alamieyeseigha to conceal 
assets that had not yet been identifi ed. Nigeria argued that it was in the 
public interest to order disclosure because it intended to use the docu-
ments to secure and recover the proceeds of corruption and because suc-
cessful proceedings would assist in efforts to reduce corrupt activities, 
would demonstrate that the United Kingdom was not a safe haven for 
corruptly acquired assets, and would permit their recovery, whereas Ala-
mieyeseigha’s fl ight from the country could otherwise thwart the crimi-
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nal confi scation process. The police confi rmed that disclosure would not 
jeopardize further criminal investigations and did not oppose the appli-
cation. The judge agreed that disclosure should be ordered.
The documents enabled Nigeria fully to articulate its case and to 
apply for its own civil freezing injunction over Alamieyeseigha’s assets. A 
civil freezing injunction was granted to Nigeria by the English High 
Court in December 2005, expressed to take effect worldwide with the 
exception of Nigeria, together with a disclosure order requiring addi-
tional banks and Alamieyeseigha’s London fi nancial adviser to disclose 
more information about his assets and activities.
Alamieyeseigha sought to defend the proceedings, claiming that there 
were innocent explanations for the assets that were claimed. The bank 
balances, it was said, largely represented unused donations to his elec-
tion campaign funds. He also denied any knowledge of the cash found in 
his bedroom in one of his London properties, saying that it was planted 
by political adversaries to “create the sensation that has coloured this 
case from the beginning.” The explanations contradicted those given 
contemporaneously to banks and solicitors and sometimes contradicted 
assertions made by Alamieyeseigha when he was interviewed by the 
police in London and Nigeria. Alamieyeseigha was unable, save in rela-
tion to one property, to produce any documents supporting his explana-
tions. The provenance of those documents was disputed.
Nigeria applied for summary judgment, a process intended to bring a 
swift end to proceedings without the need for a full trial on the basis that 
there is no genuine defense to a claim. It was supported by substantial 
affi davit and documentary evidence. Alamieyeseigha achieved signifi -
cant delay in the determination of this application on the grounds of his 
alleged illness. He relented only after an independent medical examina-
tion in Nigeria ordered by the English court at Nigeria’s request con-
cluded that he was capable of giving instructions to his lawyers.
The subsequent summary judgment hearing was heard in the High 
Court in February 2007, but failed. The judge decided that Nigeria had a 
strong case and that Alamieyeseigha “had a lot of explaining to do,” but 
he also decided that allegations of corruption against an elected public 
offi cial were so serious that Alamieyeseigha should be given the oppor-
tunity to “confront his accusers” at a trial, following the exchange of all 
material evidence.
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However, in July 2007, Alamieyeseigha put an end to delays in the 
Nigerian criminal proceedings. He pleaded guilty to six charges of mak-
ing false declarations of assets and caused two of his offshore companies 
to plead guilty to 23 charges of money laundering. He was sentenced to 
two years in prison for each personal charge, to run concurrently. A con-
fi scation order was made over some (but, for technical reasons, not all) 
of his domestic and international assets, which was enforced domesti-
cally and could have been enforced overseas. However, by that stage, it 
appeared that the assets would be recovered more quickly using the 
existing civil proceedings rather than starting a new process by seeking 
to enforce the Nigerian confi scation order through a request to the 
United Kingdom for mutual legal assistance.
Nigeria reapplied for summary judgment in the civil proceedings in 
relation to those assets deriving from the criminal conduct that had been 
admitted by Alamieyeseigha and his companies, arguing that the guilty 
pleas meant that Alamieyeseigha’s defense had no reasonable prospect of 
success in relation to those assets. That application succeeded in Decem-
ber 2007. The court agreed that the guilty pleas destroyed the already 
weak defense and that Alamieyeseigha had been given the opportunity 
to “confront his accusers,” but had, instead, accepted the charges made 
against him.
The civil proceedings continued in relation to the remaining assets. 
Nigeria made applications for orders requiring Alamieyeseigha to dis-
close information and documents. He failed to do so. In February 2008, 
Nigeria obtained an order requiring Alamieyeseigha to comply with the 
orders, with the sanction that his defense would be struck out and judg-
ment granted to Nigeria if he failed to do so. The required information 
and documents were not provided, and, on July 2, 2008, Nigeria obtained 
judgment over the remaining assets in Cyprus, Denmark, and London.
Foreign proceedings
The English judgment over the Cypriot and Danish bank accounts was 
enforced under European Community legislation for the mutual recog-
nition and enforcement of civil judgments.
The Cape Town penthouse was secured by a freezing injunction 
obtained by the South African authorities in support of requests for 
mutual legal assistance in criminal matters from Nigeria and the United 
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Kingdom. The property and rental income from the property were for-
feited in July 2006 by the High Court of South Africa in civil forfeiture 
proceedings on the application of the national director of public prose-
cutions acting through the Asset Forfeiture Unit. Nigeria successfully 
intervened in the proceedings seeking an order for the return of the pro-
ceeds of sale.
Conclusion
Alamieyeseigha is a good example of coordinated international asset 
recovery. The case involved the full set of criminal and civil asset recov-
ery mechanisms: criminal proceedings in Nigeria and the United King-
dom, including criminal restraining orders over assets; requests for 
mutual legal assistance between these jurisdictions and others; crimi-
nal confi scation of assets in Nigeria, civil forfeiture of cash in the 
United Kingdom; private civil proceedings in the United Kingdom, 
including a worldwide freezing injunction; enforcement of the civil 
judgment in Cyprus and Denmark; and civil forfeiture proceedings in 
South Africa.
There were a number of factors leading to success in the Alamieyesei-
gha proceedings, as follows:
•  Thorough investigations into the corrupt activities of Alamieyeseigha 
in Nigeria by the Economic and Financial Crimes Commission and 
by the Metropolitan Police in the United Kingdom
•  Effective and quick execution of requests for mutual legal assistance, 
including the use of a criminal restraint order to secure assets
•  Close cooperation between the Nigerian and U.K. authorities and, as 
far as was permissible, between the U.K. authorities and civil lawyers 
in Nigeria
•  The availability of the documents gathered by law enforcement agen-
cies for civil proceedings
• A package of civil and criminal efforts to recover assets
•  Relentless pressure in the civil proceedings to force Alamieyeseigha 
properly to explain his defense, in particular, the alleged legitimate 
source of his wealth, coupled with the court’s willingness to enter 
judgment following repeated failures to comply with orders for dis-
closure of information and documents
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Tommy Suharto, Son of President Suharto of Indonesia
Introduction
Tommy Suharto’s father was president of Indonesia for 30 years, from 
1968 to 1998; he died in 2008. It was alleged by Time Magazine, in an 
article published a few months after Suharto was deposed, that, during 
his 30 years in offi ce, his family had acquired cash and assets in excess of 
US$70 billion.17 By the time he was deposed, Time Magazine reckoned 
that the family controlled assets worth US$15 billion. Of these assets, it 
was estimated that the president’s favorite son, Tommy, controlled nearly 
US$1 billion.
Transfer of funds
In July 1998, scarcely a month after his father’s resignation as president, 
Tommy Suharto opened an account with the Guernsey offi ce of BNP 
Paribas (Suisse) SA in the name of Garnet Investments Limited, a com-
pany incorporated in British Virgin Islands. Between August 1998 and 
June 1999, some £8 million and US$59 million were paid into Garnet 
accounts at BNP in Guernsey.
In July 2002, Tommy Suharto was convicted in Indonesia of the 
following:
• Unlawfully possessing fi re arms and ammunition
•  Arranging the murder, on July 26, 2001, of Supreme Court Judge 
Syafi uddin Kartasasmita, who had convicted him of corruption on 
September 22, 2000
•  Preventing a public servant from performing his duty (by failing to 
surrender to serve his sentence after his conviction for corruption and 
the rejection of his petition for clemency)
In October 2002, while Tommy was in prison following his conviction 
for the above offenses, Garnet instructed BNP to make payments from 
its accounts totaling €36 million. BNP had previously notifi ed Guern-
sey’s fi nancial intelligence unit, the Financial Intelligence Service (FIS), 
of its suspicion that Tommy Suharto was involved in corruption. BNP 
accordingly sought consent from the FIS to make the payments requested 
by Garnet. In November 2002, the FIS refused consent and has done so 
ever since. Therefore, BNP declined to make the payments.
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Proceedings in Guernsey
Nearly three and a half years after BNP’s fi rst refusal to make the pay-
ments, in March 2006, Garnet, which Tommy admitted, early on, was his 
company, began proceedings against BNP in Guernsey seeking declara-
tions that BNP was obliged to comply with its payment instructions.18 In 
September 2006, the Royal Court of Guernsey ordered that the Indone-
sian Embassy in London should be notifi ed of the proceedings and asked 
whether it wished to make any claim to the money in Garnet’s account 
with BNP. As a result of this notifi cation, Indonesia took steps to inter-
vene in the proceedings and was joined as a third party in January 2007.
Indonesia immediately applied for a freezing order on Garnet’s 
account with BNP, which was granted by the Guernsey court. The freez-
ing order was continued in subsequent applications. However, the court 
in Guernsey made it clear from an early date that it did not want to be 
the sole focus of Indonesia’s endeavors to recover what were alleged to 
be the proceeds of corruption among members of the Suharto family. 
Tommy maintained that the monies in the account represented the sale 
of his shares in Lamborghini, the luxury car maker. That may have been 
so, but begs the question where the money came from to purchase those 
shares.
The Guernsey court said that Indonesia needed to demonstrate that 
action was being taken by the authorities in Indonesia against Tommy 
for corruption. Ideally, the court in Guernsey would have liked to have 
seen a conviction obtained in Indonesia. However, all attempts by the 
Indonesian government to bring civil claims and obtain a judgment 
against Tommy failed.
Difﬁ culties in Indonesia
In 2008, the Indonesian courts dismissed the last of the government’s 
claims. Indonesia appealed and won, but, in the meantime, the freezing 
injunction in Guernsey had been released. This was the result of a deci-
sion of the Court of Appeal in Guernsey in January 2009. The Court of 
Appeal’s decision was appealed to the Privy Council in London, which is 
the highest Court of Appeal for Guernsey. The Privy Council refused 
leave to continue with the appeal, but the Guernsey Financial Intelli-
gence Service, which had originally frozen the funds, has withheld its 
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consent to removal of the monies. The matter is before the courts in 
Guernsey again at the time of writing.
If the monies are ultimately released, it will obviously be an extremely 
unfortunate result for Indonesia, but the question has to be asked: Why 
has it not been possible for the authorities in Indonesia to bring a suc-
cessful prosecution against Tommy? This is particularly so in light of the 
substantial allegations of corruption that have been made against the 
Suharto family in general and Tommy in particular. It may have to be 
recognized that the Indonesian authorities face insurmountable diffi cul-
ties in bringing successful proceedings against members of a family that 
has been protected by years of political immunity in Indonesia, amount-
ing to near total impunity under Indonesian law.
Following the failure of the proceedings in Guernsey, various events 
took place in Indonesia that may shed light on the diffi culties the gov-
ernment has faced in succeeding against Tommy. A number of revela-
tions came out in the wake of a botched attempt to discredit two of the 
commissioners at Indonesia’s anticorruption agency, the KPK. One rev-
elation was that anyone with suffi cient monies could hire markuse, who, 
in the words of the New York Times, are “middlemen who can persuade 
corrupt police offi cers, prosecutors and judges to drop a case against a 
client for the right amount of money.”19
This case does not represent a failing by the offshore haven involved, 
Guernsey, which has tried to assist Indonesia by continuing to freeze 
these assets for as long as possible within the limits of Guernsey law, but 
it does demonstrate the huge diffi culties a government faces bringing 
proceedings in a foreign jurisdiction if it is, for whatever reason, unable 
to bring a successful case in its own jurisdiction.
Kenya: The Anglo Leasing Affair
Introduction
This is a rather different type of case. It does not involve a single klepto-
crat, but rather a conspiracy among high-ranking members of the gov-
ernment and dishonest businessmen to defraud Kenya of huge sums of 
money. The methods used and the failings in the Kenyan system are 
revealing.
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Anglo Leasing is the generic description given to some 18 contracts, 
two of which involved a shell company called Anglo Leasing and most of 
which were entered into by the Kenyan government over a period of two 
or three years. This period straddled the end of the rule of President 
Daniel arap Moi and the election of President Mwai Kibaki in 2003. 
Twelve of the contracts were placed during Moi’s term of offi ce, and six 
after Kibaki came to power.
The contracts were for a wide range of equipment and services spread 
across a number of government departments. These ranged from the 
Prison Service, the Police, the Police Air Wing, the Administration Police 
(responsible for country districts), the Passport Offi ce, the Post Offi ce, 
the Kenyan navy, and the Meteorological Department. The equipment in 
question for each of these departments included digital communications 
networks for the prisons, the Post Offi ce, and the Administrative Police; 
weapons, security equipment, vehicles, and a forensic science laboratory 
for the police Criminal Investigations Department; helicopters for the 
Police Air Wing; an oceanographic survey vessel for the navy; and a 
weather surveillance radar system for the Meteorological Offi ce. The 
total value of these contracts was close to US$1 billion. An evaluation of 
the contracts by a leading international fi rm of accountants concluded 
that the majority were vastly overpriced given that the equipment was 
often either outdated and useless or far too sophisticated to be supported 
adequately.20 The actual need for the majority of the equipment was, in 
any event, highly questionable.
All of the contracts had many or all of the same suspicious features, 
some of which may be summarized as follows:
•  The projects were not subject to the normal public procurement pro-
cesses as laid down by government circulars prior to 2001 and by 
regulations since 2001.
•  The procurement processes were normally avoided on the basis that 
the projects were a matter of national security, or that there was effec-
tively only one available supplier, or that there was the utmost urgency 
to undertake the project. None of these assertions was ever effectively 
challenged or investigated.
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•  As a result, each of the cotractors was presented as a single-source 
supplier on the basis of either no tender process whatsoever or, at 
best, a deeply fl awed tender process.
•  No due diligence was carried out on any of the contractors.
•  There was little or no negotiation of the contractual terms, which 
were dictated by the supplier and not adequately scrutinized by the 
commissioning department or the Finance Ministry.
•  Contractors frequently represented that they were based in major 
commercial jurisdictions, such as the Netherlands, Switzerland, or 
the United Kingdom, whereas they were registered in offshore 
 jurisdictions.
Links among the contracts
Investigations have clearly established that, apart from the numerous 
shared features summarized above, there are also numerous links of per-
sonnel, addresses, banking arrangements, and other matters in respect of 
the companies involved in the contracts. Broadly, the contracts can be 
shown to fall into two groups: 13 can be shown to be associated with the 
Kamani family, and 5 were associated with Anura Leslie Perera.
The Kamani family includes prominent Kenyan businessmen who are 
also involved in businesses overseas, most notably in India and the 
United Kingdom. In the mid-1990s, the family, which had been heavily 
linked to contracts with the Kenyan government, was involved in two 
major scandals, one concerning defective boilers sold to the Kenya Pris-
ons Department and the other concerning Mahindra jeeps that were 
sold to the Kenya Police Department and were wholly unsuitable for the 
requirements. As a result, in 1997, the family was blacklisted from gov-
ernment business. The structure of these newer contracts, with a series 
of apparently unconnected companies used as fronts, appears to have 
evolved as a way of avoiding this prohibition.
Anura Leslie Perera has lived in Kenya and done business with the 
Kenya government for many years, but is said currently to reside in 
northern Cyprus. He is of Sri Lankan origin and has an Irish passport.
Kenya is not alone in having suffered from such dubious contract-
ing practices. A combination of corrupt offi cials and unscrupulous 
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 businessmen is a pattern that appears all too often in emerging markets, 
to the huge detriment of the countries concerned.
Attempts to bring the perpetrators to justice
When the Kenya Anti-Corruption Commission (KACC) investigated 
these matters, it was clear that all the contracts had been masterminded 
by the two groups.21
The full extent of the scam only became gradually apparent to John 
Githongo, Kibaki’s newly appointed secretary for governance and ethics, 
who called on the government to cancel the contracts when it became 
clear to him what had been happening. Githongo’s attempts to expose 
the affair led directly to harassment, which included death threats and 
various attempts at blackmail; as a result, he fl ed the country and sought 
asylum in the United Kingdom.22 Already, large sums of money had been 
paid out, but this did not stop at least three of the contractors from ini-
tiating proceedings in Europe to claim the unpaid balances on their 
contracts.
One of these sets of proceedings was undertaken in Switzerland.23 In 
an endeavor to gather evidence from Switzerland, the KACC issued let-
ters of request for mutual legal assistance. Acting on one of these requests, 
the Swiss authorities raided the premises of a shell company used by the 
plaintiffs. Papers and records were removed. Within 48 hours, proceed-
ings were issued by that company in Nairobi seeking orders of certiorari 
and prohibition in respect of Kenya’s 2003 Anti-Corruption and Eco-
nomic Crimes Act.24
It was claimed that the KACC had no power to issue letters of request 
to a foreign government. The case came up for trial, and the judge at fi rst 
instance upheld the claims that KACC had, in effect, acted unconstitu-
tionally, despite the fact that express power was given to the KACC to 
request from and to give mutual legal assistance to foreign governments 
in the statute under which it was incorporated.25
The effect of this decision was interpreted by Kenya’s attorney general 
to mean that the KACC could not either give or receive mutual legal 
assistance until the court decision had been appealed and overturned or 
until new legislation, which was before Parliament, had been passed.
As a direct result, the Serious Fraud Offi ce in England issued a press 
release at the beginning of February 2009 in which it stated that it was 
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suspending investigations being carried out on behalf of the Kenyan 
government because they could not foresee receiving adequate coopera-
tion from Kenya.26
In 2010, the Kenyan court decision was successfully appealed, and 
cooperation has resumed, but two valuable years were lost.
The Swiss press has, however, been following the proceedings in 
Geneva closely, and a number of articles have been published that have 
had the effect of widening the scope of the investigation.27
The Swiss authorities have also made great efforts to cooperate with 
the Kenyans, but little progress has been made to date in prosecuting the 
wrongdoers. The fault has almost certainly lain more with Kenya than 
with Switzerland. Various attempts have been made by the Kenyan Par-
liament to obstruct investigations into this and other, older corruption 
investigations, and the head of the KACC and his deputies were not 
reappointed when their contracts came to an end. It remains to be seen 
whether the political will exists now to pursue these investigations to a 
conclusion.
Zambia: President Frederick Chiluba
Introduction
This matter was litigated in the English courts over the course of fi ve 
years.28 It involved a claim brought by the attorney general of Zambia to 
recover monies belonging to Zambia that had allegedly been fraudu-
lently misappropriated by means of money transfers made by the Minis-
try of Finance (MOF) between 1995 and 2001, during the presidency of 
the late Frederick Chiluba.
The money in question was transferred on the grounds that it was 
required to pay debts owed by the government. Some of the money was 
used in this way, but most of it was diverted for private purposes in favor 
of various of the defendants. The case fell into three distinct parts, as 
follows:
•  A claim relating to the transfer of about US$52 million from Zambia 
to a bank account operated outside ordinary government processes, 
the Zamtrop account, at the Zambian National Commercial Bank 
Limited (Zanaco) in London (the Zamtrop conspiracy)
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•  A claim relating to a property company registered in the United King-
dom and owned by the Zambian government in respect of which it 
was alleged that one of the defendants had breached his fi duciary 
duty by improperly obtaining a consultancy agreement in relation to 
the letting of a property owned by the company
•  A claim relating to payments of about US$20 million made by the 
Zambian government pursuant to an alleged arms deal with a Bulgar-
ian company (the BK conspiracy)
In respect of the fi rst claim, the court found that the Zambian defen-
dants in the case had conspired to misappropriate US$25 million 
through the Zamtrop conspiracy. In respect of the second claim, the 
court found that the defendant in question had not breached his fi du-
ciary duty in obtaining the consultancy agreement. In respect of the 
third claim, the court found that there had, indeed, been a conspiracy to 
misappropriate US$20 million through the BK conspiracy, and the 
defendants were found fully liable for that amount.
The Zamtrop conspiracy
The Zamtrop conspiracy arose following the collapse, in early 1995, of 
the Meridien Bank of Zambia, of which Meridien International Bank 
Limited, registered in The Bahamas, was the parent; the ultimate parent 
was ITM International S.A., a company registered in Luxembourg. On 
May 19, 1995, the then minister of fi nance in Zambia, Ronald Penza, 
announced that the Bank of Zambia would seize the Zambian subsidiary 
of Meridien under powers in the Banks and Financial Services Act. 
Receivers were appointed on June 5, 1995, and compulsory liquidation 
was subsequently ordered.
There was an investigation into the collapse by the accounting fi rm 
KPMG, which reported in November 1995, but no proceedings were 
brought. It was the attorney general’s case that the conspiracy was 
hatched in April 1995. Xavier Chungu, the fourth defendant, was the 
permanent secretary at the Offi ce of the President, Special Division, also 
known as the Zambian Security Intelligence Services, of which Chungu 
was the director-general. Chungu wrote to Penza seeking fi nancial assis-
tance for the Security Intelligence Services for unspecifi ed projects. 
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Funding was sought on the grounds that debts left behind by the former 
regime had to be met. In the letter, Chungu wrote as follows:
I wish to recommend that these debts be treated as part of the national 
debt. The amounts involved are quite modest and can, therefore, be 
accommodated within the external debt service budget without drawing 
the attention of the IMF [International Monetary Fund] and the donor 
community. I stand ready, Hon. Minister, to work with your Permanent 
Secretary and the Director of Budget and Loans Investments . . . in order 
to come up [with] a repayment program.29
This letter was written shortly before the Meridien collapse.
A series of letters was then written by Chungu stating that the Secu-
rity Intelligence Services would provide a company, Access Financial 
Services Limited, with funds to be utilized for selected projects. This 
company was licensed hard on the heels of Meridien’s collapse. Penza 
authorized a fi nancial services license to be granted with immediate 
effect in October 1995 without any previous evaluation by the Bank of 
Zambia. The company was licensed as a nonbank fi nancial institution 
and authorized to conduct fi nancial, but not banking services. Penza was 
murdered in 1998, although no evidence was adduced at the trial as to 
why or by whom he was murdered.
Chungu would then, from time to time, give the company instruc-
tions on disbursements to be made from the account. The company was 
assured that it would not be asked to disburse funds for unlawful activi-
ties. As the letter stated, “you are relieved from making an enquiry about, 
and will often be unable to know, the use of application of funds after 
you have disbursed them.” Chungu thus purported to give immunity 
from claims by others or any successor government offi cials.
At the same time, a woman, Stella Chibanda, the sixth defendant and 
one of the conspirators, was, fi rst, assistant director (loans and invest-
ments) at the MOF; then director of external resource management, an 
internal MOF department, in December 1997; and, fi nally, permanent 
secretary, MOF, in December 1999. She was a powerful fi gure whom 
nobody dared to cross. Until September 1998, monies were transferred 
from the MOF account at the Bank of Zambia on the authority of MOF 
letters carrying two signatures. After that date, a new system of payment 
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authorization forms was introduced. Thereafter, transfers were made 
under payment authorizations bearing only Stella Chibanda’s signature.
Over US$1.2 million of the money paid out of the account went to 
the president’s tailor in Switzerland for expensive suits. The president 
was well known for his smart clothing.30 Other payments were simply 
cash payments for the president or to Chungu to pay off Chungu’s credit 
card debts and school fees or to purchase jewelry. A “charitable dona-
tion” of US$180,000 was made to “churches in America” at the direction 
of the president.
The Zambian conspirators were aided and abetted in all their activi-
ties by two London-based fi rms of solicitors, Meer Case & Desai and 
Case Malik & Co., respectively, the fi rst and second defendants.31 Both 
fi rms acted for Access Financial Services Limited and Access Leasing Ltd. 
The judge found partners in both fi rms to be coconspirators in the Zam-
trop conspiracy.
In the judgment, Chiluba, Chungu, Chibanda, and two other cocon-
spirators were found liable to repay US$25.75 million, and Chungu was 
to pay an additional US$600,000 in damages for conspiracy. The part-
ners in the two fi rms of solicitors were found liable for sums of US$7 
million and US$2 million, respectively, for conspiracy and dishonest 
assistance. Sums were awarded against various other individuals, includ-
ing US$1.2 million against Basile, Chiluba’s Geneva tailor, for dishonest 
assistance and conspiracy.
The BK conspiracy
A letter of intent dated April 1999 was initially signed by Chungu on 
behalf of Zambia and appointing a Mr. Soriano, also known as Emman-
uel Katto, a close associate of Chiluba and Chungu, as a consultant to act 
for Zambia in negotiating and purchasing arms, ammunition, and 
equipment. In August 1999, an agreement was supposedly entered into 
between a company called Teraton of Sofi a, Bulgaria, and Zambia for the 
procurement of four helicopters, two fi ghter aircraft, arms, and equip-
ment, at a price of US$81 million.
A facility agreement dated September 1999 was purportedly made 
under which Soriano, as lender, agreed to make available to Zambia, as 
borrower, a 10-year facility of US$100 million to provide fi nancing for 
specifi c select projects and institutions for the purposes of provision of 
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equipment and the need to replace obsolete facilities. Delivery was speci-
fi ed to be within 30 days after the contract came into force. Payment was 
to be made by means of a 20 percent down payment, 20 percent after 
inspection by letter of credit, and 60 percent after delivery by letter of 
credit.
An account was opened at ABN-AMRO in Basel, Switzerland, and a 
second account was opened at KBC Bank Brugge in Bruges, Belgium. 
The latter was called BK (Betti Katumbi was the wife of Moses Katumbi, 
Soriano’s brother). The attorney general’s claim was for US$20 million 
paid into the ABN-AMRO account and the KBC account. This amount 
was allegedly stolen from Zambia by virtue of the conspiracy.
Despite the fact that Zambia was supposed to be the borrower under 
the September agreement, the fi rst down payment of US$10 million, also 
paid in September 1999, was paid by Zambia, not received by Zambia as 
the borrower. It was credited to the ABN-AMRO account as advised by 
Soriano. Subsequent payments were made between December 1999 and 
November 2001. A total of US$2.8 million was transferred to the ABN-
AMRO account, and US$17.5 million to the KBC account.
Soriano had suggested that the purchase of the arms was related to a 
need to defend Zambia from threats from Angola and the Democratic 
Republic of Congo. In these circumstances, the offi cial concerned said he 
felt compelled to sign the documents even though the facility agreement 
was not benefi cial to the government and the manner in which the 
agreement had been brought to him was not in accordance with proper 
procedures: a familiar story. In the event, no arms were purchased, and 
the court was satisfi ed that the monies paid into the two accounts simply 
dissipated.
All payments into the bank accounts originated from the MOF and 
were authorized by Stella Chibanda. Soriano authorized onward pay-
ments from the accounts. In the judgment, Soriano was found liable for 
US$20 million, plus US$1 million personally received by him. Chiluba, 
Chungu, Chibanda, and one other coconspirator were also found liable 
for the US$20 million. The fi rms of solicitors were found liable for sums 
actually received: US$1.3 million by Meer Case, and US$450,000 by Case 
Malik.32
There have been press reports indicating that enforcement of the 
judgments has run into serious diffi culties, particularly in Zambia. On 
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August 17, 2009, a magistrate in Zambia acquitted Chiluba of any wrong-
doing: a fi nding that speaks volumes on many levels about the problems 
of bringing proceedings against African leaders in their own countries. 
So far as is known, no monies have ever been repatriated to Zambia, and, 
in June 2011, Chiluba died.
Conclusion
There are a number of common, not unexpected features in all these 
cases, such as the use of traditional havens to incorporate offshore enti-
ties to hold accounts in well-established banking centers and the use of 
intermediaries such as lawyers, accountants, and businessmen operating 
in Europe. One notes also the complicity of the banks involved, not one 
of which has, to date, been prosecuted or sued for the part they played.33
While the use of well-known banks in major banking centers may 
facilitate the recovery of funds as regulatory supervision tightens, par-
ticularly in the areas of know your customer and increased awareness of 
the dangers posed by assisting PEPs, there remain vast lacunae. In the 
United States, these have most recently been vividly demonstrated by the 
work of the Levin Committee to which we refer in the introduction.
It is also apparent that, while the jurisdictions in which the banks 
operate have become increasingly cooperative (this is particularly true of 
Switzerland and the United Kingdom and its dependent territories, Jer-
sey, Guernsey, and Isle of Man), serious defi ciencies may still exist in the 
jurisprudence of these states in returning stolen assets to the peoples 
from whom they have been taken.
This has most recently been vividly demonstrated by an extraordi-
nary juxtaposition of events. On January 12, 2010, the Swiss Supreme 
Court ruled that over US$5.5 million in Swiss bank accounts benefi cially 
owned by Jean-Claude “Baby Doc” Duvalier, the former dictator of 
Haiti, should be returned to his family. This decision overturned a lower 
court decision that had awarded the monies to charities working for the 
good of the people of Haiti. The new decision was based on a statute of 
limitations that had the effect of preventing the prosecution of any 
crimes committed by the Duvalier clan before 2001. Within hours of the 
court’s decision, the devastating earthquake struck Haiti that killed over 
200,000 people. The Swiss government was appalled. “This is a public 
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relations disaster for Switzerland,” said Mark Pieth, the well-known 
Swiss professor and anticorruption campaigner.34 The money would 
have fed over one million Haitians for at least two weeks. The Swiss gov-
ernment was hugely embarrassed and immediately stepped in and stated 
the money would not be returned to the Duvaliers. It then rushed 
through new, retroactive, legislation, the Duvalier Law, which will be 
used by Switzerland if there is a perception that there is no longer a func-
tioning judicial system in a victim country: prosecutors will have 10 
years from the date on which monies are frozen in which to bring con-
fi scation proceedings.35 This legislation is potentially groundbreaking 
because it appears to remove the necessity for the victim state to request 
assistance, one of the great weaknesses of the UNCAC regime.
However, the uncomfortable fact is that Switzerland has been caught 
up in this sort of scandal before. In 2009, the heirs of Mobutu Seise Seko, 
the notorious dictator of the former Zaire, now the Democratic Repub-
lic of the Congo, who is reckoned to have misappropriated about US$12 
billion in aid money, provided largely by the World Bank, recovered 
about US$7.4 million, despite assurances given by the Swiss foreign min-
ister in 2007 that the money would be returned to the Congolese people 
(Wrong 2000). The reason, apparently, why this money was not returned 
to the people was that the Congolese government did not request the 
return.
These are but two examples of failures in asset recovery that are high 
profi le. The reality is that the efforts to recover stolen assets are all too 
often thwarted. International asset recovery depends on cooperation 
among states. If this cooperation is not given by the state that has been 
the victim of the grand corruption involved, there is often little that can 
be done by other states to assist. It is hoped that other states will consider 
following the lead of Switzerland in this regard.
The case studies in this chapter demonstrate that there are a number 
of unique features in high-level state corruption that are the more strik-
ing for their repetition across cases. An example is the use of national 
security as the pretext for the urgent and secret disbursement of funds of 
the central government. One sees this with Abacha and Chiluba, and in 
Kenya. In the case of the Suhartos, the methodology was different, 
although the president was a former general and ran a quasi-military 
dictatorship. More surprising, perhaps, is the seeming ease of extracting 
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the money—for example, simply by writing phony letters—that arises, 
directly or indirectly, from being associated with the highest offi ce in the 
land. There is also the ever-present threat of violence against those who 
resist these people: the loss of a job and even death.
The tracking down and recovery of looted assets also yield common 
features. In the fi rst instance, there is no real substitute for an initial 
investigation by law enforcement agencies, ideally in the country of ori-
gin. A lack of political will to carry out or continue with such an investi-
gation can be disastrous. This can manifest itself in a variety of ways, 
from failure to pass enabling legislation to failure to mobilize resources 
to pursue malefactors and failure to pay lawyers to pursue them. Often, 
after initial enthusiasm for a recovery exercise within a state, political 
reality intervenes, interest wanes, people disperse, and instructions are 
increasingly diffi cult to obtain. Attempted emasculation of anticor-
ruption agencies is an increasingly common phenomenon: Indonesia, 
Kenya, Nigeria, and Zambia have all shown the experience. Donor 
nations are starting to take action. The United States withheld aid to 
Kenya and placed travel bans on a number of Kenyan PEPs. A great deal 
more could be done. Kleptocrats and, especially, their wives and chil-
dren, intensely dislike being denied the opportunity to fl aunt their 
wealth in developed countries. Nongovernmental organizations in 
France have, however, brought civil proceedings in Paris against three 
African rulers in an attempt to have their assets in France confi scated, 
and the proceeds of sale repatriated to the peoples of the countries con-
cerned.36 The use of civil proceedings to recover assets is steadily being 
recognized as a powerful adjunct to criminal confi scation; the standard 
of proof is easier to meet, and, often, civil recovery is more attractive 
than high-profi le criminal prosecutions for victim states. The World 
Bank recently launched a guide to nonconviction-based asset forfeiture 
to assist states in formulating policies and legislation in this regard 
(Greenberg et al. 2009).
In all the cases, there can be no doubt that the immediate self-interest 
of those who support the kleptocrats overrides any conception of the 
long-term damage corruption does to their nations. This underlines 
once again the huge importance of raising awareness of the fi ght against 
corruption, particularly in the developing world. The UNCAC and its 
proposed peer review system is, in large measure, directed toward this 
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end.37 Bringing kleptocrats to justice is only one small part of the fi ght, 
but an important one not only in effecting recoveries, but also in testing 
the political will of the states involved. International sanctions for failure 
to act should become an increasingly recognized option.38 A number of 
those engaged in this area have opined on a need for a supranational 
jurisdiction. In this regard, thoughts turn to the jurisdiction of the Inter-
national Criminal Court. There is surely a strong argument to be made 
that the enduring effects of corruption at the highest levels is at least as 
devastating, in terms of loss of life through lack of clean water and dis-
ease, as any genocidal confl ict. A court that is internationally objective, 
addressed by independently funded lawyers, and able to deliver interna-
tionally recognized judgments that can be registered and that are 
enforceable in domestic jurisdictions is, as Hamlet said, “a consumma-
tion devoutly to be wished.”39
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Abstract
Aspects of late 20th-century globalization—growing international 
income inequality, the fi nancialization of the economy, the rise of tax 
havens, increasing rents from exports of energy and mineral resources, 
and the large international drug economy—have interacted to reshape 
the political economies of many of the poorest countries and left them 
particularly vulnerable to the adverse economic and political effects of 
illicit capital fl ows. The increasing scope for the illicit expatriation of 
capital exacerbates problems of corruption, low investment, the unequal 
sharing of tax burdens across different parts of the private sector, the 
lack of legitimacy of private enterprise, and relatively authoritarian and 
exclusionary governance. The international community is already devel-
oping a range of interlocking tools to deal with the nexus of problems 
around illicit capital fl ows, capital fl ight, corruption, money laundering, 
tax avoidance, tax havens, and transfer mispricing. Improvements in the 
design of these tools and greater vigor in their implementation should 
have especially benefi cial effects within many of the poorest countries, 
notably, in increasing private investment and economic growth, reduc-
ing the popular mistrust of private enterprise, and providing more space 
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for more democratic governance. More effective international action 
against illicit capital fl ows would be complementary rather than com-
petitive with attempts to improve from within the quality of public insti-
tutions in the poorest countries.
Introduction
Illicit capital fl ows is a diffi cult topic. As we see from the other chapters in 
this volume, there are differing defi nitions of the concept itself and con-
trasting views both on how it might be operationally defi ned for the pur-
pose of producing estimates of magnitudes and on the analytic proce-
dures that should be used to produce these estimates. The wise researcher 
might park the big questions about the dimensions and effects of illicit 
fl ows and focus on developing a better understanding of the components 
and correlates of the fl ows: capital fl ight, corruption, money laundering, 
tax avoidance, tax havens, and transfer mispricing. These topics, too, are 
challenging. I make a case here for continuing to work with the broader 
concept. Illicit fl ows have serious, systematic adverse effects on the eco-
nomic and political development of many of the poorest countries. While 
it is impossible to block all illicit fl ows, there are signifi cant, feasible 
opportunities to reduce them and mitigate their consequences through 
coordinated international action. The better we understand the adverse 
effects of these fl ows, the greater the likelihood of mobilizing more effec-
tive international action. These propositions cannot be proven beyond 
doubt. My case is based on deduction from interlocking bits of evidence. 
It is strong enough to merit more serious inquiry.
This is an exercise in political economy. For some purposes, it is use-
ful to separate the economic causes or consequences of illicit fl ows from 
the political counterparts. Illicit fl ows certainly damage the quality of 
governance. They undermine democracy. The opportunities they create 
for personal or institutional enrichment create or exacerbate incentives 
for powerful people and interest groups both to be corrupt and to 
weaken public institutions so that they can continue to be corrupt (Reed 
and Fontana 2011). I focus more on a less familiar thread of argument: 
the ways in which the system that permits illicit fl ows discourages 
domestic investment in poor countries and therefore reduces rates of 
economic growth. The economic and political aspects of this system are 
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deeply intertwined. In the poorest countries, illicit capital fl ows contrib-
ute to a vicious circle of weak and illegitimate domestic capitalism. 
(Potential) domestic capitalists expatriate much of their capital and 
invest only limited amounts in the domestic economy. They have inad-
equate incentives to nurture the domestic institutions that would protect 
and encourage private investment. They therefore continue to face an 
array of incentives to keep much of their capital overseas, and capitalist 
enterprise remains suspect and politically vulnerable, in part because it 
typically has a high foreign component. The more large-scale private 
investment is seen to be an indigenous activity, the more quickly it will 
become legitimate and the more likely property rights will be respected. 
All else being equal, a reduction in illicit fl ows is likely to lead to higher 
domestic investment.
The phenomenon of illicit capital fl ows is systemic in two senses. 
First, political and economic variables interact closely. Second, they do 
so on a global canvas (see the section on globalization). The apparently 
internal issues of weak institutions in poor countries both contribute to 
the prevalence and adverse effects of illicit fl ows and are partly caused by 
these fl ows. The appropriate policy response is not to focus only on these 
putatively domestic political and institutional problems, setting aside for 
later the problem of controlling and reducing illicit international fl ows. 
This is because the causation also works the other way: illicit fl ows exac-
erbate domestic political and institutional problems. Better global regu-
lation of illicit fl ows should benefi t both the polities and the economies 
of the poorest, weakest states.
Perspective
Mainstream economics tells us that international capital mobility can 
bring many benefi ts and that we need to scrutinize carefully any argu-
ment for restricting it, even where it is in some sense illicit. Equally, it is 
now widely accepted that, in the highly fi nancialized contemporary 
global economy, excessive international fi nancial mobility can do dam-
age. It has become conventional wisdom that capital accounts should be 
liberalized slowly and that it may make sense to tax and discourage 
short-term capital infl ows. One basis for these arguments is that the 
economies of smaller, poorer countries with relatively weak economic 
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and political institutions may need protection from the destabilizing 
effects of large fl ows of highly mobile capital. Arguments about capital 
fl ows—or, indeed, any other form of international economic transac-
tion—may mislead if they assume a population comprising only simi-
larly placed high-income countries with relatively robust economic 
institutions and fi nancial systems. What is good for those countries may 
not be good for the more disadvantaged parts of the world. This empha-
sis on the ways in which international economic inequality might chal-
lenge conventional economic wisdom has underpinned development 
studies since it emerged as a distinct fi eld in the 1950s. The argument I 
make here is fully within that tradition and refl ects the tradition’s char-
acteristic emphasis on the interactions of polity and economy. The world 
about which I write is characterized by a relatively systemic pattern of 
politico-economic inequality and advantage-disadvantage among coun-
tries. Until recently, economic inequality between the richest and poor-
est countries had been steadily increasing over several centuries. The 
quality of political and economic institutions largely mirrors average 
income levels. Poorer countries generally have less legitimate, stable, and 
effective governance systems. Property rights are less secure.
I depart from traditional development studies in that I do not posit a 
fundamental distinction in the global economy between a poor Third 
World and a rich (capitalist, industrialized, Organisation for Economic 
Co-operation and Development [OECD]) core. Neither am I entirely 
comfortable with the convention of equating political jurisdictions with 
countries. In particular, contemporary tax havens are highly consequen-
tial jurisdictions in terms of their impacts on the global political econ-
omy, but often are not countries. As I explore further elsewhere below, 
we need a minimum of four categories of political jurisdictions to 
understand the adverse effects of illicit capital fl ows on the poorest 
countries: the poorest parts of the world (labeled weak states), the OECD 
jurisdictions, tax havens, and a residual category that includes, in par-
ticular, those big, rapidly growing emergent economies that do not enjoy 
the questionable benefi ts of large reserves of point natural resources in 
the form of minerals, oil, and gas, most notably Brazil, China, India, and 
Turkey. To understand the emergence and signifi cance of these catego-
ries of political jurisdictions, we need to look more broadly at the conse-
quences of late 20th-century globalization.
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Late 20th Century Globalization and Weak States
I use the term globalization in its most general sense to refer to the 
increasing frequency and intensity of interactions across different parts 
of the globe (Scholte 2000). There is broad agreement among scholars 
that a period of globalization in the late 19th and early 20th centuries 
was followed by an era of retraction and nation-centricity that lasted 
from World War I until approximately the 1960s. This was succeeded by 
late 20th-century globalization. Some of this globalization’s most visible, 
generic manifestations are the rapid expansion of international trade, 
fueled in part by the containerization revolution; the even more rapid 
growth of transnational capital movements; and the enormous improve-
ments in long-range communications consequent on the marriage of 
telephony and digital technologies. The following, more specifi c aspects 
of the globalization process are especially relevant to later sections of the 
chapter.
Growing income inequality
The recent rapid growth of the Chinese and other Asian economies may 
herald the reversal of a long-term process of growing divergence in per 
capita incomes between the poorest and the richest countries in the 
world. However, it has been divergence rather than convergence that has 
characterized most of the period since 1970. The OECD economies have 
grown at similar rates, and their citizens have become steadily wealthier 
than the populations of most of Africa and of other poor parts of the 
world (Pritchett 1997).1 Late 20th-century globalization thus took place 
when average income disparities between the richest and the poorest 
countries were at the highest levels ever recorded. This inequality inter-
acts with other factors listed below. For example, the existence of high-
income markets in one part of the world generates large markets for 
commodities that, because they are either scarce (oil, gas, many miner-
als, diamonds) or illegal (drugs), generate high rents for those who con-
trol the sourcing in poor countries.
Financialization
Understood broadly, fi nancialization refers to the increasing infl uence of 
fi nancial markets, fi nancial actors, and fi nancial institutions in the oper-
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ation of domestic and international economies. More specifi cally, it 
includes the increasing dominance of the fi nance industry in the sum 
total of economic activity, of fi nancial controllers in the management of 
corporations, of fi nancial assets among total assets, of marketized securi-
ties and, particularly, equities among fi nancial assets, of the stock market 
as a market for corporate control in determining corporate strategies, 
and of fl uctuations in the stock market as a determinant of business 
cycles (Dore 2000). Braudel’s concept of disembedded capitalism points 
in the same direction: capitalism is “a series of layers built on top of the 
everyday market economy of onions and wood, plumbing and cooking. 
These layers, local, regional, national and global, are characterized by ever 
greater abstraction, until at the top sits disembodied fi nance, seeking 
returns anywhere, uncommitted to any particular place or industry, and 
commodifying anything and everything” (Mulgan 2009, 10–11). There is 
a wide consensus that fi nancialization has been a dominant feature of 
late 20th-century globalization. The volume of transnational capital 
movements has expanded exponentially since the 1970s, having long ago 
ceased to refl ect trade fi nancing requirements, despite the fast growth of 
international trade (Cohen 1996). As the forest of legitimate transna-
tional capital movements has blossomed and thickened, the opportuni-
ties to hide illegal or illicit capital assets within it have multiplied.2
Tax havens
Some tax havens have their historical roots in the 19th century, but their 
explosive growth dates from the early 1970s (Palan, Murphy, and Cha-
vagneux 2010). Conceptually, tax havens are easy to defi ne. They are 
“jurisdictions that deliberately create legislation to ease transactions 
undertaken by people who are not resident in their domains, with a view 
to avoiding taxation and/or regulations, which they facilitate by provid-
ing a legally backed veil of secrecy to make it hard to determine benefi -
ciaries” (Palan, Murphy, and Chavagneux 2010, 236). They are charac-
terized by high levels of secrecy and the ease with which companies and 
other legal entities, including trusts, can be established and registered. 
There are enormous disputes over which jurisdictions should formally 
be labeled as tax havens. For our present purposes, it is useful to distin-
guish two broad categories. The fi rst are basic tax havens, as exemplifi ed 
by Cayman Islands. These are secrecy jurisdictions that “remain mere 
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‘paper centers,’ providing a home for shell companies and trusts, proxy 
banking institutions, and captive insurance companies” (Palan, Murphy, 
and Chavagneux 2010, 27). They add little economic value and employ 
few people relative to the number of companies and other legal entities 
to which they are formally home. They exist purely to facilitate the hid-
ing of assets, money laundering, and the evasion of tax. These basic tax 
havens are an outcome of high levels of international economic inequal-
ity. Most were originally small island colonial dependencies, especially of 
the United Kingdom, that moved into the tax haven business in response 
to decolonization, the disappearance of imperial subsidies, and serious 
diffi culties of identifying alternative new sources of national income and 
government revenue (Palan, Murphy, and Chavagneux 2010). The sec-
ond type of tax havens are offshore fi nancial centers, which provide 
some of the basic tax haven services of secrecy, money laundering, and 
tax avoidance, but employ more people, undertake a wider range of 
fi nancial services, and, to some extent, do add economic value. While 
basic tax havens tend to be small island jurisdictions, often in the Carib-
bean, offshore fi nancial centers are more likely to be located within the 
fi nancial service sectors of larger and more prosperous economies, 
including Singapore, Switzerland, the United Kingdom, and the United 
States (Palan, Murphy, and Chavagneux 2010). Both kinds play a central 
role in illicit fi nancial fl ows. Their existence increases the opportunities 
to transfer money clandestinely and then store it secretly and securely. It 
rewards and thus motivates illicit movements of money across interna-
tional borders and the illicit activities such as grand corruption or trans-
fer mispricing that often underlie these movements.
Natural resource rents
In quantitative term, rents from point natural resources—that is, miner-
als and energy—have grown considerably in recent decades.3 Although 
the international energy and minerals economies tend to be unstable, 
demand and prices have tended upward in recent decades, and extrac-
tion activities have spread into poorer regions hitherto considered too 
diffi cult politically or technically. Relative to the 1960s and 1970s, 
resource rents are now less concentrated in the Middle East and North 
Africa and have become more important around the Caspian Basin (the 
Caucasus, Central Asia, and the Russian Federation) and in Sub-Saharan 
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Africa.4 Because the rents from mineral and energy extraction are so 
large and because the extraction processes are so distinctive, concen-
trated, and rooted in particular locations for long periods of time, we 
now know quite a lot about their impacts on politics and governance in 
the source countries.5 First, the extraction of point natural resources, in 
almost all cases, greatly enriches the political elites that control the loca-
tions where the extraction takes place. It provides revenues to both polit-
ical elites and states. Even in more bureaucratically organized states with 
some elements of formal electoral democracy, state energy corporations, 
often described as a state within a state, are bastions of privilege and 
extraconstitutional power (de Oliveira 2007; Winters 1996). Second, the 
extraction of point natural resources tends to generate relatively exclu-
sionary, monopolistic, and militarized rule. Third, governments funded 
principally through point natural resource extraction tend to treat their 
citizens badly in terms of civil and political rights, health and education 
services, and public infrastructure provision because they have so little 
need of their citizens. Natural resource wealth frees governments from 
their normal motivations to nurture at least some prosperous taxpayers, 
affl uent mass consumers, healthy and educated workers, appreciative 
voters, or fi t and skilled military recruits (Bräutigam, Fjeldstad, and 
Moore 2008; Moore 2007). Cash from oil and minerals obviates the need 
for a booming economy and tax revenues and pays for the recruitment 
of mercenaries and (politically docile) immigrant workers to provide 
essential skills.
The international drug economy
Since the 1960s, there has been a big increase in opportunities for illegal 
rent-taking through the production of drugs in poorer countries and 
drug traffi cking into rich countries. One cause has been increasing 
wealth and growing consumer demand in rich countries. Another has 
been the growth in air travel. The third is symbolized by the 1961 United 
Nations Single Convention on Narcotic Drugs, which represented the 
creation, under U.S. leadership, of an activist, punitive global antidrug 
regime that increased the monetary rewards for producers, traffi ckers, 
and the people in authority who were bribed to cooperate with them.6
In part because of these dimensions of late 20th-century globaliza-
tion, a new concept and a new problem have, over the past two decades, 
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come to occupy a prominent place on international policy agendas: the 
notion of fragile, failing, or weak states.7 Let us term this the weak state 
phenomenon. While the terms and defi nitions remain diverse and to 
some degree contested, it is widely accepted that we are dealing with a 
new, generic phenomenon, which is found, in particular, in Central 
America, parts of Central Asia and Pakistan, signifi cant parts of the 
Andean region of South America, and much of Sub-Saharan Africa.8
Governance failures are not new. They are, rather, the historical norm. 
Most attempts to establish legitimate and effective public authority fail 
somewhere along the way and end in disorder (Keefer, Loayza, and Soares 
2008; Reuter 2008). The novelty of the current situation lies in the com-
bination of several related factors. The weak state phenomenon became 
widespread across the globe within a short time. It arises in part because 
political elites in the poorest countries can enrich themselves by acting as 
gatekeepers between their own political jurisdictions and the global polit-
ical economy. They can profi t from the large rents attached to natural 
resource exports, drug traffi cking, and various other kinds of illicit activi-
ties such as illegal diamond exports. Armed confl ict may help them 
extract resources in this fashion or provide other opportunities to profi t, 
for example, from arms trading or from the provision of transport and 
other logistical services to international humanitarian operations.
Historically, the political uncertainty and instability that typically fol-
low war or internal confl ict elicited a drive toward political resolution. 
Different interests and parties competed actively for state power. Either 
one party emerged as dominant, or public authority was reestablished 
through compromise among the leading contenders. A distinctive fea-
ture of the situation in some parts of the contemporary world is that 
these processes of political resolution and the reestablishment of rela-
tively effective public authority are weak and slow. Failing governments 
have not been ousted militarily or supplanted by expanding neighboring 
states. Weak governance and continuous internal confl ict have become 
routine. For every case of apparently successful resolution, such as Sierra 
Leone, there are several in which success is not yet in sight (Maconachie 
and Hilson 2011). A major reason is that, if they can continue to act as 
rent-taking gatekeepers, elites often lack strong incentives to put an end 
to weak governance or disorder and may actively profi t from them 
(Munkler 2005). Control of rent-taking nodes becomes more rewarding 
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than ruling territory and population through the contemporary state 
institutions with which we are most familiar. Political elites have limited 
incentives to nurture or build the institutions that might ensure peace 
and the rule of law (reliable and effective militaries, police, judiciaries, 
and prison services), mobilize large numbers of people into politics 
(political parties), encourage political bargaining among different inter-
est groups (legislatures), collect revenue for public purposes (tax agen-
cies), make informed policy decisions and implement them consistently 
(civil services), encourage private investment (property rights systems 
and predictable policy-making processes), or provide the technical sup-
port needed to hold government to account for the use of public money 
(public audit offi ces). Effective institutions of these kinds become barri-
ers to the pursuit of particularistic strategies aiming at the enrichment of 
family members and small associated groups.9
What does this all look like in practice? In chapter 13 of this volume, 
James Maton and Tim Daniel detail fi ve rather spectacular cases relating 
to individual kleptocrats from Indonesia, Kenya, Nigeria, and Zambia. 
There may be no better case than Nigeria, a country that suffered pre-
cipitous declines in institutional quality around 1970 when it suddenly 
became a major oil exporter.
The problem is not simply one of embezzlement and bribery. The entire 
state machinery exists to siphon off cash. Many functions of government 
have been adapted for personal gain. It starts at the frontier. Access to the 
fast-track channel at Lagos airport can be bought from touts for $10. Bor-
der guards in cahoots with them work extra slowly to make this option 
more attractive.
A universe of red tape engulfs the economy. In a survey by the Interna-
tional Finance Corporation, Nigeria ranks 178th out of 183 countries 
when it comes to transferring property. In some Nigerian states, gover-
nors must personally sign off on every property sale; many demand a fee.
Senseless restrictions and arcane procedures abound. Procter & Gam-
ble had to shelve a $120m investment in a factory to make bathroom 
products because it could not import certain types of specialist paper. An 
American airline waited a year for offi cials to sign off on an already agreed 
route from Atlanta to Lagos.
Massive economic failure is the result. Employment in industry has 
shrunk by 90% in the past decade, “almost as if by witchcraft”, says one 
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sheepish boss. The few jobs that exist are mostly offered by cartels. These 
control imports, too. The need for new infrastructure is vast, but the price 
of a 50kg bag of cement is three times higher than in neighbouring coun-
tries. Fighting cartels is hard. Customs offi cers are bent, hindering foreign 
competitors. Judges are easily bought. The police are, at best, ill-equipped. 
One in four cops exist only on paper: chiefs collect the extra pay.
Nigeria is the leading oil producer in Africa, with a revenue stream of 
about $40 billion a year. The effect of this wealth is mostly corrosive. . . . 
Three-quarters of the government budget goes toward recurrent expendi-
ture, including salaries. Parliamentarians are paid up to US$2m a year, 
legally. Very little is invested in infrastructure. State governors all receive 
big slices of the oil pie. This has attracted some very shady characters into 
politics.10
Categorizing Contemporary Political Jurisdictions
At the end of the section titled “Perspective,” I suggested that it is useful 
to think of the contemporary world divided into four categories of polit-
ical (more or less national) jurisdictions.11 Informed by the analysis in 
the subsequent section of the impact of late 20th-century globalization, 
I explain in this section, in a little more detail, the differences among 
these categories that are most relevant to understanding the effects in 
poor countries of illicit capital fl ows.
OECD jurisdictions
These are wealthy countries that have shared similar rates of economic 
growth for many decades and similar economic and political institu-
tions. All are liberal democracies in which the historic compromise 
between capital and labor has held for decades and become almost natu-
ralized. The compromise faces little fundamental political critique. 
Property rights are strong. Workers and consumers exercise considerable 
power through electoral democracy, while controllers of capital con-
tinue to nudge and discipline governments through less visible channels: 
their autonomy either to refrain from reinvestment and, increasingly, to 
relocate in other jurisdictions (Winters 1994). Governments raise 
increasing proportions of gross domestic product (GDP)—now averag-
ing 40 percent (IMF 2011)—to meet the needs of voters for services and 
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welfare and the needs of capitalists for infrastructure and other kinds of 
support. The high proportion of the world’s private companies that are 
rooted, historically and in terms of activities and benefi cial ownership, 
in OECD countries face signifi cant tax bills and pressures to relocate 
their profi ts formally to low-tax jurisdictions.
Weak states
These tend to be small countries, although Nigeria is also included, char-
acterized by relatively weak public institutions and by political elites that 
face unusually strong temptations to enrich themselves through the ways 
in which they intermediate between domestic and international actors, 
institutions and resources (see the section on globalization). Commer-
cial and banking confi dentiality is not guaranteed. Legal and penal sys-
tems often function slowly and badly. Property rights tend to be weak. A 
relatively small proportion of the population are employees in the for-
mal private sector. Private enterprise is often associated with immigrant 
foreigners or ethnic minorities and is still widely considered illegitimate 
or immoral (Chaudhry 1994; Moore 1997; Riggs 1964). Almost para-
doxically, this limited political and cultural legitimacy of capitalism 
coexists with a relatively high dependence of governments for their rev-
enue on what they can collect directly from private companies.
In general, the capacity of governments to raise revenue is substantially 
dependent on the structure of national economies. Above all, the propor-
tion of GDP that accrues to governments increases predictably as average 
incomes rise.12 Historically, the governments of poorer countries have 
depended heavily for revenue on easy-to-collect import and export taxes. 
This remains broadly true of the contemporary world, but is, however, 
much less true than 20 years ago. In the intervening period, governments 
of poorer countries have reduced tariff rates substantially and introduced 
a value added tax (VAT) to substitute, not always completely, for the reve-
nue forgone (Baunsgaard and Keen 2005; Keen and Lockwood 2010). To 
that extent, their formal tax structures have come to resemble those of the 
OECD countries. However, they lack the capacity of the OECD’s richer 
countries to raise large revenues through personal income taxes collected 
by employers on a withholding basis (see table 14.1).
The net effect of these factors is that governments of poorer coun-
tries—the best proxy we have for weak states—are relatively highly depen-
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dent for revenue on taxes paid directly to them by private companies. This 
phenomenon is measured in two ways in table 14.1. First, in row (e), we 
can see that corporate income taxes account for a higher proportion of 
government revenue in poorer countries. But this is not the full story. The 
VATs now nominally in place in virtually every poor country are often, in 
practice, different from the formal model and the OECD practice. They 
often cover only some parts of the economy, notably the larger fi rms in the 
more organized sector, and, in practice, resemble additional sales, excise, 
or import taxes.13 To a signifi cant degree, VAT collections have a corporate 
tax element. Therefore, in table 14.1, row (f) presents the fi gures on the 
joint contribution of both corporate income tax and VAT to government 
revenue.
Both sets of fi gures illustrate the signifi cant dependence of govern-
ments on taxes paid directly by private companies. Yet, we know that for-
mal or informal tax exemptions for companies are widespread in poorer 
countries, especially in Sub-Saharan Africa (Cleeve 2008; Keen and Man-
sour 2010).14 We can also assume that most illicit capital fl ows from weak 
states pay no tax at home, for the major mechanisms used by companies, 
in particular transfer mispricing and possibly also the manipulation of 
intragroup debt, seem explicitly designed to evade taxes through reas-
signing profi ts to other jurisdictions. This information is consistent with 
Table 14.1. Summary Statistics on Sources of Government Revenue, by Country Category
Country category
Low 
income
Lower-
middle 
income
Upper-
middle 
income
High-
income 
non-OECD
High-
income 
OECD
a. Government revenue, % of GDP 18.4 26.4 28.5 33.8 41.5
b. Corporate income taxes, % of GDP 2.2 2.9 3.4 2.4 3.1
c. VAT, % of GDP 4.9 5.0 5.2 6.2 6.8
d. Trade taxes, % of GDP 3.7 4.9 4.6 2.7 0.6
e. Corporate income taxes, % of 
government revenue 12.0 1 1 .0 12.0 7.1 7.2
f. Corporate income taxes, plus VAT, 
% of government revenue 38.6 29.9 30.2 27.2 23.9
g. Corporate income tax rate % 39.0 33.5 33.3 28.9 33.8
Source: IMF 2011.
Note: The table covers 174 countries. The numbers show the means within each category and relate to recent years.
470 Draining Development?
the fact that companies paying taxes in poor countries complain they are 
required to pay at high rates. While some companies are exempt, others 
face the full brunt of the appetites of governments for revenue. In Sub-
Saharan Africa between 1980 and 2005, the total take from corporate 
income taxes in all sectors, except oil, gas, and mining, held up as a pro-
portion of GDP despite the spread of tax holidays (Keen and Mansour 
2010). It seems unlikely that the ratio of corporate profi ts to GDP could 
have expanded suffi ciently to account for this stability. Some, at least, 
must have come from high levels of extraction from those companies in 
the tax net. Other evidence points in the same direction: globally, corpo-
rate income tax rates are higher in poorer countries than in richer coun-
tries, while corporate income taxes comprise a lower proportion of GDP 
(table 14.1).15 The tax efforts made by revenue collection agencies in 
poorer countries are not inferior to those of their counterparts in high-
income countries (IMF 2011).16 Someone is paying taxes in poor coun-
tries. All too often, the taxpayers are the legitimate, formal sector compa-
nies that do not engage in large-scale transfer mispricing or lack the 
political clout to get tax exemptions. This highly uneven playing fi eld 
does not make for a good investment climate. Illicit capital fl ows alone are 
not responsible, but they exacerbate the existing distortions.
Tax havens
Tax havens, in particular, tend to be jurisdictions rather than countries. 
Sometimes, most classically in the case of Switzerland, the distinction is 
unnecessary. However, many tax havens comprise territories within 
larger political structures that enjoy a special status and make their own 
laws, including Channel Islands and other dependencies of the United 
Kingdom and the state of New Jersey within the United States (Palan, 
Murphy, and Chavagneux 2010). As explained in the section on catego-
ries of jurisdictions, the category includes both basic tax havens that 
employ few people and exist simply to facilitate secrecy, tax evasion, and 
money laundering and offshore fi nancial centers that provide a wider 
range of fi nancial services, while still performing the basic tax haven 
functions. Both offer relative security for fi nancial assets. Basic tax 
havens typically offer greater opportunities for secrecy, while offshore 
fi nancial centers are better points from which to integrate illicit assets in 
more visible, recorded activities.
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Other jurisdictions
This residual category includes most of the world’s most rapidly growing 
large economies, including Brazil, China, India, Indonesia, and Turkey, 
and a number of rapidly growing medium-sized economies such as 
Argentina; Chile; the Republic of Korea; Malaysia; and Taiwan, China. 
They are relatively peripheral to the concerns of this chapter because 
they do not yet provide environments in which illicit capital can be kept, 
invested, or laundered easily, securely, and anonymously, especially not 
by foreigners without good local political connections. Some are major 
sources of illicit international fl ows, sometimes as a part of relatively 
distinct localized fl ow patterns. We know that large quantities of illicit 
fl ows out of India are routed through Mauritius before they return to 
India to take advantage of the privileges granted to foreign investment. 
Similarly, an even larger proportion of total global illicit fl ows take the 
form of business profi ts or the proceeds of corruption generated in 
China that are illicitly expatriated, partly to avoid the risk and burdens 
of foreign exchange controls, and often reappear in China to benefi t 
from tax exemptions for foreign investment.17
The Location of Capital and Proﬁ ts
As the global economy has become more liberal and fi nancialized in 
recent decades, the people who own and control large amounts of capital 
face wider choices about where they locate it, where they book their 
profi ts for accounting and tax purposes, and how they transfer capital 
between jurisdictions. Many factors affect these choices, not least the real 
profi tability of investment. All else being equal, investment will fl ow to 
the places where it can generate higher returns. But there is, in addition, 
a range of other political, institutional, and policy factors that affect 
these decisions. Six such factors seem particularly consequential for the 
pattern of illicit capital fl ows, as follows:
1.  The degree of property security. This, in turn, refl ects the interaction 
of four main considerations: the degree of political stability; the 
extent to which political power-holders are likely, because of combi-
nations of incentive and opportunity, to prey on the property of oth-
ers; the extent to which there is effective protection against private 
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predation or theft; and the extent to which capitalism and profi t 
making are normatively suspect at the level of public opinion and 
political rhetoric.
2.  The extent of the opportunities for grand corruption. This results, in 
particular, from the interaction of (a) the existence of opportunities 
for large rent-taking through the exercise of political power, which is 
especially likely in countries with large amounts of point natural 
resources such as oil, gas, and minerals, or where drug traffi cking and 
smuggling are widespread; and (b) weak political and institutional 
checks on corruption.
3.  The scope for secrecy in asset ownership.
4.  The capacity of government institutions, especially tax authorities 
and central banks, to monitor, regulate, and tax capital.
5. Effective rates of tax on capital.
6. The degree of socioeconomic and political inequality.
Table 14.2 compares these six political, institutional, and policy 
(extraeconomic) factors across the four categories of contemporary 
political jurisdictions.18 The table sketches on the canvas with a broad 
brush, and I am aware that the boundaries between my categories of 
jurisdictions are fuzzy and that there are wide variations within them. 
The comparisons suggest some conclusions about where people who 
own or control large amounts of capital prefer to locate it.
Table 14.2. Major Political, Institutional, and Policy Characteristics Affecting Decisions on 
the Location of Large-Scale Private Capital
Characteristic OECD
Weak 
states Tax havens
Other 
jurisdictions
Degree of property security high low high mixed
Extent of opportunities for grand corruption low high low, or — 
(few residents)
mixed
Scope for secrecy in asset ownership low mixed high mixed
Capacity of government to monitor, regulate, 
and tax capital
high low mixed mixed
Effective tax rates on capital high mixed 
or low
low mixed
Degree of socioeconomic and political inequality low high — mixed
Source: Author compilation.
Note: — = not available.
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The fi rst inference that we can make is that, even if the rates of return 
on capital investment were the same across all four types of jurisdictions, 
people who own or control large amounts of capital from within weak 
states would prefer to expatriate (some of) it to other jurisdictions. 
There are three interacting reasons, as follows:
1.  In weak states, property rights are, anyway, relatively insecure. These 
are, on average, not good places for companies or wealthy individuals 
to keep abundant assets, especially liquid assets.
2.  Especially in contemporary weak states, large capital accumulations 
in private hands are often the result of corruption, the abuse of polit-
ical power, and theft of public assets. Such accumulations are always 
vulnerable to changes of political fortune. New power-holders will 
tend to try to expose the sins and corruption or take a share in the 
assets of the people they replace. Placing illicitly acquired money else-
where in the world, above all in a tax haven, is the best protection 
against political opponents or political successors at home, domestic 
tax authorities, global investigatory authorities, and campaigning 
international nongovernmental organizations.
3.  Companies operating in weak states frequently face a trade-off 
between (a) paying the relatively high headline rates of tax on their 
operations or (b) making political contributions to purchase formal 
or informal exemptions, tax holidays, or other favorable treatment 
from tax authorities. We can assume—hard evidence on this point is 
particularly elusive—that the people concerned would prefer to 
understate profi ts and expatriate capital clandestinely to reduce their 
vulnerability to this kind of political squeeze. Transfer mispricing is 
likely the dominant means.
Owners and managers of capital have signifi cant extraeconomic 
incentives to expatriate capital secretly from weak states. They also have 
opportunities to do so at relatively low cost. First, central banking and tax 
authorities tend to be weak and, thus, do not constitute much of a barrier 
to transfer mispricing or other mechanisms of illicit outfl ow. Second, 
other attractive locations for capital have become increasingly available. 
The OECD countries have some allure, but the disadvantage that their 
governments mostly require signifi cant tax payments. Tax havens more 
closely meet the three major needs: security of ownership, the secrecy 
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needed to hide the recent origins of the capital, and low tax rates. Much 
of the capital passing through tax havens might be laundered and then 
appear as direct foreign investment in other jurisdictions.
The fi rst-round consequence of the institutional confi guration I have 
sketched out is that the people who own or control capital in weak states 
have powerful incentives to convert the capital into illicit outfl ows and 
signifi cant opportunities to do so.19 Even if we remain agnostic about the 
various estimates of the aggregate size of these outfl ows from weak 
states, we could reasonably conclude that the combination of the extra-
economic incentives to expatriate capital and the opportunities to do so 
will tend to reduce the rates of investment and economic growth in weak 
states. However, only when we examine the second and third order 
effects of this institutional confi guration can we appreciate the extent to 
which it may be doing consistent economic and political damage to weak 
states, as follows:
•  The potential to hide illicit capital securely in tax havens is a direct 
stimulus to corruption and other illicit activities such as transfer mis-
pricing. It decreases the chances of detection and therefore increases 
the likely returns.
•  Especially in polities characterized by high degrees of socioeconomic 
inequality and little or no effective institutionalized popular control of 
the actions of political elites, those fractions of the political elites that 
are able and willing to participate in this nexus of corrupt internal 
accumulation and illicit capital outfl ows are also motivated and able to 
create or change the rules of the game to ensure that they can continue 
playing it in a rewarding way. In practice, this is likely to mean tax 
agencies that collect enough money to run basic government services, 
but have low overall capacity, especially in dealing with complex inter-
national issues such as transfer pricing; police services that lack inves-
tigatory powers; court systems vulnerable to corruption; weak public 
audit offi ces that lack independent authority; legislatures that lack col-
lective cohesion and authority; fragile, unstable political parties moti-
vated by money and patronage; and public services that lack a collec-
tive, professional ethos. Indirectly, these processes may further weaken 
the protection of property rights through their incentive effects on 
political elites. Powerful groups that control considerable (illicit) capi-
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tal, but locate much of it overseas, do not have strong incentives to 
strengthen property rights at home (for everyone).20
•  Not only do people who control capital domestically have extraeco-
nomic incentives to expatriate it (illicitly), but also the domestic 
investment climate suffers collateral damage. First, a certain fraction 
of legitimate, formal business tends to face unfairly and ineffi ciently 
high tax burdens because much capital evades the tax net, especially 
through transfer mispricing and extensive tax holidays (see elsewhere 
above). Second, the knowledge that businesses are engaged in illicit 
capital transfers reinforces public and political suspicion of capital-
ism and profi t making and increases the political vulnerability of the 
private sector. A not unfamiliar fi gure in weak state parts of the globe 
is the head of state who routinely lambastes the private sector for 
greed and failure to invest adequately in productive activities, yet reg-
ularly grants large tax holidays to investors on grounds that are less 
than formal or transparent.
Conclusion
Let us imagine that the international community extends and more 
actively uses the range of interlocking tools that it has been developing to 
deal with the nexus of problems implied by the term illicit capital fl ows, 
including capital fl ight, corruption, money laundering, tax avoidance, 
tax havens, and transfer mispricing. This action would take the form of 
greater international cooperation to identify and sanction transfer mis-
pricing, further limiting the scope for the abuse of tax havens, easing and 
introducing more automaticity into the exchange of information among 
national tax authorities, requiring banks to be more vigilant against illicit 
funds and money laundering, expanding the scope of the Extractive 
Industries Transparency Initiative, more vigorously extending and imple-
menting legislation that criminalizes acts of corruption overseas by citi-
zens of and companies registered in the more economically infl uential 
countries, reforming international accounting standards, strengthening 
mechanisms and laws to facilitate the recovery of stolen assets located 
overseas, increasing watchfulness in relation to the fi nancial affairs of 
politically exposed persons, reinforcing the regulation or self-regulation 
of corporate service providers, and requiring larger transnational corpo-
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rations to give more information in their accounts about the location of 
their sales or profi ts.21
What would be the political and economic consequences for the typi-
cal weak state? The analysis in this chapter and elsewhere in this book 
suggests that they would be complex, because many variables interact. I 
suggest there would be a defi nable causal chain, sequenced approxi-
mately as follows:22
1.  The net volume of illicit outfl ows would decline for two proximate 
reasons. First, transfer mispricing would diminish because it would 
be easier to detect, and the penalties would increase. Second, the 
overall level of corruption would decline because the opportunities 
to transfer and hide the proceeds overseas would decrease, and the 
chances of detection nationally or internationally would increase.
2.  More capital would stay within the country.
3.  The level of legitimate investment in productive activities would 
increase for several reasons. More capital would be available. The 
burden of taxes on the corporate sector would be spread more evenly, 
improving the investment environment for companies and sectors 
that currently bear high tax burdens. Political elites would be more 
motivated to improve the domestic investment environment. They 
would have two reasons to do so. One arises from group self-interest: 
because the incentives and opportunities to expatriate their own licit 
and illicit capital assets would be reduced, they would be more con-
cerned about domestic investment opportunities. The other stems 
from their political dominance and interest in public revenue. The 
more domestic capital that is potentially available for investment, the 
more likely it is that improvements in the investment environment 
would bring returns to those who run the state through increased 
investment leading to higher public revenues. Through these incen-
tive mechanisms, one could expect various kinds of public organiza-
tions and institutions to be strengthened, including the overall secu-
rity of property rights.
4.  The greater visible engagement of elites in productive domestic 
investment would help increase the overall legitimacy of capitalism.
5.  Democratic institutions and practices should be strengthened 
because political elites would have less interest in controlling political 
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institutions and processes to facilitate and hide their own illicit activ-
ities in the form of corruption and the illicit expatriation of capital.
Does this all sound too rosy? If the list of intensifi ed actions set out 
above were interpreted as a new policy program, then skepticism would 
be appropriate. We do not know the magnitudes of any of the causal 
processes outlined above. The arguments might be valid, but the causal 
relations and the impacts are weak. But this is not a new policy program. 
The scenario I have sketched out here involves simply the further devel-
opment of a set of tools for the regulation of perverse and damaging 
transnational transactions that the international community has been 
crafting for many years. These are the right tools to use not only in the 
broad interest of much of the world, but from the specifi c perspective of 
the problems of institutional, economic, and political weaknesses in 
weak states. These weaknesses have strong internal roots, but they also 
refl ect the ways in which the economies and political elites of weak states 
interact with global forces of various kinds, and illicit capital outfl ows 
play a signifi cant role. Anything that makes illicit fl ows signifi cantly more 
costly or risky for the benefi ciaries and their agents is likely to have posi-
tive effects on the economies and the institutions of those states that have 
emerged from late 20th-century globalization with predatory elites, weak 
institutions, and fl awed investment climates. Reducing illicit fl ows is not 
a substitute for internal reforms. Neither is it competitive with them. 
Rather, there is every reason to believe it is strongly complementary.23
Notes
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Datasheet, Groningen Growth and Development Centre, University of Gronin-
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 2. Correspondingly, diamonds seem to have lost some of their previous value as a 
mechanism for illicit capital fl ows.
 3. Point natural resources are concentrated and extracted—normally mined—
through large-scale, capital-intensive operations. The political consequences are 
different from the exploitation of agricultural and forestry resources, which, 
almost by defi nition, are widely dispersed, far less likely to generate high rents, 
and far less prone to monopoly capture.
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bank.org/3AWKN2ZOY0. Until World War II, the developed countries collec-
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nifi cant domestic oil production in the United States. Their dependence on oil 
from the Middle East (and República Bolivariana de Venezuela) increased con-
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the main oil-producing states (the Islamic Republic of Iran, Iraq, Kuwait, Libya, 
Saudi Arabia, and República Bolivariana de Venezuela) were generally dependent 
on and subservient to the United Kingdom and the United States, in particular. 
However, the balance of power gradually shifted from Western governments and 
companies to local politicians. The Organization of the Petroleum Exporting 
Countries, founded in 1960, was able to take advantage of oil shortages in 1973 to 
engineer production limits, rapidly push up the price to what were considered 
crisis levels, and, at a stroke, transfer something like 2 percent of the world’s gross 
national product from oil purchasers into its own coffers. This set in motion two 
processes that, amid all the volatility of the oil industry (and, increasingly, the 
allied natural gas industry), have continued up to the present. First, the average 
rents from oil and gas production have been high, and governments have gener-
ally succeeded in capturing a large proportion for themselves, to the extent that 
they have become wealthy and potentially powerful. Second, the large relative 
decline in the North American contribution to global oil and gas production has 
been substituted by new sources, nearly all in areas with few nonenergy income 
streams: the Russian Federaton, the Caucasus, Central Asia, and parts of Sub-
Saharan Africa (Harris, Moore, and Schmitz 2009).
 5. There is a large literature examining the diverse effects of large resource rents on 
politics and governance. Among the many sources, see Bornhorst, Gupta, and 
Thornton (2008); Bulte, Damania, and Deacon (2005); Collier (2006); Daniele 
(2011); and Torvik (2009).
 6. For good, brief general accounts of the international drug economy and its 
developmental consequences, see Keefer, Loayza, and Soares (2008) and Reuter 
(2008).
 7. As other chapters in this volume demonstrate, issues such as human traffi cking 
and the production and smuggling of counterfeit goods are a peripheral part of 
the story. They are neither large in volume terms nor themselves major drivers 
of the system. They matter to the extent that that they add more noise to cross-
border capital fl ows and make it more diffi cult to determine what is going on.
 8. The differences between overlapping concepts—such as collapsed, failed, failing, 
fragile, kleptocratic, neo-patrimonial, predatory, shadow, shell, rhizomic, and 
weak states (Blundo 2006)—are not relevant to this chapter. Some useful dis-
tinctions can be made. For example, Stewart and Brown (2009) distinguish 
among states that can be considered fragile because they lack authority, because 
they lack legitimacy, or because they fail to provide services. However, there is a 
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high degree of overlap between the various lists of weak or failed states. Lang-
bein and Knack (2010) show that, despite the effort that goes into the construc-
tion of the World Bank’s fl agship Worldwide Governance Indicators, the indica-
tors are highly correlated. For the present purposes, the concepts of state 
weakness or fragility can be considered to refer to a common syndrome. See 
Worldwide Governance Indicators (database), World Bank, Washington, DC, 
http://info.worldbank.org/governance/wgi/index.asp.
 9. For literature on the incentives for elites to weaken state institutions deliberately, 
see Ganev (2007) and Mathew and Moore (2011).
10. Abuja, Kano, and Onitsha, “Nigeria’s Prospects: A Man and a Morass; Can the 
New Government of Goodluck Jonathan Clean Up Corruption and Set Enter-
prise Free in Africa’s Most Populous Country?” Economist, May 28–June 3, 2011, 
28–29.
11. My classifi cation differs from that employed by Stephanie Blankenburg and 
Mushtaq Khan in their chapter in this volume mainly in that I treat tax havens 
as a distinct category.
12. The other features of economic structure that consistently correlate with a 
higher tax take are (a) the size of the nonagricultural economy and (b) the ratio 
of foreign trade to GDP (Gupta 2007; Pessino and Fenochietto 2010; Piancastelli 
2001). For explanations of the higher taxability of high income economies, see 
Gordon and Li (2009) and Moore (2008).
13. There is little or no effort to implement the core process of a true VAT: the rec-
onciliation of mandatory invoices relating to interbusiness transactions.
14. We also know that tax exemptions for companies have become more common 
in Sub-Saharan Africa since 1980, especially in the more damaging form of tax 
holidays, as opposed to investment allowances that can be offset against tax lia-
bilities (Keen and Mansour 2010).
15. Ideally, we would measure the corporate income tax take as a proportion of 
corporate profi ts. However, the latter fi gures are not available.
16. Tax effort is defi ned as actual tax collection as a percentage of the collections one 
could expect given the structure of national economies.
17. See chapter 7 by Lorraine Eden in this volume. A report released by China’s 
Central Bank in June 2011 and quickly recalled suggested that, from the mid-
1990s up until 2008, between 16,000 and 18,000 offi cials and employees of state-
owned companies had fl ed China, mainly to the United States, having used off-
shore bank accounts to transfer more than US$120 billion overseas. See “Chinese 
Offi cials Stole $120 Billion, Fled Mainly to US,” BBC News Asia-Pacifi c, June 17, 
2011, http://www.bbc.co.uk/news/world-asia-pacifi c-13813688.
18. I have not provided detailed statistical evidence to support table 14.2. This sup-
port is generally to be found in major data series such as the World Bank’s 
Worldwide Governance Indicators, where the best national level proxy scores for 
the concepts I have used in table 14.2 generally correlate signifi cantly with aver-
age per capita income levels. There are important questions about the extent to 
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which these correlations are valid or refl ect biases in the construction of the 
indicators and how far broad concepts such as rule of law refl ect the kind of 
property rights systems that are actually required to stimulate private invest-
ment (Andrews 2008; Haggard, MacIntyre, and Tiede 2008; Haggard and Tiede 
2011). For our present purposes, we can reasonably assume that relative national 
scores in the Worldwide Governance Indicators are substantively meaningful. 
See Worldwide Governance Indicators (database), World Bank, Washington, 
DC, http://info.worldbank.org/governance/wgi/index.asp.
19. It is likely that some jurisdictions experience signifi cant illicit infl ows also 
because they offer the advantage of such factors as tax holidays for foreign 
investment or temporarily high interest rates.
20. To the extent that they wish to protect some of their own assets at home and 
protect their families against the future loss of political infl uence, they might 
create institutions such as capital markets as a way of laundering illicit wealth. 
However, capitalism has a powerful institutional logic. Institutions protecting 
property rights as private or club goods may expand to provide collective goods 
(McVey 1992).
21. Reed and Fontana (2011) provide a basic introduction to this fi eld of regulating 
international transactions.
22. Specialists in this field might like to compare this argument with Brigitte 
Unger’s work (2007) on money laundering. She detects 25 effects of money 
laundering, most of them adverse, but also explains well the difficulties of 
 making strong claims and of finding suitable evidence.
23. Most anticorruption mechanisms operate only within individual jurisdictions. 
They are notoriously ineffective (Reed and Fontana 2011). It is as if the United 
States or some other large federal country decided to dispense entirely with any 
national-level crime fi ghting agency, even for the purposes of coordinating state 
police forces.
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Domestic resource mobilization lies at the heart of development. Illicit 
fi nancial outfl ows drain development resources.
— Task Force on the Development Impact of Illicit Financial Flows1
Introduction
The preceding chapters cover a wide range of topics (criminal markets, 
trade fl ows, the foundations of state legitimacy, internal fi rm pricing, and 
tax collection) and a moderately broad range of methods (accounting, 
criminology, economics, political theory, and law). This refl ects the real-
ity that illicit fl ows, like most interesting policy phenomena, touch many 
domains and require a variety of approaches to aid understanding.
In the face of such diversity, this concluding essay makes no claim to 
comprehensiveness. It offers observations on four matters. First, is it 
useful to focus policy attention on illicit fl ows, given that they represent 
a consequence of more fundamental and troubling problems (corrup-
tion, tax evasion, criminal markets, and so on)? Second, are illegal mar-
kets likely to be an important source of such fl ows? Third, what can be 
concluded from the existing estimates, given the lack of any systematic 
Peter Reuter
Policy and Research Implications 
of Illicit Flows
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technical assessment of the most frequently cited fi gures? The fi nal sec-
tion of the chapter reviews potential research paths.
Illicit Flows and Policy
There is no doubt that illicit fi nancial fl ows (IFFs) from developing coun-
tries are substantial. Even if the correct fi gure is only a 10th of the often-
cited Global Financial Integrity estimates (about US$1 trillion annually 
according to Kar and Cartwright-Smith 2008), that is, around US$100 
billion, it is large relative to either offi cial development assistance (about 
US$70 billion) or total foreign direct investment in the developing world 
(around US$250 billion in 2004 according to UNCTAD 2009). Eliminat-
ing this outfl ow, all else being equal, would be an enormous gain to 
developing countries.
This alone does not imply, however, that IFFs constitute a good focus 
for policy. IFFs are a specifi c consequence of more fundamental prob-
lems that have long been of great concern. Most notably, corruption and 
the payment of bribes to major government offi cials have become a cen-
tral issue for the World Bank and for the development community gen-
erally, at least since World Bank President James Wolfensohn put it on 
the Bank’s agenda in the mid-1990s. Similarly, the failure of developing 
countries to collect taxes has also come more into focus in the last 
decade; the reliance on offi cial development assistance is seen as, impor-
tantly, a consequence of the inability of these countries to tax their own 
resources (Bräutigam, Fjeldstad, and Moore 2008). The root cause argu-
ment, then, is that one should focus on ways of reducing the underlying 
problems: corruption, tax evasion, and so forth. The international fl ows 
are only a manifestation of these problems. Cut down on corruption, tax 
evasion, and the rest, and the IFFs will take care of themselves.
The argument for focusing on causes rather than symptoms is a com-
mon one in many domains of policy. For example, many analysts argue 
that crime is a manifestation less of individual failings or moral turpi-
tude than of social failure (Sykes, Cullen, and Merton 1992). Thus, they 
say, the most effective way of responding to crime is not detection and 
punishment of offenders, which treat only the symptom, but elimina-
tion of social inequality, improving the conditions in which the poor 
live, and better schools and social programs, which treat the true causes 
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of crime. In fact, there is evidence that society can usefully do both. 
Police and prison do reduce crime, at least through incapacitation, and 
social programs such as early childhood interventions also reduce the 
propensity to crime (Spelman 2000; Greenwood et al. 1998).
There are other domains in which policy focuses on root causes, 
but with little attention to amelioration of harms. For example, the cur-
rent debate about fi nancial regulation, in the wake of the global fi scal 
crisis, emphasizes rules to correct fundamentals rather than postfailure 
remedies.
There is thus no general approach. For some problems, ameliorative 
programs have a minimal role; focusing on the root causes is, indeed, the 
only path to reduction of the problem. For others, treating the symptom 
is also useful. What may be said about illicit fl ows in this respect?
A distinctive feature of the IFF issue is that the illicit fl ows may them-
selves exacerbate the underlying harms, that is, even if the tax evasion, 
corruption, and criminal markets continued unabated and all that one 
accomplished was to prevent the resulting funds leaving the home coun-
try, the result would appear to be welfare enhancing. Assuming that the 
owners of the illicit funds want to do more than hide their assets under 
mattresses, there would be more money for domestic investment and, 
perhaps, also a stronger tax base. Mick Moore takes this up in chapter 14.
It is also possible that trapping funds in the source countries reduces 
the attractiveness of corruption, tax evasion, and so on. A focus on the 
consequences might then reduce the underlying activities. This reduc-
tion could occur through at least two mechanisms. First, the returns 
associated with having to spend the money at home, with only the goods 
and services available, for example, in Congolese markets, may make the 
marginal dollar less valuable and, thus, lower the incentive to steal from 
the state. With increasing globalization, however, the consumption pos-
sibilities in developing countries are approaching those available else-
where, at least in terms of perishables. Substitutes for homes in the south 
of France may remain diffi cult to fi nd in poorer countries (indeed, in 
almost any country). Second, the funds are less secure at home than 
abroad. This will also lower the marginal return of another dollar stolen 
in an ex ante calculation because a change in regime may lead to the 
seizure of some of these assets. The calculation of the probabilities of 
seizure is no doubt complicated, but the fear of such a loss surely weighs 
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heavily in small countries with kleptocratic traditions. The fear may 
increase the current kleptocrats’ incentives for retaining power given 
that fl ight will separate them from their wealth.2 However, this seems a 
modest effect; few kleptocrats quit power easily, even with vast amounts 
of wealth overseas, as evidenced by Muammar Ghaddafi ’s refusal to leave 
Libya under extreme pressure, despite the availability of billions of dol-
lars in overseas accounts.
It is unclear how one should assess the plausibility of the above argu-
ments: one is at a loss to identify instances in which it has, in fact, been 
diffi cult to transfer money from a developing country. The arguments 
do not seem persuasive. One suspects that trapping the funds at home 
will not much reduce the temptations for corruption and tax evasion, 
but that is pure conjecture.
There are, however, potential negative effects of preventing interna-
tional transfers as well; those forced to keep their funds at home will 
have incentives to pay more bribes to protect their assets, now more vul-
nerable to the kleptocratic regime. Whereas a one-time payment may 
have suffi ced to get the funds out of the country illegally, protecting 
them at home year after year might require frequent payments. The 
share of total gross domestic product (GDP) devoted to corruption may 
actually rise. Assessing how important this effect might be is also diffi -
cult, but it is probably not large under most circumstances.
Stephanie Blankenburg and Mushtaq Khan, in chapter 2, offer an 
argument why IFFs might be the wrong focus for policy efforts. They see 
the fl ows as the consequence of more fundamental failures of gover-
nance, which generate grand corruption and a reduced willingness to 
pay taxes, a theme also of chapter 3 by Max Everest-Phillips. The argu-
ment is almost one of feasibility rather than relative effectiveness. It is 
only possible to reduce the outfl ows from developing countries by 
improving governance, and, anyway, good governance produces many 
other gains. For example, a signifi cant share of illicit fl ows in some coun-
tries arise in response to policies that lower the domestic returns avail-
able to investors outside of a favored elite who have access to the best 
opportunities. The sources of the income that is seeking higher returns 
overseas may be legitimate, but, if the government has imposed strict 
limits on currency conversion to stimulate domestic investment, money 
will fl ow overseas illegally. Eliminating the restrictive policies may be a 
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precondition to cutting illicit fl ows, fl ows that some see as having a 
moral legitimacy lacked by the regime, which, among other excesses, is 
unfairly rewarding its supporters. In effect, the argument is that IFFs can 
only be reduced domestically by actions that will also reduce the under-
lying distortions that fuel the fl ows in the fi rst place.
There is also the question of whether the political resources freed up 
for reform are best spent addressing the IFFs as opposed to the root 
causes. At the international level, there is only a limited amount of 
energy available for these kinds of efforts, which require commitments 
of time by heads of state and other senior policy makers. At this level, 
IFFs score well. They represent a target that can be dealt with through 
well- established entities such as the Financial Action Task Force (FATF), 
which has managed to obtain at least formal compliance in many 
nations through the establishment of specialized governmental agencies 
or through forums such as the G-8 and G-20.3
Nonetheless, the fundamental problems are essentially domestic. 
There is not much that outsiders, even major international fi nancial 
institutions such as the International Monetary Fund or the World Bank, 
can do to address corruption, tax evasion, or criminal markets. The fail-
ure of the coalition supporting the government of Afghanistan is an 
extreme illustration of the limits of interventions on these matters: even 
150,000 troops do not make much difference with respect to heroin pro-
duction and broadbased corruption in that country (Caulkins, Kleiman, 
and Kulick 2010).
One of the benefi ts of focusing on the fl ows is that the developed 
world can play a direct role. These funds do not mysteriously disappear 
from developing countries. In large part, they fl ow into legitimate and, 
often, even highly respected fi nancial institutions in the developed 
world. Thus, governments of the rich countries that serve as the domicile 
for many of the recipient banks can, through legislation, more forcefully 
push the institutions to ensure they are not taking in illicit fl ows.
Controlling the Flows
Numerous proposals aim at reducing the fl ows rather than targeting the 
fundamentals. Many of these are associated with nongovernmental orga-
nizations such as the Tax Justice Network, Global Financial Integrity, and 
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Christian Aid. Some proposals, such as country-by-country reporting of 
revenues and taxes by corporations that has been advocated by Richard 
Murphy and referred to by him in chapter 9, seek to reduce the extent of 
transfer mispricing (Murphy 2009). Others, such as tightening the regu-
lation of tax havens and secrecy jurisdictions, broadly target all methods 
behind IFFs (TJN 2007). Still others, such as strengthening anti–money 
laundering (AML) efforts, build on existing initiatives.
One rhetorical merit of the term fl ows is it makes clear that there is 
both a destination and a source. Should both ends receive the same 
focus? Michael Levi, in chapter 12, points to the diffi culty of enhancing 
AML controls in developing countries, illustrating the political economy 
point made by Blankenburg and Khan in chapter 2. Inasmuch as AML 
aims to curb the fruits of corruption, it often requires those who benefi t 
most from the theft to build stronger controls that either prevent the 
crime or increase the probability of detection. It is fanciful to imagine 
that Marcos, Mobutu, or Suharto would have allowed the operation of 
an effective domestic AML, whatever laws they might have permitted to 
be placed on the books. It may be that the AML controls that matter 
more for developing countries are those that operate in destination 
countries. Tim Daniel and James Maton, in their review of recent cases 
(chapter 13), show that courts and police in Switzerland and the United 
Kingdom have helped return stolen assets to Nigeria, whereas the sys-
tems in African countries such as Kenya have singularly failed in dealing 
with their own grand corruption (Wrong 2009). In his talk at the confer-
ence at the World Bank in September 2009 at which the papers forming 
the basis of this volume were presented, Nuhu Ribadu, the former anti-
corruption chief of Nigeria, stressed that a major aim of his early efforts 
in Nigeria was to induce cooperation from investigative bodies in the 
United Kingdom and the United States because, relative to his agency, 
they had more expertise and greater legal powers. He sought to demon-
strate to these bodies that he was serious about recovering the stolen 
assets, and he accomplished that goal. As a consequence, after successful 
prosecutions in British and Swiss courts generated by his Nigerian initia-
tives and cooperation from the British and Swiss governments, there was 
a sharp reversal in fl ows of illicitly generated funds; large sums fl owed 
from the United Kingdom and Switzerland, where they now seemed 
exposed to confi scation, back to Nigeria.
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Surely, AML systems can be made more effective globally so that those 
who transfer illegally obtained funds are at greater risk of losing the 
assets or of being prosecuted.4 The risk, at present, is generally thought 
to be negligible; it certainly is far less than 1 percent (in the share recov-
ered) if the estimates of hundreds of billions of dollars in IFFs are cor-
rect.5 More information exchange agreements among nations, more 
well-drafted laws, more dedicated investigative units will all raise the 
effectiveness of AML in many countries. Nonetheless, it is worth noting 
that the United States, which has a strong set of laws and a reasonably 
committed and honest enforcement system, has had little success in seiz-
ing laundered moneys or catching launderers or their clients. Reuter and 
Truman (2004), admittedly using data that do not refl ect the increased 
effort since 9/11, estimate that only about US$700 million in laundered 
money is seized annually and offer a speculative calculation that the 
probability a launderer will be arrested during the course of a year is no 
more than 1 in 15. Perhaps radical changes in the status of tax havens 
would make a large difference, but the record suggests that AML initia-
tives have had little effect on illegal fl ows through the fi nancial system. 
Databases containing suspicious activity reports have given investigators 
and prosecutors in a few countries a valuable additional source of infor-
mation, but this has hardly transformed the effort to identify and punish 
those seeking to conceal criminal earnings. In countries without a tradi-
tion of independent and vigorous prosecution, it is even more diffi cult 
to be optimistic about the creation of an effective system, especially if 
(unlike the United States) senior political elites are also the probable tar-
gets of such prosecutions.
The fundamental problem for AML and, perhaps, for IFFs is the 
plethora of channels by which money can be laundered. AML controls 
initially were targeted only at banks, which had a public utility element 
in their role of providing liquidity. As refl ected in the FATF guidelines, 
the controls soon expanded to fi nancial enterprises more generally; 
insurance companies and stockbrokers also had to develop AML special-
ists to monitor transactions. In some countries, the systems have 
expanded still more broadly to cover all businesses that might be able to 
provide useful money laundering services. In the United Kingdom, all 
businesses must report cash purchases involving more than US$10,000. 
The FATF 40+9 regulations, published in 2004, impose obligations on a 
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great array of businesses. No country has been found to be in compli-
ance with the entire set of regulations. Even if a nation were in compli-
ance, there are other channels, such as hawalas (informal systems for 
transferring money that are traditional in Arab countries and South 
Asia), for which the regulations are barely meaningful. AML regulations 
have certainly complicated the lives of felons with large incomes and 
helped remove some of the barriers to imprisoning sophisticated offend-
ers. It is much less clear that they have reduced the criminal activities 
they have targeted.
Can the set of proposals for controlling IFFs accomplish more? 
 Country-by-country reporting, transparency rules for traditional secrecy 
jurisdictions, and better tracking of politically exposed persons are all 
major reforms that would importantly change the ways in which busi-
ness is conducted. The need of major corporations, both fi nancial and 
other, to maintain working relationships with the international fi nancial 
system provides a strong incentive for compliance with these rules, as 
may be indicated by the apparent success of recent efforts to isolate the 
Iranian economy. Such sanctions have the advantage of a well-defi ned 
target, whereas those aimed at IFFs are, by defi nition, not so narrowly 
targeted. It would be premature to make a judgment whether these 
reforms would do more than change the modalities by which illicit 
money moves internationally. Perhaps kleptocrats sleep less comfortably 
because of these changes.
Alex Cobham, in chapter 11, points to the signifi cant exposure of 
developing countries to secrecy jurisdictions (which are usually called 
tax havens) in terms of the share of capital fl ight that passes through 
fi nancial institutions domiciled in these places. These jurisdictions are 
now seen as a threat to the effectiveness of fi nancial regulation and mac-
roeconomic policy globally. A number of international bodies, such as 
the European Union and the Organisation for Economic Co-operation 
and Development, have taken steps to make them more transparent; see 
the survey and critique of such efforts in the report of the Norwegian 
Government Commission on Capital Flight from Poor Countries.6
Despite the high level of rhetoric on this issue from world leaders, it is 
fair to say that little progress has been made in the fundamentals (Euro-
dad 2009). The barriers to change with respect to tax havens are the stan-
dard ones for international economic policy reform, well described in 
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recent tracts by distinguished academics such as Joseph Stiglitz. The sug-
gested barriers extend from protectionism by leaders of countries and an 
inherent difference in pace between fi nancial globalization and the inter-
national fi nancial regulatory system to the procyclicality of fi nancial sys-
tems.7 The reform mill may grind slowly, but, if even the massive crisis of 
2008–09 does not generate meaningful reform, one has to be concerned 
whether such reform is possible.
In summary, it is not clear how much effort should go toward halting 
illicit fl ows, as opposed to dealing with the underlying phenomena. 
There are political arguments that favor the effort, but also serious ques-
tions about how effective the targeted controls can be. It is likely that 
some effort should go specifi cally toward IFF control, but also that such 
control should be seen mostly as a component of the agenda for helping 
deal with corruption and tax evasion in developing countries.
Transfer Price Manipulation
Transfer price manipulation (TPM), the explicit subject of chapter 7, by 
Lorraine Eden, and chapter 8, by Carlos Leite, and part of the scope of 
chapter 9, by Richard Murphy, and chapter 4, by Clemens Fuest and 
Nadine Riedel, falls in another category. TPM is both a means by which 
illicit funds are generated and a method for transferring illegal funds 
generated by other economic activities.8 There is a shallow consensus 
that TPM is reasonably well controlled in the developed world; there are 
intricate and heavily monitored agreements among countries that can 
occasionally even lead to a twinge of sympathy for a multinational fi rm 
caught between two aggressive national tax authorities.9 This suggests 
that the TPM problem for developing countries can be solved through 
negotiation of agreements comparable with those found among mem-
bers of the Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development 
and through training of the relevant offi cials.
However, this takes us back to the conundrum raised in chapter 2 by 
Blankenburg and Khan, who treat all these regulatory issues as an exer-
cise in political economy. TPM can occur for two quite distinct reasons. 
In one case, the multinational fi rm has more technical competence than 
the government with which it is engaged, and the TPM is simply unde-
tected. This problem of government is, in principle, easily addressed 
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through technical assistance. The other reason is that TPM is the result 
of corrupt dealings, whereby, for example, the original contract govern-
ing the transaction has involved bribes to government offi cials. The 
TPM is easily detected, but is allowed by the contract. There are many 
detected instances of this sort of problem (Global Witness 2006; Green-
peace 2008). We are therefore taken back again to the conundrum; can 
effective domestic restrictions on IFF be developed without tackling the 
underlying corruption?
Perhaps the actions initiated by rich nations can provide the missing 
element because transfer pricing involves two nations (or, at least, two 
jurisdictions given that so many of the secrecy jurisdictions are depen-
dencies).10 Even more than the other controls of IFFs, transfer pricing 
involves highly technical accounting issues that are diffi cult for non-
experts to assess.
Illegal Markets
Chapter 5 on Colombia by Francisco E. Thoumi and Marcela Anzola 
points to a fundamental problem in the current view of how illicit mar-
kets contribute to illicit fl ows. Consider illegal drugs, the most well stud-
ied and probably largest of the global criminal markets.11 The main fl ow 
is of drugs (particularly opiates and cocaine) from producer and transit 
countries, which are mostly in the developing world, to rich consuming 
countries that account for most of the expenditures, though not neces-
sarily most of the quantities consumed.12 The reverse fl ow is of funds 
from consumers in rich countries to the traffi ckers, who are predomi-
nantly in the source countries. Indeed, it is an oddity of the drug market 
that, in contrast to legal markets, the dominant earners in the interna-
tional trade have come from poorer countries. Pablo Escobar (Colom-
bia), Arellano Félix (Mexico), and Khun Sa (Myanmar) were all promi-
nent fi gures who made massive fortunes from the international drug 
trade; if there are comparably rich European and U.S. traffi ckers in 
recent decades, they have managed to keep their identities concealed.
At fi rst impression, this suggests that illegal drugs would generate illicit 
infl ows to developing nations. It is often claimed that opium and heroin 
add one-third or more to the measured GDP of Afghanistan (UNODC 
2009). Most of this comes not from the production of opium, but from 
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the smuggling to Afghanistan’s neighbors and possible involvement in 
other transactions entirely outside Afghanistan (Paoli, Greenfi eld, and 
Reuter 2009). There may be some fi nancial outfl ows as richer drug traf-
fi ckers seek to fi nd more liquid and secure locations for wealth generated 
by wholly domestic transactions. However, it is more likely that some of 
the foreign earnings are brought back to Afghanistan. Those earnings 
have not been generated in the country and never enter the national 
income accounts even theoretically. The net fl ow may well be inward.
Thus, it is not surprising that Thoumi and Anzola, in chapter 5, fi nd 
that the fi scal problem for Colombia related to drug earnings has been 
precisely the effects of the infl ow of dollars on its fi nancial system and 
exchange rate. The demand for pesos has been so great that the peso, 
rather than the dollar, has commanded premiums in the illicit exchange 
market that arose in response to currency controls. Drug traffi cking and 
production have many adverse consequences on Colombia, but outfl ows 
of domestic earnings is not one of them.
A few developing nations have substantial international monetary 
fl ows related to drug markets; Afghanistan, Bolivia, Colombia, Mexico, 
Myanmar, Peru, Tajikistan, and (in percentage terms) a number of micro-
states in the Caribbean may exhaust the list of jurisdictions with 5 per-
cent or more of GDP originating in drug production or traffi cking. The 
newer human traffi cking markets, analyzed by Pierre Kopp in chapter 6, 
are much more widely spread across the developing world; the Kyrgyz 
Republic, Moldova, Paraguay, and Thailand are a few of the countries 
mentioned. The fl ows have a different dynamic relative to the fl ows asso-
ciated with drugs. They are often highly dispersed. Instead of a 100 kilo-
gram shipment of cocaine, which may have a value for the smuggler of 
US$1.5 million, there are many coyotes at the Mexican border that earn 
US$1,000–US$10,000 for each crossing with a few illegal immigrants.13 
There may also be large payments for more complex human traffi cking 
ventures such as the smuggling of a large number of Central Asian 
women to brothels in Western Europe (Shelley 2010). The extent to 
which this traffi c is in the hands of residents of the sending countries has 
not been determined. Whether there are equivalents in human traffi ck-
ing to Pablo Escobar and Khun Sa in drug traffi cking is also unknown.
Keefe (2009) describes in detail the workings of Chinese human traf-
fi ckers in the United States. The central fi gure in his account is a Chinese 
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citizen who received most of her revenues in the United States from 
other Chinese immigrants (families of her customers), who had earned 
the money in the United States. She spent some of the money in her 
home village in China; many of her agents spent their money exclusively 
in the United States.
However, even for these markets, it is not clear that there is any sub-
stantial outfl ow from the source countries of funds from activities that 
are properly included in domestic GDP. The Netherland income from the 
prostitution of a coerced Moldovan woman, if it is included in any GDP, 
is counted in the country in which it becomes income, the Netherlands.14 
The money may be repatriated to the source country by the prostitute or 
by the smuggler.15 There is a loss of human capital and associated earn-
ings as a result of human traffi cking, but the people who are smuggled 
are generally in the lower quantiles of earnings in their own nations; the 
loss may be minor relative to the loss of human capital associated with, 
for example, the admission under various U.S. immigration programs of 
medical physicians and skilled technology workers trained abroad.
Raymond Baker (2005) identifi es other illegal markets that make sub-
stantial contributions to the illicit fl ows from developing and transi-
tional economies: counterfeit goods, smuggling, and racketeering. The 
only method of determining the actual outfl ows of these markets would 
be to examine the dynamics of each market separately. It is easy to argue 
that there are substantial illicit infl ows associated with, at least, counter-
feit goods. These are often exports from developing countries that 
undercut products bearing the same name that are made in a variety of 
countries. The net effects on any individual country depend on various 
elasticities of substitution about which prior speculation is essentially 
impossible. Smuggling, while it certainly deprives governments of legiti-
mate revenues, may involve net infl ows to developing countries if the 
smuggling occurs from poorer countries to richer countries.
Existing Estimates
The debate about IFFs has been dominated by reference to estimates of 
the large scale of the phenomenon that are associated with Global Finan-
cial Integrity (Baker 2005; Kar and Cartwright-Smith 2008). These esti-
mates, which are apparently the only ones to date, have been extremely 
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valuable. They have focused attention on an issue that had previously 
been quite marginal. In this respect, they fi t well into the modern pattern 
by which policy issues acquire a public identity; it is numbers as much as 
stories that attract scrutiny (Andreas and Greenhill 2010).
Thus, the numbers have been taken up by the advocacy community 
and used extensively to press for various policy proposals. For example, 
they are used to support the case for paying more attention to AML 
regimes in developing countries and for curbing tax havens and secrecy 
jurisdictions (DIIS 2009; Christensen 2009; FitzGerald 2010; Helleiner 
2009; Purje, Ylö nen, and Nokelainen 2010). As discussed in chapter 1, 
these estimates also have the troubling possibility of undercutting the 
case for providing offi cial development assistance simply because they 
imply that there is a solution to the development problem that is both 
more constructive and less expensive for the wealthy nations that cur-
rently provide offi cial development assistance, namely, preventing illicit 
fi nancial outfl ows. Thus, it matters a great deal if they are substantial 
overestimates, a problem that is exacerbated by reference to missing 
items that might make them conservative estimates.
We address two related issues here: how well the measures match with 
the concept of illicit as formulated for policy purposes and the unex-
pected and troubling pattern of the distribution across countries in the 
estimates. The interested reader can fi nd other concerns scattered in the 
chapters by Fuest and Riedel, by Eden, and by Nitsch (chapters 4, 7, and 
10, respectively).
Concepts and Measures
Kar and Cartwright-Smith apply an unusually sweeping defi nition of 
their target measure, as follows:
Illicit fi nancial fl ows involve the transfer of money earned through activi-
ties such as corruption, transactions involving contraband goods, crimi-
nal activities, and efforts to shelter wealth from a country’s tax authori-
ties. Such fl ows may also involve funds that were earned through legitimate 
means. It is in transferring legitimately earned funds in direct contraven-
tion of applicable capital controls that the transfer becomes an illicit fl ow, 
regardless of the fact that the funds were earned in a legitimate activity. 
(Kar and Cartwright-Smith 2008, 1)16
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In terms of the Blankenburg and Khan taxonomy of defi nitions of capi-
tal fl ight in chapter 2, this defi nition is legalistic, with its emphasis on the 
formal law, regardless of whether the regime enacting the law has social 
legitimacy. It ignores the distinction between the terms illegal and illicit, 
whereby the latter term covers concepts of morality.
Illicit includes some actions that are not covered by illegal, and vice 
versa.17 For example, if Zambia has no transfer pricing regulations, then 
a contract with abusive transfer pricing terms may be illicit, but not ille-
gal. Meanwhile, moving private funds out of Myanmar almost certainly 
will be illegal, but may not be illicit if it represents the assets of an indi-
vidual escaping the inhumane rule of that nation.
Whether the distinction turns out to be important cannot be deter-
mined a priori; it involves sensitive judgments. If governments lacking 
moral legitimacy account for a small share of IFFs, then this becomes a 
minor issue. However, the estimates do not allow such a simple solution. 
The government of China, which accounts for such a large share of IFF 
estimates, has delivered extraordinary economic prosperity to its people 
over the last 30 years. It may not be democratic, but its achievement gives 
the government an important element of legitimacy. Does this imply that 
all violations of the government’s many unreasonable restrictions on eco-
nomic activities and individual mobility should be considered illicit?
The Russian Federation, also among the top 10 nations in terms of 
estimated IFFs, presents another diffi cult case. The government has been 
democratically elected, but has used capital control violations for politi-
cal ends. This was one of the weapons it used to close down Yukos Oil 
Company and target the Yukos chief executive offi cer, Mikhail Khodor-
kovsky, for allegedly political reasons (Sakwa 2009). Are all violations of 
the Russian government’s controls illicit?
One argument for using a legally oriented defi nition is that it simpli-
fi es the task. However, it does so at the expense of conceptual clarity. 
Moreover, it grants a legitimacy to regimes with foundations that are 
anything but licit. Major developing countries such as Iraq, Libya, Nige-
ria, and Pakistan have, at times in the last 20 years, been ruled by regimes 
that violated any notion of democracy and created legal systems that 
benefi ted only a small, privileged subset of the population. To assert that 
each of these nations would have been benefi ted if legitimately earned 
moneys had not been smuggled away from brutal and corrupt regimes is 
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to take an unusually strong stand for the inherent legitimacy of the gov-
ernment. Such issues also raise diffi cult problems for the legitimacy and 
socioeconomic impact of suspicious activity reporting schemes if these 
are used in such countries for tax recovery or other purposes. When does 
extortion become the “recovery of stolen money”?
Which countries have large IFFs?
A striking feature of the fi nal estimates is the dominance of China. The 
estimated annual normalized IFF from China is US$238.5 billion (Kar 
and Cartwright-Smith 2008). This is almost exactly equal to the total of 
the next nine countries with the largest fl ows. Indeed, China accounts 
for about 25 percent of the global total. Note that there is evidence, 
referred to by Lorraine Eden in her chapter, that TPM is a particularly 
important phenomenon for China. Only considering the 57 developing 
countries in the study by Kar and Cartwright-Smith, the China estimates 
range from 58 percent of the gross unadjusted mispricing estimates to 83 
percent of the net unadjusted trade mispricing estimates for these coun-
tries, a major element of the illicit fl ows.
The focal policy concern about IFFs at the national level has been lack 
of domestic investment; this is clearly not an issue in China. Over the last 
30 years, since its economy was released from command and control, 
China has experienced sustained domestic growth rates higher than the 
rates achieved by any other nation over such a long period. Moreover, 
the well-being of China has not been adversely affected by a lack of capi-
tal for investment. Some of that investment has been subject to lower 
taxation because it falsely appears as foreign direct investment, the result 
of illicit transactions that allow domestic capital to move overseas rather 
than appear as domestic investment; Hong Kong SAR, China, seems to 
be a particularly important location for faked capital movement. The 
comment here is not that the outfl ows have no consequence, but that the 
most dire one—the lack of investment—is absent.
It is also striking that fi ve of the next seven countries ranked by the 
size of IFFs are countries of which the exports are dominated by oil 
(Saudi Arabia, Russia, Mexico, Kuwait, and República Bolivariana de 
Venezuela). Two of these nations (Saudi Arabia and Kuwait) are not 
developing countries at all; they have high per capita GDP.18 The other 
three are middle-income countries, with high levels of corruption and 
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low levels of tax collection. However, the dominance of oil is highly rel-
evant because there are specifi c factors that can explain outfl ows related 
to oil. Indeed, it is well known that oil trade statistics are particularly 
error-ridden because of the fl uid (pun intended) nature of the trade 
(Statistics Norway 2006; Laherrere 2007; Sinton and Fridley 2001). For 
example, a tanker may leave Saudi Arabia bound for the Netherlands 
(and be so recorded in Saudi Arabia’s trade statistics), but then be 
diverted to Mumbai because a better price has been negotiated for deliv-
ery there. It will show up as an Indian rather than a Netherland import. 
Moreover, the supposed price when it leaves Saudi Arabia will be lower 
than the price when it arrives in India.
None of these concerns invalidates the estimates. They do raise ques-
tions about exactly what the numbers mean, a matter we take up below 
in the research agenda portion of this chapter.
Do illicit inﬂ ows matter?
Critics of the large Global Financial Integrity estimates of IFFs, such as 
Fuest and Riedel (chapter 4) and Nitsch (chapter 10), have pointed out 
that net illicit fl ows may be substantially smaller than gross outfl ows 
because there are reasons to bring funds in illicitly. Capital fl ight, from 
which the estimates are derived, has always been considered potentially a 
two-way fl ow. While temporary events might lead to rapid exits (fl ight 
having a time dimension), these might then reverse after the events. 
Political unrest is an example; money that has exited during a period of 
instability might return after a new regime has been established. Even in 
the period 2002–06, which is covered by Kar and Cartwright-Smith 
(2008), a large share of the developing world had restrictions on currency 
conversion and international funds fl ows that gave individuals and fi rms 
incentives to carry out such transactions illegally.
Kar and others have correctly pointed out that illicit infl ows generate 
their own problems for governments.19 The ability of the government to 
conduct effective economic policy, whether fi scal or monetary, is under-
mined by these fl ows. Illegal organizations can gain power by access to 
these unregistered funds. The illicit funds are likely to avoid taxation.
Governments, indeed, make great efforts to force such fl ows above 
ground. The government of Bangladesh, faced with a fl ow of unrecorded 
remittances from overseas workers, developed methods to make the use 
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of the formal banking system more attractive to the senders and recipi-
ents of remittances: user costs were lowered; time to delivery was 
decreased; and the density of branches in Bangladesh was increased, so 
as to facilitate access for recipients. As a result, a large share of remit-
tances moved into offi cial fi nancial accounts, and the share of GDP orig-
inating in remittances rose from 4 to 8 percent between 2001 and 2006 
(Hasan 2006; Barua, Majumder, and Akhtaruzzaman 2007).
The problems associated with the two sets of fl ows are quite different. 
However, if the focus is on development potential, then netting them out 
can serve a useful purpose. Even if the Bangladesh remittances enter ille-
gally, as a portion of them still do through the Bangladesh equivalent 
of hawalas (hundis), they provide resources for development. Indeed, 
remittances hardly represent tax-evading fl ows because such a large 
share of the funds go to poor households with minimal tax obligations 
even if they declare all relevant income. One needs at least to pay some 
attention to whether efforts to stop illegal outfl ows have negative conse-
quences for illegal, but benefi cial, infl ows.
A Research Agenda
The research agenda should be diverse both methodologically and in 
terms of the unit of analysis. Beyond the disciplines represented in this 
volume, ethnographic and forensic accounting approaches should be 
added. Instead of focusing only on broad aggregates, there should be 
studies of the phenomenon in the small as well.
The overall goal of the research agenda is to increase understanding 
of the determinants of the phenomenon and to inform policy discussion 
of proposals to reduce IFFs. This section will provide a sketch of what is 
needed.
The existing estimates can serve an important function for future 
research. If they hold up to further scrutiny, then the national estimates 
become data. It may be possible to estimate a set of equations that exam-
ine both causes and consequences of IFFs. While the estimates are cer-
tainly noisy, they may not be much different in this respect from mea-
sures such as Transparency International’s corruption index and the 
World Bank’s various governance indicators that are now the staple of 
economists’ modeling.
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Generally, however, the focus on aggregate fi gures obscures the 
dynamics of the phenomenon; it has a black box quality to it. The 
aggregates do not allow the analyst to determine composition. Kar and 
Cartwright-Smith note (2008, 1) that their “paper makes no attempt to 
link illicit fi nancial fl ows with the nature of underlying activities 
whether legal or illegal.” It could be argued that, if IFFs constitute a 
useful target for policy purposes, then the tools are generic. It does not 
matter whether the fl ow is generated by bribery, tax evasion, or cir-
cumventing exchange controls. These all involve similar mechanisms 
for moving money to another country, probably a rich one, and can be 
dealt with through the various reform proposals: tightened AML con-
trols, country-by-country reporting, a requirement that transfer pric-
ing regulations be instituted in all countries, and so on. All that is 
needed is evidence that the problem is large, and the proposals should 
then be adopted.
In fact, we know far too little about the causes and consequences to 
take such a reductionist approach at this stage. It is likely that the out-
fl ows have varied sources, channels, and destinations across countries. 
Nigeria’s IFFs have historically come primarily from high-level cor-
ruption in the oil industry; in Mexico, tax evasion has probably been 
substantially more important. The high estimates for China show that 
trade mispricing is a particularly serious problem in that nation, whereas 
it has been a relatively minor channel in many other developing coun-
tries. As Alexander Cobham shows in chapter 11, Switzerland plays a 
central role in Zambian fl ows, while the Isle of Jersey is important in the 
case of Algeria. Some channels will be more diffi cult to shut down; some 
destinations, more recalcitrant; and some sources, more innovative in 
circumventing particular controls. The discussion above also suggests 
that the adverse consequences differ among the various components of 
illicit outfl ows.
Moreover, IFFs are almost certainly driven by different factors across 
countries and over time. As with capital fl ight generally, political events 
may be important. Population dynamics matter as well; countries with 
large diasporas may see high infl ows, as well as outfl ows given that émi-
grés provide facilitating networks for placing funds overseas.
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The existing estimates provide a useful basis for selecting case study 
countries. The dominance of China in the Global Financial Integrity cal-
culations suggests that it should be a prime target for research. As Lor-
raine Eden notes, Chinese government agencies have been cooperative 
in prior studies of trade mispricing. While this does not mean they will 
cooperate in all aspects of illicit fl ows research, it does suggest the pos-
sibility of obtaining the kind of information, for example, on the extent 
of informal moneylending, that can help identify the methods other 
than trade mispricing that are important in the transfer of illicit funds 
overseas. The recent release of a study by the Bank of China, “Investiga-
tion on the Asset Transfer Routes Used by Corrupt Offi cials and the Cor-
responding Surveillance Methods,” is further indication of the Chinese 
government’s interest in the phenomenon of IFFs.20
At the microlevel, it may be possible to learn from case studies of spe-
cifi c channels that have been hypothesized as important channels in par-
ticular countries. Ethnographic techniques involving participant obser-
vation or, at least, close and lengthy immersion may help increase our 
understanding of how, for instance, hawalas in East Africa serve to facili-
tate such fl ows, who are the customers, which are the destinations, per-
haps even, what are the sources of the money being transferred.
As the number of successful asset recovery actions increases, a data-
base could be developed on the portfolio decisions of kleptocrats. This 
may be fertile ground for forensic accountants, particularly if the case 
records allow the creation of a historical record of the movements of the 
associated assets. The recent studies by the World Bank of the portfolios 
of Abacha, Marcos, and Montesinos are indicative of the potential of this 
kind of research (Dumas 2007).
Policy shifts may also provide important research opportunities. The 
loosening of exchange controls, for example, should reduce the incentives 
for at least certain kinds of illicit outfl ows. Building models that allow for 
the separate identifi cation of these effects, fi rst, on the outfl ows them-
selves and, then, on the real economy, would be a worthwhile challenge.
IFFs have complex origins and varied consequences and present dif-
fi cult policy options. Research will require a mix of opportunism and 
imagination.
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Notes
 1. See “Final Report from the Task Force on the Development Impact of Illicit 
Financial Flows” (2008, 4), at http://www.leadinggroup.org/IMG/pdf_Final
_report_Task_Force_EN.pdf.
 2. Thanks goes to Michael Levi for this point.
 3. See FATF, Paris, http://www.fatf-gafi .org/. Though FATF has only 36 members, 
it covers a majority of countries through counterparts, associates, and affi liates 
such as the FATF-Style Regional Bodies. For example, the Egmont Group of 
Financial Investigative Units lists approximately 120 member units throughout 
the world; see http://www.egmontgroup.org/about/list-of-members.
 4. AML laws require that the funds be generated by specifi ed predicate offenses, 
that is, underlying crimes. Money laundering itself is not a predicate offense.
 5. Though most of the attention is placed on the collective uncertainty about the 
size of the outfl ows, it is also worth noting that there are no global and few 
national estimates of the total assets recovered.
 6. Norway, Minister of the Environment and International Development, 2009, 
Tax Havens and Development: Status, Analyses and Measures, Oslo: Government 
Commission on Capital Flight from Poor Countries, http://www.regjeringen
.no/upload/UD/Vedlegg/Utvikling/tax_report.pdf.
 7. For example, see Gordy and Howells (2004); Saccomanni (2008); “All’s Fair: The 
Crisis and Fair-Value Accounting,” Economist, September 18, 2008, http://www
.economist.com/node/12274096.
 8. The focus of the Eden and Leite chapters is the use of TPM to transfer excess 
fi rm profi ts. However, TPM can also be used to assist other parties who wish to 
move illicit money out of a country; in that case, side payments may be made in 
the destination country.
 9. Leite provides an example in chapter 8.
10. TPM involving only two developing nations is rare.
11. This is a conjecture; systematic estimates of the size of other illegal markets have 
not been made.
12. Rich countries can serve as transit and producing countries. The Netherlands 
was, at one time, perhaps the major producer of Ecstasy. The Netherlands and 
Spain are the entry points for much of the cocaine coming to Europe, as indi-
cated by seizures (EMCDDA 2010). Paoli, Greenfi eld, and Reuter (2009) present 
data on the world heroin market that support these statements about that drug. 
Cocaine use is concentrated in North America and Western Europe as measured 
by volume and expenditures.
13. The price at which a kilogram of cocaine is exported from Colombia is about 
US$2,000. At its fi rst sale in the United States, it might attract US$15,000–
US$20,000 (Kilmer and Reuter 2009). On the prices of coyote services at the 
border, see Massey and Durand (2003).
14. The United Nations System of National Accounts includes earnings from illegal 
markets in national income accounts (see OECD 2002). However, little effort is 
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made to create the relevant estimates, and they are not, to our knowledge, 
included in the routine offi cial GDP estimates of any nation.
15. There is a conceptual complexity mentioned in Kopp’s chapter, namely, how to 
deal with the location of the earnings of smugglers. Assume that the prostitute 
is smuggled by a Moldovan traffi cker who is paid in the Netherlands: Putting 
aside issues of legality, in which country should the value added (so to speak) be 
recorded?
16. They also offer an even broader defi nition, as follows: “money that is illegally 
earned, transferred or utilized” (Kar and Cartwright-Smith 2008, 1). They do 
not subsequently develop the concept of “illegally utilized.”
17. It is useful to repeat here the distinction between illegal and illicit provided in 
chapter 1. A typical defi nition of illicit, presented at dictionary.com, shows two 
meanings: “1. not legally permitted or authorized; unlicensed; unlawful,” and 
“2. disapproved of or not permitted for moral or ethical reasons.” See http:// 
 dictionary.reference.com/browse/illicit.
18. The World Bank lists Kuwait number 7 in terms of per capita income (adjusted 
for purchasing power parity); Saudi Arabia is number 37.
19. The issue is dealt with directly in Kar and Cartwright-Smith (2010).
20. The translated report can be found on the website of this volume, http://go 
.worldbank.org/N2HMRB4G20. 
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A GROWING CONCERN AMONG THOSE INTERESTED IN ECONOMIC development is the realization that hundreds of billions of dollars are unlawfully fl owing out of developing countries to tax havens and 
other fi nancial centers in the developed world. These fl ows of illicit money, 
much of which is generated by corruption and tax evasion, dramatically 
reduces the eff ectiveness of foreign aid and robs countries of domestic 
funds for investment. What causes these massive, illegal outfl ows from 
developing countries, what are their consequences, and how might they be 
controlled? Draining Development? provides the fi rst collection of analytic 
contributions on illicit fi nancial fl ows. It assesses what is known about the 
composition of these fl ows, the processes that generate them, the role of 
tax havens in facilitating them, and the eff ectiveness of programs aimed at 
either preventing the fl ows or locating and recouping them once they have 
left. Drawing on the expertise of prominent criminologists, lawyers, and 
economists, the volume will be a valuable resource for anyone wishing to 
better grasp this rapidly growing, but poorly understood, phenomenon.
“There are few problems of global importance that are as analytically 
muddled as money laundering.  This book is a major step in clarifying our 
thinking, and the insights it off ers will become an obligatory reference for 
anyone interested in the causes and consequences of the illicit fl ow of funds 
from developing countries and the options to curb them.”
—MOISÉS NAÍM
Senior Associate, Carnegie Endowment for International Peace 
Author of Illicit: How Smugglers, Traffi  ckers and Copycats Are Hijacking the Global Economy.  
 
“This book is a must for anyone who is interested in development economics 
and why poor countries continue to stay poor.”
—PROFESSOR GUTTORM SCHJELDERUP 
Chair of the Norwegian Government Commission on Capital Flight from Poor Countries.
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